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A STUDY OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION: VASUBANDHU, BUDDHAGHOSA,
AND THE INTERPRETATION OF "PRATITYASAMUTPADA"

University of Pennsylvania

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A Study of Dependent Origination:
Vasubandhu, Buddhaghosa, and the
Interpretation of Pratītyasamutpāda

Susan C. Stalker

A Dissertation
in
Oriental Studies

Presented to the Graduate Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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Supervisor of Dissertation



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ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION:
VASUBANDHU, BUDDHAGHOSA, AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA

SUSAN C. STALKER
DR. WILHELM HALBFASS

One of the main problems in the interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda, or dependent origination, is the temporal framework within which its twelve limbs occur. The most commonly accepted explanation within the Buddhist tradition distributes the twelve limbs successively over three separate lives. This is the theory discussed by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa, and also by Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga. Another interpretation, most fully developed in the Vibhaṅga, the second book of the Theravāda Abhidhamma Piṭaka, states that all the limbs occur in a single thought-moment. The possible reconciliation of these two views is the theme for a comparison of Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa.

The first chapter is an introduction to the doctrine, its twelve limbs, and some of the problems with the three lives theory. The second provides a summary of the historical background of the Sarvāstivādin school which produced the Kośa, and the controversial biography of its author. The third chapter is devoted to the history of the Western scholarship on dependent origination. The fourth chapter, entitled "Introduction to the Translation," explains the Sarvāstivādin technical terms and concepts which occur in the

translation of the pratītyasamutpāda section of the Kośa. The translation itself, the first from the Sanskrit, constitutes the fifth chapter, and is preceded by an Analytical Table of Contents. The final chapter compares the interpretations of Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa, and drawing extensively from the discussion of dependent origination in the Vibhaṅga and the Sammoḥavinodanī, argues that Buddhaghosa's definition of the third limb, vijñāna, allows a more successful reconciliation of the successive and simultaneous interpretations of dependent origination than does Vasubandhu's. Appendices give the mātikā to the Paccayāḥkāvibhaṅga, and the chains of dependent origination which it enumerates.

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Abbreviations

BHS - Franklin Edgerton. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary.
Volume II: Dictionary.

ERE - James Hastings, ed. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

JPTS - Journal of the Pali Text Society.

LVP - Louis de la Vallée Poussin. L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu:
Traduction et Annotations. 6 vols.

MW - Monier Monier-Williams. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary.

PTS - T.W. Rhys Davids and William Stede. The Pali Text Society's Pali-
English Dictionary.

Introduction to the Doctrine of Dependent Origination

Dependent origination (Skt.: pratītyasamutpāda, Pali: paṭiccasamup-pāda) is an enigmatic list of twelve limbs or branches (aṅga), each said to cause the next. It is, along with the Four Noble Truths, the central doctrine of Buddhism.¹ In fact, the Majjhima Nikāya equates understanding dependent origination with understanding the dharma, or the essence of the Buddha's teaching. "He who sees dependent origination sees the dhamma; he who sees the dhamma sees dependent origination."²

Interpreting the twelve limbs of dependent origination in such a way that an internally coherent philosophical explanation of their interconnections emerges has, however, long been a problem for both Buddhist exegetes and Western scholars. There are, in the Pali suttas, different versions of the so-called chain of causality, showing a development of the concept.³ One particular interpretation of the chain, in which the limbs occur in groups over three separate lives, became the most commonly accepted explanation. In this interpretation, the limbs occur successively over time, each arising as the result of the former. There is also a competing interpretation in which the twelve limbs are said to occur simultaneously. This atemporal interpretation is developed most fully in the second book of the Theravādin Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the Vibhaṅga, but it is also mentioned by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa. The Belgian scholar Louis de la Vallée Poussin has made the intriguing suggestion that the Kośa reconciles the successive and the simultaneous interpretations of dependent origination with its theory of static and serial dependent origination.⁴ The theory of static dependent origination declares each of the twelve limbs to be a "state" composed of all the aggregates

(skandha), or material form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), perception (samīñā), the tendencies (saṃskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna),⁵ and named after the one which is predominant. Serial dependent origination connects these states as causes and effects. This way, the limbs can be both simultaneous and successive.

Doubts about La Vallée Poussin's suggestion, and, indeed, about the possibility of reconciling these two views at all, emerged as the theme of my research into dependent origination. The goal of this dissertation is to examine the problem of the temporal framework within which the process outlined by the chain of dependent origination occurs. Specifically, does the Kośa successfully reconcile the simultaneous and the successive interpretations of dependent origination? If not, why not? Furthermore, what does the Pali tradition have to offer on this problem? I have translated here, for the first time from the Sanskrit, that section of the third chapter of the Kośa which discusses dependent origination. The only known Sanskrit manuscript of the Kośa was discovered in Tibet in 1936, and so was not available to La Vallée Poussin, who translated the Kośa from Chinese into French in the 1920's. In addition, I have included much material from the Pali Abhidhamma tradition. The Vibhaṅga develops the idea of simultaneous dependent origination to a greater extent than any other work of which I am aware, yet has not received any attention from Western scholars. Buddhaghosa, another major figure in Indian Buddhism, wrote the commentary on the Vibhaṅga, entitled the Sammohavinodanī. Intrigued by the possibility that his familiarity with the idea of simultaneous dependent origination might influence his explanation of successive dependent origination, I went to his most famous work, the Visuddhimagga, the seventeenth chapter of which is devoted to dependent origination. A comparison of Vasubandhu's

explanation of dependent origination as found in the Abhidharmakośa with that of Buddhaghosa's as found in the Visuddhimagga was most fruitful. Although both expound the three-lives theory of dependent origination, there is a marked difference in their definition of the limbs. Vasubandhu defines them as discrete periods of time; Buddhaghosa as causes. While Vasubandhu's approach obscures the connections between the limbs, Buddhaghosa's complicates the temporal sequence with pre-, post-, and simultaneously existing causes. The key to the problem, I propose, may be found in the third limb, consciousness (vijñāna). Buddhaghosa defines consciousness in such a way that the conflicting demands of succession, simultaneity, and causality can be resolved to a large extent. I contend, against La Vallée Poussin, that no resolution is offered by Vasubandhu, primarily because there are two distinct, unintegrated roles of consciousness in the Kośa. I would further suggest that we can here see the influence of their respective schools.⁶ Sarvāstivādin doctrine centers on the concept of the dharma as a distinct, discrete, and real entity. Much of the argumentation in the Kośa concerns the status of the various limbs of dependent origination as dharmas. Although important for Sarvāstivādin dogma, it is tangential to the question of how each limb causes the next to arise. Buddhaghosa, on the other hand, studied the Pali Abhidhamma classification of the states of consciousness and their components. These doctrinal predilections resulted in different viewpoints: Buddhaghosa approached dependent origination as a process which occurs continually in all states of consciousness, Vasubandhu approached consciousness as a particular limb in the process of dependent origination. We can only conclude that neither the successive nor the simultaneous interpretation is wholly successful. Neither are they mutually exclusive, however. The possibility of their complementarity is

found in the Pali Abhidhamma and exegetical tradition, correcting the assertion of Yamada⁷ and others that the Abhidhamma tradition failed to see the deeper implications of the doctrine of dependent origination.

A brief survey of the Table of Contents will introduce the reader to the rationale for the contents and organization of the dissertation. The remainder of this chapter presents the chain of dependent origination itself. The twelve limbs are enumerated and defined, and some of the problems with the three-lives theory pointed out. Chapter Two, "The Historical Background," discusses the origins of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Excerpting a small portion from a work of the Kośa's importance, length, and decided stance requires care. The doctrine of dependent origination is itself difficult to understand. Because the Sarvāstivādins did have a number of idiosyncratic doctrines which influenced their discussion of dependent origination in the Kośa, a brief account of the school's history, its doctrines, and its literature is necessary to provide the historical context for the translation. Furthermore, because the date of Vasubandhu is controversial, a summary of the major points in the dating dispute is included. Chapter Three, "The Interpretation of Dependent Origination by Western Scholars," reviews the literature, which, in my opinion, has contributed the most to our knowledge and understanding of the doctrine. I have made these selections primarily on the basis of the scholars' reputations and the coherence and originality of their interpretations. I paraphrase the arguments and the opinions of each scholar, and these should not be mistaken for my own opinions. However, as personal preferences do often appear in these works, and as they can influence the interpretations, where they are stated outright by the authors themselves, they are mentioned.

The following chapters present the translation and the thesis. My thesis is that the conflicting temporal interpretations of dependent origination can be reconciled to a great extent, and that Buddhaghosa has more successfully accomplished this in the Visuddhimagga than has Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa. As there are at least two translations of the Visuddhimagga available in English,⁸ another would be superfluous. The Kośa, on the other hand, is being translated from the Sanskrit into English piecemeal,⁹ and this is the first translation of the dependent origination discussion. The translation appears at this point in the dissertation for logical reasons. As stated, I contend that Vasubandhu has not reconciled the successive and the simultaneous interpretations, whereas Buddhaghosa has presented a way to do so. Vasubandhu is therefore the pūrvapakṣin, or the prima facie view in this dispute. The translation includes the verses from the Kośa in capitals, the commentary in lower case, and the subcommentary identified as such and enclosed in brackets. The translation itself is preceded by both an Introduction, Chapter Four, and a Table of Contents. Chapters Two and Four contain some overlapping material. Chapter Four, however, is intended as a glossary of technical terms occurring in the translation. Any term or concept not actually occurring in the translation, but essential to Sarvāstivādin dogma, is therefore explained in Chapter Two. Chapter Four is cross-referenced with the translation, and contains charts to aid the reader. The Table of Contents to the translation provides an outline of verses, topics discussed in each, and page numbers in the translation, useful both as an overview of the discussion and for reference. The final chapter develops the thesis. There are also two appendices. The first is the Mātikā, or Table of Contents, to the Vibhaṅga discussion of dependent origination, which is modelled on an outline of

twenty-four possible variants of the chain. The second Appendix gives the chains of dependent origination that occur in each of the eighty-nine states of consciousness enumerated in the Pali Abhidhamma.

We will now briefly present the chain of dependent origination and the definitions of each of its links as found in the Samyutta Nikāya of the Pāli Canon. The second part of the Samyutta, called the Nidānavagga, is devoted to discourses on dependent origination. It provides a succinct and orthodox presentation of the doctrine which is useful as an introduction. The later chapters and the translation itself will make a closer examination.

The Nidānavagga opens with the teaching (desanā) of dependent origination:

The Blessed One said this: What, O monks, is dependent origination? Dependent on ignorance, monks, are the karmically-caused tendencies, dependent on the karmically-caused tendencies is consciousness, dependent on consciousness is name and form, dependent on name and form are the six sense spheres, dependent on the six sense spheres is contact, dependent on contact is feeling, dependent on feeling is desire, dependent on desire is grasping, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth arise old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair. Thus there is the arising of this whole mass of misery. This, monks, is called arising.

However, from the complete destruction and ceasing of ignorance, there is the ceasing of the karmically-caused tendencies, from the ceasing of the karmically-caused tendencies, there is the ceasing of consciousness, from the ceasing of consciousness, there is the ceasing of name and form, from the ceasing of name and form, there is the ceasing of the six sense spheres, from the ceasing of the six sense spheres, there is the ceasing of contact, from the ceasing of contact, there is the ceasing of feeling, from the ceasing of feeling, there is the ceasing of desire, from the ceasing of desire, there is the ceasing of grasping, from the ceasing of grasping, there is the ceasing of becoming, from the ceasing of becoming, there is the ceasing of birth, from the ceasing of birth, there is the ceasing of old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair. Thus there is the ceasing of this whole mass of misery.¹⁰

This, then, is dependent origination. The sequence from ignorance to old age and death is called the anuloma, or regular order, that from old age and

death to ignorance, the pratiloma, or reverse order.¹¹ Each of the twelve constituents of the chain is called a nidāna, a link or a cause, or an aṅga, a member or a limb. It is sometimes summarized or prefaced by a general formula of causality, of which it is said to be the specifics, or the applied formula. The general formula runs as follows: This being, that is; from the arising of this, that arises. This not being, that is not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases.¹²

The Nidānavagga then proceeds with an analysis (viḍḍhaṅga) of each link,¹³ in the pratiloma sequence. I paraphrase here:

Old age (jarā)¹⁴ is literally and graphically explained as the decay of the body, the graying of the hair, the wrinkling of the skin, and the failing of the senses. Death (maraṇa) is the "falling" from this life, the break up and disappearance of the five aggregates composing the personality. Old age and death are together the twelfth link. Sorrow (śoka, soka), lamentation (parideva), misery (duḥkha, dukkha), grief (daurmanasya, domanassa), and despair (upāyāsa) are usually, but not always, added. Here they were included in the teaching, but not the analysis. They are not a separate limb.

Birth (jāti), then, is the conception and the reappearance of the five aggregates, and the reacquisition of the sense organs.¹⁵

Becoming (bhava) is defined in the Nidānavagga simply as becoming or existing in one of the three worlds, that of the sensual realm (kāmadhātu), that of the material realm (rūpadhātu) or that of the non-material realm (arūpadhātu).¹⁶ In the Abhidharma and scholastic works, bhava is divided into two types. Upapattibhava, or "originating existence," is existence in one of the three realms. Karmabhava, or karma existence, is those acts which produce rebirth. Originating existence is therefore a particular time within the continuous karma existence, and also its result.

Grasping (upādāna) is fourfold. There is grasping after sensual desires (kāmopādāna, kāmapādāna), grasping after false views and opinions (dr̥ṣṭy-upādāna, dit̥ṭhupādāna), grasping after rules and rituals as a way to release (śīlavr̥atopādāna, sīlabbatupādāna), and grasping after a false belief in the self (ātmavādupādāna, attavādupādāna).¹⁷

There are six types of desire or craving (tr̥ṣṇā, taṇhā), corresponding to the six objects of the sense organs. Thus, there is desire for visible objects, for sounds, for smells, for tastes, for tangibles, and for ideas.¹⁸ Desire is, in other texts, said to be threefold -- desire for sensual pleasures (kāmatr̥ṣṇā, kāma-taṇhā), desire for existence (bhavatr̥ṣṇā, bhavataṇhā), and desire for non-existence (vibhavatr̥ṣṇā, vibhavataṇhā).

There are also six types of feeling (vedanā), arising from the six types of contact, which, once again, correspond to the six sense spheres. So, there is feeling arising from eye contact, from ear contact, from nose contact, from tongue contact, from body contact, and from mind contact. According to other texts, it can also be threefold--pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent. In the Kośa, it is also divided into two types -- mental and bodily.

Contact¹⁹ (sparśa, phassa), too, is of six kinds: eye contact, ear contact, nose contact, tongue contact, body contact, and mind contact.

The six sense spheres (saḍāyatana, saḷāyatana) are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. Sphere (āyatana) means both the internal sense organ and its respective external object.

Name (nāma) is feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā, saññā), will (cetanā), contact (sparśa, phassa), and attention (manaskāra, manasikāra). Form is the four great elements, earth, fire, water, and wind, and all that is derived from them. Together they are called name and form (nāmarūpa); they

are the psycho-physical individual. The definition of name varies. It is more commonly defined as the non-material aggregates, that is, feeling, perception, and the karmically-caused tendencies, omitting only consciousness, which occurs independently as the third link.

Consciousness (vijñāna, viññāṇa) is the six groups of consciousness: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness. In the Dīgha Nikāya, consciousness is that which descends into the mother's womb and produces name and form. So, it is rebirth consciousness.²⁰ Consciousness and name and form are the only two links that are described in the Nikāyas as having a reciprocal relationship. Consciousness depends upon name and form, and name and form develop only when consciousness is present.²¹

The karmically-caused tendencies (samskāra, sankhāra) are deeds of body, speech, and mind. Samskāra literally means that which forms or is formed, or is put together.²² It refers to the inclinations we possess as the result of past actions and thoughts.

Ignorance (avidyā, avijjā) is not knowing the Four Noble Truths, which are the Truths of Suffering, its Arising, its Cessation, and the Path to its Cessation. In other texts, the list of ignorances is increased to include, for example, ignorance about the past and the future, or the non-existence of a soul. However, ignorance is never a first cause nor a cosmic condition. It, too, has its causes, and certainly can be ended.

Dependent origination, then, is presented in the Nikāyas as a reversible, in this case, twelve-member chain of successive causes and effects. There are logical problems, however, with the assumption that only one limb exists at a time. Ignorance must exist continually, for it underlies the whole process.

Consciousness, name and form, and the six sense spheres must exist and function simultaneously. The aggregates appear in the list twice.²³ Birth is not mentioned until the end, long after a human personality has appeared in the chain. Furthermore, the distinction between becoming and birth is not clear. There also seem to be two different causes given for the process, ignorance and desire, and a repetition of the process using different terms.

The three-lives theory, which distributed the twelve links over three births in an everrecurring process, became the standard solution to these problems. It is the theory expounded by Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga, and also accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas in the Abhidharmakośa. According to it, the first two limbs, ignorance and the karmically-caused tendencies, occurred in a past life. The third limb, consciousness, refers to the conception of the present life, which is further described by the limbs of name and form, the sense spheres, contact, feeling, desire, grasping, and becoming. Becoming plays the same role in this life that the tendencies did in the past life, producing karma which necessitates rebirth. The last two limbs, birth and old age and death, refer to becoming's results in a future life. This explanation requires redefinition of two limbs--consciousness and becoming. Consciousness is not simply the six types of sense perception; it is the embryo at conception. Whether or not these two definitions are reconcilable will be explored in Chapter Six. Becoming is no longer just existence in one of the three realms; it is those acts performed during existence which require moral retribution in a future existence. The three-lives theory has not solved the temporal problems of the chain by assigning the limbs to different lives. The definitions of the two crucial limbs beginning and ending the present life must be altered, and the description of

the process is incomplete for all three lives. In any case, some of the limbs must still be simultaneous.

La Vallée Poussin suggested that the Kośa could help in the search for solutions to these problems. So, it is there that we shall look first, and then to the Pali Abhidhamma tradition. We shall conclude with the comparison of the Kośa and the Visuddhimagga.

Before beginning, let us heed the Buddha's warning to his disciple Ānanda, who remarked that dependent origination seemed easy to understand:

Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was staying among the Kurus, where there was a Kuru town named Kāmmassadhama. Then the venerable Ānanda approached the Blessed One, and having approached and greeted the Blessed One, he sat down to one side. So seated, the venerable Ānanda said this to the Blessed One,

"Wonderful it is, O Venerable Sir, marvelous it is, O Venerable Sir! Even though this dependent origination is profound and looks profound, nonetheless to me, it is just as clear as it can be."

"O Ānanda, don't say that! O Ānanda, don't say that! This dependent origination is profound, Ānanda, and it looks profound, too. It is because of not understanding this teaching, because of not penetrating it, that mankind is like an ensnarled ball of string, like an entangled skein, or like grass or reeds and cannot go beyond calamity, misfortune, ruin, and the round of rebirth."²⁴

NOTES

¹ The connection between these two central teachings of the Buddha is problematic. E. Lamotte has most recently explored this question in his article, "Conditioned Co-production and Supreme Enlightenment," in Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula (London: Gordon Fraser; Sri Lanka: Vimamsa, 1980), pp. 118-32.

² Majjhima Nikāya, vol. 1, ed. V. Trenckner (London: Henry Frowde, 1888), pp. 190-1. Yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati, so dhammam passati, yo dhammam passati, so paṭiccasamuppādam passati. Dhamma is the Pali for dharma.

³ See H. Nakamura, "The Theory of 'Dependent Origination' in its Incipient Stage," in Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula, pp. 165-72.

⁴ Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes. (Gand: Librairie Scientifique E. Van Goethem; London: Luzac and Co., 1913), pp. 40-3.

⁵ On the aggregates (skandha), see pp. 106-10.

⁶ Vasubandhu presents the Sarvāstivādin view, even though he often argues against it.

⁷ See I. Yamada, "Premises and Implications of Interdependence," in Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula, pp. 267-93.

⁸ Pe Maung Tin, trans. The Path of Purity. Pali Text Society translation series, volumes 11, 17, 21. (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1923-31). Ñāṇamoli, trans. the Path of Purification. 2nd. ed. (Colombo: A. Semage, 1964.)

⁹ See the dissertations of Thomas Dowling (Columbia, 1976), Bruce Hall (Harvard, 1983), and Paul J. Griffiths (University of Wisconsin, 1983).

¹⁰ Samyutta Nikāya, Part II, ed. M. Léon Feer (London: Henry Frowde, 1888), pp. 1-2.

¹¹ See I. Yamada, "Premises and Implications of Interdependence," in Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula, pp. 267-93, for a discussion of the significance of the anuloma and pratiloma sequences.

12 Imasmim sati, idam hoti; imass' uppādā, idam upapajjati; imasmim asati, idam na hoti; imassa nirodhā, idam nirujjhatīti. Majjhima II. 32; Samyutta V. 388; Aṅguttara V. 184.

13 The intent of this skeletal description of each link is merely to give a brief, but accurate idea of the twelve nidānas as defined in a typical Theravāda text. Also see D. Williams, "The Translation and Interpretation of the Twelve Terms in the Paṭiccasamuppāda," in Numen XXI (1974): 35-63, for a more detailed consideration. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, in Théorie des douze causes, pp. 6-33, offers one of the best and most complete, though brief, discussions of the various explanations of each link.

14 The Sanskrit word, and then the Pali, when it differs, are given in the brackets.

15 Williams, p. 62, emphasizes the point that jāti covers the period of time "from conception until parturition" and is thus "something within the concept of bhava."

16 On the three realms, see pp. 97-101.

17 The Śālistamba Sūtra defines upādāna as an excessive or intensive craving, trṣṇāvaipulya. See Théorie des douze causes, p. 80, or the Ārya Śālistamba Sūtra, ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri ([Madras]: Adyar Library, 1950), p. 10.

18 "Idea" here translates dharma, the objects of the mind.

19 Williams, pp. 50-1, prefers to translate phassa as "reaction," not "contact," objecting to the "almost exclusively physical aspect" of the latter word. I have kept the traditional translation of "contact," as I believe the definition of it as of six types clearly shows that it is not exclusively physical. His second objection, however, is more valid. He states that since physical contact is something which cannot be stopped in this life, and yet the reaction to particular objects or experiences can be controlled, phassa must properly mean the reaction to contact, not simply the contact itself. He cites a passage in which he claims this is the only acceptable interpretation of phassa. While the point he makes is valid, to my mind, contact is the neutral event and the feeling born from it is the controllable reaction. See the discussion of the Vibhaṅga in chapter 6 where contact always leads to feeling, but feeling can lead to craving, decision, or other results.

20 Williams, pp. 46-7, shows that there is an intimate connection between these two functions of consciousness.

21 Dīgha Nikāya, Part II, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter (London: Henry Frowde, 1903), p. 63.

22 M. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (MW) (1899; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 1120. Henry Clarke Warren, Buddhism in Translations (1896; rpt. New York: Atheneum, 1976), pp. 179-82, replaces senkhāra with karma, and others have copied him. Although the terms are close in meaning, the word karma does not appear among the twelve links.

23 See p. 55. Senart interprets upādāna to mean the five aggregates. He then finds them repeated in links two, three, and seven, that is, in the karmically-caused tendencies, consciousness, and feeling. Rūpa is included in name and form and perception (samjñā) as the six sense spheres and contact.

24 Dīgha Nikāya, ii, 55.

The Historical Background

The history and genealogy of the many schools of Buddhism, which have existed since its earliest days, is a complex problem. Twenty to thirty distinct schools of the Hīnayāna¹ are attested by inscriptional or literary remains.² In addition, we possess numerous accounts of the origins and relations of these schools, but they differ greatly and they date from at least five hundred years after the events they recount.³ It is therefore hazardous to make any definitive statements about the councils recorded by the Buddhist traditions, much less their connection with the origin of the various schools. However, on the basis of a careful study of the materials, Bareau has determined with some certainty that the Sarvāstivādins, to whose tradition the Abhidharmakośa belongs, separated from the Sthaviras⁴ during the reign of Aśoka, in 244 or 243 B.C.⁵ Bareau stresses that this second council of Pāṭaliputra and the resulting emergence of the Sarvāstivādins as a separate school was an affair confined to the Sthaviras of Pāṭaliputra. The dispute which occasioned both the council and the schism concerned the very assertion which gave the Sarvāstivādins their name. They maintained the real existence of the past, the present, and the future, a position rejected by one Maudgalyāyana or Moggaliputta as unorthodox. Following the council, the Sarvāstivādins were defrocked by Aśoka. While some hid in Magadha, others fled to Kashmir.⁶

It was Kashmir that became their stronghold, although Sarvāstivādin monks were found throughout India.⁷ In Kashmir, the school

evolved and developed its own canon⁸ during the first century A.D.⁹ The Kashmiri Sarvāstivādin tradition also produced a number of "masters" of the doctrine, whose views, expressed in extracanonical works, did not always agree. Prominent among the dissenting opinions were those of the Sautrāntikas. This school split off from the Sarvāstivādins in the fourth century after the Nirvāṇa,¹⁰ disagreeing with the Sarvāstivādins over the status and the classifications of many of the dharmas.¹¹ According to Vaibhāṣika tradition, a council of the Sarvāstivādin school was convened under King Kaniṣka (c. A.D. 125), perhaps to settle these disputes by deciding upon the orthodox views. This council may also have compiled the Mahāvibhāṣā or Great Commentary to the Jñānaprasthāna,¹² the Sarvāstivādins' main text. Those who accepted these opinions became known as the Vaibhāṣikas. The Vaibhāṣikas are thus the inheritors of the orthodox Kashmiri Sarvāstivādin opinions and the names are interchangeable. There was also a Gandhari branch of the Sarvāstivādin school, which did not accept the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra.

In India the school had a very long history, from Aśoka's times (240 B.C.) to the visit of the Chinese pilgrim I-ching (A.D. 671-95).¹³ The school was also popular outside of India, in Central Asia, China, Japan, Sumatra, Java, and Bali.¹⁴

A Mūlasarvāstivādin school is also known. It is somewhat of a mystery, as it is first mentioned by I-ching at the end of the seventh century A.D. Hsüan-tsang, however, did not mention it only some fifty years earlier.¹⁵ Furthermore, I-ching, who declares the Mūla-

sarvāstivādins to be one of the four basic Buddhist schools, does not seem to clearly distinguish them from the Sarvāstivādins. They were, however, without question, a distinct school, as we have their Vinayapitaka.¹⁶ and it differs from that of the Sarvāstivādins. Their doctrines, at least as presented by Vinītadeva, are not substantially different from those of the Sarvāstivādins.¹⁷ In any case, it seems that since the fourth century A.D. there were two sects, probably divisions of the original Sarvāstivādin school, both using that name and having similar doctrines, but possessing at least partially their own canons.¹⁸

The school name, Sarvāstivādin,¹⁹ means one who holds the view that everything exists, from sarvam asti, or "everything is." The doctrine taught the reality of the momentary dhammas, or "elements of existence,"²⁰ in all three times, the past, the present, and the future. It is the Sarvāstivādins' most controversial doctrine.²¹

The question, "Do all things exist?," occurs in several discourses of the Samyutta Nikāya.²² There, however, the theory of sabbam atthi represents the Eternalist view of the world as opposed to the Annihilationist view. These are the two extreme views rejected by the Buddha in favor of the teaching of the Middle Way, or pratītyasamutpāda. It is not used in the technical sense of a doctrine about reality.

The question also occurs in the Kathāvatthu. The "controverted point" in I.6 is "That everything exists."²³ The commentary identifies the Sabbatthivādins as those holding this opinion. They base

their belief on a saying of the Buddha found in the Majjhima Nikāya 3.16f. and in the Samyutta Nikāya 3.47²⁴ regarding the aggregates (skandha).²⁵ They quote, "Whatsoever material quality, O monks, whether past, future or present . . . is called the material aggregate," and so on for the other aggregates.²⁶ The commentary explains that the Sabbatthivādins interpret this to mean that " . . . all phenomena, past, present, future,' 'persist in that state, and that therefore all go on existing.'"²⁷ The Theravādins counter with hypothetical questions and problems intended to show that this doctrine destroys any difference between past, present, and future. They also point to numerous suttas which clearly distinguish the three times.²⁸ That is the crux of their argument--to say that past, present, and future all exist is to negate the concept of time.

" . . . You affirm that the past exists, the future exists, the present exists. But is not the past (something that has) ceased--that is, departed, changed, gone away, gone utterly away? How then can you say 'the past exists'? Again, is not the future (something that is) not yet born, not yet come to be, not yet come to pass, has not happened, not befallen, is not manifested? How then can you say 'the future exists'?"²⁹

Thus the Theravādins attack the Sarvāstivādin claim that all three times exist on the grounds that the past, the present, and the future would then be indistinguishable. All three would have an equal status, an identical nature, and a simultaneous existence. Furthermore, they say, if the past and the future exist and retain their intrinsic nature as past and future, then they must always

exist. This is equivalent to the heresy of Eternalism and contradicts the very concept of time, as well as the suttas.

The Sarvāstivādins, however, deny that past, present, and future are identical and simultaneous. They insist that saying the past, present, and future all exist is justified by the Suttas, but that saying that the past exists does not mean that the existent is the past, nor does saying that the future exists mean that the existent is the future.³⁰

The question of the existence of the past and the future arises also in chapter five of the Kośa, as the result of a discussion about the defilements (kleśa)³¹ binding a person to past and future objects. (5.24) In a lengthy argument between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas, Vasubandhu expounds the Sarvāstivādin defenses for their position and the four interpretations of it propounded by the Sarvāstivādins themselves. It is evident from this discussion that the Sarvāstivādins explain the doctrine of sarvam aṣṭi in such a way as to attempt to avoid the objections raised by the Theravādins in the Kathāvatthu and the Sautrāntikas in the Kośa. It also becomes clear that the intent of the doctrine was primarily to address the problems of perception, consciousness, and karmic continuity.

In the discussion about the defilements binding a person to past and future objects, the Sautrāntikas object that if past and future defilements and objects really exist, then the conditioned (samskṛta) dharmas³² always exist, that is, they are eternal. On the other hand, if the past and future defilements and objects don't

exist, then it is not possible for a person to be bound to those objects by the defilements. (5.24) The Vaibhāṣikas respond that although past and future dharmas exist, the conditioned dharmas are nonetheless not eternal because they have the characteristics of that which is conditioned, and hence, transitory.³³ They do, however, maintain that dharmas exist in all three times and propose four defenses for their position (5.25) First, they cite the words of the Buddha when he says that if past and future material forms (rūpa) did not exist, the monk could not be indifferent to them. Second, they say that consciousness arises dependent on a sense organ and a sense object, which necessitates that the mental consciousness having past and future dharmas as its objects has extant objects. Third, since consciousness arises dependent on the object, if the past and future did not exist, there would be consciousness of them without an object. Last, if the past did not exist, acts could not produce their results in the future.

Anyone maintaining that the past and future exist is a Sarvāstivādin (5.25), but there are four different opinions among them as to the nature of a dharma's existence in all three times. Bhadanta Dharmatrāta maintained bhāvānyathātva, or difference in state. He explained that the manner of the existence of a dharma changed in time, but not its substance (dravya). The past, present, and future are distinguished by a change in the status of the existence of a dharma. As a gold vase which breaks has a new form, but not a new color, so a future dharma becomes present when it casts off its future nature, but its essence remains the same. Bhadanta Ghoṣaka

proposed lakṣaṇānyathātva, or difference in character. A past dharma has a past character, but it isn't altogether without present and future characters, as a present dharma has present character and yet still has some past and future character, and a future dharma has future character, but doesn't lack past and present characters. Vasumitra defended the explanation of avasthānyathātva, that the three times are distinguished by a difference of condition. This is the explanation preferred by Vasubandhu and the Vibhāṣā.³⁴ According to this interpretation, dharmas are defined as past, present, or future according to their activity or operation. A past dharma has already produced its action, a present dharma is producing it, and a future dharma has yet to produce it. There is no change in substance. Bhadanta Buddhadeva offered the last interpretation, anyonyathātva, the establishment of a dharma's nature by its relation to other dharmas. A dharma, existing in all three times, is called past, present, or future in relation to what precedes and succeeds.

The Sautrāntikas, like the Theravādins in the Kathāvatthu, object that if the past and the future exist, then they are actually the present. They refute the Sarvāstivādin defenses one by one (5.26-27), showing that they do not convince as to the real existence of the past and the future. They reject the establishment of past, present, and future on the basis of a dharma's activity, replying that if a dharma always exists, it must also always be active. The argument ends with the Sautrāntikas rejecting altogether the doctrine of sarvāstivāda in the sense that the Sarvāstivādins have explained it.

If it is to be accepted at all, they say, then "everything" (sarva) should be understood as it is defined in the sūtras, that is, as meaning the twelve spheres (āyatana).³⁵ Or, if "everything" means the three times, then the past means that which has already existed, and the future means that which will exist, given its causes. In conclusion, the Vaibhāṣikas admit that not everything has been nor can be explained since the nature of dharmas is profound. They still maintain, nonetheless, that the past and the future exist.³⁶

The point of maintaining that "all exists" becomes clear from this discussion. Cognition, in the Sarvāstivādin system, is based on existing objects; perception and consciousness are causal processes. When there is an object and a sense organ, consciousness arises, but not otherwise. The object and the organ must both exist, and they must have some relationship. Therefore, when there is consciousness of a past or a future object, that object must exist in some sense, or the consciousness could not exist. Furthermore, they must have a relationship even if they are widely separated in time. The past object can still cause present consciousness, so it has causal efficacy and therefore must exist. It is this same problem of the causal efficacy of the past which is addressed in the fourth defense of the doctrine offered in 5.25a-b, that past acts could not produce their karmic effects in the future if they did not continue to exist in some sense.

Given the Sarvāstivādin concept of causality and consciousness, there is a clear need for the assertion that "all exists." The difficulties with it arise from the problem of defining in what sense

the past and the future exist. The Theravādins in the Kathāvatthu and the Sautrāntikas in the Kośa interpret the existence of the past and of the future as obliterating any distinction between them and the present. Indeed, this conclusion is quite understandable. The Sarvāstivādins themselves gave different explanations of the meaning of "all exists." That proposed by Vasumitra, the change in condition or state, which is the explanation preferred by the Vibhāṣā, most skillfully avoids this problem. According to it, the present or future status of a dharma is determined by its activity. Time is not an inherent quality of a dharma; rather, time itself is defined by a dharma's operation.

As for the other doctrinal points which distinguish the Sarvāstivādins, we will mention only those which are relevant to our translation.³⁷ Many of these points concern the nature of enlightenment and the path to it.³⁸ For them, enlightenment is a gradual process which blurs the distinctions between common people and arhats. Thus they maintain that an average man can destroy two of the proclivities (rāga and pratigha) even in the realm of sensual desires (kāmadhātu) and that an arhat can fall.³⁹ They also accepted the existence of non-indication (avijñapti),⁴⁰ or bodily and vocal acts which do not communicate anything to another person. The Sautrāntikas, and along with them, Vasubandhu, deny its existence. Another important difference is the Sarvāstivādin belief in an antarābhava, or intermediate existence between death and birth in the Kāma and Rūpadhātus.⁴¹ In the dispute about the nature of the defilements, the Sarvāstivādins say that the proclivities (anuśaya)

are all corruptions (pariyavasthāna) and that they are all connected with thought. As for dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), the Sarvāstivādins classified it as samskrta, or conditioned, that is, subject to arising and dissolution. There were schools which listed it as asamskrta, unconditioned.

There is also considerable disagreement about causality among the schools. Causality is the core of dependent origination. While the particular relation between each pair of links in the twelvefold formula does not enter into the discussion in the Abhidharmakośa, the Theravādin Abhidhamma analyzed it thoroughly from this standpoint.⁴² They recognized twenty-four pratyayas or conditions, ways in which dhammas could be related to each other, and determined which of these twenty-four applied to each pair of links. The Vaibhāṣikas, on the other hand, recognized six hetus or causes and four pratyayas or conditions.⁴³ (2.49, 3.61) A dharma arises when there is the simultaneous presence of the necessary causes and conditions. The first of the six causes is the kāraṇaheṭu, or general cause. (2.50a) All dhammas are the general cause of all other dhammas,⁴⁴ except themselves, in so far as they present no obstacle to the arising of those other dhammas. Sahabhūheṭu, or co-existent mutual causes, are those dhammas which arise together and condition each other.⁴⁵ (2.50c-51) The sabhāgahetu, or similar cause, is the cause which produces a like or homogeneous effect. For example, good dhammas cause good dhammas. (2.52-53b) The samprayuktaheṭu, or associated cause, applies only to the mind (citta) and mental concomitants (caitta), which never occur independently.⁴⁶

(2.53c-d) The sarvatraḡaḡetu, or universal cause, refers only to past and present defiled dharmas of a particular stage (bhūmi) which cause other defiled dharmas. (2.54a-b) Finally, there is the vipākaḡetu, the cause of moral retribution. (2.54c-d) All bad dharmas, and all good, but impure, dharmas, produce a karmic result.⁴⁷ There is no sūtra which teaches these six causes just in this manner, so the Vaibhāṣikas defend themselves by claiming that the sūtra which did teach them: has been lost.⁴⁸

As for the four pratyayas, the first is the hetupratyaya, the condition which is the generating cause. It is the same as the five hetus with the exception of the kāraṇaḡetu. (2.61a) The samanantarapratyaya is the immediately-preceding cause. It refers to all thoughts and mental concomitants except the last of an arhat, which, by ceasing, allow the arising of the next dharma. (2.62a-b) The ālambanapratyaya is the condition which is the object of consciousness. (2.62c) All dharmas are ālambanapratyaya. Last, there is the adhipatipratyaya, or predominant condition. (2.62d) It is the same as the kāraṇaḡetu.

These causes and conditions produce five kinds of results. The niṣyandaphala is an effect which is similar to its cause (2.57c), the vipākaphala is karmic retribution (2.56a), the viśaṃyogaphala is cessation due to wisdom or insight⁴⁹ (2.57d), the puruṣakārāphala is a dharma which arises because of the activity of another dharma (2.56,58), and the adhipatiphala is the result of predominance. All conditioned dharmas are the adhipatiphala of other conditioned dharmas, except those which succeed them. (2.56,58c-d)

The Sarvāstivādin had a complete canon of their own, in Sanskrit, compiled probably during the first century A.D., which we know in its entirety through the Chinese and Tibetan translations.⁵⁰ The Vinaya and Sūtra Piṭakas show many correspondences with the Pāli.⁵¹ In the Sarvāstivādin canon, however, there are four Āgamas, corresponding to four of the Pāli Nikāyas. The status of a fifth Āgama, the Kṣudrakāgama, corresponding to the Pāli Khuddaka Nikāya, is uncertain.⁵² The Sarvāstivādin canon did, however, contain Sanskrit versions of the Udāna, the Dhammapada, the Theragāthā, the Vimānavatthu, the Buddhavaṃsa, and the Jātakas.⁵³ Fragments of the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya have been found in Central Asia and published by various scholars.⁵⁴ A "large portion" of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya was discovered at Gilgit in Kashmir.⁵⁵

It is the Abhidharma literature that interests us most, though, and it is the Adhidharma literature that shows the greatest differences.⁵⁶ The Adhidharma works were evidently composed after the Sarvāstivādin were a distinct school. Of the seven Adhidharma books of the Sarvāstivādin, each has an author, although, according to Sarvāstivādin tradition, the Abhidharma was delivered piecemeal by the Buddha and collected by his disciples.⁵⁷ Furthermore, one of the Sarvāstivādin works, the Jñānaprasthāna, is chief, and the other six are its "limbs" or "supplements" (pāda).⁵⁸ The seven books and their authors are: the Jñānaprasthāna, also known as the Aṣṭagrantha, by Kātyāyaniputra, the Prakaraṇapāda of Vasumitra,⁵⁹ the Vijñānakāya of Devaśarmā, the Dharmaskandha of Śāriputra, the Prajñaptiśāstra of Maudgalyāyana, the Dhātukēya of Pūrṇa and the

Saṅgītiparyāyapādaśāstra of Mahakaṣṭhila.⁶⁰ Of these, a Sanskrit fragment of the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra was identified by Demiéville; fragments of the Saṅgītiparyāyapādaśāstra were found at Bāmiyān. Fragments of the Dharmaskandha in Sanskrit have also been found.⁶¹

The Sarvāstivādins also had numerous important non-canonical Abhidharma works.⁶² The Mahāvibhāṣā, mentioned earlier, is a commentary on the Jñānaprasthāna, according to legend composed at the Council in Kashmir called by Kaniṣka in the second century A.D. Also of importance are two works of Saṅghabhadra, a contemporary of Vasubandhu, and his opponent. He composed the Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā to explain the Vaibhāṣika doctrines and the Abhidharmanyāyānusāra to refute Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika tendencies.⁶³ As we will learn from the biography of Vasubandhu, Saṅghabhadra challenged him to a debate, but he declined.

Without question, the Abhidharmakośakārikā and bhāṣya by Vasubandhu is the most important of the non-canonical Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma works. Vasubandhu opens the Kośa with a definition of abhidharma. He explains in the second verse that abhidharma is pure wisdom, and that which accompanies it.⁶⁴ Wisdom is then defined as the proper understanding and classifying of the dharmas, and pure wisdom as that which is not connected with any defiling influx. Its accompaniments are the five pure aggregates (skandha) which exist along with pure wisdom. In common usage, however, the word abhidharma has a more general meaning, referring to all wisdom and all treatises that lead to the attainment of pure wisdom. (1.2b) A dharma is that which supports its own character (svalak-

ṣaṇa). The prefix abhi, according to Vasubandhu, means either face-to-face (abhimukha) with the supreme dharma, that is, Nirvāṇa, or face-to-face with the characteristics, both individual and shared, of dharmas.⁶⁵ He explains that he has therefore entitled his work the Abhidharmakośa, or Treasury of Abhidharma, because it contains the "essential contents"⁶⁶ of the Abhidharmaśāstra, or because it relies on the Abhidharma works as its sources. (1.2c-d) As for the reason for teaching the Abhidharma, Vasubandhu says there is no other way than the proper understanding of the dharmas to stop the defilements (kleśa)⁶⁷ which keep us in the cycle of existence and misery. (1.3)

The Abhidharmakośa consists of approximately six hundred verses (kārikā), ślokas, expounding the views of the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika school, supplemented by a prose commentary (bhāṣya) also by Vasubandhu, in which the divergent theories and opinions of other Buddhist schools are explained and debated. Although Vasubandhu presents the Sarvāstivādin doctrine in the verses, he often supports the Sautrāntika viewpoint in the commentary, for which he earned the criticism of Saṅghabhadra and others. We also have Yasomitra's Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā, an important prose subcommentary, and, incidentally, the only commentary preserved in Sanskrit.⁶⁸ The date of the Kośa is disputed, along with the much-disputed date of Vasubandhu, which will be discussed shortly. The original Sanskrit text itself was only discovered in 1936 by Mahāpaṇḍita Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in the Tibetan monastery of Ngor.⁶⁹ An edition based on that manuscript was first edited by P. Pradhan and

published by the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute in Patna in 1967. A second edition with an introduction by Dr. Aruna Halder appeared in 1975.

Before this remarkable discovery, our sources about the Kośa consisted of the Vyākhyā just mentioned and the Chinese and Tibetan translations. The Kośa was translated into Chinese twice, first by Paramārtha in A.D. 563-7, and then again by Hsüan-Tsang in A.D. 651-4. There is also a translation of it in the Tibetan Tanjur, by Jinamitra and Śrīkūṭarakṣita (c. A.D. 816-38).⁷⁰ There were commentaries by Guṇamati and Vasumitra, now lost, but the Tanjur preserves at least five other commentaries.⁷¹ In China, a minimum of seven commentaries was composed on it, and it spawned a school devoted to its study, the Kośa school, or Chü-shê Tsung. This school was also taken to Japan by two Japanese priests in A.D. 658, although it was short-lived there.⁷²

Vasubandhu and his Abhidharmakośa may have met with disapproval when first made public, but it became an extremely popular and influential text, as the above facts demonstrate. All students at the Indian Buddhist universities were required to study it.⁷³ Winternitz notes, "In the seventh century the Abhidharmakośa was so widely read in India that, in a description of a hermitage of Buddhist monks, Bāṇa says that the parrots explained the Kośa to one another."⁷⁴

The Buddhist schools agreed on many fundamental doctrines so that its Vaibhāṣika stance did not detract from its usefulness as a textbook for all schools. A glance at the nine chapters of the Kośa

confirms its comprehensiveness. They are, in order: Dhātunirdeśa, Indriyanirdeśa, Lokanirdeśa, Karmanirdeśa, Anuśayanirdeśa, Āryapudgalanirdeśa, Jñānanirdeśa, Samāpattinirdeśa, and Pudgalanirdeśa. The first chapter discusses the aggregates (skandha), spheres (āyatana), and components (dhātu),⁷⁵ or the constituents of existence, the second the twenty-two faculties,⁷⁶ the third the cosmos, the fourth action (karma) and its results, the fifth the defilements,⁷⁷ the sixth the "saints," the seventh knowledge, and the eighth meditation. The ninth chapter discusses the heresy of the Pudgalavādins, who maintained the continued existence of a "person" that could neither be identified with nor differentiated from the aggregates. The ninth chapter alone is in prose and is sometimes considered an appendix rather than a full-fledged chapter.⁷⁸ Some question its authenticity. Our translation comes from the third chapter on cosmology.⁷⁹

Not much can be said about Vasubandhu's life or date without causing controversy. Frauwallner calls his date one of "the most discussed questions of the history of Indian literature and philosophy."⁸⁰ It is neither necessary nor possible to review here all that has been written on the subject.⁸¹ Rather, we will present only the standard biography and mention the problems with it and the suggested solution. We will then also summarize the arguments and conclusions of the main antagonists in the dispute about his date.

The primary source for information about Vasubandhu's life is the biography of him written by Paramārtha (A.D. 499-569), and

translated by J. Takakusu.⁸² The following biographical sketch emerges:

Vasubandhu was the middle of the three sons of a Brahmin family of Peshawar. He became a monk of the Sarvāstivādin school, taught by Buddhamitra, but later found many of the Sautrāntika doctrines more appealing. In order to study them, he went inognito to Kashmir and became the pupil of Saṅghabhadra. He returned to Gandhara some years later, after his identity had been guessed. Arriving there to find that his teacher Buddhamitra had been defeated in debate by a Sāṅkhyan named Vindhyavāsin, he composed the Paramārthasaptatikā in response. This brought him fame and the patronage of King Vikramāditya of Ayodhyā, who made him the tutor of crown prince Bālāditya. Next he wrote the Ābhidharmakośakārikā, which he sent to the Kashmiri king, who, in turn, requested that he also write an explanation of it. In his later life, he defended himself against a challenge by the grammarian Vasurāta, but declined one by Saṅghabhadra because of his age. He was then supposedly converted to Mahāyāna by his brother Asaṅga and wrote a reported five hundred works in its favor. He died at the age of eighty in Ayodhyā.

The fact that he converted and wrote prolifically after refusing to debate Saṅghabhadra because of age seems improbable to many scholars. Kimura apparently first proposed the hypothesis of two Vasubandhus,⁸³ an hypothesis championed most recently and forcefully by Frauwallner for solving the problem of his date.⁸⁴

A good starting point for the discussion of Vasubandhu's date is Noël Péri's article, "A Propos de la date de Vasubandhu," published in 1911.⁸⁵ After an exhaustive study of all the available sources, primarily Chinese, Péri proposes a date of A.D. 350 for Vasubandhu. He discusses the three traditional dates given for Vasubandhu--900 A.N., 1,000 A.N., and 1,100 A.N. The first is "generally accepted,"⁸⁶ the second is given by Hsüan-tsang and the third by Paramārtha. That there were different methods of calculating the Nirvāṇa era presented a problem in evaluating the reliability of these dates. Péri accepted as authentic works of Vasubandhu two treatises translated by Kumārajīva in A.D. 361-2 and A.D. 404-5,⁸⁷ and as correct the attribution to Kumarājīva of a second, lost biography of Vasubandhu.⁸⁸ Furthermore, Péri cited various dateable authors and works to show that Vasubandhu was "assez ancien pour pouvoir être considéré comme un patriarche dès les dernières années du Ve siècle,"⁸⁹ and suggests A.D. 350 as a reasonable date.

Takakusu, who had translated and published Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu in 1905, concluded at that time that there was one Vasubandhu and that he lived from A.D. 420-500.⁹⁰ In reaching this conclusion, however, he dismissed all the evidence indicating an earlier date, which Péri later accepted. Takakusu examines the dates of the Chinese translations of Vasubandhu's Mahāyāna works, which range from A.D. 508 to 569. Assuming a time lag between composition and translation, he concludes that Vasubandhu could not have lived after A.D. 500.⁹¹ Further, he identifies Vasubandhu's patrons as the Gupta kings Skanda Gupta and his son Bālāditya Gupta,

whose reign commenced either in A.D. 481 or 490.⁹² In a later article entitled "The Date of Vasubandhu," Takakusu replies to Péri. He praises his "painstaking research," but remains convinced that the sources which he has rejected, and Péri accepted, are "dubious."⁹³ He retains his conclusion of 1905, that there was one Vasubandhu who lived in the fifth century A.D.

Frauwallner, on the other hand, believes the biographical and chronological data prove that there were two Vasubandhus whose lives, dates, and accomplishments have long been confused. One, the brother of Asaṅga and the master of the Yogācāra school, lived from A.D. 320-80,⁹⁴ the other, the author of the Abhidharmakośa, lived from A.D. 400-80.⁹⁵

Frauwallner, then, begins his monograph by referring to Péri's work. He shows that the two dates of 1,000 A.N. and 1,100 A.N. are really the same, the fifth century A.D. They were simply based on different calculations of the Nirvāṇa era.⁹⁶ We are thus left with two equally acceptable dates, which Frauwallner concludes refer to two different people. As for Takakusu's conclusions, Frauwallner strongly objects to his dismissal of Kumārajīva's statements.⁹⁷ Among them is one that his teacher introduced him to a Mahāyāna work by Vasubandhu which greatly influenced him. This had to be about A.D. 360. He agrees, however, with Takakusu's identification of the Gupta kings.⁹⁸ In addition, he cites the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā itself. Several times Yaśomitra refers to another Vasubandhu, other than the author of the Kośa. He mentions a vrddhācārya Vasubandhu and a sthavira Vasubandhu.⁹⁹ He glosses pūrvācāryāḥ as "Asaṅga,

etc.," proving to Frauwallner that the brother of Asaṅga was another, earlier Vasubandhu. So, on the basis of the tradition regarding Vasubandhu's date, Paramārtha's biography, and Yaśomitra's comments, Frauwallner concludes that there were two Vasubandhus. Paramārtha's biography has conflated their lives, but Frauwallner believes this to be the mistake of his pupils and that, in fact, Paramārtha knew of two Vasubandhus.¹⁰⁰ The first and last parts of the biography refer to Vasubandhu the elder. It was he who was born in Peshāwar, belonged to the Sarvāstivādin school in his youth, was converted to the Mahāyāna by his brother Asaṅga and wrote the Mahāyāna treatises. We know nothing about the birth or the family of the author of the Kośa. Buddhāmītra was his teacher, the Gupta kings his patrons. His magnum opus was the Abhidharmakośa and he died at the age of eighty in Ayodhyā.¹⁰¹

This long-standing and complex dispute continues. Frauwallner's theory of two Vasubandhus has been challenged by Jaini on the basis of hints in the Abhidharmadīpa that the author of Abhidharmakośa had Mahāyānist tendencies.

The facts are clear enough, but the conclusions questionable. There is evidence to support dates in both the fourth century A.D. and in the fifth century A.D. The reliability of the evidence for either date is so far indeterminable. Either some of it is in error, or it refers to two separate individuals. As of yet, there is no way to prove either theory. The majority opinion, however, points to the fifth century A.D. as the lifetime of the author of the Kośa.

NOTES

¹ I use the term Hīnayāna with no pejorative implications in preference to Theravāda here to refer to the pre-Mahāyāna Indian Buddhist schools, since Theravāda properly refers to only a branch of those schools.

² André Bareau, Les Sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule (Saïgon: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1955), pp. 15-16.

³ See Bareau, Sectes, pp. 16-29 for a complete exposition and analysis of the works offering genealogies. For briefer accounts, see J. Masuda, trans., "Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools," Asia Major 2 (1925):14-17, the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, (ERE) ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), vol. XI, p. 198 and E. J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought (1933; 2nd. ed., 1951, rpt. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1971), pp. 288-92. Also see the charts in "Prefatory Notes" to Points of Controversy, trans. Shwe Zan Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (3rd. ed., 1915; rpt. London: Luzac and Co., 1969), to face pp. XXIX, XXVI, and XXXVII.

⁴ The Sthaviras were a minority of more strict, senior monks opposed to the more lax majority called the Mahāsāṅghikas. The schism which created these two schools was the first within the Buddhist community and occurred during an earlier council at Pāṭali-putra, held about 350 B.C. See Bareau, Les Premiers conciles bouddhiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), pp. 108-9.

⁵ Bareau, Sectes, p. 131.

⁶ Bareau, Conciles, pp. 132-3.

⁷ See Bareau, Sectes, pp. 133-4 for the Chinese pilgrims' accounts of the distribution of Sarvāstivādin monks throughout India.

8 See p. 26-7.

9 Bareau, Sectes, p. 132.

10 Ibid., p. 155. See pp. 155-9 for their doctrines.

11 A dharma is that which has reality in so far as it supports its own self-nature. There are seventy-five such dharms or irreducible entities according to the Sarvāstivādin. For more details on dharma, see pp.101-6.

12 Bareau, Sectes, p. 132. Legend says that either the Abhidharmapiṭaka or the Mahāvibhāṣā was compiled at this council. The Mahāvibhāṣā itself, however, Bareau says, informs us that it was written after the reign of Kaniṣka. He cautiously, but inconclusively, states, "Il est possible que ce concile ait été une réunion particulière aux Sarvāstivādin tenue au Cachemire au 1^{er} ou au début du 11^e S. de notre ère et dans laquelle fut fixé le Canon de cette secte." Also see J. Takakusu, "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādin," Journal of the Pali Text Society (JPTS) (1904-5), p. 123, who expresses the same doubts about the tradition.

13 ERE, XI, 199; J. Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, ed. W. T. Chan and Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1947), p. 58; Takakusu, JPTS, p. 70.

14 ERE XI, 199; Takakusu, JPTS, pp. 69-71; Bareau, Sectes, p. 134.

15 Bareau, Sectes, p. 153.

16 Ibid. The Tibetans had the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinayapiṭaka also.

17 Ibid., p. 154. Vinītadeva, however, considered the Sarvāstivādin school to be a group of schools, one of which was the Mūla-

sarvāstivādin. Also see N. Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1970), p. 52.

18 H. Nakamura, Indian Buddhism (Hirakata City, Japan: KUFS Publication, 1980), p. 102, states, "The Mūlasarvāstivādin was [sic] a branch which appeared within the school of the Sarvāstivādin, that claimed to be fundamental and orthodox against other branches."

19 Takakusu, JPTS, pp. 72-3, offers a few remarks about the Sanskrit name of the school, Sarvāstivādin. According to him, the Chinese phonetic translation cannot represent the Sanskrit sarvāsti. Rather, it probably represents the Pali sabbatthi, or a similar word in another dialect. The use of the Sanskrit name is justified, he says, by references in Śāṅkara's commentary to the Vedāntasūtras and in Vācaspatiśrī's Bhāmati to the Sarvāstivādin or the Sarvāstivāda.

20 Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, (1923; rpt. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), p. 3.

21 In fact, it is a doctrine whose interpretation still causes controversy. Braj Sinha, Time and Temporality in Sāṃkhya Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1983), p. 90, notes a recent tendency, which he repudiates, to explain time in the Sarvāstivādin system as an "ontological reality containing change." As he explains in the article, "The Abhidharmika Notion of Vijñāna and its Soteriological Significance," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 3, No. 1 (1980), p. 55, "It is not the reality of past, present and future as three points of time that is posited by Mahāvibhāṣā; rather, it is the reality of things or dharmas as past, present and future that is admitted here. Time is no factor in the determination of things or dharmas as past, present or future." The definition of the dharma's temporal status is dependent on its stage in completing its activity. Time is defined in terms of the dharma, not vice versa. Also see A. Bareau's article, "The Notion of Time in Early Buddhism," East and West 7 (1957): 353-64, in which he discusses not only the Sarvāstivādin concept, but that of other schools as well.

22 See 2.17, 2.48 and 3.135. Takakusu, Essentials, p. 59, JPTS, p. 68, mentions this fact.

23 Aung and Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy, p. 84.

24 Ibid., p. 95, fn. 1.

25 On the skandhas, see pp. 106-10.

26 Aung and Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy, p. 95.

27 The Debates Commentary, trans. B. C. Law, 2nd. ed. (1940; rpt. London: Luzac and Co., 1969), pp. 52-3.

28 See Aung and Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy, pp. 95-8.

29 Ibid., p. 85.

30 Aung and Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy, p. 94.

31 On the kleśas, see pp.123-6, 133-41 and chapter five of the Kośa.

32 On the saṃskṛta dharmas, see pp. 101-5.

33 The Vaibhāṣikas recognized four characteristics of the conditioned: arising (jāti), decay (jarā), duration (sthiti), and impermanence (anityatā). On these four characteristics, see 2.45c-d. These characteristics are also characterized, as they too arise, subsist, decay, and perish. These secondary characteristics (anulakṣaṇa) are discussed at 2.46. Generally speaking, only three characteristics of the conditioned were accepted by most Buddhist schools. The Vaibhāṣikas added sthiti, a phase of existence prior to decay. See Y. Karunadāsa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter (Colombo: Department of Cultural Affairs, 1967), pp. 78-91.

34 See Louis de la Vallée Poussin (LVP), L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, vol. 16, 6 vols. (Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1971), vol. 4, ch. 5, p. 54, fn. 3. It is the opinion approved by the Council held under Kaniṣka.

35 LVP, vol. 4, ch. 5, p. 64 translates, "Ce n'est pas dans ce sens qu'il faut entendre le sarvāstivāda. Le bon sarvāstivāda consiste à affirmer l'existence de tout en comprenant le terme tout comme le comprend l'Écriture. Comment le Sūtra affirme-t-il que tout existe?-- "Quand on dit: 'tout existe', ô brâhmane, il s'agit des douze āyatanas: ce sont des termes équivalents." For references, see p. 64, fn. 2. The twelve āyatanas are the six internal sense organs and the corresponding six external sense objects. Also see Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 5, on this interpretation of "everything exists."

36 La Vallée Poussin has translated into French the Vibhāṣā 76 which discusses this controversy about time and Saṅghabhadra's commentary on the Kośa V. 25-27 in "Documents d'Abhidharma" in Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, cinquième volume: 1936-1937 (Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1937), pp. 7-158. It contains a detailed account of each of the four masters' explanations and the objections to them.

37 The best source for the doctrines of the Indian Buddhist schools is the treatise ascribed to Vasumitra and translated by J. Masuda in Asia Major 2 (1925), "Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools." For the Sarvāstivādins in particular, see pp. 38-52. Bareau, Les Sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule, pp. 137-52, also lists the Sarvāstivādin doctrines.

38 The Vaibhāṣika path (mārga) to Nirvāṇa is a series of graduated exercises and meditations grounded in morality and study of the Buddhist teachings. They lead eventually to the realization of, and then the comprehension of, the Truth of Suffering as it pertains to each of the three realms. This then also occurs for the other three Truths, resulting in sixteen moments of comprehension.

The first fifteen are called the darśanamārga, the path of insight; the sixteenth is the beginning of the bhāvanāmārga, the path of cultivation. At this point, the aspirant is a Stream Winner, the lowest of the eight steps toward Nirvāṇa. For the details, see the Kośa, 6.5-31.

39 On the proclivities (anuśaya), see chapter five of the Kośa and pp. 133-41. On the kāmadhātu, see pp. 97-101.

40 On avijñapti, see the Kośa 1.11 and 4.1-22, T. Dowling's dissertation, Vaṣubandhu on Avijñapti-rūpa, Columbia University, 1976, and pp. 117-19.

41 On the antarābhava, see the Kośa, 3.10-18.

42 See Ñyāṇatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary (Colombo: Frewin and Co., Ltd., 1950; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1983), pp. 101-6 and 113-20.

43 The Vyākhyā says that hetu and pratyaya are synonyms (2.49). See LVP, vol. 1, p. 244, fn. 4 and Shastri, Abhidharmakośa and Bhaṣyā of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphūṭārtha commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra. 4 vols. (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970-3), vol. 1, p. 278. ka ime hetavaḥ ke ca pratyayā iti. hetūnāṃ ca kaḥ prativīśeṣaḥ? na kaścidityāha hetuḥ pratyayo nidānaṃ kāraṇaṃ nimittaṃ liṅgaṃ nupaniṣaditi paryāyaḥ

44 Shastri, vol. I, p. 280, sarvadharmāḥ saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtā kāraṇaheturiti.

45 For more on sahabhūhetu, see footnote 140, p. 275-6.

46 On citta and caitta, see pp. 119-28.

47 On good (kuśala) and bad (akuśala), see pp. 130-3.

48 See Shastri, vol. I, p. 279. atha katamaṣmin sūtre ṣaḍ hetavaḥ uktāḥ? antarhitam tat sūtramiti Vaibhāṣikāḥ. Also see LVP, vol. I, p. 245, fn. 2.

49 It is the same as pratisaṃkhyānirodha, one of the three unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas. Being the disjunction (visaṃ-yoga) from impure dharmas, it is really a synonym for Nirvāṇa. Pratisaṃkhyā means a pure wisdom, the comprehension of the Four Noble Truths; the destruction (nirodha) by which one gains this wisdom is called pratisaṃkhyānirodha. See 1.6a-b. Also see N. Dutt's article, "Pratisaṃkhyā and Apratisaṃkhyā Nirodha" in Indian Historical Quarterly 33 (1957): 156-61.

50 Bareau, Sectes, pp. 131-2.

51 See N. Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India, (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1970), pp. 145-51, Banerjee, Sarvāstivāda Literature (Calcutta: D. Banerjee, 1957), pp. 18-50, and Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur, edited by H. Bechert. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1985).

52 It is mentioned by Hsüan-tsang as a fifth Āgama, but the division into four Āgamas is far more common. Banerjee, Sarvāstivāda Literature, pp. 18-19.

53 Moriz Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, vol. 2 (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1933), pp. 234-8; Dutt, Buddhist Sects, pp. 146-9; Banerjee Sarvāstivāda Literature, p. 19.

54 See H. Nakamura, Indian Buddhism, pp. 53-4, fn. 19 and p. 102, fn. 24, for bibliography and A. Yuyama, A Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature Erster Teil: Vinaya Texte (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1979). The latter is a better reference work as its entries are arranged clearly by subject and school. Nakamura has much valuable information, particularly about Japanese scholarship, which is so often inaccessible to us, but

the bibliographical information is all contained in the footnotes and harder to locate.

55 Dutt, Buddhist Sects, p. 151. Also see Gilgit Manuscripts, ed. N. Dutt, vol. 3 (Srinagar, 1939-43) and A. Yuyama, A Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature Erster Teil: Vinaya Texte, for a complete bibliography.

56 Burnouf supplied the first information concerning the Sanskrit Abhidharma texts, translating a passage from Yaśomitra's Vyākhyā, kārikā 3, in which he names all seven works and their authors. Takakusu, JPTS, pp. 74-5. See Shastri, vol. 1, p. 15.

57 Banerjee, Sarvāstivāda Literature, p. 53; LVP, vol. I, p. XXXII, fn. 3; Sukomal Chaudhuri, Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1976), p. 70, fn. 8; Takakusu, JPTS, p. 75.

58 Banerjee, Sarvāstivāda Literature, p. 54.

59 Vasubandhu frequently refers to the Prakaranapāda in particular. The Chinese understand prakarana to mean "classification." The work classifies the dharmas according to the five types (rūpa, citta, caitta, cittaviprayukta, and asamskrta, see pp. 112-13), knowledge according to ten types, the anuśaya according to ninety-eight types, and so on. See Takakusu, JPTS, pp. 103-6.

60 See Takakusu, JPTS, pp. 86-118 for detailed contents of all these works as well as the non-canonical ones.

61 Nakamura, Indian Buddhism, pp. 105-6. Also see p. 113, fn. 110, where he mentions that there are "many Sanskrit fragments of the Abhidharma texts" preserved in Japanese temples. See also p. 156, fn. 64-8 for further references about Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts from Central Asia.

62 Takakusu, JPTS, pp. 118-44; Banerjee, Sarvāstivāda Literature, pp. 70-5.

63 Takakusu, JPTS, pp. 134-9; Banerjee, Sarvāstivāda Literature, p. 72; Bareau, Sectes, p. 137.

64 praiñāmalā sānucarābhidharmah. (1.2) All quotes from the Kośa are from Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu, ed. by P. Pradhan (2nd rev. ed. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975), unless otherwise noted.

65 The primary meaning of the prefix "abhi," according to the Pali Text Society dictionary (PTS), ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, 6th ed. (1921-5; rpt. London: The Pali Text Society, 1972), is "taking possession and mastering" (p. 61), from which it acquired a figurative meaning of increasing or intensifying. "Abhidhamma" is found in conjunction with the word "abhivinaya" at Dīgha Nikāya III. 267 and Majjhima Nikāya I. 272. In this context, "abhivinaya" apparently means "higher discipline, refinements of discipline," (p. 69) and "abhidhamma" "special Dhamma," "the doctrine classified, the doctrine pure and simple" (p. 65). "Abhi" thus probably indicates discussion, exposition or analysis of the dhamma. Buddhaghosa, however, defines "abhi" in the Atthasālinī as meaning "excellence and difference," and Abhidhamma as therefore meaning the dhamma which is superior to or different from the dhamma of the Sutta Piṭaka. This is discussed by Banerjee in Sarvāstivāda Literature, p. 51.

66 Chaudhuri, p. 5.

67 On the kleśas, see pp. 133-41.

68 See Nakamura, Indian Buddhism, pp. 109-10, fn. 71-2 and 75 for complete bibliography of editions.

69 Rahula Sāṅkṛityāyana, "Second Search of Sanskrit Palm-Leaf Manuscripts in Tibet," Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society XXIII (I) (1937): 18.

70 A. C. Banerjee, "Abhidharma Texts in Tibetan," Indian Historical Quarterly 28 (1952): 373. Chaudhuri (p. V) says there are two versions, one by each of these men, but this is incorrect.

71 Chaudhuri, p. V.

72 Takakusu, Essentials, pp. 62-3.

73 Chaudhuri, p. 17.

74 Winternitz, vol. 2, p. 358.

75 On the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus, see pp. 106-12, chapter one of the Kośa, and Bruce Hall's dissertation, "Vasubandhu on 'Aggregates, Spheres, and Components': Being Chapter One of the Abhidharmakośa," Harvard University, 1983.

76 On the indriya, see footnote 24, p. 263.

77 On the kleśas, see pp. 133-41.

78 Th. Stcherbatsky has translated the ninth chapter separately as The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, (1920; Varanasi: Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśan, 1970).

79 La Vallée Poussin has translated this chapter separately as well. See bibliography under Vasubandhu. That translation was based on the Tibetan. Nakamura mentions a Japanese translation of the third chapter also, by Yamaguchi and Funahashi. See p. 109, fn. 72.

80 Erich Frauwallner, On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu (Rome: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1951), p. 1.

81 Frauwallner includes a forty-item bibliography. See pp. 67-9. In addition, one should consult Jaini's article, "On the Theory of Two Vasubandhus," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and

African Studies XXI (1958): 48-53, in which he re-examines and questions Frauwallner's conclusion. A Japanese scholar, H. Sakurabe, has also objected to Frauwallner's conclusions. See "On Frauwallner's dating of Vasubandhu," Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) I, 1951, p. 202f. cited in Nakamura, p. 109.

82 T'oung Pao V (1904): 269-96; Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, IV (1904): 40-47.

83 Winternitz, vol. 2, pp. 355-6, fn. 6.

84 See On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu.

85 Noël Péri, "A Propos de la date de Vasubandhu," Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient XI (1911): 330-90.

86 Frauwallner, On the Date . . . p. 3.

87 Péri, p. 372.

88 Ibid., p. 373.

89 Ibid., p. 346.

90 J. Takakusu, "A Study of Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu; and the Date of Vasubandhu," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1905, p. 43.

91 Ibid., pp. 42-3.

92 Ibid., p. 44.

93 J. Takakusu, "The Date of Vasubandhu, the Great Buddhist Philosopher," in Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929), p. 82.

94 Frauwallner, On the Date . . . p. 46.

95 Frauwallner, p. 32.

96 Ibid., p. 10.

97 Ibid., pp. 34-6.

98 Ibid., p. 31.

99 Ibid., p. 21.

100 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

101 Ibid., pp. 54-6.

The Interpretation of Dependent Origination by Western Scholars

The Abhidharmakośa and its explanation of dependent origination require a context. This chapter will review the most important work on the subject of dependent origination published by Western scholars, thereby providing a background for the present study which will illustrate the Kośa's stance. In reviewing the research, a review of the history of the Western interpretation of dependent origination will emerge. For this reason, the review will be done in chronological order, scholar by scholar. This method will also allow us to discern a development or a pattern of interpretation, if such exists, and to draw conclusions regarding the influence of date and sources on the scholars. It also leads us naturally to the present and a summary of the most recent work. The following points will be considered for each scholar: his methodology, his sources, his topics of discussion, and his conclusions and contributions.

Our review will give an idea of the diversity of opinion regarding dependent origination. The problems surrounding the doctrine are not minor ones. Doubts about its origin, its meaning, its purpose, and its extent are all overshadowed by the greater doubt about its intelligibility. Only its importance is not usually questioned.

We will see it explained as the expansion of the Second and Third Noble Truths, as the mechanism of rebirth, as the process of

perception, as an itinerary to Nirvāṇa, and as the emptiness of all phenomena. We will see it explained as applying to only one aspect of human life, as applying to all aspects of human life, and as applying to the entire physical world. We will see the twelve links explained as all occurring simultaneously or as occurring in groups over three lives. We will see it described as the most important teaching of Buddhism and as the pointless bastardization of the Four Noble Truths. We will see it described as coherent and consistent and as piecemeal and contradictory.

Yet there are recurrent themes in all these works. Among the twelve links, the karmically-caused tendencies, name and form, consciousness, and becoming are troublesome; these are the same links which are the connecting links between lives in the three-lives theory. The blurring of the subjective and the objective worlds causes interpretive and philosophical difficulties for those not accustomed to thinking in this manner. The question of the significance of the pratiloma sequence arises frequently. The rivalry for primacy in the chain between ignorance and desire raises the problem of the internal consistency of the doctrine of dependent origination, while the problem of the place of dependent origination in Buddhist doctrine as a whole is raised by its rivalry with the Four Noble Truths.

A word about the selection of scholars and works--I have chosen those scholars whose research and opinions are outstanding. Most of this work is quite old; much of it dates from the early part of this century, and even from the latter part of the last century. It

was during that period, and then again, quite recently, that dependent origination attracted the attention and effort of scholars. Yet the older work remains the most important and most perceptive work on dependent origination, and therefore deserves the extensive consideration it receives here. Oldenberg marks the true beginning of a sound philosophical analysis of dependent origination. Oltramare and La Vallée Poussin contributed new sources and new views, drawing much of their material from the Mahāyāna schools. Senart's conclusions about the later, derivative nature of dependent origination are taken up again by Frauwallner fifty years later. The three articles in the *Rahula Festschrift* are all by prominent Buddhologists, and are all about important aspects of dependent origination. They indicate a resurgence of interest in the subject and represent current concerns and scholarship about it. Johansson's psychological interpretation is the most thorough attempt to explain dependent origination to appear in many years. There are, in addition, many other articles about dependent origination, which it is neither possible nor necessary to review.¹ Most offer nothing new.²

The earliest Western interpretation of dependent origination that we will examine in detail is that of Oldenberg, published in German in 1881, translated in 1882 as Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order. Prior to doing so, however, a brief account of some earlier and contemporary notions regarding the doctrine will provide the background necessary for appreciating the originality of Oldenberg's ideas. None of these other attempts to explain dependent origination will receive more than this cursory mention,

based on secondary sources, because their importance lies primarily in forming the academic and philosophical background which later scholars rejected. They must be evaluated with the quantity and quality of the sources then available in mind; most of this work was done even before the completion of the editing of the Pali texts.

Burnouf, who may have been the first to call dependent origination a "chain,"³ saw in it a description of the evolution of being from non-being; Kern saw a description of the evolution and destruction of the universe. Warren was stumped by the composite nature of the chain. He contended that birth was described twice, at the fourth and eighth links, the two independent sections then being put together. Jacobi, struck by the similarities between the Buddhist chain and the Sāṅkhyan tattvas, believed dependent origination to be largely borrowed from the Sāṅkhya school, but made incoherent by the denial of an ātman. Pischel, although writing some twenty-five years after Oldenberg, was even more insistent than Jacobi that dependent origination was a Buddhist borrowing and imitation of the Sāṅkhya system's tattvas.⁴

Oldenberg, then, who cautions that in discussing "abstract notions of Buddhist dogmatic," " . . . the ground vanishes from beneath our feet at every step,"⁵ nonetheless appears to have his feet firmly on the ground when it comes to dependent origination. He immediately states the connection between the "formula of the causal nexus,"⁶ as he calls it, and the Four Noble Truths, a connection overlooked in the earlier theories. For him, the purpose of dependent origination was to "strengthen" or "supplement"⁷ the

Truths, filling in the details of the process of the origination and cessation of suffering. He relies solely on the tradition of the Pali Canon, drawing attention to the essential points about dependent origination made in its narrative of the enlightenment. The Buddha attained knowledge of dependent origination before enlightenment, but a final insight into it constituted the essence of enlightenment, and it was dependent origination which the Buddha expected and feared would be misunderstood if he taught his doctrine.⁸

Relying on a close reading of the Pali texts, he reaches the following conclusions about the intent of the dependent origination doctrine:

The attempt is here made by the use of brief pithy phrases to trace back the suffering of all earthly existence to its most remote roots. The answer is as confused as the question was bold. It is utterly impossible for anyone who seeks to find out its meaning, to trace from beginning to end a connected meaning in this formula. Most of the links of the chain, taken separately, admit of a passable interpretation; many arrange themselves also in groups together, and their articulation may be said to be not incomprehensible; but between these groups there remain contradictions and impossibilities in the consecutive arrangement of priority and sequence, which an exact exegesis has not the power, and is not permitted to clear up.⁹

This paragraph alone contains many of Oldenberg's best insights and conclusions. First, the formula is an attempt to explain suffering, earthly and human suffering; it applies to the "personal life,"¹⁰ not the universe. Furthermore, it was not merely the borrowing or imitating of another system; it was a "bold" and new approach, and consequently bears the marks of a pioneering and

incomplete idea. He rejects as impossible the search for a coherent and logical framework within the formula, either between pairs of links or in the twelve taken as a whole. Yet he sees that despite the inconsistencies, certain links more naturally form groups than others and that some connection between them is comprehensible. Thus he later refers to dependent origination as offering a "structure of being,"¹¹ and comes to understand it in what we could call the "orthodox" way, as extending over three lives.

In keeping with his observation of the logical groupings of certain links and his contention that they describe the process of human life, Oldenberg begins his exposition of the links at number three, consciousness. As he points out, there are versions of dependent origination which do exactly the same. Thus, the links consciousness through clinging describe the conception and development of a person with relatively minor difficulties. The last two links, however, birth, and old age and death, stop one short. For, as Oldenberg says, one has "long since"¹² assumed the birth of the individual whose conception takes place at links three and four, for the subsequent links described his interaction with the world. He sees here a serious and irreconcilable "gap in the train of thought"¹³ and an inadequate and sloppy attempt to gloss over it by inserting the ill-defined notion of "becoming" between the two sets of links, numbers three through nine and numbers eleven and twelve.¹⁴ Oldenberg, as we will see, is not alone in his discontent with this particular point in the chain.

He then backtracks to discuss the first two links, ignorance and the karmically-caused tendencies, which he felt were less accessible and less concrete. He concludes that ignorance, although "the ultimate ground of all suffering,"¹⁵ is neither a cosmic power such as māyā nor an original sin. It, too, is "within the range of the earthly, tangible reality."¹⁶ It is ignorance of the Four Noble Truths, and as the last link in the inverse chain, it leads not to nothingness, but to a previous existence. As for the karmically-caused tendencies, Oldenberg finds that they are very similar to karma, but include not only physical, but also volitional actions.¹⁷ Or, from a slightly different viewpoint, they are the aspirations and desires which influence our rebirth.

Oldenberg makes specific and important statements in the section on ignorance that reveal his methods. After admitting that the later Mahāyāna Prajñāpāramitā texts make ignorance the equivalent of māyā, he cautions against relying on them to interpret "the old texts."¹⁸ "The course, which we must follow, is clearly enough indicated: we have only to inquire from the oldest tradition of Buddhist dogmatics, obtainable in the Pali texts, what is that ignorance. . . ."¹⁹

Yet, in his concluding remarks about the world view which can be inferred from the chain taken in its entirety, we find him reaching conclusions which became the hallmark of later Buddhism.

Causality, or, to translate more accurately the Indian word (paṭiccasamuppāda), the origin (of one thing) in dependence (from another thing), represents a relation existing between two members, of which the one, and because of it necessarily

the other, is at no moment unaltered. There is no being subject to the law of causality, that does not resolve itself, when analyzed, into a process of self-changing, of becoming.²⁰

Things or substances, in the sense of a something existing by itself, as we are accustomed to understand these words, cannot, according to all we have stated, be at all thought of by Buddhism.²¹

Becoming is the only reality; mutual dependence the only "substance." So, from the doctrines of no-soul (anātman) and impermanence (anitya) comes the logical and explanatory corollary that while there is no substance, there is a law.

Émile Senart's 1896 article entitled "A Propos de la théorie bouddhique des douze nidānas" begins as many monographs on dependent origination begin, by making reference to the importance of the doctrine and the difficulty of understanding it. "Elle a largement exercé la sagacité des interprètes occidentaux. Cependant les plus ingénieux et les mieux informés ont, jusqu'aux plus récents, désespéré d'en découvrir une explication assez logique pour être réputée satisfaisante et définitive."²²

Senart persists, though, believing that there must be "entre les termes une continuité normale, nécessaire."²³ Finishing a review of the research which precedes him, he nicely poses the problem that has caused so much confusion:

La question, en effet, se pose d'abord de la façon suivante: la nomenclature des nidānas représente-t-elle directement, ainsi qu'on paraît toujours l'admettre, la pensée originale, réfléchie et consciente du bouddhisme sur l'origine de l'existence humaine? Ou bien n'est-elle qu'une construction plus ou moins

tardive où sont amalgamées, sans un ordre logique sévère, des catégories primitivement indépendantes, différentes dans les termes, quoique assez équivalentes par le sens, en sorte que l'on n'y saurait, sans une extrême illusion, chercher la forte structure d'une théorie autonome, sortant tout armée d'une spéculation maîtresse d'elle-même?²⁴

Oldenberg, we can guess, would answer yes to the first question, but Senart says the second alternative is the only possibility.²⁵

They reach these opposing conclusions relying upon the same texts. For Senart, too, the Pali texts are the primary sources, the scholastic commentaries being untrustworthy and overenthusiastic.²⁶ He does not ignore the fact that even the Pali Canon cannot be considered an authentic record of the Buddha's teachings, for a considerable period of time separates the life of the Buddha and the redaction of the Canon. Also, Pali was not the language of the Buddha. Thus, there is no absolutely reliable account of the earliest Buddhist teachings. Senart, therefore, relies primarily on a philological analysis of the terms and their relations.²⁷

Analyzing the members of the chain, Senart finds that the aggregates (skandha) are mentioned twice, as he interprets "upādāna," or clinging, to mean "pañca upādānaskandha." He then finds the aggregates repeated in numbers two, three, and seven, that is, in the karmically-caused tendencies, consciousness, and feeling, matter (rūpa) repeated in nāmarūpa, and perception (samjñā) included as the six sense bases and contact.²⁸ For him, this alone is sufficient to damage the philosophical significance of dependent

origination. In addition, there are versions in which the number of links varies, and some of the terms, for example, avidyā, saṃskāra, and nāmarūpa, are borrowed.²⁹

Yet, searching for continuity and coherence, he finds it. The solution to all these inconsistencies and problems lies in the derivative nature of the doctrine. The twelve links of dependent origination are merely an awkward and unnecessary elaboration of the Four Noble Truths, which is the authentic statement about the origin of suffering in Buddhism.³⁰ The last five terms are the essential ones. Desire and grasping are the origin of suffering, becoming, birth, old age and death, the results. The first two links, ignorance and the karmically-caused tendencies, are borrowings from the Sāṃkhya system, in which they were the cause of suffering, and the remaining links are the unjustified repetition of the aggregates.³¹

He finds dependent origination not only to be a restatement of the Noble Truths, but finds its structure and terminology to depend upon them as well. ". . . C'est le cakrapravartana des quatre vérités qui a inspiré la nomenclature, qui en a déterminé la forme, qui en a fixé les limites."³² He even derives the number of links, twelve, from the four Truths, three for each. The idea of a wheel, however, seems to break down when insisting that ignorance depend upon death, as this does not naturally nor easily fit a twelve-member successive chain.³³ So, it is more or less made to fit.

Thus, Senart views dependent origination as entirely derivative, the ideas and terms pulled both from the earlier Buddhist

teaching of the Noble Truths and from the Sāṅkhya system. It has nothing new and nothing significant to add to Buddhist thought, and has been overrated.

La théorie des nidānas se lie aux thèses fondamentales du bouddhisme. Cependant elle n'exprime déjà plus l'effort spontané de la recherche. C'est une combinaison scolastique de catégories dont plusieurs sont elles-mêmes dérivées. Elle repose sur des formules antérieures dont les termes ont suggéré l'idée et fourni le cadre. Quoique ancienne, elle est donc déjà secondaire et par la date et par l'inspiration.³⁴

Still, he thinks this both understandable and excusable since Buddhism is a religion whose moral teachings are its unique contribution, and in which philosophical speculation was discouraged.

Paul Oltramare's La Formule bouddhique des douze causes was published in 1906, and therefore predates La Vallée Poussin's Théorie des douze causes by a few years. They are without question the two outstanding works on dependent origination, even today. Oltramare's is a most interesting, interpretive monograph, less strictly scholarly than La Vallée Poussin's, containing many notable insights and drawing on a wider range of sources than any previous work.

Three main chapters constitute the work. The first considers the original meaning of the formula, which he translates as "la loi de l'enchaînement des causes et des effets,"³⁵ discussing each of the twelve terms. While this is, of course, a standard, if not obligatory, feature of every article on dependent origination, Oltramare's presentation of it stands out because he discusses them in reverse

order, beginning with old age and death. The pratiloma sequence, he says, more easily explains "la genèse psychologique de la formule,"³⁶ a remark which indicates the significance of the reverse sequence to his interpretation of dependent origination.

The internal coherence of Buddhism being an important subject to Oltramare, he then goes on to examine the relation of dependent origination to the doctrines of the Four Noble Truths, the aggregates, and karma. He cites the criticism of Śāṅkara, something new and noteworthy in itself, who sees a contradiction in maintaining both the theory of momentariness and that of the *nidānas*.³⁷ Oltramare defends Buddhism against Śāṅkara's accusations, replying that "l'enseignement du Bouddha ne fut rien moins que systématique" and that the apparent contradictions result from the fact that they "ne sont pas nées dans sa pensée en connexion les unes avec les autres."³⁸ Oltramare can accept this, but, as we will see, it is still the source of criticism for scholars as recent as Frauwallner. Nor could the Buddhists accept it, and so the well-known connections between these doctrines were drawn. He then reviews the history of the Western scholarly interpretation of dependent origination, from which section the introductory material offered at the beginning of this account was taken. Finally, he considers the Buddha's intent in teaching dependent origination, which is, naturally, indistinguishable from his own interpretation of the doctrine and will be discussed shortly.

The next chapter opens by mentioning the variant sequences of the chain found in certain texts. These have been a stumbling block

for some scholars, but Oltramare is able to accept them as the natural result of a religion with a penchant for stereotyping its doctrines.³⁹ His review of the interpretation of dependent origination found in both scholastic and Mahāyāna Buddhism includes material from the Milindapañha, the Daśabhūmikasūtra, the Visuddhimagga, the Śālistambasūtra and the Abhidharmakośa, perhaps the first account not based largely on the Pali sources. As much of this material will be discussed in the next chapter, the specifics will not detain us here, other than to make one remark about Oltramare's reaction. He rejects what he sees as an unjustified expansion of the doctrine to apply to all aspects of life, a tendency he deplores in the Visuddhimagga as well as in the Śālistamba Sūtra. The culprit in this process was nāmarūpa, when rūpa is interpreted to mean the entire physical world.⁴⁰ Indeed, nāmarūpa is one of the sticking points throughout the history of the attempts to understand dependent origination. He is also critical of avidyā coming to mean māyā, and of the enumeration of many types of causes and conditions.⁴¹

In the final chapter, Oltramare evaluates the philosophical importance of dependent origination. Throughout, he rejects any interpretation that deviates from understanding dependent origination as a description of a subjective, psychological state unique to human beings, and an explanation of the way that state develops, and hence, the way it ends. He writes:

Une chose est certaine, le Bouddha n'a pas voulu, par le Pratītyasamutpāda, donner la formule de la causalité universelle . . .

Son but n'a pas été non plus de donner la formule de la vie humaine . . . Les processus psychiques et physiques ont un caractère entièrement mécanique . . . La question à laquelle la théorie des nidāna est censée apporter une réponse, n'est donc pas: Qu'est-ce que la vie? Elle est: Pourquoi la vie est-elle ce qu'elle est? Le fait ultime qu'il s'agit d'expliquer, c'est l'existence empoisonnée par la souffrance physique et moral. Mieux encore, le pratītyasamutpāda envisage la misère en elle-même, indépendamment du sujet misérable, comme si elle évoluait in abstracto par la seule force de l'avidyā.⁴²

To Oltramare, dependent origination simply and directly addresses the question of why life is as it is, that is, why it is suffering, and what is to be done in order to end it. Dependent origination was taught with a very specific, practical, and moral purpose; it was never meant to be a flawless philosophical doctrine. Its flaws are irrelevant to its purpose, and when approached with this understanding, the problems of the relations between the links are solved.⁴³

Le Pratītyasamutpāda est une tentative d'expliquer la qualité de la vie, sans qu'interviennent ni la notion d'âme, ni la notion de Dieu. C'est là sa portée négative. Il a aussi une valeur positive. Il affirme que la souffrance est 'dépendante'. Dépendante, ne naissant pas d'elle-même, elle peut être détruite. Et comme, en dernière analyse, elle dépend de la volonté de l'homme qui souffre, et d'elle seule, il ne tient qu'à l'homme de la détruire.⁴⁴

This is the importance of the pratīloma sequence.

Oltramare is unusual in his acceptance of the illogical or the inconsistent in the doctrine. He does not try to force dependent origination to fit a rational or coherent schema, and goes so far as

to defend the Buddha against accusations of sloppy thinking. He finds the general principle of causality more important than the specifics, which may lack conceptual sophistication, but neither insight nor utility.

He admits, however, that his "simple et naturelle" interpretation of dependent origination as strictly "moral et practical," is not the same as that reached by the Buddhist theologians.⁴⁵ Nor is it the same as that reached by most other Western scholars, who continue to be disturbed by the illogical and the inconsistent juxtaposition of the links.

Yet Oltramare, for all his acceptance and defense of Buddhism, concludes that it is ultimately and profoundly pessimistic. There is in the "chaîne des causes l'expression du pessimisme radical, universel, qui faisait le fond de la doctrine bouddhique."⁴⁶ Despite his emphasis on the reverse sequence, and his description of it, quoted above, as "positive," he can find no goal and no point to causality. Buddhism " . . . n'assigne aucun but au flux incessant de toutes choses."⁴⁷ It is merely mechanical. Dependent origination may explain the origination and cessation of an undesirable state of life, but it offers no reason and no consolation. " . . . Le bouddhisme a poussé jusqu'aux dernières limites son explication phénoméniste et déterministe des choses"⁴⁸ In this he sees the seeds of the later idealism and nihilism of Buddhism which he so disdains. Interposing feeling between the six sense bases and desire shows the subjective character of the chain of dependent origination because it is only as feeling that external objects exist.⁴⁹ Furthermore, it is

not difficult to see the connection between making consciousness the condition of name and form and the condition of the entire objective world.⁵⁰ These are themes brought up again by La Vallée Poussin.

La Vallée Poussin's Théorie des douze causes, published in 1913, remains to date the most important single work on dependent origination. It is a less interpretive and less speculative study than Oltramare's, revealing on every page his familiarity with the greatest range of Buddhist texts, and his extensive knowledge of the languages in which they were written and into which they were translated. The footnotes and textual references contain detailed information and cross references to works representative of all stages of Buddhist thought and frequently to Hindu works as well. By compiling and publishing the text of the Śālistamba Sūtra, he presents a crucial new source on the subject. Yet, given his more objective scholarly approach, it is harder to discern his personal opinions, as he does not champion any particular interpretation of dependent origination. In his opening remarks, he echoes Oldenberg when he cautions, "Il faut quelque courage pour s'y aventurer, car il y a danger de perdre non seulement pied, mais haleine."⁵¹

With this warning, he sets out to limit his project. What he proposes is to write an analytical and expository work relying on both the work of his predecessors, among whom he names Oldenberg, Senart, and Oltramare, and the "most notable" sources.⁵² As mentioned, the list of most notable sources is impressive; it includes the Nikāyas, of course, and the Visuddhimagga, the Atthasālinī, the

Kathāvatthu, the Vibhaṅga, the Abhidharmakośa, the Śālistamba Sūtra, the Madhyamakavṛtti, the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, and many others. No other scholar has drawn from such an extensive bibliography as La Vallée Poussin. He begins by discussing the extent to which the chain developed from and depended upon other Buddhist teachings or presuppositions and reconstructs a possible derivation of dependent origination from the Second Noble Truth.⁵³ The next chapter collects the definitions and explanations of each of the twelve nidānas as found in canonical and later scholastic works, and the third chapter, the interpretations of the chain as a whole. He reserves for the final chapter some "metaphysical problems" connected with dependent origination: the pratiloma sequence, the etymology of the word, the theories of causality, and the connections between dependent origination and the Middle Way.⁵⁴

There are two questions which he refuses to consider, labeling them as unanswerable. The first is the origins of the formula and the second the original meanings of the twelve terms.⁵⁵ Considering all the work and arguments of his predecessors, he may sound somewhat cavalier when he says,

On peut, croyons-nous, en toute sécurité et sans grande difficulté, déterminer d'une manière générale le sens du Pratītyasamutpāda, qui est une explication de l'origine de la douleur ou une explication de la renaissance, et fixer la portée philosophique soit explicite, soit implicite, de la doctrine. ⁵⁶

On the other hand, it is no doubt true.

Because of the amount and complexity of information available, he also eliminates from consideration the problem of the pre-

or extra-Buddhist influences and origins of the doctrine, and the history of the Western interpretation of it, for which he refers the reader to Oltramare.⁵⁷

Appended to Théorie des douze causes are "Documents relatifs au Pratītyasamutpāda," an invaluable contribution to the study of dependent origination. Heading it is the transliterated Sanskrit text of the Śālistamba Sūtra, which La Vallée Poussin reconstructed primarily from the quotations from it which appear in other works. He also publishes the Tibetan version. This sūtra, which is mentioned in the sixth chapter, was, according to La Vallée Poussin, the source of brahmanical knowledge about dependent origination.⁵⁸

Another appendix culls the definitions of dependent origination from various brahmanical and Buddhist works, and others offer the Sanskrit texts of the sixth chapter of the Daśabhūmaka, the twentieth to twenty-fourth verse of the third chapter of the Abhidharma-kośa, Nagarjuna's Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya and the sixteenth chapter of the Caṇḍamahāroṣanatantra, all of which deal with dependent origination. The importance of collecting and publishing these materials, along with his commentary and references, cannot be overestimated.

La Théorie des douze causes, being an exposition and analysis of many diverse points connected with dependent origination, is difficult to summarize. Certainly La Vallée Poussin's discussion of the Abhidharmakośa is most important to us, but also important are his comments on some recurrent themes, for example, the internal

consistency of the doctrine of dependent origination and of Buddhism as a whole.

Accepting dependent origination as being based on the Second Noble Truth, it is to that Truth that La Vallée Poussin looks to find a " . . . système raisonné et raisonnable sur les doctrines que doit enseigner le Pratītyasamutpāda," to find " . . . s'il est bien construit en effet"59 In this search, he assumes that the earliest compilers knew what they wanted to say and should be taken literally. Their task was to explain just how craving and suffering arise from action and how action then leads to rebirth and suffering. The twelve links were therefore divided according to their nature--they were defilement (kleśa) or action (karma) or result (vipāka).60 This, of course, leads to the irresolvable mutual causation of ignorance and desire, their battle for primacy also apparent in the pratiloma sequence which attributes the cessation of ignorance to the cessation of desire. The problem is further complicated by the fact that there are good desires, too, such as the desire to attain Nirvāṇa, which can lead to the cessation of ignorance.61 Or, the twelve links can extend over three lifetimes, but not without the familiar difficulties. This develops into the idea of the wheel of rebirth, whose roots Senart believed derived from the Noble Truths. La Vallée Poussin notes that he thinks the idea of bhavacakra has other, adequate antecedents in such concepts as punararmtyu and the circular causation of ignorance and desire.62

The notion of the wheel of rebirth, with the twelve links of dependent origination extending over three lives, poses the question

of what connects them, what provides the continuity between lives. There were some schools who adopted the Hindu idea of the gandharva, the being of subtle matter who exists in the state between death and rebirth, the being whom La Vallée Poussin calls "le héros du Pratītyasamutpāda."⁶³ The discussion of dependent origination in the Kośa, which is translated here, follows immediately the discussion of the gandharva, although La Vallée Poussin says it does not draw any direct connection between them.⁶⁴

It is clear that whatever the merits of these explanations, they also leave other problems unsolved. Some of the links cause each other successively, but their causation is a life-long process. Some, for example, ignorance and desire, must exist without interruption for the others to arise. In another theory, all twelve links exist simultaneously, with consciousness playing the role of coordinator, or the "maîtresse de l'existence."⁶⁵ This is the theory preferred in the Kośa and La Vallée Poussin comments at some length on it, revealing a personal opinion as well. He says:

Il n'est pas impossible de concilier cette vue plus profonde de la vraie nature du processus, avec la théorie canonique des douze causes successives. L'Abhidharma sanscrit résout le problème par la théorie du Pratītyasamutpāda 'statique' (āvasthika), contrasté et combiné avec le Pratītyasamutpāda 'de relation' (sāmbandhika), c'est-à-dire montrant l'enchaînement des causes et des effets.⁶⁶

A tous les moments, sauf peut-être (d'après quelques-uns) au moment de l'incarnation, ce que nous appelons 'être' (sattva) est un complexe où le vijñāna occupe l'emploi de régent, mais où ne manquent pas les autres skandhas. Le Pratītyasamutpāda

peut-être considéré comme l'énumération d'un certain nombre d'états (avasthā) de ce complexe quinquenaire (cinq skandhas) et quaternaire (quatre éléments grossiers, mahābhūta),--états consécutifs, qui reçoivent leur nom du caractère et du facteur qui dominent dans chacun d'eux."⁶⁷

However, he criticizes this idea, too, saying, "Mais il était difficile de la préciser sans tomber dans l'arbitraire, et on peut penser que les définitions de l'Abhidharmakośa sont quelquefois forcées."⁶⁸ He then reviews the definitions which the Kośa offers; we will save the details for the translation and discussion.

A bit later, La Vallée Poussin summarizes the development of the interpretation of dependent origination. Originally an explanation of the Second Noble Truth, dependent origination teaches the impermanent and painful nature of existence, the doctrine of rebirth, and the way to escape it all.⁶⁹ Dependent origination, however, was more than this; it implied an "entire metaphysic." It implied soullessness (nairāṁya), impermanence (anityatva), and momentariness (kṣaṇikatva).⁷⁰

This, according to the Abhidharmakośa, was the suggested or implied⁷¹ (ābhiprāyika) teaching of dependent origination.

Des skandhas ou des dhātus se combinant et se renouvelant, des phénomènes momentanés qui se succèdent, telle est la définition rigoureuse (lākṣaṇika) du Pratītyasamutpāda que nous font connaître les traités de métaphysique, dit l'Abhidharmakośa; et si, dans les Sūtras, le Bouddha paraît envisager le développement causal et la destinée des êtres (sattva), c'est un enseignement intentionnel (ābhiprāyika)-- qui a, en somme,

pour fin de montrer qu'il n'y a point d'êtres, qu'on ne doit pas se préoccuper de 'son' passé, de 'son' présent, de 'son' avenir.⁷²

This theory, however, leads logically to the denial of anything existing in itself, as all things exist only by relation and only for an instant. This is indeed far from the canonical interpretation, but its origins are obvious. Perhaps from the final sentence in this section we can conclude that La Vallée Poussin shares Oltramare's evaluation of this interpretation, for he pleads, "Pourquoi les premiers docteurs n'auraient-ils pas compris tout ce que cette formule porte de nihilisme?"⁷³

Masson-Oursel, acknowledging the monographs of La Vallée Poussin and Oltramare as "profound," but also acknowledging their admission of the unresolved "obscurity" still surrounding dependent origination, proposes to once again review the meanings of the twelve terms and thence to attempt to deduce its philosophical significance.⁷⁴ Although there is much repetition in all these works, each one does nonetheless contribute a different viewpoint or interpretation, or offer a strikingly succinct and appropriate definition. This is true of Masson-Oursel's brief definitions of the nidānas, in particular, that of the karmically-caused tendencies (saṃskāra). He calls them "manières d'être psychologiques, <<de se faire>> ou de <<s'être fait>>: ce qu'on est en fonction de son acte moral, ou des objets perçus, ou de par sa constitution, selon les trois facteurs composants de notre être: corps, voix, esprit."⁷⁵ The definition also illustrates Masson-Oursel's main point about the nidānas--not only does each have a range of possible meanings from

which one which best fits in with all the other links must be chosen, but even when the meaning is narrowed down, each link still has a dual nature, an active and a passive aspect, in many cases, an internal and an external aspect. The samskāras are both that which makes and that which has been made. The six sense bases are both the internal sense organs and the external sense spheres; birth can be either the physical process of birth or the metaphysical appearance of new aggregates.⁷⁶ Furthermore, once the meaning of each nidāna is settled, there still remains the puzzle of the connection of each with the next, for it is by no means the same in each case. Masson-Oursel believes that these facts--the multiple meanings of each word, the dual aspect of each link, and the confusing and dissimilar nature of the connection between each pair of links--account for the "obscurity" surrounding dependent origination.⁷⁷

Therefore, he, too, suggests putting aside the problem of the exact and original meanings of the terms and relying on Buddhist exegesis. He relies primarily on Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, representatives of the later Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools, and so, what he finds is quite different from the views already discussed. He finds that dependent origination has lost its importance. It is no longer the fundamental teaching of the doctrine, but an "old, rusty cogwheel,"⁷⁸ nearly lost in the ontology of the Yogācāras and the criticism of the Mādhyamikas. He concludes that its importance is connected with the importance assigned to dharmas.

However, Masson-Oursel himself considers this view short-sighted, for dependent origination is not primarily an explanation of phenomenal existence. It is rather a map, or an "itinerary," of the path to enlightenment, the nidānas being markers or signposts along the way, pointing the direction.⁷⁹ He finds this meaning in taking the anuloma and pratiloma recitations of dependent origination together. The inverse order provides the key to this interpretation, simultaneously saving Buddhism from being a "pessimisme absolu."⁸⁰ In fact, when taken together, they provide the coherence and neatness sought by so many scholars. In dependent origination, Masson-Oursel finds the convergence of the answers to so many basic questions: the nature of existence, the determination of the problem of existence, the method of resolving the problem, and the rules of the religious life.

Quoi de plus conforme à la notion de dharma, que d'exprimer à la fois la nature de l'être, qu'il soit substantiel ou phénoménal, et la règle de la vie morale et religieuse? Quoi de plus conforme à l'allure habituelle de la pensée indienne, que de trouver dans la dénonciation de l'illusion la méthode même de l'affranchissement? Et même quoi de plus conforme à l'essence de toute philosophie, que d'offrir une théorie du monde qui ait pour contre-partie une doctrine de morale et de sainteté? Les deux séries de concepts se recouvrent point par point, et se confirment l'une à l'autre leur vérité intrinsèque.⁸¹

Masson-Oursel ends on a uniquely optimistic note, finding in dependent origination the coherence and the consistency, if not the logic, that have eluded so many others.

As stated at the beginning of the chapter, there are few new contributions to the study of dependent origination made during the fifty-some years that separate Masson-Oursel and Frauwallner. The most important ones do, however, deserve a brief mention. V.V. Gokhale translated the Chinese text of the Pratītyasamutpādaśāstra of Ullaṅgha into German as his dissertation at the University of Bonn in 1930. He also published the transliterated text of the Abhidharmakośakārikā of Vasubandhu in 1946, relying on the photographic negatives of Sāṅkṛtyāyana.

B.C. Law published a short article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of 1937, entitled "Formulation of Pratītyasamutpāda," in which he discusses the anuloma-pratiloma sequences of dependent origination. He suggested that the presentation of the anuloma sequence without the pratiloma sequence influenced the interpretation of dependent origination. The absence of the pratiloma order may have led some schools to consider dependent origination an unconditioned (asamskrta) reality itself, or a theory of arising, rather than as the Middle Way between eternalism and annihilation.

In his article, "Pratītyasamutpāda as Basic Concept of Buddhist Thought," B.M. Barua makes some important observations which are also stressed in Chapter Six of this work. He discusses the interpretation of dependent origination in the Kośa, giving the definitions of the limbs in the static interpretation. He points out that this twelve-limbed chain applies only to the physical existence of mankind, and is not the "whole" of dependent origination. He furthermore emphasizes that Vasubandhu states a specific purpose of this chain: to end the notion of "I". However, he looks in vain to Vasubandhu, and also to the Vibhaṅga, for the chain of dependent origination beginning with knowledge (vidya), not ignorance, and describing the development of spiritual

life. We will see in Chapter Six what the Vibhaṅga does say about the variants of the chain which do not begin with ignorance.

Our review now arrives at Erich Frauwallner's History of Indian Philosophy, which appeared in German in 1953. Let us begin with Frauwallner's conclusions. Dependent origination is " . . . the most important doctrinal statement of Buddhism . . . a very valuable example of the development of the old Buddhistic doctrine, and above all, of the inner spiritual development of the Buddha himself."⁸² It is a doctrinal statement, not a philosophical statement. It provides a way of Deliverance, no more. As an example of the development of Buddhist doctrine, it is also an example of the Buddha's "greatest weakness,"⁸³ his inability to systematize his teachings. For, as Frauwallner understands the chain, it is made up of two distinct sections, each explaining birth, and each in a different way. The first explanation runs from ignorance to feeling, the second from desire to old age and death.⁸⁴ These were originally separate teachings. Whereas the Noble Truths proclaim desire the cause of suffering, dependent origination proclaims ignorance the cause. Frauwallner asserts that the Buddha "remodelled his doctrine decisively on this point."⁸⁵ The two ideas were then mixed, but awkwardly, the twelve-linked chain being the result. " . . . The second existence in the first series of causes was equated with the first existence in the second row and so that resulted in the distribution of all the links of the chain over three births."⁸⁶ Since dependent origination "partly overhauls and replaces"⁸⁷ the Four Noble Truths, it also shows the deepening of the Buddha's insight.

It is also, however, to be considered whether it was not psychologically impossible for the Buddha to annul or to replace the knowledge which had come to him in the hour of enlightenment and which had become an unwavering certainty to him But a further formulation through supplements and explanations was possible and that has occurred in the doctrinal statement of Causal Origination.⁸⁸

A resurgence of interest in the subject of dependent origination has recently taken place. Unfortunately, much of the work is now being done in Japan and published only in Japanese, so I must exclude this reportedly excellent scholarship.⁸⁹ A Festschrift for Walpoia Rahula published in 1980, alone contains three important contributions dealing with dependent origination by three notable scholars: Lamotte, Nakamura, and Yamada. Thus we have access to just a few of these Japanese scholars' ideas. We will also consider the Danish scholar Johansson's book, The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism, which presents an interpretation of dependent origination as perception.

That dependent origination is still a puzzle is evident from the three articles in the Festschrift, for they all discuss aspects of dependent origination which have been dealt with frequently in the past. Nakamura discusses the development of the doctrine, Lamotte its connection with the Four Noble Truths, and Yamada the inverse sequence and dependent origination as emptiness (śūnyatā). Because they are the only sources available on his topic, Nakamura naturally relies on the Pali texts. Lamotte and Yamada, on the other hand, also refer to many Mahāyāna texts and their Chinese and Japanese

translations, giving a decidedly Mahāyāna preference to their work. Nonetheless, their themes, reservations, and conclusions echo those of their predecessors.

Nakamura and Lamotte both contend that dependent origination does not belong to the earliest stages of Buddhist thought. Despite the texts which place the discovery of dependent origination as occurring during the night of enlightenment, there are many more which place it at different times, and many passages which clearly show a development of the concept. Their conclusions support one frequently mentioned before: that dependent origination is an amalgam whose patchwork nature is evident in its contradictions and intricacies. The conclusion is not new, but the question of the origin of dependent origination remains irresistible, and no doubt, irresolvable.

The doctrine of dependent origination does not appear full-blown in the texts without any development. The well-known twelve-linked chain is the end result of the development of the idea, and bits and pieces of the history of that development are identifiable. As Nakamura says in the introductory paragraph to his article, "The Theory of Dependent Origination in its Incipient Stage," the idea of dependent origination existed before the formula of the twelve links.⁹⁰ That was probably " . . . formed in later stages of the development of early Buddhism."⁹¹ In the Suttanipāṭa, which is considered the oldest scripture, there is no mention of dependent origination at all. There are "descriptions" of human existence, emphasizing the greed and desire and suffering and ignorance which

characterize it. No connections are made between these characteristics; the passages are merely factual statements about human life and exhortations to avoid entanglements in worldly affairs and emotions. The vocabulary used in them is not the same as the later standard twelve terms, but synonymous. This is what Nakamura calls the "stage before the formation of the theory of dependent origination."⁹² The view of the world and of human existence contained in dependent origination is evident here, but there is no explicit chain of relationships between the items and no attempt to explain life, but only to describe it on the basis of them.

Nakamura next discusses a lengthy passage from the Sutta-nipāṭa which he labels as showing dependent origination in the process of formation.⁹³ It is indeed an interesting passage. There is an inquiry about the origin of sorrow, arguments, and conceit, to which those things which we hold dear (piya) are pointed as the cause. Then begins the standard chain of reverse inquiry, aiming at the ultimate origin of all this misery. "Being conditioned by what do dear things originate in the world?" They are traced back to greed (lobha), and desire (chanda), and the experience of the pleasant (sāta), and the unpleasant (asāta). Then follows the question, "By the absence of what (kasmim asante) do these not originate?" The answer is by the absence of touch (phassa), which depends upon name and form.⁹⁴ The passage is, as Nakamura says, "rather disorderly,"⁹⁵ but the important points are clear: the idea that things arise conditioned by others, the idea of a sequence of such arising, the idea later generalized as "when A is B is," and the idea

of the anuloma and pratiloma sequences. The vocabulary as well as the ideas are similar to that of the later twelve-linked chain. Notable is the absence of any mention of ignorance, which only later was placed at the head of the list.⁹⁶

Nakamura demonstrates with textual evidence that there is a history of the development of the idea of dependent origination. Lamotte does the same, starting with inconsistencies in the story of the Buddha's enlightenment, and concluding with their implications for the understanding of enlightenment. He begins by emphasizing the close connection, and even the overlapping, of the Four Noble Truths and dependent origination, calling them "practically interchangeable."⁹⁷ The five aggregates of appropriation (upādāna-skandha)⁹⁸ are the subject of both and ignorance is their basis. Dependent origination in direct order often substitutes for the origin of suffering and dependent origination in reverse order for its cessation, the Second and Third Truths, respectively. This is also Senart's theme.

Because of these overlappings, Lamotte concludes that, "It is difficult to see how one could acquire knowledge of the Four Noble Truths without discovering through so doing the law of Conditioned Co-production and vice-versa."⁹⁹ This was not the case, however, according to the scriptural accounts of the enlightenment. The insight into the Noble Truths is invariably placed as occurring during the Night of Enlightenment at Bodh Gaya, but the discovery of dependent origination is not.¹⁰⁰ Mostly from more recent texts, both Theravādin and Māhāyanin, Lamotte finds at least five different

times and places at which the Buddha supposedly discovered dependent origination. All of them are close to the time of the discovery of the Noble Truths, but not invariably the same time, during the last watch of the night.¹⁰¹ More important, the Buddha had "some knowledge" of dependent origination before his enlightenment, even before the birth in which he attained enlightenment.¹⁰² The Jātakas and Avadānas contain many stories in which the bodhisattva acquires fragments of the dharma.

It was indeed in the course of a previous existence that the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni discovered the old path already followed by the Buddhas who had preceded him in time . . . and formulated the doctrine of the direct and inverse Pratītya-samutpāda by borrowing so as to define it, formulae identical to those he was to use later after his Saṃbodhi.¹⁰³

The obvious question is that if the bodhisattva already understood dependent origination, what then was the enlightenment? Lamotte dismisses the objection, stating that the night of enlightenment gave him "clarity" and a "new efficacy" assuring him of nirvāṇa, and that it perfected his "qualities and attributes."¹⁰⁴ It was the culmination and the perfection of what had been imperfectly known for a long time;¹⁰⁵ it was the attainment of perfectly pure wisdom, completely free of all defilements, guaranteeing nirvāṇa;¹⁰⁶ it was the completion and the attainment of all the attributes of a Buddha.¹⁰⁷

We can now return to Lamotte's original problem: the discrepancy between the close interconnection of dependent

origination and the Four Noble Truths and their separate discovery, and his suggestion that this had doctrinal significance. The problems are solved by the proper understanding of sambodhi, or enlightenment.

Sambodhi is the culminating point of a long intellectual search . . . Bodhi is the clear and lucid version of the law of causes and effects presiding over the formation and evolution of the triple world, the knowledge of the general characteristics--impermanence, suffering and non-substantiality--of all things produced by causes with, in addition, the belief in an undefinable Nirvāṇa. The discovery of these empirical realities is neither sudden nor fortuitous.¹⁰⁸

So, dependent origination is the essence of enlightenment, but an understanding of it is acquired slowly and rigorously. Its comprehension is an intellectual process gained over the course of many lives.

Yamada's contribution to the Festschrift, "Premises and Implications of Interdependence," focuses on the inverse order of dependent origination, that is, from old age and death back to ignorance. However, he calls it the "natural and primary" sequence, as it is where the Buddha's inquiry started. He says that it leads to "interdependence."¹⁰⁹ The other sequence, which he calls the reversal sequence, that is, from ignorance to old age and death, is merely "the enumeration of the factors involved in the sequence" and leads to "causation," " . . . a systematic rearrangement of the order of conditions and consequences."¹¹⁰

The first, or natural sequence, focuses on the cessation of suffering, which was the Buddha's main concern, while the reversal sequence focuses on cause and effect. The second sequence became the topic of the Abhidhamma texts which discussed each link individually, the cause and effect relationship between the links, and a "rather mechanical theory of Karma and Rebirth."¹¹¹

Yamada contends that understanding dependent origination in its natural sequence or in its reversal sequence makes "a great difference in understanding."¹¹² Viewed in its natural sequence, "The twelve aṅgas are not so much causal chains, in which the cause precedes to the effect in rigid succession, but the factors of human existence which are interdependent upon each other simultaneously in a structural cross-section of human life."¹¹³ This way it explains "how suffering arises from wrong views and wrong actions, and how it ceases with right views and right actions."¹¹⁴ Viewed from the reversal sequence, the twelve factors become a chain of causation, with ignorance as the cause of suffering.¹¹⁵ This led to the theory of dependent origination extending over three lives.

The chain of cause and effect was understood strictly one-to-one correlating causal relationships along with the flow of time. The cause precedes the effect. The twelve factors involved are taken to explain the order of causal relationship going through man's past, present and future lives. As the elements (dharmas) of cause and effect all twelve-aṅgas are given 'substantiality' as a matter of fact.¹¹⁶

This, however, contradicts the Buddha's teaching of anātman. Yamada claims that a reciprocal relationship (aññamañña) exists among all the links. The Abhidharmists recognized only that definitely stated by the Buddha to exist between consciousness and name and form.¹¹⁷ Although no other reciprocal relationships were specified, Yamada says they are implied. Consciousness, name and form, and the six sense bases have to exist simultaneously, as do becoming, birth, and old age and death.¹¹⁸ They have a relationship which is not temporal. They are not causes and effects, otherwise the old problem of the effect pre-existing in the cause and hence being the same as it, or not existing in it, and hence being unrelated to it, arises. So the links are not causes and effects, but they are related and do exist simultaneously. "Thus the Interdependence (idappaccayatā) is not only a description of the fact of relatedness or relativity of cause and effect, but also it points to the mode of existence of cause and effect which are existing interdependently."¹¹⁹

This mutual dependence means the links have no individual independence and no self-nature (svabhāva). "Thus for Mahāyānists the Paṭiccasamuppāda finally leads to the Buddha's teaching of Anātman."¹²⁰ Dependent origination and the Three Marks of Existence, impermanence (anitya), sorrow (duḥkha), and soullessness (anātman), are closely related. "The Paṭiccasamuppāda indeed confirms the Anātman. The Paṭiccasamuppāda, which explains how Dukkha arises and ceases, finally leads to the Buddhist understanding of reality of human existence expressed as Anātman."¹²¹

The Abhidharmists, on the other hand, believed in the reality of the dharmas, and, for them, dependent origination was " . . . the causal law which determines the relationship between these elements which are real. This understanding of the Pratītyasamutpāda theory is based on the principle of 'When this is, that is' (imaṣmiṃ sati, idaṃ hoti)."¹²² It is based on the chain from ignorance to old age and death. For the Mahāyānists, for whom the mutual interdependence of the dharmas means their unreality, their lack of substantiality, "This understanding of the Pratītyasamutpāda is based on the principle of 'When this is not, that is not (imaṣmiṃ asati, idaṃ na hoti)."¹²³ It is based on the chain from old age and death to ignorance.

According to Yamada, the Abhidharma interpretation involves a contradiction between the Three Marks and dependent origination, for, although no soul was found to exist in the aggregates, the dharmas were nonetheless considered real. The Mahāyānists opposed this with their view of the emptiness of all dharmas, which, without contradiction, teaches both the interrelatedness and the impermanence of them.¹²⁴

One of the most recent and most thorough attempts to interpret dependent origination is Rune Johansson's The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism (1979). He describes his work as " . . . a psychologist's attempt to understand what the Buddha meant by 'dependent origination' "¹²⁵ The Nikāyas of the Pali Canon are his only sources and his method is the compilation of all passages where the terms occur. He eliminates only those that are

idiosyncratic, or so I understand his reservation, "I have tried to accept only explanations that I think agree with all the facts in the Nikāyas."¹²⁶ Johansson understands Buddhism as a psychological system, a bias which is clearly evident in an earlier work about nirvāṇa, The Psychology of Nirvāṇa. With respect to dependent origination, he states outright, "I think that the only aim of Early Buddhism was a certain transformation of the human individual personality and that paṭiccasamuppāda is both an explanation and a prescription."¹²⁷ Some might object that Buddhism involves more than a transformation of the personality, but the identification of dependent origination as a statement of the problem, the analysis of the problem, and the solution to the problem, is familiar.

Johansson stresses two features of Buddhist thought that he finds pervasive and crucial. One is the lack of a clear distinction or dichotomy between the subjective and objective worlds. As we have seen, this blurring of two realms we normally keep distinct has elicited comment from others as well.

The other feature is the dynamism of life. Perception is the "principal factor"¹²⁸ of Buddhist psychology, the perception of a constantly changing world by a constantly changing mind. In fact, he thinks the dynamic nature of early Buddhist psychology has not been adequately recognized. Thus, for the ordinary man, the world and his perceptions of it are hopelessly intertwined, actually creating each other. "The world is a dynamic process, constantly being produced and deliberately constructed by our senses, our thoughts and our desires."¹²⁹ The world does exist, but our perceptions of it are an

integral part of it and create our experience of it and of life. The goal, then, is to acquire mastery over our perceptions, an achievement that will change our perceptions and experiences. It is the inability to control our perceptions that is the problem stated in dependent origination. They are so difficult to control because all these "endless sequences of conscious processes"¹³⁰ are produced by the mind and condition one another. It is by meditation and understanding that one gains control.¹³¹

Others have emphasized dependent origination as an explanation of rebirth; Johansson emphasizes dependent origination as an explanation of perception, but contends that these are not actually different interpretations, both rebirth and perception being suffering. "The series is conceived to explain the arising of perceptual, emotional and intentional processes; these processes are themselves called jāti, 'birth', but they also are the formation of the next personality."¹³²

The interpretation of dependent origination as a description of the perceptual process goes as follows:

The links of the series would correspond to factors influencing the process. The main phases would be: (a) sensation with its feeling-tone, as described above, (b) craving, which means personal selection and distortion through adjustment to prevailing needs, (c) upādāna and the following links, which create a subjective superstructure of interpretation and evaluation.¹³³

The pivotal link in this process of distorted perception is desire or craving (taṇhā), for without desire there is no motivation

to perceive what one wants to perceive, believe what one wants to believe, or acquire what one wants to acquire. The core of the personality transformation described by dependent origination lies in the elimination of bad motives.¹³⁴

Johansson conceives dependent origination as twelve factors which are "functions of the personality"¹³⁵ existing in time. They all exist simultaneously and continually interact, conditioning one another. As to its being a chain of causation, he cautions against a strict or literal interpretation of the phrase; it means no more than "When this is, that is."¹³⁶

According to Johansson,

. . . the five first links are constitutional factors, in the sense of different dimensions of activity and experience, but also historically responsible for the beginning and the differential growth of our personalities. Phassa and vedanā are the receptive functions of personality. Taṇhā forces us to get involved in the world, to build values and superstructures, to build up our personalities in good or bad directions (in upādāna) and so to prepare us for prolonged life (bhava) and get more and more involved in suffering.¹³⁷

Insight into dependent origination and the Four Noble Truths results in a changed personality--one without moral defects, emotional entanglements, misperceptions, or self-centeredness.¹³⁸ This is Nirvāṇa.

There is certainly no unanimity as to the interpretation of dependent origination, nor is there any real chronology or development of interpretation. There are scholars whose insights and

sources mark significant contributions, but the same points and the same problems have been discussed for decades. A tension which runs throughout the history of the attempts to understand dependent origination stands out very clearly: the tension between looking at dependent origination as a philosophical doctrine of which coherence and clarity can be demanded and that of looking at dependent origination as a moral or religious teaching of which only effectiveness should be expected.¹³⁹

The following chapters address one of the most difficult problems still remaining in the interpretation of dependent origination: What is the temporal relation of the twelve links? As we saw, Oldenberg pointed out that there is a fundamental flaw in the sequence of the chain, which describes human existence in limbs three through ten, before the statement of birth in limb eleven. Senart and Frauwallner focussed on the apparent repetition in the chain, which even the three-lives theory cannot completely eliminate. Oltramare and Masson-Oursel both stressed the importance of the pratiloma sequence of the chain. Although Oltramare was disturbed by the many variants of the chain, and Masson-Oursel by the inconsistencies between the links, their interest in the pratiloma sequence may have led them to concentrate on the purpose rather than the structure of the chain. Yamada returns to this theme, claiming that the anuloma sequence teaches only a series of causes and effects, while the pratiloma sequence teaches interdependence and simultaneity. Chapter Six will discuss Abhidhamma texts that challenge Yamada's assertion that the Hīnayāna schools failed to see these more subtle implications of dependent origination. Johansson has suggested that perception and birth are really the same process. This could eliminate the contradictions which currently arise

from the necessity of choosing between the definitions of consciousness as either perception or conception.¹⁴⁰ We will also discuss in Chapter Six what Buddhaghosa has to say about this.

As stated in my opening remarks, I studied Vasubandhu's and Buddhaghosa's explanations of the consciousness limb and decided that it held the key to many of these temporal problems. This, of course, is what La Vallée Poussin suggested in Théorie des douze causes. He, however, felt that the Kośa had integrated the successive and the simultaneous interpretations of dependent origination with its theory of static and serial dependent origination. I do not challenge his suggestion that such a reconciliation may be possible; I challenge only his suggestion that the Kośa has succeeded in this task. We will therefore now see what the Kośa has to say about dependent origination, and then compare it with the Visuddhimagga.

NOTES

¹ See the indexes: Nakamura, Indian Buddhism; Pierre Beatrix, Bibliographie du Bouddhisme, vol. I (Brussels: Institut Belge des Hauts Études Bouddhiques, 1970); Karl Potter, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, vol. I of The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, 2nd. rev. ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.)

² See footnote 139, pp. 95-6.

³ Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought, p. 58.

⁴ These references were taken from Paul Oltramare, La Formule bouddhique des douze causes (Geneva: Librairie Georg & Cie, 1909), pp. 20-6.

⁵ Hermann Oldenberg, Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order, trans. William Hoey (London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1882), p. 223.

⁶ Ibid., p. 224.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 224-5.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 226-7.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 242.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 247.

¹² Ibid., p. 235.

¹³ Ibid., p. 236.

14 Oldenberg, Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order, p. 236.

15 Ibid., p. 240.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 242.

18 Ibid., p. 239.

19 Ibid., pp. 239-40.

20 Ibid., pp. 248-9.

21 Ibid., p. 250.

22 Émile Senart, "A Propos de la théorie bouddhique des douze nidānas," Recueil de Travaux d'Erudition offert à Mgr Charles de Harlez (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1896), p. 281.

23 Ibid., p. 283.

24 Ibid., p. 284.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., p. 295.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., pp. 284-5.

29 Ibid., pp. 285-6.

30 Ibid., p. 286.

31 Senart, "A Propos de la théorie bouddhique des douze nidānas," pp. 287-8.

32 Ibid., p. 290.

33 Ibid., p. 288.

34 Ibid., p. 294.

35 Oltramare, La Formule bouddhique des douze causes, p. 9.

36 Ibid., p. 10.

37 Ibid., p. 17.

38 Ibid., p. 18.

39 Ibid., p. 33-4.

40 Ibid., pp. 38ff.

41 Ibid., pp. 41-2.

42 Ibid., pp. 27-8.

43 Ibid., p. 36.

44 Ibid., pp. 29-30.

45 Ibid., p. 36.

46 Ibid., p. 37.

47 Ibid., p. 49.

48 Ibid., p. 48.

- 49 Oltramare, La Formule bouddhique des douze causes, p. 12.
- 50 Ibid., p. 15, fn. 1.
- 51 La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes, p. VI.
- 52 Ibid., p. VIII.
- 53 Ibid., pp. 1-5.
- 54 Ibid., pp. VIII-IX.
- 55 Ibid., VI.
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 Ibid., p. VII.
- 58 Ibid., p. 69. See Ch. 6, footnote 3, p. 337 for the Śālistamba Sūtra.
- 59 Ibid., p. 34.
- 60 Ibid., pp. 34-5.
- 61 Ibid., pp. 47-8.
- 62 Ibid., p. 38, fn. 2.
- 63 Ibid., p. 38.
- 64 Ibid., p. 39.
- 65 Ibid., p. 40.
- 66 Ibid., p. 41.
- 67 Ibid., p. 41.

68 La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes, p. 41.

69 Ibid., p. 59.

70 Ibid., pp. 59-60.

71 Ābhiprāyika, which La Vallée Poussin translates in the passage below as "intentional," is more accurately translated by V. S. Bhattacharya's phrase, "intended to imply or suggest something different from what is expressed by the words," as Michael Broido shows in his article, "Intention and Suggestion in the Abhidharma-kośa: Sandhābhāṣā Revisited," Journal of Indian Philosophy 13, No. 4 (Dec. 1985): 327. It refers to the levels of teaching within Buddhism aimed at listeners having various capacities for understanding. An ābhiprāyika word or phrase is a figurative one, not meant to be understood literally, although it can be, which suggests the speaker's real meaning to those with greater insight and understanding. It is contrasted in the Kośa to a lākṣaṇika word or phrase which gives a definition. See 3.25b., translation, p. 166.

72 Ibid., p. 61.

73 Ibid., p. 64.

74 P. Masson-Oursel, "Essai d'interprétation de la théorie bouddhique des douze conditions (nidānas) Pratītya Samutpāda," in Revue de l'Histoire des Religions (Paris: Ernest Leroux, Editeur, 1915), p. 30.

75 Ibid., p. 31.

76 Ibid., pp. 31-3.

77 Ibid., p. 34.

78 Ibid., p. 38.

79 Masson-Oursel, "Essai d'interprétation de la théorie bouddhique des douze conditions (nidānas) Pratītya Samutpāda," p. 39.

80 Ibid., p. 40.

81 Ibid., pp. 39-40.

82 Erich Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, trans. V. M. Bedekar. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), p. 169.

83 Ibid., p. 168.

84 Ibid., pp. 166-8. Frauwallner's theory is confirmed by a commentary to the Udānavarga discussed by Franz Bernhard in "Zur Interpretation der Pratītyasamutpāda-Formel," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens 12-13 (1968/1969): 53-63. He shows that two separate commentators have explained the same terms in the Udānavarga by using different links of dependent origination, Prajñāvarman beginning with ignorance and Kātyāyana(putra) with desire. Also see pp. 316-17.

85 Ibid., p. 156.

86 Ibid., p. 167.

87 Ibid., p. 169.

88 Ibid., pp. 168-9.

89 See, in particular, Nakamura, Indian Buddhism, for references to Japanese works.

90 Nakamura, "The Theory of Dependent Origination in its Incipient Stage," p. 165.

91 Ibid.

92 Nakamura, "The Theory of Dependent Origination in its Incipient Stage," pp. 165-6.

93 Ibid., pp. 167-8.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid., p. 168.

96 Ibid., p. 171.

97 Lamotte, p. 119.

98 On the upādānaskandha, see pp. 106-10.

99 Lamotte, p. 119.

100 Ibid., pp. 119-20.

101 Ibid., p. 121.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid., p. 122.

104 Ibid., p. 123.

105 Ibid., p. 126.

106 Ibid., p. 127.

107 Ibid., p. 131.

108 Ibid., pp. 125-6.

109 Yamada, p. 269.

110 Yamada, pp. 269-70.

111 Ibid., p. 270.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., p. 271.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid., pp. 272-3.

117 Ibid., p. 273.

118 Ibid., p. 274.

119 Ibid., p. 276.

120 Ibid., p. 277.

121 Ibid., pp. 277-8.

122 Ibid., p. 279.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid., p. 281.

125 Rune Johansson, The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism (London and Malmö: Curzon Press; New Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co., 1979), p. 7.

126 Ibid., p. 8.

127 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

128 Johansson, The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism, p. 9.

129 Ibid., p. 28.

130 Ibid., p. 24.

131 Ibid., p. 28.

132 Ibid., p. 34.

133 Ibid., pp. 95-6.

134 Ibid., p. 102.

135 Ibid., p. 143.

136 Ibid., p. 138.

137 Ibid., p. 142.

138 Ibid., pp. 203-4.

139 Of the articles on dependent origination which I have not discussed in this chapter, there are three which I would like to mention briefly. I mention them in a footnote only as their contribution is not significant enough to merit longer discussion, and yet, of the current publications on dependent origination, they are the best. First, there is an unpublished paper by Iida and Matsumoto of the University of British Columbia, delivered at a conference in 1978, which discusses another, later work by Vasubandhu, the Pratītyasamutpāḍādivibhaṅganirdeśa. Fragments of the original exist; G. Tucci edited and published them in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society in 1930. Iida relied upon the Tibetan translation. The authors claim that " . . . [Vasubandhu] revised the ps section in the AKB when he composed the PSAVN." (p. 12) The crux of the meaning of dependent origination is the purpose of the two-fold general formula. In the Kośa, Vasubandhu supports the interpretation which claims the general formula specifies what occurs in

the applied formula, that is, that the preceding limb is the only cause of the succeeding limb. Dependent origination is a chain of causation operating in an individual life. This is the Vaibhāṣika interpretation which Vasubandhu repudiates in the *PSAVN*, according to *lida*. (p. 13) In that work, he explains the general and the applied formulas of dependent origination as showing different aspects of arising. The first half shows that things arise from a cause as "ceaselessness," the second that they arise as "finiteness" and the applied formula that they arise as "capacity." (pp. 18-19) These are the three characteristics of dependent origination, a theory which does not appear in the *Kośa*.

The second article, written by A. D. P. Kalansuriya, appeared in the *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1979, pp. 7-22. It belongs to the tradition which argues that dependent origination must be interpreted contextually, from an ethical or religious standpoint. Attempts to find in it the equivalents of modern empirical or scientific laws render the doctrine "unintelligible." (p. 19)

The last article is Rita Gupta's, which was published in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 5, nos. 1,2, Sept./Dec. 1977, pp. 163-86, entitled "'Twelve-Membered Dependent Origination': An Attempted Reappraisal." Her thesis is that the beginning of the idea that causation can be analyzed as conditioning, rather than producing, is traceable to twelve-limbed dependent origination. With the exception of ignorance and the karmically-caused tendencies, the karmically-caused tendencies and consciousness, and grasping and becoming, the causality between the links is a conditioning, not a producing.

¹⁴⁰ See p. 10.

Introduction to the Translation

Abhidharma philosophy is complicated and technical. In addition, as it is based on a cosmology completely different from our own, the reader requires maps, as it were, to orient himself. The task is not quite so formidable as it first seems once one has some basic definitions and concepts. This introduction is intended to provide the information essential to understanding the Sarvāstivādin dharmas and their many classifications.¹ Without this information, the translation which follows will not be comprehensible. An introduction of this type seems preferable to lengthy, detailed footnotes, as these interrupt the reader and cannot be offered in the logical, but only the chronological, order, or to a glossary of terms, which also precludes a coherent presentation. The material in this introduction is based on the Kośa and the bhāṣya themselves,² and cross-references to the appropriate pages in the translation and the introduction are included. The first reference in the parentheses in this chapter refers to the chapter and verse in the Kośa where the subject is discussed; the second gives the page in the translation which follows where the term or concept occurs. Footnotes to the translation contain references to the appropriate pages in this introduction. It is not intended to be a complete exposition of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

Cosmology

The Buddhist cosmos consists of the bhājanaloka, or world receptacle, which is the physical or geological world, and the

various strata of beings it contains.⁴ (See Table I, pp. 99-100). This world receptacle is divided into three spheres of beings: the Kāmadhātu, the Rūpadhātu, and the Ārūpyadhātu.⁵ The compounds can be analyzed as meaning either the realm associated with sensual pleasures, the realm associated with matter, and the realm associated with the non-material, or the realm of sensual pleasures, the realm of matter, and the realm of the non-material. (3.3, pp. 159, 235-9) Kāma means desire or greed, particularly for food and sexual pleasure. Rūpa will be explained in detail later,⁶ for the present, "matter" or "form" is an adequate translation. Ārūpya is an adjective formed from arūpa, meaning that which is not matter, or without matter, so it means the non-material. (3.3) These three spheres are arranged horizontally, the Ārūpyadhātu above the Rūpadhātu, the Rūpadhātu above the Kāmadhātu. The beings of each sphere are increasingly refined. Those in the Kāmadhātu have material bodies and are plagued by desires, but those of the Rūpadhātu do not experience desires and lack the sense organs of smell and taste. Those of the Ārūpyadhātu have neither bodies nor desires, only consciousness exists there.⁷

In the Kāmadhātu, there are five gatis, or destinies, five different possible types of birth. They are: as a hellish being, a preta or "ghost," an animal, a man, or a god. (3.4) As mentioned, the Vaibhāṣikas also believed in an antarābhava, or intermediate birth, in the Kāmadhātu and the Rūpadhātu. (3.12-17) The Rūpadhātu has seventeen, or according to the Sarvāstivādins, sixteen, places of rebirth (sthāna). Each of the first three meditations (dhyāna)⁸ has

Table I.

The Cosmology of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (pp. 97-101)

The three spheres are arranged horizontally, the immaterial above the material, the material above the sensual. The beings of each sphere are increasingly refined. There are innumerable such worlds. There are many more divisions within each of these realms, for the details, see the Kośa, 3.1-9.

The World Receptacle (bhājanaloka)

the immaterial realm
(Ārūpyadhātu)

four modes of rebirth:

- 1) the sphere of the infinity of space
(ākāśānantyāyatana)
- 2) the sphere of the infinity of consciousness (vijñānānantyāyatana)
- 3) the sphere of nothingness
(ākīṃcanyāyatana)
- 4) the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana) also known as the bhavāgra

the material realm
(Rūpadhātu)

These are various categories of divine birth, obtained by practicing the appropriate meditation.

seventeen places of rebirth (sthāna):

the fourth stage of meditation (dhyāna):

- 1) Anabhrakas 5) Atapas
- 2) Puṇyaprasavas 6) Sudṛśas
- 3) Bṛhatphalas 7) Sudarśanas
- 4) Avṛhas 8) Akaniṣṭhas

the third stage of meditation:

- 1) Parīttaśubhas
- 2) Apramāṇaśubhas
- 3) Śubhakṛtsnas

the second stage of meditation:

- 1) Parīttābhas
- 2) Apramāṇābhas
- 3) Ābhāsvaras

the first stage of meditation:

- 1) Brahmakāyikas
- 2) Brahmapurohitas
- 3) Mahābrahmans

the sensual realm
(Kāmadhātu)

Certain divine births are included within the realm of sensual pleasures.

five types of birth (gati):

- 1) as a god
- 2) as a human
- 3) as an animal
- 4) as a "ghost" (preta)
- 5) in one of the hells

three stages, the fourth has eight. (3.2) Rebirth in one of these sthānas is the result of having practiced that particular meditation. The Ārūpyadhātu does not have places of rebirth, but modes of rebirth. They are: the heaven or the stage of the infinity of space (ākāśānantyāyatana), the heaven of the infinity of consciousness (viññānānantyāyatana), the heaven of nothingness (ākimcanyāyatana), and the heaven of neither perception nor non-perception (naivasam-jñānāsamjñāyatana), also called the bhavāgra, the summit of existence.⁹ (3.3, 8.4, pp. 226-7, 238) Thus, the four dhyānas of the Rūpadhātu and the four ārūpyas of the Ārūpyadhātu are known as the basic or fundamental meditations (maulasamāpattidravya). (8.6, p. 239) They are of two types, being both realms of existence (3.3) and stages of meditation. (8.2) Practicing the dhyānas leads to rebirth in the Rūpadhātu, practicing the ārūpyas leads to rebirth in the Ārūpyadhātu.

Dharma

The universe, both the bhājanaloka and all the beings inhabiting it, is composed of dharmas. They are its irreducible building blocks; everything can be broken down into its constituent dharmas. Although dharma is a basic concept of Buddhism, the word has a wide range of meaning. Derived from the root dhṛ, meaning to hold, carry, or bear,¹⁰ a dharma is that which supports or maintains. It is often used simply to refer to the Buddha's teaching and doctrine. Further, it is the law or the order of things.¹¹ It is also morality and proper conduct. Most important here, dharma is also a technical

term, meaning an "element of existence."¹² Dharmas are both mental and physical. They are both subjective or psychological states and also objective or material things. The word thus frequently refers to the entire world of phenomena.

Vasubandhu defines a dharma as that which supports its own nature or its own characteristic.¹³ A dharma has a unique characteristic, it has a unique intrinsic nature. Each dharma is in this sense separate and minimal. Its nature is distinctly identifiable, not shared with other dharmas, and not composite. However, this definition describes only a dharma's nature, not its existence. Although its nature is not dependent on anything other than itself, its existence is. With the exception of the three unconditioned dharmas, see below, a dharma arises through the combination of its prerequisite conditions. A dharma does not support its own existence; its reality does not imply its eternality. This does not apply, however, to the three unconditioned dharmas, which are eternal, and free of any connection with causality. Clearly, there is an unbridgeable difference between the conditioned and the unconditioned dharmas. The existence of the conditioned dharmas is dependent and transitory, the existence of the unconditioned is neither. In fact, the question of the determinants of a conditioned dharma's existence was one of the main problems confronted by the Sarvāstivādins, as we saw in the second chapter. That they exist and can be identified, that they are transitory, and that they are interconnected, were accepted. How they were interconnected, given their transitoriness, and how, through their ephemeral relations, they constituted the

world of phenomena and experience, were debated. The solutions, as we also saw, were not entirely satisfactory. The meaning of a dharma's status as past, present, or future had to be carefully distinguished from the common temporal meaning of the past, present, and future, and defined instead in terms of completion of activity. The confusion about the status of a dharma before and after its brief "life" led opponents to suspect that all dharmans were eternal. Was a dharma something new, created by the combination of its necessary conditions, or did the dharma already exist in some sense, and "approach" its conditions in order to arise? What was the status of those dharmans which had already arisen and passed, but whose effects had not yet taken place? Although the general concept of a dharma is not difficult to understand, many problems arise in explaining its status and functioning. Perhaps attempting to understand the purpose of the concept will be more fruitful. We will conclude this Introduction with further remarks and speculations about the purpose of the analysis and classification of the world into dharmans.

According to the Sarvāstivādins, there are in all seventy-five dharmans, divided into those that are conditioned (samskrta) (pp. 165, 178) and those that are unconditioned (asamskrta) (See Table II, p. 105). Conditioned means that they are produced by causes which have united and combined. A dharma is never produced by a single cause.¹⁴ The conditioned dharmans are the five aggregates (skandha) (pp. 158, 161, 212):¹⁵ material form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), perception (samjñā), the karmically-caused

tendencies (saṃskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna). (1.7) They have four characteristics according to the Vaibhāṣikas--arising (jāti), decay (jarā), duration (sthitī), and impermanence (anityatā). (2.45) The unconditioned dharmas number only three. They are space (ākāśa) and the two types of cessation, or nirvāṇa. (1.5-6) Pratisaṃkhyānirodha is cessation due to wisdom or knowledge of the Four Noble Truths; apratisaṃkhyānirodha is cessation due not to wisdom, but to the removal of the causes of rebirth. The unconditioned dharmas are eternal (1.48), and thus have no relation to causality, having neither causes nor results. (2.55)

Dharmas are also either pure (anāsrava) or impure (sāsrava). (1.4, pp. 219, 235) With only one exception, the pure dharmas are the unconditioned dharmas, and the impure the conditioned. The exception is those dharmas constituting the Noble Path, which, although conditioned, are pure. (1.5) Conditioned dharmas are impure because they "have relations with"¹⁶ the defilements (kleśa).¹⁷ The impure conditioned dharmas are the five upādānaskandhas, the aggregates of appropriation. (1.8, p. 249) Upādāna here means the defilements. The upādānaskandhas, then, are the aggregates of the common man.¹⁸

All impure dharmas are sorrow (duḥkha) because of the three principles of sorrow. (6.3) There is sorrow which is sorrow by its very nature, such as unhappy feeling; there is sorrow which is sorrow because of change, and there is sorrow which is sorrow because of being conditioned.¹⁹

Table II.

The 75 Dharmas of the Sarvāstivādins (pp. 103-4)

There are two main categories of dharmas, the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) and the conditioned (saṃskṛta). The unconditioned dharmas are eternal, and have no connection with causality. The conditioned dharmas are transitory, and arise through a combination of causes.

- I) the unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta)
 - A. space (ākāśa)
 - B. cessation (= nirvāṇa) due to wisdom (pratisaṃkhyānirodha)
 - C. cessation due to the termination of the causes of rebirth (apratisaṃkhyānirodha)
- II) the conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta) (1.7)
 - A. the five aggregates (skandha):
 - 1. material form (rūpa)
 - 2. feeling (vedanā)
 - 3. perception (saṃjñā)
 - 4. karmically-caused tendencies (saṃskāra)
 - 5. consciousness (viññāna)

The unconditioned dharmas are pure (anāsrava), except for those dharmas constituting the Noble Eightfold Path; the conditioned dharmas are impure (sāsrava).

A word often found in connection with dharma is dravya. (pp. 167, 204, 206, 232, 254). A dravya is a real thing, a thing-in-itself, an individual substance. It is that which has its own character, but, unlike dharmas, dravyas are eternal, they are permanent.²⁰ (1.38) The word is synonymous with unconditioned (asamskrta).²¹

Aggregates, Spheres, and Components

The aggregates (skandha), spheres (āyatana) (p. 161), and components (dhātu)²² are three different classifications of the seventy-five dharmas. (See Table III, pp. 108-9). All the conditioned dharmas are included in the aggregates, and all dharmas, both conditioned and unconditioned, are included in the spheres and the components. The unconditioned dharmas are not part of the aggregates because they do not fit into any of the five categories of aggregates. (1.22)

The Buddha taught this threefold division in order to cater to the various types of people. (1.20) Those who mistakenly consider the mental accompaniments (caitta)²³ to be a soul (ātman), who have sharp insight and understanding, and who like brief explanations, are taught the aggregates. Those who think material form (rūpa) is a soul, who are of average insight, and like things explained at normal length, are taught the spheres. Those who think that both the mental and material dharmas are a soul, who have little insight, and prefer lengthy explanations, are taught the components.

Skandha means "mass, heap" (rāśi). (1.20) There are five: the rūpaskandha (1.9), or aggregate of matter, composed of the five sense organs, the five sense objects, and non-indication (avi-jñapti),²⁴ as well as the four great elements (mahābhūta)²⁵ and that derived from them (upādāyarūpa or bhautika); the vedanāskandha (1.14), or aggregate of feeling, which is pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent; the saṃjñāskandha (1.14), the aggregate of the perception of the characteristics of a thing, of six types corresponding to the six sense organs; the saṃskāraskandha (1.15), the aggregate of tendencies, which includes all conditioned dharmas not included in another one of the aggregates; and the viññānaskandha (1.16), or aggregate of consciousness, also of six types corresponding to the six sense organs.

The aggregates are listed in order of decreasing grossness, which also corresponds to their distribution among the three realms. The Kāmadhātu is the sphere of matter and sensual pleasures, the Rūpadhātu that of sensation and the Ārūyadhātu that of ideation and consciousness. Their order also corresponds to the process of defilement, which begins with attachment to material form and pleasures, and eventually progresses to defile consciousness. (1.22)

As stated, all seventy-two conditioned dharmas are included in the five aggregates (1.7), and all the impure dharmas are included in the aggregates of appropriation (upādānaskandha). (1.8) The term upādānaskandha refers to the five impure aggregates which constitute the personality and which the common man mistakenly considers the self. Upādāna here means the defilements (kleśa). The

Table III.

Classification Systems of the Dharmas (pp. 106-12)

There are many different ways to classify the dharmas. The division into aggregates (skandha), spheres (āyatana), and components (dhātu) is the most common. It is the subject of the first chapter of the Kośa.

I. A. Aggregates:

1. material form (rūpa)
2. feeling (vedanā)
3. perception (saṃjñā)
4. karmically-caused tendencies (saṃskāra)
5. consciousness (vijñāna)

B. Spheres:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. eye (<u>caṣurindriyāyatana</u>) | 7. visual objects (<u>rūpāyatana</u>) |
| 2. ear (<u>śrotendriyāyatana</u>) | 8. sounds (<u>śabdāyatana</u>) |
| 3. nose (<u>ghrāṇendriyāyatana</u>) | 9. odors (<u>gandhāyatana</u>) |
| 4. tongue (<u>jihvendriyāyatana</u>) | 10. tastes (<u>rasāyatana</u>) |
| 5. the body (<u>kāyendriyāyatana</u>) | 11. tangibles (<u>spraṣṭavyāyatana</u>) |
| 6. the mind (<u>manendriyāyatana</u>) | 12. ideas (<u>dharmāyatana</u>) |

C. Components

- | | | |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. eye | 7. visual objects | 13. visual consciousness * |
| 2. ear | 8. sounds | (<u>caṣurvijñānadhātu</u>) |
| 3. nose | 9. odors | 14. auditory consciousness |
| 4. tongue | 10. tastes | (<u>śrotavijñānadhātu</u>) |
| 5. body | 11. tangibles | 15. olfactory consciousness |
| 6. mind | 12. ideas | (<u>ghrāṇavijñānadhātu</u>) |
| | | 16. gustatory consciousness |
| | | (<u>jihvāvijñānadhātu</u>) |
| | | 17. tactile consciousness |
| | | (<u>kāyavijñānadhātu</u>) |
| | | 18. mental consciousness |
| | | (<u>manovijñānadhātu</u>) |

* See remarks on pp. 119-20.

All eighteen of the components occur only in the Kāmadhātu. Fourteen occur in the Rūpadhātu, because neither smell nor taste, nor the consciousnesses of them exist there. Only three occur in the Ārūpyadhātu: mind (manodhātu), ideas (dharmadhātu), and mental consciousness (manovijñānadhātu), 6, 12, and 18 in the Table above.

upādānaskandhas are so called because they feed the defilements, or are ruled by them, or give rise to them.²⁶ (1.8, p. 249) Therefore, although the aggregates can be either pure or impure, the aggregates of appropriation are only impure. (1.22) As such, they are the false view of the self (satkāyadr̥ṣṭi). (5.7)

Āyatana means the "door of entry" (āyadvāra) of thought and mental accompaniments.²⁷ (1.20, p. 161) It is a classification of the dharmas into twelve categories, made from the viewpoint of consciousness and cognition. There are six internal faculties of consciousness and six corresponding external objects of consciousness. They are: visual sense (caḥsurindriyāyatana) and visual objects (rūpāyatana), auditory sense (śrotendriyāyatana) and sounds (śabdāyatana), olfactory sense (ghrāṇendriyāyatana) and odors (gandhāyatana), gustatory sense (jihvendriyāyatana) and tastes (rasāyatana), tactile sense (kāyendriyāyatana) and tangibles (spraṣṭavyāyatana), and consciousness (manendriyāyatana) and mental objects (dharmāyatana). The first ten spheres fall within the aggregate of material form (rūpaskandha). Manāyatana, or mental sphere, is a term for the six types of consciousness considered together.²⁸

The order in which the spheres are enumerated also has significance. (1.23) The first five are first because their object is present at the time of the consciousness of it, whereas the object of the sixth, the mind, can be simultaneous, past, future, tri-temporal, or non-temporal. Or, the first four are first because their objects are derived matter (upādāyarūpa), whereas the object of the fifth,

the body, can be either primary or derived matter. Or, they are arranged according to the necessary proximity of their objects. For example, the eye can perceive at a great distance, whereas the body cannot.

Dhātu, which was earlier defined as meaning, "that which supports its own character,"²⁹ here means family, race, or type (gotra). (1.20)³⁰ In this context, it is translated as "component" in the text. It refers to the eighteen different types of dharmas which are found in the stream (santāna) of an individual life. They are compared to the different types of metals or minerals which can be extracted from a single mine, the dhātus being called the mines of their own type. (1.20)

There are eighteen components. The first twelve are the same as the twelve spheres, the remaining six are the corresponding consciousnesses produced from each pair of the spheres. Therefore, they are: visual consciousness (cakṣurvijñānadhātu), auditory consciousness (śrotavijñānadhātu), olfactory consciousness (ghrāṇavijñānadhātu), gustatory consciousness (jihvāvijñānadhātu), tactile consciousness (kāyavijñānadhātu), and mental consciousness (manovijñānadhātu). Again, the first ten belong to the aggregate of material form. (1.29)

Not all these types of consciousness occur in every realm. In the higher realms, material or sense consciousness disappears. So, all eighteen components exist in the Kāmadhātu, but only fourteen exist in the Rūpadhātu because of the absence of smell and taste and the consciousnesses of them there. Only three of the eighteen exist

in the Ārūpyadhātu: the manodhātu, or mental organ, the dharmadhātu, or objects of mental consciousness,³¹ and the manovijñānadhātu, or mental consciousness. (pp. 213, 252)

The Five Categories of the Sarvāstivādins

There is another fivefold classification of the dharmas given in 2.22. This division is peculiar to the Sarvāstivādins.³² There, dharmas are said to belong to one of the following categories: matter (rūpa), mind (citta), mental accompaniments (caitta), which are those dharmas associated with thought, thought-dissociated dharmas (cittaviprayukta), which are the tendencies (saṃskāra) not associated with thought, and the unconditioned dharmas. (See Table IV, p. 113). No more will be said about the unconditioned dharmas. The others, however, occur frequently in the translation, and will be considered briefly, one by one.

Material Form (Rūpa)

Matter (rūpa), as already explained, is the first of the five aggregates, defined in 1.9 as the five sense organs, the five sense objects, and non-indication. (See Table V, p. 115). As the ten sense organs and their objects have already been discussed under the components (dhātu), and non-indication is discussed separately on pages 117-19, some general remarks on the nature of rūpa will be offered here.

Table IV.

Classification Systems of the Dharmas (p. 112)

II. The following classification system is peculiar to the Sarvāstivādins. It is merely another way of dividing the 75 dharmas classified as unconditioned or conditioned in Table I, and as aggregates, spheres, and components in Table II. For further details on these categories, see Tables V, VI, and VII.

- A. material form (rūpa)
- B. mind (citta)
- C. mental accompaniments (caitta)
- D. thought-dissociated dharmas (cittaviprayukta dharmas)
- E. unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta)

In everyday usage, rūpa means that which is visible, colors and shapes. Its two primary meanings are therefore "visual objects or forms" and "matter." Note that the word rūpa is used for the sense object of the eye. Although there are ten spheres which are included in the aggregate of form, one in particular is called the sphere of form (rūpāyatana), and that is visible object. (I.24) The "sphere of form" is reserved for the objects of the eye because they, above all else, meet the requirements for being considered rūpa. That is, they resist, and can therefore be hurt by contact, and they are visible, and can therefore be definitely located or pointed out. (I.24)

The word rūpa is derived etymologically from the verb rūpyate (Skt. lup), to be broken, hurt, or damaged.³³ (I.13) Rūpa, it is explained, is damaged by change or deterioration (vipariṇāma). Others, however, object that it is not deterioration that defines rūpa, but impenetrability (pratigha). Rūpa is that which occupies space and resists when contacted.

It is this fact of resisting that above all else characterises rūpa. Rūpa is sapratigha; it resists when something comes into contact with it. There are three types of resistance (I.29, p. 217): āvaraṇapratighāta, or resistance to being displaced or penetrated, viṣayapratighāta, or the contact of a sense organ with its object, and ālambanapratighāta, or the contact of mind and mental accompaniments with their object. Among the components, the five sense objects are resistant in the first sense only, that of impenetrability. The five sense organs are resistant both in that sense and also in the second, by contact with their sphere of action.

Table V.

Rūpa (p. 112-17)

Material form (rūpa) is defined in 1.9 as the five sense organs, their respective objects, and non-indication (avijñapti). The sense organs and sense objects are, of course, spheres 1-5 and 7-11, and components 1-5 and 7-11 in Table III.

I. A. the five sense organs:

1. the eye
2. the ear
3. the nose
4. the tongue
5. the body

B. the five sense objects:

1. visual objects
2. sounds
3. odors
4. tastes
5. tangibles

C. non-indication

There is another common division of rūpa into the four primary elements (bhūta) and the eighteen secondary phenomena (bhautika or upādāyarūpa) derived from them.

II. A. the four primary elements (bhūta or mahābhūta):

1. earth (prthivī)
2. water (ap)
3. fire (tejas)
4. wind (vāyu)

B. the secondary phenomena (bhautika):

11. the five sense organs, the five sense objects, non-indication
12. smoothness (ślakṣnatva)
13. roughness (karkaśa)
14. heaviness (gurutva)
15. lightness (laghutva)
16. cold (śīta)
17. hunger (bubhukṣā)
18. thirst (pipāsā)

Another division of rūpa which frequently occurs in the text is that into the four primary elements (bhūta or mahābhūta) (1.12) and the secondary phenomena dependent on them (bhautika or upādāya-rūpa) (pp. 223, 255). The four elements are earth (pṛthivī), water (ap), fire (tejas), and wind (vāyu), manifested by their actions, which are, respectively, supporting, cohesion, "ripening," and expansion. They exist in combination in all rūpa. The first five sense organs, sense objects, and non-indication are secondary phenomena, as are the seven other qualities listed in 1.10, smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst.³⁴ Only tangibles are both primary and secondary matter. (1.35)

Both primary and secondary matter, being conditioned dharmas, are composed of paramāṇus, a word best translated as atoms or molecules (2.22) These molecules never occur alone. They are not dravyaparamāṇus, in the sense of being separate substances, but saṃghātaparamāṇus, grouped atoms. (2.22, 1.35) They are nonetheless indivisible, being the most subtle aggregation of matter that occurs in phenomenal reality.³⁵ In the Kāmadhātu, a molecule is composed of not less than eight dravyas: four of the great elements, and four of secondary matter, rūpa, odor, taste, and a tangible. (2.22) Sound, if applicable to the molecule, is a ninth atom. Because of the non-existence of smell and taste in the Rūpadhātu, the number of atoms there is correspondingly decreased.

The ten material components, that is, the five sense organs and the five sense objects, are aggregates of atoms. (1.35) The disposition and arrangement of the grouped atoms is disputed.

Vasubandhu holds the opinion that there is no contact between them, that they are contiguous with one another, but that there is neither contact nor an interval between them. (1.43) The atoms of the sense organs function differently in perceiving their objects. The atoms of the nose, tongue, and body perceive the same number of atoms of their respective objects, but the eye and ear perceive objects both larger and smaller than themselves. (1.44) Similarly, the eye, ear, and mind can perceive their objects over a distance, without direct contact, whereas the nose, tongue, and body must come into contact with their objects. (1.43) The atoms composing each sense organ are arranged in a particular pattern on that organ, for example, those of the eye cover the pupil like a cumin flower, and those of the tongue are shaped like half-moons. (1.44)

The matter of the sense organs is called rūpaprasāda, "material sensibility."³⁶ (pp. 253, 283) Although they are composed of matter, the matter is suprasensible and translucent. The material sensibility which is, properly speaking, the sense organ, is distinguished from the physical sense organ, the eye, etc.³⁷

Avijñapti

Avijñapti is the eleventh category of the aggregate of matter. (pp. 251, 256-7)³⁸ The word is a noun derived from the causative past participle of the root jñā, to know, with the preverb vi, to discern, ascertain, or understand.³⁹ The causative verb vijñāpayati therefore means to make known, to declare, to communicate, or to

inform of or about.⁴⁰ The privative particle -a- gives avijñapti the meaning of that which does not communicate anything. I have adopted Dowling's translation of "non-indication" as both literal and accurate.⁴¹

Non-indication is a type of karma. Vasubandhu defines karma as volition and that which is produced by it. (4.1) Explaining in more detail, he says that volition is mental act and that bodily and vocal act arise from it. (4.1) Bodily and vocal act are, in turn, either indication⁴² (vijñapti) or non-indication (avijñapti) (4.2), resulting in a total of five kinds of acts. Bodily (kāyavijñapti) and vocal indication (vāgvijñapti) are, in La Vallée Poussin's words, "the manifestation of a thought either by means of the body or the voice."⁴³ Bodily and vocal non-indication are the invisible counterpart or result of bodily and vocal indication. For example, when one takes the vows of a monk, he performs a vocal indication, but he also starts in himself a non-indication, that is, the discipline of a monk, which does not require any further indication to operate.⁴⁴

Our translation contains Vasubandhu's definition of non-indication,⁴⁵ which appears in the first chapter with his discussion of the aggregate of form. (1.11) It is an uninterrupted series (anubandha), a dharma which is dependent on the four great elements rather than on the mind. It is rūpa without mass or extension, and it functions independently of one's mental state. It is therefore unaffected by the attainment of concentration (samādhi). It is always either good or bad, never indeterminate. (4.7)⁴⁶

This is, briefly, the Vaibhāṣika theory of non-indication.⁴⁷ The Sautrāntikas, and Vasubandhu, do not accept the existence of a dravya, avijñapti, as outlined above. There is, in the bhāṣya, a long argument between the two schools. (4.4) The Sautrāntikas object that non-indication is not a dravya, and does not really exist on the following grounds: 1) it consists merely of continuing to not do what one was not doing, 2) it depends upon the past great elements, and that which is past no longer exists, and 3) it cannot be rūpa because it does not have the characteristic of rūpa, the capacity to be damaged.

The Vaibhāṣikas respond with eight arguments establishing the existence of non-indication. They point to the sutra⁴⁸ which declares there is rūpa that is invisible, pure, and non-resistant, which they say can only be non-indication. They also maintain that it is only due to non-indication that merit can increase despite a contrary mental state, or that one in samādhi can still possess the three members of the Path, right speech, right action, and right livelihood, or that one who orders a sin committed can be held culpable and receive the appropriate karmic result. The Sautrāntikas counter-respond to all these points, and the disputants remain convinced of their own views.⁴⁹

Thought (Citta)

Citta, thought or mind, refers, according to Vasubandhu, to the same thing as do the words yijñāna, translated here as "conscious-

ness," and manas, the mental sense organ.⁵⁰ (2.34) Each emphasizes a different activity of what we would call the "mind." Citta emphasizes the accumulation of good and bad, represented schematically by the different types of karmically good, bad, and neutral thoughts occurring throughout the three realms and the path to Arhatship.⁵¹ Vijñāna often refers specifically to the perceptive faculty of the mind. In that case, there are six types of vijñāna: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental. This definition of vijñāna as "perception" is inadequate for vijñāna as the third link of dependent origination. That is the reason for consistently translating vijñāna as "consciousness" in this work, even in the lists of the spheres and components, where "perception" would be more accurate. Differentiating these two uses of vijñāna would cause more problems than it would solve in this work, because, as we saw in the opening remarks, and will see again, vijñāna as the third link of dependent origination is often defined as the six types of perception, despite the fact that this definition is inappropriate to the role vijñāna plays in dependent origination. Manas, or manodhātu, is the mental sense organ. Its objects are distinguished from those of the other senses in that they are more numerous, totalling sixty-four dharmas, and that they are perceived directly, without an intermediary sense organ.

In the list of the eighteen components, numbers six, twelve, and eighteen, the manodhātu, the dharmadhātu, and the manovijñāna-dhātu, form the triad of mental consciousness. (See Table VI, p. 121). The manodhātu⁵² is the mental sense organ; it is the support for

Table VI.

Thought (Citta) (pp. 119-22)

In the list of the components, 6, 12, and 18, the mind or mental sense organ (manodhātu), ideas or objects of the mind (dharmāyatana or dharmadhātu), and mental consciousness (manovijñānadhātu), constitute the triad of mental consciousness. The mental sense organ is not a material organ, like the eye, but the consciousness which has just passed, and therefore serves as a support for the arising of future consciousness. The objects of mental consciousness number sixty-four:

- I. forty-six mental accompaniments (caitta)
- II. fourteen thought-dissociated dharmas (cittaviprayukta dharmas)
- III. non-indication (avijñapti)
- IV. the three unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta)

The mental accompaniments are enumerated in Table VII. The relevant thought-dissociated dharmas are discussed on pp. 128-30, and non-indication on pp. 117-19.

mental consciousness, analogous to the eye, or ear, etc. It is defined as the six types of consciousness which have just passed, and which, by passing, allow the next moment of consciousness to arise. It is in this sense that they serve as a support; the manodhātu is not a material organ.

The dharmāyatana or the dharmadhātu both mean the objects of mental consciousness. (pp. 214-16, 232) There are sixty-four dharmas which are objects of the mind. Each of the first eleven spheres consists of a single dharma and this twelfth sphere contains the remaining sixty-four. They are the forty-six mental accompaniments (caitta),⁵³ the fourteen thought-dissociated dharmas (viprayukta),⁵⁴ non-indication, and the three unconditioned dharmas, including nirvāṇa.⁵⁵

Just as only one of the ten spheres which is included in the aggregate of matter is called the sphere of matter (rupāyatana), so, despite the fact that all the spheres are in fact dharmas, only one is called the sphere of dharmas (dharmāyatana). (1.24) This is for the same reasons as in the case of the rūpāyatana. That is, the term dharmāyatana does distinguish it from the other spheres, and as the dharmāyatana includes a great many dharmas, among them nirvāṇa, it is therefore above all entitled to this name. (1.24)

Mental Accompaniments (Caitta)

Etymologically, caitta means "associated with the mind or thought," and is often translated as "mental concomitants."

(pp. 225, 249). Caitta or cittasamprayukta dharmas are those dharmas associated with thought. In fact, citta and caitta cannot arise independently; they always occur together.⁵⁶ (2.23) They are associated (samprayukta) in five ways, due to sharing five "samenesses" (samatā). (2.34) They have the same support (āśraya), the same object (ālambana), the same aspect (ākāra), the same time (kāla), and the same number of dravyas. Each citta and caitta occurring in a particular moment is a single dravya.

There are five classes of mental accompaniments: the mahābhūmikas, the kuśalamahābhūmikas, the kleśamahābhūmikas, the akuśalamahābhūmikas, and the parīttakleśabhūmikas. (2.23, pp. 206, 225) (See Table VII, pp. 124-5). Bhūmi here means the sphere or place of arising, and mahābhūmi, the place of the arising of the great dharmas, the dharmas which are present in every moment of thought. (2.23)

There are ten mahābhūmikas, or mental accompaniments that occur in every thought-moment. They are: feeling (vedanā), volition (cetanā), ideation (saṃjñā), desire (chanda), contact (sparsā), wisdom (mati), memory (smṛti), attention (manaskāra), zealous application (adhimokṣa),⁵⁷ and concentration (samādhi). (2.24) Every single moment of thought includes at least these ten.

In addition, if it is a good (kuśala)⁵⁸ thought, it will also include the ten kuśalamahābhūmikas, which are present in every moment of good thought. They are: faith (śraddhā), diligence (apramāda),⁵⁹ dexterity of thought (praśrabdhi), indifference (upekṣā), respect (hrī) (2.32), fear of sin (apatrāpya) (2.32), absence

Table VII.

Mental Accompaniments (Caitta) (pp. 122-6)

A thought always arises with its mental accompaniments (caitta), those dharmas which are associated with thought. There are five classes of mental accompaniments.

I. The mahābhūmikas are those mental accompaniments that occur along with every thought.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| A. feeling (<u>vedanā</u>) | F. wisdom (<u>mati</u>) |
| B. volition (<u>cetanā</u>) | G. memory (<u>smṛti</u>) |
| C. perception (<u>saṃjñā</u>) | H. attention (<u>manaskāra</u>) |
| D. desire (<u>chanda</u>) | I. zealous application
(<u>adhimokṣa</u>) |
| E. contact (<u>sparsā</u>) | J. concentration (<u>saṃādhi</u>) |

II. There are also ten kuśalamahābhūmikas which occur in all good thoughts, in addition to the mahābhūmikas.

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. faith (<u>śraddhā</u>) | F. fear of sin (<u>apatrāpya</u>) |
| B. diligence (<u>apramāda</u>) | G. absence of greed (<u>alobha</u>) |
| C. dexterity of thought
(<u>praśrabdhi</u>) | H. absence of hatred (<u>adveṣa</u>) |
| D. indifference (<u>upekṣā</u>) | I. non-malice (<u>avihiṃsā</u>) |
| E. respect (<u>hrī</u>) | J. energy (<u>vīrya</u>) |

III. The kleśamahābhūmikas occur in every defiled thought.

- | |
|---------------------------------------|
| A. delusion (<u>moha</u>) |
| B. non-diligence (<u>pramāda</u>) |
| C. laziness (<u>kausīdya</u>) |
| D. lack of faith (<u>āśraddhya</u>) |
| E. torpor (<u>styāna</u>) |
| F. dissipation (<u>audhatya</u>) |

IV. There are two akuśalamahābhūmikas which occur in all bad thoughts.

- | |
|--|
| A. disrespect (<u>ahrī</u>) |
| B. lack of fear about committing sins (<u>anapatrāpya</u>) |

V. There are also ten parīttakleśabhūmikas, or minor defilements, which are associated with ignorance.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| A. anger (<u>krodha</u>) | F. hypocrisy (<u>mrakṣa</u>) |
| B. hostility (<u>upanāha</u>) | G. envy (<u>maṣara</u>) |
| C. dishonesty (<u>śāṭhya</u>) | H. deceit (<u>māya</u>) |
| D. jealousy (<u>īrṣyā</u>) | I. pride (<u>mada</u>) |
| E. contentiousness (<u>pradāśa</u>) | J. malice (<u>vihiṃsā</u>) |

of greed (alobha), absence of hatred (adveṣa), non-malice (avihiṃsā), and energy (vīrya). (2.25)

The kleśamahābhūmikas, then, are those dharmaṣ which are found in every defiled thought. They number six: delusion (moha), non-diligence (pramāda), laziness (kausīdya), lack of faith (śīraddhya), torpor (styāna),⁶⁰ and dissipation (auddhatya).⁶¹

The two akuśalamahābhūmikas are disrespect (ahrī) and a lack of fear about committing sins (anapatrāpya). (2.32) Ahrī is a lack of respect for good qualities either in oneself or in others, and anapatrāpya is the inability to understand the harmful effects of sin.⁶²

The last category, the parīttakleśabhūmikas, consists of ten "small or minor" defilements, which must be abandoned by the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga).⁶³ (2.27) The parīttakleśabhūmikas are also included among the impurities (upakleśa) and the corruptions (paryavasthāna).⁶⁴ (5.47-50) They are: anger (krodha), hostility (upanāha), dishonesty (śāṭhya), jealousy (īrṣyā), contentiousness (pradāśa), hypocrisy (mrakṣa), envy (matsara), deceit (māya), pride (māda), and malice (vihiṃsā). Anger, jealousy, hypocrisy, and envy are corruptions; hostility, dishonesty, contentiousness, deceit, pride, and malice are impurities.

Vitarka and Vicāra

There remain some caittas which are called indeterminate (aniyata) because they can be associated with good, bad, or indeter-

minate thought. Their number is usually given as eight, although this, and precisely which dharmas they are, is disputed. (2.28) We are concerned with only two of them, vitarka and vicāra, which are defined as the grossness and subtlety of thought, respectively.⁶⁵ (2.33, p. 226)

The Vaibhāṣikas argue that vitarka and vicāra exist simultaneously in a single moment of thought, but the Sautrāntikas hold that they are consecutive. For the Vaibhāṣikas, there is a clear difference between the two, apparent in the strength or weakness of a thought. They define vitarka as a preliminary, vague investigation or inquiry by consciousness as to the nature of an object, and vicāra as the succeeding judgment made about the same object.⁶⁶ There is no specific difference between these two, counter the Sautrāntikas, only a matter of degree.

As vitarka and vicāra are essential components of investigating consciousness, their existence or non-existence in the various spheres is considered at length. (1.32) The five sense consciousnesses are always associated with both vitarka and vicāra. Mental consciousness differs according to the realm to which it belongs. In general, the lower realms, that is, the Kāmadhātu and the first stage of meditation are associated with both. The dhyānāntara, or the stage between the first and second stages of meditation,⁶⁷ has vicāra, but not vitarka. The higher stages have neither. Thus, there are four categories: cittasamprayukta dharmas are associated with both vitarka and vicāra, cittaviprayukta dharmas are not associated

with either vitarka or vicāra, and vitarka and vicāra are associated with each other, but not with themselves. (I.32)

Thought-dissociated Dharmas (Cittaviprayukta)

The cittaviprayukta dharmas⁶⁸ are tendencies (saṃskāra) which are not associated with thought. (p. 249) The word viprayukta, disjoined, distinguishes them from those dharmas which are samprayukta, associated,⁶⁹ with thought. However, they are not rūpa, either. Their nature is actually closer to citta than to rūpa, for they are non-material, and belong to the aggregate of tendencies (saṃskāraskandha).⁷⁰ (2.35) They are perhaps best defined by their differences, then, from the other four categories of dharmas. They are not citta, nor are they associated with citta (caitta). They are non-material, so they are not rūpa, and they belong to the saṃskāra-skandha, so they are certainly not asaṃskṛta. Only those that appear in the translation are discussed here.⁷¹

Prāpti

An important thought-dissociated dharma is prāpti. (pp. 178, 257, 258). Prāpti means "obtaining," "acquisition."⁷² This is essentially its meaning for the Vaibhāṣikas, too. Vasubandhu defines it as the obtaining (lābha) of that which one did not formerly possess, or which one had lost, and the possession (samanvaya) of it once it has been acquired. (2.36) Aprāpti is its opposite. Thus,

prāpti and aprāpti refer to the existence or non-existence, respectively, of any particular conditioned dharma, or two of the unconditioned dharmas, pratisamkhyānirodha and apratisamkhyānirodha,⁷³ in the "stream" which constitutes an individual. (2.36)

Prāpti determines a person's state, condition, and character. The Vaibhāṣikas use it to explain the evolution, as it were, of a man from a common man (prthagjana) into an Arhat. They cite the Madhyamāgama sūtra which says that the arising, acquiring, and possessing of the ten dharmas belonging to an Arhat makes one an Arhat.⁷⁴ So it is the possession of certain dharmas which makes one an Arhat and the non-possession of them, and the possession of others, that makes one an ordinary man. An Arhat who has an ordinary thought is still different from an ordinary man because he has prāpti of certain pure dharmas. (2.36)

The Sautrāntikas do not admit the existence of this dharma, prāpti, and explain the difference between an Arhat and an ordinary man as due to the Arhat's having abandoned the defilements, and hence, decisively and irrevocably having changed his "stream" (saṃtāna).

Samāpatti

Two other cittaviprayuktadharmas are mentioned in the section on dependent origination. They are asamjñisamāpatti and nirodhasamāpatti. (p. 257). First, the word samāpatti needs explanation. It is a synonym for samādhi, or concentration, defined

by Edgerton as "attainment" of the successive stages of meditation.⁷⁵ La Vallée Poussin refers to attempts to distinguish samādhī and samāpatti.⁷⁶ Some maintained that samādhī was momentary, and samāpatti prolonged, or that samādhī was always accompanied by citta, and samāpatti either accompanied by citta or not. They are, however, essentially synonymous.

These two, the asamjñīsamāpatti, or the attainment of unconsciousness (2.42), and the nirodhasamāpatti, or more correctly, the samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti, the attainment of the cessation of ideation and feeling, are both dharmas which stop thought and mental accompaniments, and prevent future dharmas from arising. (2.41b-43)

Although they are the same in nature, they do differ. Asamjñī-samāpatti belongs to the fourth stage of meditation. It is practiced or produced by ordinary men who desire nirvāṇa and mistakenly identify this lack of consciousness with it. It results in birth among the unconscious gods in the next life. (2.42) Āryas, however, recognize asamjñīsamāpatti as a "trap" (vinipātasthāna) and do not practice it. (2.42) They cultivate nirodhasamāpatti, which belongs to the realm of neither perception nor non-perception.⁷⁷ They may either be reborn there as a result, or they may obtain nirvāṇa during that same lifetime.

Good, Bad, and Indeterminate

There are, of course, still other ways that thoughts are classified in the Abhidharmakośa. They can be categorized as good

(kuśala), bad (akuśala), or indeterminate (avyākṛta), depending upon their origin and their result (pp. 226, 245). From this standpoint, there are five types of thought in the Kāmadhātu: good, bad, which can be either associated with ignorance only and called āveṇiki,⁷⁸ (5.12, p. 199), or associated with other defilements as well, and indeterminate, which has no result and can be either defiled (nivṛta) because of association with the false views of the self and the two extreme views,⁷⁹ or undefiled (anivṛta), because it is karmic result. (2.28) (See Table VIII, p. 132). A good thought has twenty-two caittas-- the ten mahābhūmikas, the ten kuśalamahābhūmikas, vitarka, and vicāra. (2.28) A bad thought has the ten mahābhūmikas, the six kleśamahābhūmikas, the two akuśalamahābhūmikas, vitarka, vicāra, and one more, if another defilement is present. (2.29) Nivṛta is a synonym of kliṣṭa, defiled. (4.127) It means "that which is covered by the defilements."⁸⁰ So, nivṛtāvyākṛta thought is impure because of association with the defilements, but also indeterminate, or without result. (2.30) Anivṛtāvyākṛta thought is without defilement and without result. (p. 219).

As defined in the Kośa, a good (kuśala) act is beneficial, producing either a desirable result and hence temporarily relieving suffering, or leading to the attainment of nirvāṇa. An act which has an undesirable result is a bad (akuśala) act. Those acts which are neither beneficial nor harmful, that is, which are without result, are called indeterminate (avyākṛta). They are also known, respectively, as punya, apunya, and āniñja. (4.45, pp. 161, 198). The last term,

Table VIII

The Five Types of Thought in the Kāmadhātu (pp. 130-3)

Thoughts can be good (kuśala), bad (akuśala), or indeterminate (avyākṛta). There are five types of thought in the Kāmadhātu when classified by these categories.

- I. good (kuśala) thought
- II. bad (akuśala) thought that is associated with ignorance alone
- III. bad (akuśala) thought that is associated with other defilements, as well as with ignorance
- IV. defiled (nivṛta) thought that is associated with false views
- V. undefiled (anivṛta) thought, which is karmic result

Thought can be defiled, but also indeterminate (nivṛtāvyākṛta), when it has no result. It can also be undefiled and without result (anivṛtāvyākṛta).

āniñiya, refers to a good act of the rūpa or arūpa realms. (4.46)

Actions are good not only because of their result, but also because of their origin. (4.9) Those that originate from one of the roots of good (kuśalamūla), which are lack of greed (alobha), lack of hatred (adveṣa), and lack of delusion (amoha), or are associated with these three roots, are good. Likewise, bad (akuśala) acts have their basis in one of the three roots of bad, greed (lobha), hatred (dveṣa), and delusion (moha), or in dharmas associated with them. (4.9)

The Proclivities (Anuśaya)

Anuśaya, the root of acts and hence, of existence, is the decisive factor in rebirth.⁸¹ (pp. 204, 258) When acts are committed with anuśaya, karma accumulates and necessitates rebirth; the same act without anuśaya has no karmic result. An act influenced by anuśaya is sāsrava, impure, one not influenced by anuśaya is anāsrava, pure.

The word anuśaya comes from the root śī, with the preverb anu, meaning to sleep with or adhere closely to.⁸² Anuśaya thus means a close connection or attachment in classical Sanskrit. It is, however, a specifically Buddhist term meaning a proclivity, a propensity, or a disposition to evil.⁸³

According to the Kośa, there are six anuśayas. (See Table IX, p. 134). They are: attachment (rāga), hostility (pratigha), pride (māna), ignorance (avidyā), false view (drṣṭi), and doubt (vicikitsā).

Table IX.

The Proclivities (Anuśaya) (pp. 133-6)

According to the Kośa, there are six anuśayas.

- I. attachment (rāga)
- II. hostility (pratiṅha)
- III. pride (māna)
- IV. ignorance (avidyā)
- V. false view (dr̥ṣṭi)
- VI. doubt (vicikitsā)

Attachment is sometimes divided into attachment to existence (bhavarāga) and attachment to sensual pleasures (kāmarāga), resulting in seven anuśayas. In some Abhidharma texts, a total of ten anuśayas is counted because of the fivefold division of false view.

- V. false view:
 - A. false belief in a real personality (satkāyadr̥ṣṭi)
 - B. false view of the negation of the Four Truths (mithyādr̥ṣṭi)
 - C. false view of eternity and annihilation (antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi)
 - D. attachment to heresy (dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśa)
 - E. attachment to morality and ritual practices (śilavrata-parāmarśa)

There are ninety-eight anuśayas when considering the realm to which they belong and the method by which they can be abandoned.

(5.1) Attachment is sometimes divided into attachment to existence (bhavarāga) and attachment to sensual pleasures (kāmarāga), resulting in seven anuśayas. (5.1-2) In the Abhidharma, a total of ten anuśayas is counted because of the fivefold division of false view. (5.3, pp. 205-7). The false views are: the false belief in a real personality (satkāyadr̥ṣṭi), the false view of negation (of the Four Truths) (mithyādr̥ṣṭi), the false view of eternity and annihilation (antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi), the attachment to heresy (dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśa), and the attachment to morality and ritual practices (śīlavrataparāmarśa). There are ninety-eight anuśayas when considering the realm (dhātu) to which they belong and the method by which they can be abandoned. (5.3-5.5) Thus, in the realm of sensual pleasures (Kāmadhātu), there are twelve false views, four doubts, five attachments, five hostilities, five prides, and five ignorances. The five hostilities are missing in the form realm (Rūpadhātu) and the formless realm (Ārūpyadhātu). (5.5)

An anuśaya operates by attaching a person to an object. (5.23) Vasubandhu glosses the activity of the anuśayas as "pratiṣṭhām labhante,"⁸⁴ which can be colloquially translated as "gaining a foothold." There are two types of anuśaya, the special or specific (svalakṣaṇakleśa) and the common (sāmānyakleśa). (5.23) Attachment, hostility, and pride are special defilements (kleśa), meaning that they have specific objects. False view, doubt, and ignorance are the common defilements, meaning that they occur in everyone with respect to everything, in the past, the present, and the future. (5.24)

The precise nature of anuśaya is in question. Note that the two types of anuśaya are said to be the specific and the common kleśa. The use of the words anuśaya and kleśa interchangeably is justified by the Vaibhāṣika claim that defilement (kleśa) (pp. 160, 168, 170, 244-5, 258), proclivity (anuśaya), and corruption (pariyavasthāna) (pp. 165, 245) are synonyms. (5.47) The Sautrāntikas distinguish kleśa as moral defilement, the anuśaya as defilement in a latent state, and the pariyavasthāna as defilement in an active state. Vasubandhu supports this interpretation. He therefore agrees with the Sautrāntikas in the argument about the nature of anuśaya which centers on the interpretation of the word kāmarāgānuśaya. (5.2) Is the compound a tatpuruṣa, meaning the anuśaya of kāmarāga, the proclivity of attachment to sensual pleasures, as the Sautrāntikas say? In this case, an anuśaya would be a dharma not associated with thought (cittaviprayuktadharma) and this would contradict the sūtra which says that kāmarāgānuśaya is associated with pleasure, displeasure, or indifference. Or is it a karmadhāraya compound, meaning the anuśaya which is kāmarāga, the proclivity which is itself the attachment to sensual pleasures, as the Vaibhāṣikas say? In this case, it would contradict the sūtra which says that attachment is abandoned along with its anuśaya. Vasubandhu supports the Sautrāntika analysis of the compound into the anuśaya of kāmarāga, but says it is neither associated nor unassociated with thought, because it is not a separate entity (dravya). It is merely the kleśa in a state of rest.

The Corruptions (Paryavasthāna)

The corruptions (paryavasthāna) number ten according to the Vaibhāṣikas. (5.47-48, pp. 165, 245) (See Table X, pp. 138-9). They are: disrespect (āhrīkya), lack of aversion to sin (anapatrāpya) (2.32), envy (īrṣyā), greed (mātsarya), dissipation (auddhatya) (2.26), regret (kaukrītya) (2.28), torpor (styāna) (2.26), drowsiness (middha) (5.47),⁸⁵ anger (krodha), and hypocrisy (mrakṣa). (2.27) Disrespect, dissipation, and greed arise from attachment (rāga), hypocrisy either from desire (trṣṇā) or ignorance (avidyā), torpor, drowsiness, and non-aversion to sin from ignorance, regret from doubt (vicikitsā), and envy and anger from hostility (pratigha). (5.48-49) There is overlapping with the list of parīttakleśabhūmikas, see pp. 125-6.

Now, the ninety-eight anuśayas plus these ten paryavasthānas are also known as the influxes (āśrava), the floods (ogha), the bonds (yoga), and the graspings (upādāna). (Intro. to 5.35, pp. 204, 258-9) These are all names for the anuśayas, each name focusing on a different aspect of their activity. (5.39-40) There are three influxes: the influx of the sensual desires (kāmāśrava), the influx of (desire for) existence (bhavāśrava), and the influx of ignorance (avidyāśrava). There are four floods, and the same four bonds: the flood and the bond of sensual desires (kāmaugha, kāmayoga), the flood and the bond of (desire for) existence (bhavaugha, bhavayoga), the flood and the bond of false views (drṣṭyogha, drṣṭiyoga), and the flood and the bond of ignorance (avidyaugha, avidyāyoga). The four

Table X.

The Corruptions (Paryavasthāna) (pp. 137-40)

- I. disrespect (āhrīkya)
- II. lack of aversion to sin (anapatrāpya)
- III. envy (īrṣyā)
- IV. greed (mātsarya)
- V. dissipation (auddhatya)
- VI. regret (kaukr̥tya)
- VII. torpor (styāna)
- VIII. drowsiness (middha)
- IX. anger (krodha)
- X. hypocrisy (mrakṣa)

There is overlapping with the list of parīttakleśabhūmikas, see Table VII.

The ninety-eight anuśayas, plus the ten paryavasthānas, are also known as the influxes (āsrava), the floods (ogha), the bonds (yoga), and the graspings (upādāna).

- I. the influxes (āsrava)
 - A. influx of sensual desire (kāmāsrava)
 - B. influx of desire for existence (bhavāsrava)
 - C. influx of ignorance (avidyāsrava)
- II. the floods (ogha)
 - A. flood of sensual desire (kāmaugha)
 - B. flood of desire for existence (bhavaugha)
 - C. flood of false views (dr̥ṣṭyogha)
 - D. flood of ignorance (avidyaugha)
- III. the bonds (yoga)
 - A. bond of sensual desire (kāmayoga)
 - B. bond of desire for existence (bhavayoga)
 - C. bond of false views (dr̥ṣṭiyoga)
 - D. bond of ignorance (avidyāyoga)

IV. the graspings (upādāna)

- A. grasping after sensual pleasures (kāmapādāna)
- B. grasping after false views (dr̥ṣṭyupādāna)
- C. grasping after morality and ritual practices (śīlavratopādāna)
- D. grasping after the belief in a self (ātmavādupādāna)

Note: This is also the definition of upādāna as the ninth link of pratītyasamutpāda, see the Kośa 5.38.

graspings are the grasping after sensual pleasures (kāmapādāna), the grasping after false views (dr̥ṣṭyupādāna), the grasping after morality and ritual practices (śīlavratopādāna) and the grasping after the belief in a self (ātmavāḍopādāna). (5.35)

There is also another grouping of the anuśayas into five categories, the fetters (saṃyojana), the ties (bandhana), the proclivities (anuśaya), the impurities (upakleśa), and the corruptions (paryavasthāna). (Intro. to 5.41) Obviously, there is much repetition and reclassification in these lists. The anuśayas and paryavasthānas have already been explained. The bandhanas are attachment (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), and delusion (moha). (5.45) Each occurs with a particular feeling. Attachment occurs with happiness, hatred with displeasure, and delusion with indifference. The impurities are defiled mental accompaniments belonging to the aggregate of karmically-caused tendencies (saṃskāraśandha), in close association with the kleśas and yet not kleśas.⁸⁶ (5.46)

The Fetters (Samyojana)

It is the category of saṃyojana, "fetter" (5.41-45) that interests us most, for it is to the saṃyojanas that the Vaibhāṣikas point in the argument about the nature of ignorance. (3.29, p. 204-5). There are nine: affection (anunaya), aversion (pratigha), pride (māna), ignorance (avidyā), false view (dr̥ṣṭi), clinging (parīmarśa), doubt (vicikitsā), envy (īrṣyā), and greed (mātsarya). (5.41) (See Table XI, p. 141). If ignorance were merely the lack of knowledge,

Table XI.

The Fetters (Samyojana) (p. 140)

The anuśayas can also be grouped into the following five categories:

- I. fetters (saṃyojana)
- II. ties (bandhana)
- III. proclivities (anuśaya)
- IV. impurities (upakleśa)
- V. corruptions (paryavasthāna)

It is the category of fetter that interests us most, because of the argument about the nature of ignorance (3.29). There are nine:

- I. the fetters:
 - A. affection (anunaya)
 - B. aversion (pratigha)
 - C. pride (māna)
 - D. ignorance (avidyā)
 - E. false view (dr̥ṣṭi)
 - F. clinging (parāmarśa)
 - G. doubt (vicikitsā)
 - H. envy (īrṣyā)
 - I. greed (mātsarya)

and not a separate dharma, it would not be listed among all these categories of defilement. It is found among the saṃyojanas, the bandhanas, the anuśayas, the āsravas, the oghas, and the yogas. Nor can ignorance be a wrong view (dr̥ṣṭi), because both ignorance and wrong view are listed as separate saṃyojanas.

The introduction has provided the definitions and classifications necessary for understanding the translation which follows. The question of the purpose of all this classification, especially with its many overlappings and repetitions, has probably occurred to the reader. Although this question cannot be answered, some remarks about the goal of Buddhism and its view of the nature of reality may offer ideas for consideration. Obviously, the list of dharmas, although it includes both the mental and the physical, the internal and the external, is largely composed of elements of the personal, mental life. For the early Buddhists, the external world was relatively stable; it was the world of psychological processes that was experienced as being in constant flux. The goal of Buddhist ethics and meditation was to control this constantly-changing, momentary mental process, resulting in the experience of egolessness (anātmā). Clearly, this is reflected in Abhidharma ontology and its list of dharmas, which is appropriate to a meditative life, not an active one.

The very listing and classifying of the dharmas is functional within Buddhist psychology. In other words, the intellectualizing process brings with it an emotional distance. Furthermore, the categorization is simultaneously analytic and synthetic. It analyzes

the person and the world into their constituent, transient bits and pieces, breaking down the idea of any permanent substance. It also synthesizes those bits and pieces into a different schema, explaining how their interaction produces that individual and that cosmos. There are rules or laws according to which the dharmas combine. Their arising is not fortuitous, and therefore not uncontrollable. Their relations are clarified by the different categories of classification. The various methods of classification are made from different viewpoints, with different purposes. The skandhas analyze the individual, the āyatanas the individual as subject and the world as object, and the dhatus their interaction, which results in consciousness. Consciousness is the subject matter par excellence of these classification systems. Of the Sarvāstivādin's five categories (see Table IV), three are purely mental, and the fourth, the cittaviprayukta dharmas, are more mental than physical. The Sarvāstivādin's have constructed a cosmology built primarily on consciousness, analyzed all of its constituent dharmas and their interrelations from various standpoints, and shown that there is nothing therein beyond comprehension or control.

Notes

¹ Also see, in particular, Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma.

² Where the Kośa's explanations were inadequate, other sources were consulted, all of which are noted.

³ See Chaudhuri, Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa.

⁴ See the third chapter of the Kośa, which describes the structure and life cycle of the universe, for details.

⁵ A dhātu is defined as that which supports (dadhāti) its own characteristic (svalakṣaṇa). (3.3) "Realm" is an appropriate translation here.

⁶ See pp. 112-17.

⁷ That there was no rūpa at all in the Ārūpa realms was not accepted by all schools. Some maintained the existence of "a little rūpa" (īṣadrūpa) in the Ārūpyas and disputed this question at length with the Vaibhāṣikas. See 8.3.

⁸ Dhyāna, from the root dhya, meaning to contemplate or meditate (MW, p. 521), is a synonym of prajñā, intuitive wisdom. (8.1) There are four dhyānas, each of two types. Upapatti-dhyāna, or rebirth dhyāna, refers to the realms of existence in the Rūpadhātu. (3.2) Samāpattidhyāna is the concentration of good thoughts on a single object, or samādhi. (8.1) The Vaibhāṣikas consider samādhi to be a dharma which unifies the thoughts on a single object, but the Sautrāntikas consider it the concentrated thoughts themselves. (8.1) The four dhyānas are characterized by different limbs (aṅga). (8.2) The first dhyāna has initial investigation (vitarka), sustained reflection (vicāra), rapture (prīti), and joy (sukha). The second

has rapture and joy, the third has only joy, and the fourth has none of them.

9 The first three are so named after the "prefatory exercises" (LVP, vol. 5, ch. 8, p. 143) (prayoga) leading to them, not after their object or their nature. The last is named neither perception nor non-perception because there is perception in it, but it is not clear or sharp. (8.4).

10 MW, p. 519.

11 For instance, in this statement, which occurs in 3.28a-b, and elsewhere, "Whether or not Tathāgatas arise, this nature of things (dharmatā) remains constant" This was interpreted by some schools to mean that dependent origination is itself unconditioned.

12 This is Stcherbatsky's translation of dharma, Central Conception, p. 3.

13 svalakṣaṇadhāraṇāddharmah. (1.2)

14 sametya sambhūya pratvayaiḥ kṛtāḥ. na hyekapratvayajanitam kimcidastīti. (1.7a-b)

15 On the skandhas, see pp. 106-10.

16 anuśerate. LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 7, says "en relation avec les vices."

17 On the kleśa, see pp. 133-41.

18 For more on the upādānaskandha, see pp. 107-10.

19 tisro hi duḥkhatā duḥkhaduḥkhatā saṃskāraduḥkhatā vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā ca. (6.3) This brings to mind the Three Marks of the Pali texts (Samyutta Nikāya III.132): sabbe dhammā aniccā, sabbe dhammā dukkhā, sabbe dhammā anattā.

- 20 aśaṃskṛtaṃ hi sārātvāḍ dravyaṃ. (1.38a).
- 21 See LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 100, fn. 2. "Asaṃskṛta, nitya, dhruva (IV. 9) et dravya (1.38) sont synonymes."
- 22 These are Bruce Hall's translations.
- 23 On the caitta, see pp. 119-22.
- 24 On avijñapti, see pp. 117-19.
- 25 On the great elements and derived matter, see 1.12 and pp. 115-17. For a complete exposition of rūpa, see Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter.
- 26 tatra upādānāni kleśāḥ. tatsambhūtatvādupādānaskandhāḥ. trṇatuṣṭāgnivat. tadvidheyatvādvā rājapuruṣavat. upādānāni vā tebhyaḥ sambhavantīti upādānaskandhāḥ puṣpaphalavṛkṣavat. (1.8)
- 27 cittacaittāyadvārārtha āyatanārthaḥ. nirvacanaṃ tu citta-caittānāmāyaṃ tanvantīti āyatanāni. (1.20)
- 28 The manāyatana and the mano dhātu are identical, the six consciousnesses which have just passed. See 1.17.
- 29 See footnote 5, p. 144.
- 30 rāśyāyadvāragotrārthāḥ skandhāyatanadhātavaḥ. (1.20)
- 31 The dharmadhātu includes feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā), the tendencies (saṃskāra), non-indication (avijñapti), and the three unconditioned dharmas. It is the same as the dharmāyatana. See 1.15b-d.
- 32 Bareau, Sectes, p. 136.

33 rūpyate bādhyata ityarthah. (1.13)

34 The Theravādin list of the upādāyarūpas differs. See Karuna-dāsa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter, for a complete discussion.

35 Stcherbatsky, p. 14.

36 i am indebted to Karunadāsa for this translation of rūpaprasāda, although it does not occur as such in Buddhist Analysis of Matter. He discusses the sense organs and the concept of rūpaprasāda on pp. 44-49, there translating the Pali pasāda as "sentient organ" and kāya-prasāda as "bodily sensibility." (p.45)

37 See 1.9c-d, p. 253 and footnote 206, p. 283.

38 See Thomas Dowling, Vasubandhu on the "Avijñapti-rūpa": A Study in Fifth-century Abhidharma Buddhism.

39 MW, p. 961.

40 Ibid.

41 Also see LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 20, fn. 1.

42 Vijñapti, of course, means that which does inform or make known.

43 LVP, vol. 3, ch. 4, p. 3, fn. 2. The Vaibhāṣikas say that bodily indication is shape, form (saṁsthāna), not movement (gati), as the Vātsīputriyas maintain. The Sautrāntikas, however, have already objected (1.10a) that form (saṁsthāna) is not a dravya, it is a mere designation (prajñapti). (4.2b-3c). In any case, the Sautrāntikas do not accept the existence of avijñapti. Vocal indication is articulate speech.

44 LVP offers this example at vol. 3, ch. 4, p. 3, fn. 2.

45 See pp. 256-7.

46 On good, bad, and indeterminate, see pp. 130-3.

47 In the fourth chapter, Vasubandhu discusses the characteristics and classifications of avijñapti, which are outside of our consideration. See 4.5-6, 13-17, and Dowling. Chaudhuri, pp. 151-6, is also helpful.

48 LVP, vol. 3, ch. 4, p. 14, fn. 3 identifies this as the Rūpasamgrahasūtra.

49 Samghabhadra does not agree with Vasubandhu's explanation of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of avijñapti as he expounds it in the Kośa. He included his objections in the Nyāyānusāra and the Samayapradīpikā. Yaśomitra quotes from the latter work in the Vyākhyā and refutes Samghabhadra.

50 cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānamekārthaṃ. cinotīti cittaṃ. manuta iti manaḥ. vijñānātīti vijñānam. cittaṃ śubhāśubhairdhātubhiriti cittaṃ. tadevāśrayabhūtaṃ manaḥ. āśritabhūtaṃ vijñānamityaṇare. (2.34)

51 For the different categories of citta and their distribution throughout the three realms and the supramundane realm, see Ñyāṇatiloka's chart in his Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka (Lake House, Colombo: The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, Ltd., 1938), facing p. 12.

52 Manodhātu, manas, manāyatana, and manendriya are synonyms. They all mean the support (āśraya) of consciousness. (1.17c-d)

53 On caitta, see below.

54 On the viprayukta dharmas, see pp. 128-30.

55 See the Kośa, 1.16c-d, where the same items are listed under different categories: vedanā, saṃjñā, the saṃskāraskandha, avijñapti, and the asamskr̥ta dharmas.

56 cittam caittāḥ sahāvaśyam. nahyete vinā 'nyonyam bhavitum-utsahante. (2.23)

57 On adhimokṣa, see LVP, vol. 1, ch. 2, p. 154, fn. 5; p. 278, footnote 160, and p. 350, footnote 114.

58 On kuśala, see p. 130-3.

59 "Diligence" is LVP's translation, vol. 1, ch. 2, p. 157. Apramāda is explained in the bhāṣya as kuśalānām dharmānām bhāvanā, "the cultivation of good dharmas." (2.25)

60 Torpor is both mental and physical, as the bhāṣya defines it: yā kāyagurutā cittagurutā kāyākarmaṇyatā cittākarmaṇyatā, the "heaviness and lack of dexterity of the mind and body." (2.26)

61 Dissipation is mental restlessness, cetaso 'vyupaśamaḥ. (2.26)

62 There is a more common definition, which Vasubandhu himself accepts in the Pañcaskandhaka (LVP, vol. 1, ch. 2, p. 171, fn. 2). According to that interpretation, ahrī is the absence of shame with respect to oneself and anapatrāpya the absence of shame with respect to another.

63 On the bhāvanāmārga, see footnote 38, pp. 39-40.

64 On the upakleśas and parvavasthānas, see pp. 137-40.

65 cittaudārikatā vitarkaḥ cittasuksmatā vicarāḥ. (2.33) LVP, vol. 1, ch. 2, p. 173, fn. 1, says that this definition is from an unknown, undesigned sūtra.

66 The definition is given by Yaśomitra. See Shastri, vol. 1, pp. 206-7, and LVP, vol. 1, ch. 2, p. 175, fn. 2.

67 The dhyānāntara is distinguished from the preparatory meditation (sāmantaka) of the second stage. (8.22)

68 See P. S. Jaini's article, "The Development of the Theory of the Viprayukta-saṃskāras," in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 22 (1959): 531-47.

69 The caitta or cittasamprayuktadharmas were just discussed, see pp. 122-6.

70 ime saṃskārā na cittena samprayuktā na ca rūpasvabhāvā iti cittaviprayuktā ucyante. (2.35)

71 The complete list is given at 2.35-36a. Each is discussed individually in 2.36b-48.

72 MW, p. 707.

73 On these, see footnote 49, p. 41.

74 2.36c-d. See LVP, vol. 1, ch. 2, p. 181.

75 Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. Volume II: Dictionary. (BHS) (1953. Reprint. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), p. 569.

76 LVP, vol. 5, ch. 8, p. 182, fn. 4.

77 naivasamjñānāsamjñā, also known as bhavāgra. See pp. 99-101.

78 See the Kośa V. 12..

79 Satkāyadr̥ṣṭi (5.7) and antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi (5.7), respectively.

80 Yaśomitra explains, kleśacchāditatvānnivṛtāḥ. Shastri, p. 754. (4.127)

81 mūlaṃ bhavaśyānuśayaḥ.

82 MW, p. 39.

83 BHS, p. 35; PTS, p. 44.

84 5.18, Pradhan, p. 290.

85 BHS, p. 432.

86 ye 'pyante caitasāḥ kliṣṭāḥ saṃskāraśkandhasaṃjñitāḥ.
kleśebhyaste 'pyupakleśāste tu na kleśasaṃjñitāḥ. (5.46)

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Vasubandhu on Pratītyasamutpāda:
A Translation from Chapter Three of the
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
With Selections from Yaśomitra

This series of aggregates (skandhasam̐tāna),¹ which was (already) explained,² extends over three lives.

IT IS THE DEPENDENT ORIGINATION³ WHICH HAS TWELVE LIMBS AND THREE DIVISIONS.⁴ (3.20a-b)

Its twelve limbs (aṅga) are: ignorance, the karmically-caused tendencies (samskāra),⁵ consciousness, name and form, the six sense spheres, contact, feeling, desire, grasping, becoming, birth, and old age and death. Its three divisions (kāṇḍa) are: the preceding, the succeeding, and the middle, that is, the past, the future, and the present lives.

How are the twelve limbs distributed among these three divisions?

THERE ARE TWO EACH IN THE PAST AND FUTURE (LIVES) AND EIGHT IN THE PRESENT (LIFE). (20c-d)

Ignorance and the karmically-caused tendencies (occur) in the past (life); birth and old age and death (occur) in the future (life). The remaining eight (occur) in the present (life).

Do these eight limbs, though, occur in every life?⁶

"No," he replies.

Of whom, in that case, (do they occur)?

OF ONE WHO IS COMPLETE. (20d)

One who is complete (paripūr̐ṇa) means one who has gone through them all.⁷ Here a person who experiences (sparśati) all these (eight) different states is meant, not one who dies midway

(antarāla) (through them), nor a being of the form (rūpa) or formless (ārūpya) realms.

[Yaśomitra--But not in the form or the formless realms. Because of the existence (sadbhāva) of the name and form and the six sense sphere limbs at the same time as the consciousness limb for one in the form realm. Nor are there eight limbs in the present life for one in the formless realm, because of the non-existence of the name and form and the six sense sphere limbs.]

In the Mahānīdānaparyāya (sūtra), for example, only a person belonging to the realm of sensual desires is described, because of the statement, "If consciousness, O Ānanda, does not descend into the mother's womb"8

[Yaśomitra--As is said in the Mahānīdānaparyāyasūtra, "If, Ānanda, consciousness does not descend into the mother's womb, but yet that name and form were to develop into an embryo, that is not possible, O Venerable One" So the sūtra reads. For the descent into the womb of the mother (takes place) only in the realm of sensual desires.]

However, when dependent origination is said to be twofold, that is, pertaining to the past and pertaining to the future, then the seven limbs as far as feeling pertain to the past and the last five pertain to the future. This is so because of the understanding (grahaṇa) of the past (pūrva) and the future (aparānta) as having results and causes.

[Yaśomitra--Because of the understanding of the past and future as having results and causes. This (should be understood)

respectively--because of the understanding of the past as having results and because of the understanding of the future as having causes. With respect to this, the cause in the past is ignorance and the karmically-caused tendencies, their result, the five limbs from consciousness through feeling. In the future, birth and old age and death are called the result; the three limbs which are its causes are desire, grasping, and becoming. So, in this way, "Seven limbs pertain to the past, five limbs pertain to the future," has been explained.^{9]}

Now, then, what are these (limbs), ignorance, etc.?

IGNORANCE IS THE STATE OF DEFILEMENT IN THE PAST. (21a)

The state of defilement (kleśāvasthā) ¹⁰ in a past life is here called ignorance.

[Yaśomitra--"Is it ignorance alone, or is it all the defilements, or is it the state of defilement?," he asks in doubt.]

Because of the association (sāhacarya), and

[Yaśomitra--Because of association. Because the defilements are associated with ignorance.]

because of the activity (śamudācāra) of them due to its power.

[Yaśomitra--And because of the activity of them due to its power. Because the activity, the repeated performance (punastad-anuvṛtti) of those defilements is due to the power of ignorance. For there is activity of the defilements of one who is deluded (mūḍha), but not of one who is not deluded.]

As in the announcement of the coming of the king, the coming of his retinue with him is established.

[Yaśomitra--In the announcement of the coming of the king . . .

These are similar because the activity of them (the defilements or the retinue) is due to its/his (ignorance or the king) power because of their association. So it means that the ignorance limb is the state of defilement due to the power of ignorance. Therefore it was said, "Ignorance is the state of defilement in the past," not "Ignorance is the state of ignorance in the past."]

THE KARMICALLY-CAUSED TENDENCIES ARE ACTIONS IN THE PAST. (21b)

Understand "state" (as above). The state of meritorious, etc. karma in a past life only is called the karmically-caused tendencies, of which karma it is here (in this life) the result.

[Yaśomitra--The state of meritorious, etc. deeds. This means the state of meritorious and demeritorious actions.¹¹]

CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE AGGREGATES AT CONCEPTION. (21c)

Consciousness is the five aggregates¹² at the moment of conception (pratisandhi) in the mother's womb.

AFTER THIS IS NAME AND FORM, UNTIL THE ARISING OF THE SIX SENSE SPHERES.¹³ (21d-22a)

That state (which lasts) from the time of rebirth consciousness until the six sense spheres arise is called name and form. It should be said, "After the arising of the four sense spheres," (because) then the phrase "the six sense spheres" (is correct), because of their establishment then.

[Yaśomitra--It should be said, "After the arising of the four sense spheres . . . " Because of the arising of the mind and body

spheres at conception (upapattibhava)¹⁴ itself. Because of the establishment of them then. This means because of the establishment of the mind and body spheres at the time of the arising of the eye and other sense spheres.^{15]}

THAT IS PRIOR TO THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE THREE. (22b)

The state that lasts from the arising of the six sense spheres until the meeting (sannipāta) of the triad sense object, sense organ, and consciousness, is called the six sense spheres.

CONTACT (LASTS) UNTIL (ONE ACQUIRES) THE ABILITY TO DISCRIMINATE THE CAUSES OF PLEASURE, DISPLEASURE,¹⁶ ETC. (22c-d)

Contact arises from the meeting of the three. The state called contact lasts until there is the ability to distinguish the causes of the three types of feeling.¹⁷

Once there is the ability to distinguish, then

THERE IS FEELING,¹⁸ UNTIL (THERE IS) SEXUAL DESIRE. (23a)

The state of feeling (lasts) as long as sexual desire is not felt (samudācarati).

THERE IS DESIRE OF ONE HANKERING AFTER SENSUAL DELIGHTS AND SEXUAL PLEASURE. (23b)

The state of hankering for sensual objects and sexual pleasure is called "desire," as long as one has not begun to actively search after those objects.

HOWEVER, THERE IS GRASPING OF ONE RUNNING AROUND IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SENSUAL DELIGHTS. (23c-d)

The state in which one runs around everywhere, preoccupied by (āpanna) striving for the attainment of sense objects (viṣaya)--this is the state called "grasping."

[Yaśomitra--Grasping. The belief in a self (ātmabhāva) is appropriated (upādīyate) by him with respect to sense objects. That state which is the fourfold defilement is called "grasping."¹⁹]

Running around in this way--

HE MAKES KARMA WHICH HAS AS ITS RESULT FUTURE BIRTH (BHAVA); THIS IS BECOMING (BHAVA). (24a-b)

Running around in order to obtain sense objects, he accumulates karma, which produces a new birth (paunarbhavika). That is his becoming. (It is) because of this karma that when he dies, he is reborn in the future.²⁰

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Karma means connected with rebirth (paunarbhavika). That is becoming. It means one becomes because of it. Becoming is the revolving of karma (karmaparyāya).

This, which is

REBIRTH, IS CONCEPTION. (24c)

That very (limb) which is, in this life, the consciousness limb, is, in another life, birth.²¹ After this, (there is)--

OLD AGE AND DEATH, AS FAR AS FEELING.²² (24d)

Old age and death is the state from birth until feeling. The same four limbs which in this life are called name and form, the six sense spheres, contact, and feeling, are, in another life, called "old age and death."

[Yaśomitra--Old age and death is the self-nature (svabhāva) of the four limbs beginning with name and form. The Buddha called these four limbs by the words "old age and death" in order to shake up the people he was instructing . . .]

These are the twelve limbs.²³

Furthermore, this dependent origination is said to be four-fold--momentary (kṣaṇika), prolonged (prākarṣika), serial (sāmbandhika), and static (āvasthika).

[Yaśomitra--Momentary. Momentary means existing in a moment or that there is only a moment of it. Prolonged means connected with an uninterrupted series (prabandhayukta). It lasts or goes on for a long time. Thus serial means connected by the relationship of cause and effect. Static means the twelve states connected with the five aggregates.]

How is it momentary? (All) twelve limbs arise in the very same moment. For example, one might kill a living being out of greed. The delusion (moha) is the ignorance. The volition is the karmically-caused tendencies. The individual discernment of the object is consciousness. The four aggregates which arise along with consciousness are name and form. The sense faculties (indriya)²⁴ located in (vyavasthāṇita) name and form are the six sense spheres.

[Yaśomitra--The sense faculties located in name and form. Because the activity of the sense faculties is dependent on (prati-baddha) them. Or, it is said that they are located in name because it is their support (āśraya).]

The contact is the falling upon (abhinipāta)²⁵ the six sense spheres.

[Yaśomitra--Contact is the falling upon the six sense spheres. Falling upon is the activity (pravṛtti) of the eye and the other sense organs with respect to their appropriate sense object . . .]

The feeling is the experience (anubhavana) of touch. The greed is the desire. The grasping is the corruption (parvavasthāna)²⁶ associated with it. Becoming is the bodily and vocal karma arising from it.

[Yaśomitra--Arising from it. Which arise from desire, or others say which arise from volition.²⁷]

Birth is the production (utsarjana) of these elements (dharma), old age their maturation, death their break up.

[Yaśomitra--Birth is the production (unmajjana), old age the maturing because of the diminished capability of projecting (ākṣepa) a result, or with regard to an earlier moment. Death is the breaking up. Their destruction in that moment, or others say breaking up means the imminence of break up.]

Furthermore, they say that (dependent origination) is momentary and serial. As (is said) in the Prakaraṇas, "What is dependent origination? All conditioned dharman."²⁸

[Yaśomitra--With respect to this, dependent origination is momentary because of the destruction at every moment of conditioned dharman. It is serial because of its connection with two moments, being both cause and effect.]

Static (dependent origination refers to) the twelve states of the five aggregates connected with three immediately-successive lives. This very same (static dependent origination) is (also) prolonged.

[Yaśomitra--This same is (also) called prolonged. This very same static (dependent origination) is (also) prolonged because of its extension either through its relation to many moments or its connection to many births.]

Which of these did the Buddha intend?

STATIC IS MEANT, SO THEY SAY.²⁹ (25a)

If the five aggregates exist in each and every limb (aṅga), why then did (the Buddha) call the limbs (dharma) "ignorance," etc.?

THE LIMBS ARE NAMED ACCORDING TO THE PREDOMINANT (DHARMA). (25b)

This is no mistake, for the state having ignorance as its predominant factor is called ignorance, the state having the karmically-caused tendencies as its predominant factor is called the karmically-caused tendencies, and so on as far as old age and death.

What, then, is the reason that dependent origination is called twelve-limbed in the sūtra, whereas in the Prakaraṇas, it is said, "What is dependent origination? All conditioned dharmas."?

In the sūtra, the definition of dependent origination is suggestive (ābhiprāyika),³⁰ in the Abhidharma, it is definitional (lākṣaṇika).

This distinction (bheda) (is made): static, momentary, prolonged, and serial dependent origination pertain to both living and non-living things.³¹ What is the reason, however, that in the sūtra, dependent origination pertains only to living beings?³²

IN ORDER TO END CONFUSION ABOUT THE PAST, THE FUTURE, AND THE PRESENT. (25c-d)

There are three divisions of dependent origination precisely for this reason. That is, there is confusion (sammoha) about the past which gives rise to this doubt, "Did I or did I not exist in the past? Who was I? What was I like?" There is confusion about the future which gives rise to this doubt, "Will I exist in the future?" etc. There is confusion about the present which gives rise to this doubt, "What, indeed, is this? What are they? Who will we be?"³³

[Yaśomitra-- . . . What, indeed, is this? He seeks the substance (dravya)³⁴ which is the self (ātmabhāva). "What is it like?," "with what type," "under what circumstances" (does it exist)? This he cannot ascertain, the substance which is the self . . .]

Dependent origination is taught in the sūtra as pertaining only to living creatures and as having three divisions in order to end this threefold confusion. According to the order (in the sūtra), ignorance and the karmically-caused tendencies (exist in the past), birth, old age and death (in the future), and consciousness through becoming (in the present). For, as is said in the sūtra, "Therefore, a monk, O Monks, having seen with right insight dependent origination and dependently-arisen dharmas as they really are, does not concern (pratisarati) himself with the past, (asking), "Did I exist in the

past?" and so on. However, others say that desire, grasping, and becoming are also (taught) in order to end confusion about the future, for they are said to be its causes.

[Yaśomitra--Desire, grasping, and becoming also . . . Desire, grasping, and becoming are all taught in order to end confusion about the future, not the present. Since it was taught earlier that (the limbs) consciousness through becoming (were taught in order to end confusion about the present), what, then, is the purpose (yukti) now (of saying it was in order to end confusion about the future)? He says, "For these are its causes . . . "]

Furthermore, this twelve-limbed dependent origination should be understood to have a triple self-nature (svabhāva)--defilement (kleśa),³⁵ act (karma), and base (vastu).³⁶

THREE ARE DEFILEMENTS. (26a)

Three limbs, ignorance, desire, and grasping, have the self-nature of defilement.

TWO ARE ACT. (26a)

Two limbs, the karmically-caused tendencies and becoming, have the self-nature of defilement.

SEVEN ARE BASES. (26b)

Seven limbs, consciousness, name and form, the six sense spheres, contact, feeling, birth, and old age and death, have the self-nature of bases, because they are supports (āśraya)³⁷ for the defilements and acts.

As seven limbs are bases,

SO (SEVEN LIMBS) ARE RESULT. (26b)

The same seven limbs are result (phala).

[Yaśomitra--So, result. The same seven limbs (are result). Consciousness, name and form, the six sense spheres, contact, and feeling are the results of ignorance and the karmically-caused tendencies. Birth and old age and death are the results of desire, grasping, and becoming.]

The remaining five are causes, because they have the self-nature of act or defilement.

[Yaśomitra--Five are causes. Ignorance, the karmically-caused tendencies, desire, grasping, and becoming . . .]

What is the reason, though, that cause and effect are explained in detail in the present? (In the present they are explained) by the fivefold division of base (and) the twofold (division) of defilement. In the future, the result is summarized by a twofold division, and in the past, cause is indicated by the one chief defilement.

THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE PAST AND FUTURE ARE ABRIDGED BECAUSE THEY CAN BE INFERRED FROM THE PRESENT.³⁸
(26b-d)

Since it is possible to infer the extent of the causes and effects of the past and future also (from the present alone), they are not stated. Don't put a lot of effort into something which isn't terribly important.

If, indeed, dependent origination is only twelve-limbed, then, this being so, it follows that the round of rebirths (samsāra) has a beginning, because there is no stated cause of ignorance, and it has an end, because there is no stated result of old age and death. Either

that, or another limb should be added, and because of (adding) another (limb) to that one also, the unacceptable consequence of an infinite regress (results).

It is not necessary to add (other limbs), because, as the Buddha explained about this--

DEFILEMENT AND ALSO ACT (ARISE) FROM DEFILEMENT, FROM THAT, (ARISES) BASE, AND, FROM THAT, AGAIN, ARISE BASE AND DEFILEMENTS. THIS IS THE SYSTEM OF THE LIMBS OF EXISTENCE. (27)

Defilement arises from defilement--grasping from desire. Act (arises) from defilement--becoming from grasping, and the karmically-caused tendencies from ignorance. Base (arises) from act--consciousness from the karmically-caused tendencies, and birth from becoming. Base (arises) from base--name and form from consciousness, through feeling from contact, and old age and death from birth. Defilement (arises) from base--desire from feeling. Since this is the system established for the limbs of existence, then, ignorance, too, having the self-nature of defilement (kleśa-svabhāva), (arises either) from a base or from defilement; this is the correct teaching (jñāpita). Also, because of feeling, defilement will again arise from the base old age and death. It is not so that anything more should be added here, because of the statement, "Thus is the arising of this whole great mass of suffering." For otherwise, what would be the meaning (sāmarthya) of this?

[Yaśomitra-- . . . "Defilement from defilement . . . this is the system of the limbs of existence." From that, base. From that (means) from act (kriyā) . . . It was explained that old age and death

is a base having the self-nature of four of the limbs.³⁹ Here defilement was seen arising from a base--desire is dependent on feeling. Therefore because of this defilement will arise it means in the future. This is the correct teaching. It is not so that something more should be added here, because of the fact that it has been correctly taught. Is this understood, (though), "Why, then, is the system taught (darśita) this way?" He explains, "Because of the statement, 'Thus is the arising of this whole great mass of suffering.'" For, if it were otherwise, what would be the meaning of this? If the system were not as stated, "Defilement and also act (arise) from defilement, from that, base, from that, again, base and defilements arise," then only this much could be said, "Dependent on ignorance are the karmically-caused tendencies . . . dependent on birth are old age and death, grief, lamentation, sorrow, despair, and irritation." This could not be said, "Thus is the arising of this whole great mass of suffering. . . ." Therefore, it is understood that the explanation as given is suitable.]

In another sūtra, ignorance is said to have incorrect attention⁴⁰ as its cause, and incorrect attention has ignorance as its cause.

[Yaśomitra--In another sūtra, ignorance is said to have incorrect attention as its cause. In the Sahetusapratyayasānidānasūtra. How? Because the sūtra says, "Ignorance, O Monks, has a cause (hetu), a condition (pratyaya), a reason (nidāna)."⁴¹ What, O Monks, is the cause of ignorance, what is the condition, what is the reason? Incorrect attention is the cause of ignorance, O Monks, incorrect

attention is the condition, incorrect attention is the reason." Incorrect attention has ignorance as its cause. This refers to "It was said in another sūtra."⁴² Because, in that sūtra, it is said, "Confused (āvila) attention (manaskāra), born of delusion (mohaja), arises dependent on the eye and on visible objects." Why is there no mention of it here? Why isn't it a separate limb? Therefore, he said--]

Others say that it is stated here, too, because it is inherent (antarbhū) in grasping.

[Yaśomitra--It is stated here because of the fact of its being inherent in grasping. "It" is confused attention. "Here" is the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra. How is it stated? By the fact of being inherent in grasping. For example, grasping is the active state of the defilements in order to obtain sensual pleasures (bhoga). It is said that incorrect attention, the consideration (ābhoga)⁴³ of a mistaken (viparīta) mind, is inherent in that.

Therefore it is not so that there is no cause of ignorance, nor that another limb should be added to the twelve, ignorance, etc., nor that the unacceptable result of an infinite regression results, because of the fact that incorrect attention is the cause of ignorance. Others. The elder preceptor, Manoratha, the teacher of Vasubandhu, said this.]

How is there the inherence of incomplete attention in grasping? If through association, then there is the unacceptable result of its inherence in desire and ignorance also.⁴⁴ Even if it were inherent, how has it been taught here that ignorance has

incorrect attention as its cause? If the nature of cause and effect (hetuphalabhāva) is explained only by inherence, then, in that case, it would not be possible to distinguish the different limbs because of the inherence (of incorrect attention) there, in desire and ignorance also.

[Yaśomitra--The teacher said, "How?" etc. How is there the inherence of incorrect attention in grasping? For it is not so that incorrect attention has the self-nature (svabhāva) of grasping. If through association . . . If it is said that incorrect attention is associated with grasping, then its inherence in grasping is acknowledged by the Buddha. The inherence of that of incorrect attention in desire and ignorance in these two limbs of dependent origination also results. For it is associated also with desire and ignorance. Therefore, it should be said that it is stated here also because of the fact of being inherent in ignorance, desire, and grasping, but it should not be said that it is stated here also because of the fact of being inherent in grasping. This means that its inherence in grasping is not to be affirmed this way. Even if it were inherent . . . We say this having already agreed that the inherence is impossible. How has "Incorrect attention is the cause of ignorance" been taught? For there is no such statement in the sūtra. If by inherence If it has been taught by stating that since incorrect attention inheres in grasping that therefore incorrect attention is the cause of ignorance and that no other limb need be stated, because of its being proved by the sole mentioning of grasping, then, in that case, because of the inherence in grasping, (it) also (inheres)

in desire and ignorance. Then it would not be possible to make a distinction between the limbs because of the inherence (of it) there, in these two also. It is proved by the sole mentioning of grasping and because the desire and ignorance limbs are mentioned separately. Therefore this is not the refutation.]

However, someone else says, "In another sūtra, incorrect attention is said to be the cause of ignorance. This is indicated (nirdiṣṭa) at the time of contact: 'Dependent on the eye and on visible objects arises confused attention, born of delusion.'" It must necessarily exist at the time of a feeling (which is associated) with ignorance.⁴⁵

According to another sūtra, "Desire arises dependent upon feeling which is born from contact associated with ignorance." Therefore it is proved that there is incorrect attention existing at the time of contact because it is the cause (pratyavabhāvena) of the ignorance which occurs along with feeling. Thus it is not so that ignorance lacks a cause or that another limb should be added, nor is there the unacceptable result of an infinite regression, either. Moreover, because of the word "delusion-born," there is confused attention, born of delusion, also of this incorrect attention.⁴⁶

[Yaśomitra--However, someone else says. Bhadanta Śrīlābha. In another sūtra, incorrect attention is said to be the cause of ignorance. In the Sahetusapratyayasānidānasūtra.⁴⁷ "Ignorance, too, O Monks, has a cause, a condition, a reason, etc. . . ." And it incorrect attention is indicated at the time of contact. How? He says, "Dependent on the eye and on visible objects, arises confused

attention, born of delusion." The time of contact is the time of the arising of eye consciousness. The attention is confused because of the fact of having occurred superficially (ayoniśas), or because of the fact of being born from delusion . . . Feeling which is born of contact with ignorance. Feeling born from contact with ignorance (means) produced by contact which is associated with ignorance. Ignorance is necessarily associated where there is feeling born from contact associated with ignorance . . . Moreover, there is confused attention, born of delusion, of this incorrect attention also, because of the word "delusion-born." So this has been called circular--ignorance arises from incorrect attention and incorrect attention arises from ignorance.]

In that case, shouldn't what's stated elsewhere, be restated here?

No, it shouldn't be.

How is it to be understood, though, if it's not stated?

Through reasoning (yukti).

By what reasoning?

(By this reasoning)--It is not so that the feeling of arhats, which is not associated with ignorance,⁴⁸ can cause desire, nor is correct contact (the cause) of defiled feeling. Furthermore, there is no wrong contact of an arhat who is without ignorance.

It is going too far (atiprasaṅga evaṃ prāpnoti) to say that what is not stated should be understood in so far as it arises through reasoning. Therefore this is not the refutation.

[Yaśomitra--Next, the refutation. The teacher (ācārya Vasubandhu), seeing (the argument) to be faulty, begins stating the consequences in order to make the error clear. In that case . . . etc. So, as stated, "Incorrect attention is the cause of ignorance," . . . according to either the sūtra or reason . . . this which was stated in another sūtra should be stated again here in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra. Bhadanta Śrīlābha says it need not be stated. Through what reasoning? Thus questioned, Bhadanta Śrīlābha says, "For it is not so . . . " etc. There is feeling of arhats. It is not so that (this feeling) is the cause of desire. It is understood that only feeling associated with ignorance is a cause of desire. And it is not so that correct contact (is the cause of) defiled feeling. It has been proposed that it is its cause. Moreover, it is not so that there is wrong contact of an arhat who is free of ignorance. Also, it is understood that only that contact which is associated with ignorance is called the cause of feeling in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra, and it is understood that ignorance is the cause of that contact. So, by this reasoning, it is understood that in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra feeling is caused by contact which is associated with ignorance and that desire is caused by feeling which is associated with ignorance. Therefore by reasoning by (the reasoning) as stated. "Moreover, it is indicated at the time of contact" . . . About this, it has been proved in dependent origination that incorrect attention is the cause of ignorance . . .

The author of the text says, This is going too far. How is it going too far? He says, "It was pointed out in another sūtra, 'Desire

arose dependent on feeling which is born from contact associated with ignorance." It is not so that feeling is the cause of desire in an arhat whose feeling is not associated with ignorance, nor is it so that correct contact is the cause of defiled feeling, nor that there is incorrect contact of an arhat who is without ignorance. So, according to this reasoning, these two limbs also, called contact and feeling, although not stated here in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra, should be understood because they are taught elsewhere. So (this reasoning) results (in) the non-mentioning of these two limbs also. As is taught in another sūtra, "If he makes (abhisamskaroti) meritorious karmically-caused tendencies, there is consciousness of one acquiring merit, or of one acquiring demerit, or imperturbability."⁴⁹ However, an arhat, who has karmically-caused tendencies, but not ignorance, has no consciousness acquiring merit . . . acquiring imperturbability. The karmically-caused tendencies limb, too, is proved by reasoning, so it results that it need not be stated here. Likewise, it is understood by reason that old age and death do not exist without birth, so the birth limb needn't be mentioned, etc. This is going too far.]

However, this is not to be insisted upon. It does not follow that the round of rebirths (samsāra) has a beginning and an end because no other limbs are mentioned before ignorance or after old age and death. Nor is the list (nirdeśa) incomplete. Why not? Because there is a specific goal intended here, namely, to teach those who are to be instructed (and) who are confused about correct behavior (pravṛtti) how this life (loka) is connected with the next

life and vice versa. Also, because of this (intent), which was stated earlier, "In order to end confusion about the past, the future, and the present."⁵⁰

[Yaśomitra--However, this is not to be insisted upon. The teacher states his own opinion at length. How is this life to the next life? etc. About this, this life is connected (to the past) by ignorance and the karmically-caused tendencies. This life is the consciousness, name and form, six sense spheres, contact, and feeling limbs. The next life is connected by desire, grasping, and becoming, and is birth and old age and death . . .⁵¹]

The Buddha said, "I will teach to you, O Monks, dependent origination and dependently-arisen dharmas. What is the difference between them? According to the śāstra, nothing at all.⁵² For both are all conditioned dharmas.

[Yaśomitra--For both are all conditioned dharmas. All conditioned dharmas, those of all three times (past, present, and future) are dependent origination and therefore they are called dependently-arisen. There is no difference at all.]

How, at this moment, can unarisen, future dharmas be called "dependently-arisen"? How, indeed, can unmade, future dharmas be called "conditioned" (samskr̥ta)?

Because they are willed by a volition which is characterized by the formation of karma.⁵³

What about (katham) pure dharmas?

They, too, are willed by a good volition with the purpose of attainment (prāpti).⁵⁴

Then there is the unacceptable consequence that this would also apply to Nirvāṇa.

There is an analogy there because of the fact that they belong to the same class, just as (future) form is called form, although it is not yet formed, because they belong to the same class. There is no error here.⁵⁵

[Yaśomitra--What about unmade (dharma)s then? This means that since future (dharma)s are said to be conditioned by future ideas (saṃjñā), they are dependently-arisen. By a volition which is characterized by the formation of karma. He says, "characterized by the formation of karma," explaining the true character (svalakṣaṇa) of all volitions. For it is "characterized by the formation of karma" because it forms a result (vipākābhisaṃskāraṇa). Because of the fact of being willed by that (volition), because of the fact of being resolved on something. "I will be a god, I will be a man"--this sort (of resolution). Therefore, future dharma)s are called conditioned . . . What about pure? Future (dharma)s which are impure are suitable to being thus willed, but how are future (dharma)s which are pure suitable to being willed? The objector says, "They also are willed by a good volition for the purpose of attainment. Pure dharma)s should be attained. Then there is the unacceptable result that this applies also to Nirvāṇa. Conditionedness would also apply to Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa would then be obtained because of the fact of willing to obtain (it). Therefore, because of this meaning, it is said that there is an error in maintaining the conditionedness of future (dharma)s, (so) a different rule should be laid down. Because of the

fact of belonging to the same class as them, etc. This is the analogy: although future form is not being formed (presently), it is still called form because it belongs to the same class as form which is being formed, just as future dharmas are also called dependently-arisen because they belong to the same class as dependently-arisen dharmas. The analogy is between these (things which) are future.]

However, this is said to be the intent of the sūtra--

HERE, THE PRODUCTION IS THE CAUSE, THE PRODUCED IS CONSIDERED THE RESULT. (28a-b) ⁵⁶

The limb which is the cause is dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), so determined (iti kṛtvā) because something arises from it; the limb which is the result is dependently-arisen (pratītyasamutpanna). Thus all the limbs function in two ways, as both cause and effect. So there can be no establishment of an (absolute) truth, because of different references.⁵⁷ (Something which is) the cause (pratītyasamutpāda) of a certain thing is not dependently-arisen with reference to that very same thing, like cause and effect, or father and son.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . As that which is established as the cause of something is not the result of that same thing, and that which is established as the result of something is not the cause of that same thing. In that case, how is it established? A cause is established by reference to a result, a result is established by reference to a cause.]

The elder Pūrṇāśa wrongly (kila) says, "It is possible that (that which is) cause (pratītyasamutpāda) not be dependently-arisen

(pratītyasamutpanna) dharmas. There are four instances (koṭika). The first instance is future dharmas the second, the final dharmas of an arhat, the third, past and present dharmas other than those, and the fourth, unconditioned dharmas.

[Yaśomitra--Kila means impossibility. The first case is future dharmas. They are pratītyasamutpāda because of being the cause of other dharmas, determined by the saying, "Something arises from it," but they are not dependently arisen, because they have not arisen. Second, the last of an arhat. Although they are dependently arisen, they are not the cause of a result. Third, other than these. Past and present dharmas other than the last dharmas of an arhat.⁵⁸ Fourth, unconditioned. They do not result in anything, nor do they arise.]

However, the Sautrāntikas question (vijñāpayanti) this, "Indeed, aren't these (just) to be called fantasies (iṣṭha), and what fantasy of whom? Or is this the meaning of the sūtra?

He says, "It is the meaning of the sūtra."

If (you say that it is) the meaning of the sūtra, (we say) it is not.

Why not?

What you have said so far, that this static dependent origination has twelve limbs which are twelve states pertaining to the five aggregates, this is not in the sūtra, because the explanation in the sūtra is different. "What is ignorance? The not-knowing about the past," etc.⁵⁹ This, then, is not the meaning of the sūtra, as it is said that that which has a clear meaning (nītārtham) should not be interpreted (neyam).⁶⁰

[Yaśomitra--Aren't these (just) to be called fantasies? From "static dependent origination" to "It is possible that what is dependent origination not be dependently-arisen." Not knowing about the past. Since only ignorance is mentioned, no other aggregate, only ignorance is a limb.]

It is not at all so (respond the Sarvāstivādins), that all has a clear meaning according to this definition. Besides, definitions are made according to what is predominant. As, for example, in the Hastipadopama (sūtra), it says with reference to, "What is the earth element?," "the hair on the head and body." There are other (dharmas) as well there (in the hair), form (rūpa), etc. Thus here, too, the definition may be according to what is predominant.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . So here also the definition may be according to predominance. So here in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra also, the definition may be of that which is predominant in each of the twelve states relating to the five aggregates. The definition "ignorance" may refer to that which has ignorance as predominant, the definition "karmically-caused tendencies" and so on, may refer to that state which has the karmically-caused tendencies, etc., as predominant, and so on. There are also other dharmas there, such as form (rūpa), feeling, etc.]

(Sautrāntika) This is not conclusive, for it is not so that hair, etc. are there (in the Hastipadopamasūtra) defined by the earth element. If they were, the definition of them would be incomplete. Rather, the earth element is there defined by the hair, etc., and it is not so that there is also earth element outside of the hair, etc. So

the definition of it is complete. Thus here, too, (in dependent origination), the definition of ignorance and the other limbs is complete; there is nothing remaining (unmentioned).

(Śarvāstivādin) Isn't it so, though, that besides (in) the hair, the earth element is also found in tears, phlegm, and mucus? It is defined just this way.

(Sautrāntika) Whether because of the statement, "Moreover, there is in this body also other hardness of rough constitution," or let's just say that there is a remainder of ignorance, you still have to point it out.⁶¹ However, what would be the reason for the insertion of something belonging to a different class into ignorance? Even if the five aggregates are found in the (twelve) states, still, there is the rule about the existence or non-existence of a certain (limb) because of the existence or non-existence of a certain (other limb). Only that (which determines the existence or non-existence of another limb) is established as a limb.⁶² Although an arhat may have the five aggregates, he does not have the karmically-caused tendencies caused by those aggregates.

In that case, what (causes them)?

They are caused by ignorance alone. So (there is no)⁶³ consciousness leading to merit, demerit, or imperturbability, nor desire, etc. The meaning of the sūtra is precisely as defined.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Let's just say there is a remainder of ignorance--if it is possible to point it out. The word "if" is used because he thinks, "It is not possible to point it out," because all the locations of ignorance are mentioned: ignorance about the past,

ignorance about the future, ignorance about the present, ignorance about the Buddha, ignorance about the teaching (dharma), ignorance about the Order, and so on. However, why insert something belonging to a different class, belonging to feeling, etc., into ignorance? Ignorance is a state of the five aggregates. It is not so that the fact of ignorance is suitable to (the aggregate) feeling, etc. Rule about the existence or non-existence. Because the existence or non-existence of a certain (limb) is fixed one for one (yathāsaṅkhyena) because of the existence or non-existence of a certain (other limb). Only that is a limb. When ignorance exists, there is the existence of the karmically-caused tendencies, when it doesn't exist, there is the non-existence of them, so only ignorance is the limb, not feeling, etc. It means that it is not so that an arhat has the karmically-caused tendencies which produce the consciousness limb, even though there is the existence (sadbhāva) of feeling, etc.⁶⁴ Therefore he says, "Although the five aggregates exist, the karmically-caused tendencies do not . . ." although the five aggregates exist in the state of arhatship. There is no consciousness leading to merit . . . leading to imperturbability. This means there is no rebirth (pratisandhi) consciousness . . . So even though the five aggregates exist, desire and grasping, etc., do not exist in a state without ignorance. The meaning of the sūtra is precisely as defined. This means that the (correct) comprehension of "ignorance," etc., is just as it has been explained. Therefore, although existing, other aggregates are not the causes of the karmically-caused tendencies, etc.--they are not limbs.]

Also, (all) this which has been said, from "Production is the cause, the produced the result" to "There are four instances," is not in the sūtra, because the definition in the sūtra is different. "What is dependent origination? Namely, when this is, that is, (and so on, stating the quotation at length) . . . the nature of things (dharmatā), the stability of dharmas (dharmasthititā), and so on to the correctness (aviparyastatā)--this is called dependent origination." The nature of things, namely, the arising of dharmas (dharmajāti), is the manner of dharmas. Then, what is the nature of things, what is this rule? Only when ignorance exists do the karmically-caused tendencies arise, and not otherwise. This dependent origination is not simply a cause (hetu). Also, as to the four instances which were stated, about them, if future dharmas are not dependently produced, then the sūtra is contradicted. "Which are the dependently-arisen dharmas? Ignorance . . . birth, old age and death." If the future existence of these two is not admitted, then the division into three periods breaks down.⁶⁵

Those belonging to another school say dependent origination is unconditioned (asamskrta)⁶⁶ because of the statement, "Whether or not Tathāgatas arise, the nature of things (dharmatā) is stable" This is both correct and incorrect depending upon the interpretation.

[Yaśomitra--Thus have I heard.⁶⁷ The Buddha was staying at Rājagṛha, on the Vulture Peak Mountain, with a large assembly of monks, numbering twelve hundred and fifty, and with a great many bodhisattvas. The venerable Śāriputra said this to the bodhisattva Maitreya, "Looking at a rice stalk, (the Buddha) spoke this sūtra to

the monks. 'Whoever, O Monks, sees dependent origination sees the law (dharma), whoever sees the law sees the Buddha,' and having said this, he fell silent. What is the meaning of this sūtra spoken by the Buddha? What is dependent origination? What is the law? What is the Buddha? How does one, seeing dependent origination, see the law, etc.?" About this, dependent origination is said to be, "Namely, ignorance, etc." With this in view, it is said there in the sūtra, "Whether or not Tathāgatas arise, this nature of things (dharmatā) is stable (sthita), it is the stability of dharmas (dharmasthititā), the regularity of dharmas (dharmaniyāmatā), the state of being so (tathatā), the necessity (avitathatā), the invariability (ananyatathatā), the reality (bhūtatā), the truth (satyatā), the essence (tattva), the certainty (aviparītatā), the correctness (aviparyastatā)" Thus the Buddha said to Maitreya. If future are not dependently-arisen then, as stated, the first instance, that of future dharmas, contradicts the sūtra. Birth and old age and death would not be dependently-arisen, and it was said, "Ignorance through birth, old age and death" So the limbs of birth and old age and death are also acknowledged to be dependently-arisen. If the existence of these two in the future is not admitted, then the division into three periods breaks down. "Two each in the past and future, eight in the present." (3.20)

Those belonging to another school the Āryamahīśāskas.⁶⁸

How, then, is it both correct and incorrect? If it means that whether or not Tathāgatas arise, there is invariably (nityam) the arising⁶⁹ of the karmically-caused tendencies, etc., dependent on

ignorance, etc., never independently (apratītya), nor dependent on something else, that it is eternal in this way, then this is acceptable. If this is the meaning--that dependent origination is a separate (antara), eternal (nitya) state (bhāva), then this is not correct, this is denied. Why? Because of the fact that arising is a characteristic of the conditioned.⁷⁰ It is not so that the characteristic of transience is suitable to a separate, eternal state. Indeed, origination belongs to that which originates.⁷¹ What would be the connection of it (an eternal state) with ignorance, etc., by which it could be called the cause (pratītyasamutpāda) of them? The word doesn't have its intended meaning this way.⁷² Indeed, (it would mean both) eternal and dependent origination.

[Yaśomitra--Because of the fact that arising is a characteristic of the conditioned. Those belonging to another school imagine this arising, called dependent origination, to be eternal, (but) the character of the conditioned has been stated. "There are these three conditioned characteristics of that which is conditioned: the arising (utpāda) of the conditioned is known, the passing away (vyaya), and the stasis (sthityanyathātva).⁷³ This means that, because of the fact of being a characteristic of the conditioned, it is not eternal. You say that the characteristic too is eternal? Therefore, he says, "It is not so that an eternal, separate state is suitable as a characteristic of the transient." For, it is not so that Nirvāṇa or space is the characteristic of something impermanent. Of what would it be the characteristic before the arising of the thing to be characterized, and of what would it be the characteristic after the

disappearance of the thing to be characterized?--so it is not suitable. Arising . . . Arising, after not existing, is a characteristic of existence.⁷⁴ According to the system of the Sautrāntikas, the arising of a dharma occurs at that very same time. What would be its unconditioned arising, according to their belief, connection with ignorance, etc.? There is a connection between cooking and porridge, said to be (a connection) characterized by the agent and the action, which is called the cooking of porridge, (but) it is not so that there is a connection between space (ākāśa) and form (rūpa) which is characterized by the ariser and the arising, because of which it is called the space of form. Thus, what could be its connection with ignorance, etc.? Because of which it (could) be called the cause of them of ignorance, etc? The meaning of the word is not what is intended. The meaning of the word "dependent origination" is "arising together after having obtained the condition" (pratyayaṃ prāpya samudbhavaḥ). How could it be (both) eternal and dependent origination?

What, then, is the meaning of the word "dependent origination"? "Prati" means "attainment," the root "ī" means "to go." "Pratītya" means "having attained," because the preverb changes the meaning of the root. "Pad" means "existence." Preceded by "samut," it has the meaning "appearance." Therefore, dependent origination means arising, having attained the condition.

This definition is not acceptable.

Why not?

When two actions are performed by the same agent, the earlier action is expressed by a gerund. For example, having bathed, he eats. There is nothing which, before arising, first attains (the conditions) and, at a later time, arises, nor is there an action without an agent either. About this, he says, "If it is said that previous to arising, it approaches (the conditions), then this can't be, because it is non-existent. If it is said that it arises and approaches at the same time, then the use of the gerund is incorrect, because of the rule about past time."⁷⁵

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Because of the rule about the gerund with respect to two actions done in the past. Because of the rule (Pāṇini 3.4.21), "When two actions have the same agent, the affix 'ktvā' comes after that verb which takes place in a time anterior to that of the other."⁷⁶ It is not so that something, before arising according to the Sautrāntika opinion . . .]

This is not an error. The grammarian should be asked this, "Having what state, that is, present (varttamāna) or future, does a dharma arise? And what (results) from (each proposition)? If (something) which exists arises, (then) how can it be extant if it hadn't (already) arisen? The unacceptable consequence of an infinite regression results from the re-arising of that which has already arisen. On the other hand, if (something) future arises, (then) how can there be agency of something non-existent, or how can there be an action without an agent? Therefore, (a dharma) arises having the very same state with which it approaches (the conditions).

With what state does it arise?

A future (dharma) is ready to arise (utpāddābhimukha). It is said that (a dharma) having that same state approaches the conditions.

This establishment of agent and action, according to the grammarian, as "that which arises" (bhavati) and "the act of arising" (bhūti), (respectively), is not successful. We do not see here that the act, arising, is different from what arises.⁷⁷ However, there is nothing wrong with the common usages of these words.

[Yaśomitra . . . If future future means not yet having acquired a (self) nature (alabdhātmako 'nāgata) . . . The future is ready to arise It is not so that all that is future arises; in that case, what (does)? "Ready to" means "approaching, preparing for" (upapāda). It means "about to arise" (utpitsu), ready with respect to arising. That very state. It was said (a dharma) approaches having that very state of being about to arise. This is unsuccessful . . . The establishment of agent and act. Why? Because no difference can be seen between the meaning of "that which arises" (bhavitr), here called "agent," and arising (bhūti), here called "action." However, there is nothing wrong in saying "It exists," "It arises," "It approaches," and so on.⁷⁸]

Rather, this is the meaning of the word (pratītyasamutpāda): "When this is, that is; from the arising of this, that arises."⁷⁹ This is what dependent origination means.⁸⁰ About this, he says -- ⁸¹

Either not existing, it arises, and also in the same way (that is, not existing), it approaches (the conditions), or, existing, it arises, (already) arisen. In this way, there is either an infinite regression, or it didn't exist earlier.⁸² Besides, the gerund can also mean

simultaneity. For example, the darkness disappeared as the lamp was lit, or, yawning, he lies down. If he lies down afterward, why doesn't it say, he closes his mouth?

[Yaśomitra--About this, he says. He explains production according to this system. Either not existing, it arises . . . As it arises, so it also approaches, that is, not having acquired a (self)-nature (ātmaka), with the state of not existing. Or existing it is postulated that it arises having acquired a (self)-nature. There is an infinite regression in saying, "Arisen, it arises." The non-establishment (aniṣṭhā) of the other (proposition, in this case, non-being) results from the infinite regression in saying that that which has already arisen arises again. For example, referring to this, he says that according to the Sāṅkhya opinion, there is the arising only of that which exists, not of that which doesn't exist. Or existing earlier. The word "or" indicates a difference of opinion. If it is your opinion, sir, that (a dharma) arises, (already) existing, it is also ours that it arises existing, because of the existence of the future according to the Vaibhāṣikas⁸³ and the reality of the generative seed (janakadharmabīja) according to the Sautrāntikas. So why was it said, "It is not so that there is something which, arising earlier, arises dependently at a later time?" In the case that only that which exists arises, there results the jar being brought about by itself previously, regardless of the earth, the clods, etc. However, others explain, There is an infinite regression, or else it didn't exist earlier. Then let's not accept an infinite regression, you then arrive at "not existing, it arises." It leads again precisely to this, "Either

not existing, it arises, and also in the same way, it approaches (the conditions)" Our opinion is proved. It should be explained as it was earlier . . .]

However, others interpret (parikalpayati) (dependent origination) differently in order to avoid this difficult problem. (For them), "prati" means "distributiveness" (vīpsārtha).⁸⁴ "Itya" means "excellent in regard to going, to transience."⁸⁵ "Pad" preceded by "ut" means "appearance." Therefore dependent origination means the arising in combination of what is transient because of the totality (sāmagrī) of each and every cause.

[Yaśomitra--Others Bhadanta Śrīlābha . . . The preverb "sam" means "coming together" . . . Dependent origination is the arising in combination of what is transient of what is perishable. It is not so that any single dharma arises . . . ⁸⁶]

This explanation may be suitable in this instance, but will it be here, "Dependent on the eye and on visible objects arises eye consciousness?"

[Yaśomitra-- . . . The explanation in this instance in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra is suitable, but will it be here, "Dependent on the eye and on visible objects arises eye consciousness?" For it is not so that there is a compound pratītyaśakṣuṇi, "the eyes of what is transient because of the totality of each and every cause," (analogous to pratītyasamutpāda), because it has no meaning. It means, "dependent on, that is, having attained, the eye and visual objects, eye consciousness arises." Therefore that same situation (avasthā) and that difficult matter which was stated, "This definition is not

acceptable" . . . (is reached again). Why? When two actions are performed by the same agent, the gerund expresses the prior action--having bathed, he eats. It is not so that there is eye consciousness which arose earlier, which then arises at a later time dependent on the earlier eye and forms, nor is there action without an agent.]

For what reason, then, did the Buddha proclaim the two-part formula (paryāyadvaya), "When this is, that is; from the arising of this, that arises?" For the purpose of restriction. As he says elsewhere, "When there is ignorance, there are the karmically-caused tendencies, (but) it is not so that the karmically-caused tendencies exist when anything other than ignorance exists." Or, in order to show the succession of the limbs. When this limb is, that limb is; moreover, from the arising of this limb, that limb arises. Or, (in order to show) the succession of lives (janma). When there is a past (life), the present (life) is; from the arising of the present (life), the future (life) arises. It (also) shows the nature of causality (pratyayabhāva), (both) immediate and successive, for sometimes the karmically-caused tendencies arise immediately from ignorance, sometimes successively.

[Yaśomitra--He proclaimed the two-part formula for the purpose of restriction. When this is . . . If only this much were said, then it would not be only when ignorance existed that the karmically-caused tendencies arise, it might be understood (that they could arise) also when something else existed, as when it is said that when there is the eye, there is (bhavatu) eye consciousness. It is not restricted by saying, "when the eye alone is," therefore it is

understood that a visible object too (must) exist. So, he restricts this first part with the second, from the arising of this, that arises. From the arising of this alone, that arises, not from the arising of anything else. Or, in order to show the succession of the limbs. When this limb is . . . When the ignorance limb is, the karmically-caused tendencies limb is; moreover, from the arising of this limb, of the karmically-caused tendencies limb, that, the consciousness limb, arises. The succession of the other limbs is to be explained in the same way. Or the succession of lives. It continues, "What did he intend to point out with the two-part formula?" Immediate. He proclaimed the two-part formula in order to show the nature of the causality of ignorance and the other limbs by their continuity (santatyā), (both) immediate and successive. "When this is, that is" shows the immediate nature of causality, "from the arising of this, that arises" (shows) the successive. About this, it is immediate (causality) when defiled karmically-caused tendencies arise from ignorance without an interval, but it is successive when good (karmically-caused tendencies) arise, because of the non-existence of ignorance in a good state. Moreover, ignorance is the immediate cause of the karmically-caused tendencies and the successive (cause) of consciousness and the other limbs. So, it has been said that when the ignorance limb is, the karmically-caused tendencies limb is; from the arising of the karmically-caused tendencies limb, this, the consciousness limb, (having the karmically-caused tendencies limb) as its immediate cause and ignorance as its successive cause, arises. All this is the opinion of the teacher (Vasubandhu).]

According to others, it is in order to refute the theory of the absence of a cause or of an eternal cause. It is not so that there is anything (bhāva) which arises without a cause, nor that anything arises from an un-arisen eternal, such as Nature or Spirit,⁸⁷ etc. However, following this explanation, the first half of the formula becomes superfluous (anarthaka), because "from the arising of this, that arises" is alone adequate to refute both theories.

[Yaśomitra--Others say it is in order to refute the Elder Vasuvarmā. It is not so that anything arises without a cause. The first half of the formula refutes the causeless view, the second half . . . refutes the eternal cause view . . . Because it is adequate to refute both theories. This half only, "From the arising of this, that arises" (is). The first half of the formula becomes superfluous because the refutation of both the causeless and the eternal cause views is accomplished by saying, "There is the existence of a cause" and "There is the causation of that which arises."]

Then there are those⁸⁸ who posit (parikalpayati) the existence of the karmically-caused tendencies, etc., because there is a soul (ātman) having the nature of a support (āśraya), and from the arising of ignorance, etc., the arising of them (the other limbs). Therefore, in order to refute this supposition, this was specified: that which arises because of the arising of something else, exists only because that very something is, and not because anything else is. For example, "Dependent on ignorance are the karmically-caused tendencies . . . Thus is the arising of this whole great mass of suffering."

[Yaśomitra-- . . . He says, "From the arising of which . . . is the arising of this mass." That which arises because of the arising of something else, arises only because that very something is and not because anything else is, not because there is a soul. For example, dependent on ignorance are the karmically-caused tendencies. Only because there is ignorance do the karmically-caused tendencies arise, not because there is something else . . . Thus is the arising of this whole great mass of suffering. How? Old age, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, despair, and mental irritations arise dependent on birth. Thus is the arising of this whole great mass of suffering. Only because there is birth do old age, death, and the rest arise, not because there is something else, not because there is a soul. For otherwise, there may be some who explain, "When this is, that is" (in this way)--because there is a soul having the nature of support (and) because there is ignorance, etc., the karmically-caused tendencies, etc., arise. Or else he would state only the second half, "From the arising of this, that arises," (which) they might also interpret in this way--it is true that the karmically-caused tendencies, etc. arise from the arising of ignorance, etc., but (only) because there is a soul having the nature of a support. Therefore he specifies by means of the twofold formula, that that which arises from the arising of something, arises only because that thing is, not because there is something else, not because there is a soul having the nature of a support.]

The teachers (ācārya) say that it is in order to teach about non-abandonment (aprahīṇa) and arising. When ignorance is not

abandoned, the karmically-caused tendencies are not abandoned. From the arising of that alone, they arise, and so on.

[Yaśomitra--The teachers the former teachers . . . When ignorance is not abandoned, the karmically-caused tendencies are not abandoned. He shows this by means of the first half of the formula. From the arising of that alone, they arise. He shows this by means of the second half of the formula . . .]

According to (still) others, it is in order to point out abiding (sthiti) and arising. As long as there is a stream (śrotas) of causes, there is a stream of effects. The effect arises from the arising of the cause only. However, referring to arising, what is the appropriateness (prasaṅga) of the word "abiding" and why did the Buddha teach, out of order, first abiding and afterwards, arising?

[Yaśomitra--According to others . . . Bhadanta Śrīlabha . . . As long as there is a stream of causes, there is a stream of effects. (He shows this) by means of the first part of the formula. The effect arises from the arising of the cause only. (He shows this) by the second (part of the formula). However, referring to arising. Referring to, "I will teach you dependent origination, O Monks." What is the appropriateness what is the suitability (prastāva) of the word "abiding"? "When this is, that is," because of this, as long as there remains a stream of causes, there remains a stream of effects. Thus, the word "abiding" is selected for this. Why did the Buddha teach it out of order? After all, arising occurs first and abiding afterwards. Having determined that abiding is dependent on arising, "From the arising of this, that arises" should be stated first, and

then, "This being, that is." However, it is not so, therefore, this is not the meaning (of the two-part formula).]

Furthermore, he continues, "When this is, that is," means "When the result is, there is the destruction of the cause." In that case, one might think that the result arises without a cause. Therefore he says that it was not without a cause, because, "From the arising of this, that arises."

[Yaśomitra--Furthermore, he says. He is Bhadanta Śrīlābha.]

If this were the meaning of the sūtra, he would have said, "When this is, that is not." So, first he would have stated the arising of the effect and afterwards, "When this is, that is not." For then the order is correct. On the contrary, with reference to the meaning of "What is dependent origination?," why is the order such that the statement of destruction comes first? Therefore, this is not the meaning of the sūtra.

How, then, are the karmically-caused tendencies dependent on ignorance . . . how are old age and death dependent on birth? We shall show only the connection (abhisambandhamātra). A fool (bāla) undertakes threefold action with his body, etc., for the sake of his own happiness or pleasure (aduḥkha),⁸⁹ intent on the false belief in a self and egoism (ātmadr̥ṣṭyaśmimānābhiniṣṭa), not knowing, "This is only dependently-arisen, karmically-caused tendencies."⁹⁰ (This threefold action which he undertakes) is meritorious for the sake of happiness in the future, imperturbable for the sake of happiness or indifference, and demeritorious for the sake of present happiness.⁹¹ (These are) the karmically-caused tendencies which

are dependent upon this ignorance. Because of the projecting of karma (karmākṣepa), there is a series of consciousness (vijñāna-santati) which goes to this or that realm of existence, moving in the manner of a flame (ivālāgamanavogena), because of its connection with the intermediate existence. This consciousness is not dependent on other karmically-caused tendencies.⁹² Taking it in this sense, it then conforms to the definition of the consciousness limb, "What is consciousness? The six groups of consciousness."

[Yaśomitra--In the sūtra, it was said, "Dependent on birth arise old age, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, despair, and mental irritations." They are thus included in "old age and death"; they are not to be considered a separate limb. As for them, they arise (either) because of a change of an object (viṣaya) connected with living and non-living things or because of a change in a person (ātmabhēva)

For a fool and so on. Fool means ordinary person (prthagjana). Only the karmically-caused tendencies "Only" is used here in order to negate (the idea of the) soul. Not knowing. He points out that ignorance is not connected with anything else (āveṇikī).⁹³ He undertakes three-fold action, that is, meritorious, demeritorious, and imperturbable with his body, etc. with his body, speech, and mind, intent on firm in the false belief in a self and egoism . . . Meritorious for the sake of happiness in the future for the sake of happiness in future lives. What (is)? Good action relating to the realm of sensual pleasures. Imperturbable for the sake of happiness or indifference. Good relating to the form and formless realms. (It is) for the sake

of happiness as far as the third stage of meditation (dhyāna), above that, for the sake of indifference. For the sake of present happiness. It means that which is done for happiness here, not for happiness in the future. Because of the projecting of karma as explained, because of the throwing (āvedha) of karma. It goes to this or that realm of existence hell, etc. In the manner of the movement of a flame. As a fire fed with grass is said to move, so (consciousness) goes to this or that destiny, even a very protracted one, by means of its connection with the intermediate life, because of the connection of the intermediate life with the series of consciousnesses. Taking it in this sense, it then conforms. If "dependent on the karmically-caused tendencies is consciousness" means this entire series of consciousness of the six groups of consciousness, from the moment of rebirth in the intermediate existence (antarabhavapratīsandhī-citta) until the moment of birth in the next existence (upapattikṣaṇa), (then it conforms to the definition) . . . What is consciousness? The six groups of consciousness. For otherwise, if it did not mean the series of the six groups of consciousness, if "dependent on the karmically-caused tendencies is consciousness" meant only rebirth consciousness, it wouldn't say here "the six groups of consciousness." Instead, it would say, "What is consciousness? Mind consciousness (manovijñāna)." For it is not so that every consciousness group arises at the time of rebirth (pratīsandhī), because rebirth is connected with mind consciousness only . . . "94] Then name and form, consisting of the five aggregates, preceded by consciousness and followed by the whole life,⁹⁵ is born in this or

that destiny. According to the definition in the Vibhaṅga and the Mahānidānaparyāya, "After the maturing of name and form, in the usual order,⁹⁶ (arise) the six sense spheres. Then there is the arising of consciousness when an object is obtained."⁹⁷ The coming together of the three is contact, which is experienced as pleasant, etc. From this, there arises threefold feeling. From that, desire. There is desire, of one who is oppressed by suffering (duḥkha), for pleasant feeling relating to the realm of sensual pleasures; there is desire for pleasant or indifferent feeling relating to the form realm; there is desire for indifferent feeling relating to the formless realm.⁹⁸

[Yaśomitra--According to the definition in the Vibhaṅga. According to the definition in the analysis (vibhaṅga) of name and form in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra. "What is name? The four non-material aggregates. What is form? Whatever is form . . . That which is form and that which is name, together they are called "name and form."]

Then, because of desire for the coveted feeling, there is the production of the sensual desires.⁹⁹ As for them, the sensual desires are the five classes (of objects) of sensual desire. The wrong views are sixty-two in number, as (listed) in the Brahmajālasūtra.¹⁰⁰ Good conduct is the abstention from bad conduct. Vows are the dog and cow vows, etc. As, for example, the nakedness, the clothelessness of the Nirgranthas, and so on, or the taking up of the staff and skin by the Brahmanas, the ashes and matted hair of the Pāśupatas and the three staves and the tonsure of the Pari-

vrājikas. The theory about the self is the self (itself), the theory about the self is the theory about that which one calls "self."¹⁰¹ According to others, it is the false belief in a self and egoism. Why is there a theory about the self because of these two? Because of the saying, "Because of these two, there is a soul." It is called grasping after the theory of the self because of the non-existence of the self, because of the grasping at a mere designation (praiñapti-mātraka). As (the Buddha) said, "'Self,' 'Self,' O monks, says the fool, the unlearned, the ordinary person, who accepts everyday usage (praiñapti), but there is no self here, nor anything relating to a self." Desire (chanda) and attachment (rāga) to them is the grasping after them. For, as the Buddha declared everywhere,¹⁰² "What is grasping? Desire and attachment."

[Yaśomitra--Grasping after the sensual desires, etc.¹⁰³ This means grasping after sensual desires, false views, rites and rituals, and the theory of a self. The five classes of sensual desire . . . visible objects, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangibles . . . The theory about the self is the theory about that which one calls "self." As was said, "Whatever ascetics (śramaṇa) or priests (brahmaṇa), observing, speak of the 'self,' they all are observing only these five aggregates of grasping." Others say the false view of the self and egoism. They say (they are) the theory of the self . . . Desire and attachment. Desire is the wish for unobtained sensual objects, attachment (the feeling) for obtained ones. Desire and attachment for these sensual objects, etc. is the grasping after them.]

From this, karma, which is dependent on grasping and which produces another birth, is accumulated. That is becoming. According to the sūtra, "That very karma, O Ānanda, which produces another birth in the future, here (in this life) belongs to becoming." Then, dependent on becoming, because of the descent of consciousness, there is a future life, the birth of the five aggregates. When there is birth, there is old age and death, as they are defined in the sūtra. "Thus is the arising of this whole great mass of suffering." "Of this whole" means "void of anything relating to a self." "Of this great mass of suffering" means "of the heap of suffering which is without beginning or end." "The arising" means "the appearance." (All) this which has just been explained is the system (nyāya) of the Vaibhāṣikas.

[Yaśomitra--Relating to rebirth. Having another birth as its result. Here this is of becoming. It means here this is the self-nature (svabhāva), the own characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of becoming. Because of the descent of consciousness. Because of the connection with the intermediate life by means of flame-like movement. Future life is birth of the five aggregates. Because of the self-nature of name and form . . . This which has just been explained is the system of the Vaibhāṣikas. The twelve limbs as twelve states of the five aggregates.]

Now, then, what does "ignorance" (avidyā) mean?

That which is not knowledge.

That would then also include the eyes, etc. (within "knowledge").

In that case, the non-existence of knowledge.

If this were so, then it would be nothing, and this is not acceptable. Therefore--

IGNORANCE IS A SEPARATE DHARMA, THE OPPOSITE OF KNOWLEDGE, LIKE ENEMY OR FALSEHOOD. (28c-d)

Just as, by the contrary of a friend. (is meant) someone who is the opposite of it, that is, (someone) who is an enemy, but not (simply) anyone who is not a friend, nor the non-existence of a friend. Rta means truth. The word anṛta, falsehood, is the opposite of it. Injustice, useless, and improper are the opposites of justice, etc. Thus ignorance should also be considered a separate dharma, the opposite of knowledge.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . It would be nothing. This means that if ignorance were the non-existence of knowledge, it would be a non-thing (adravya). This is not acceptable, because of the teaching about the nature of causality. The opposite of it. He points out that (this type of compound, that is), nañ compounds, have the meaning of antithesis. Not anyone who is not a friend. He points out that it is not merely an exception . . .]

Why is this? Because of the teaching about the nature of causality. Also--

BECAUSE OF THE STATEMENT ABOUT THE FETTERS, ETC. (29a)

In the sūtras, ignorance is called a fether (samyojana), a tie (bandhana), a proclivity (anuśaya), a flood (ogha), and a bond (yoga).¹⁰⁴ So it is not the mere non-existence; it must exist, nor is

it the eyes, etc., either. Therefore, ignorance is indeed a separate dharma.

[Yaśomitra--Why is this? Because of the teaching about the nature of causality. Dependent on ignorance are the karmically-caused tendencies. The teaching about the nature of causality does not permit (the arising) of other (things), such as the eye, from ignorance, because of the non-arising of the karmically-caused tendencies of an arhat, and not from non-existence, because of the causality of the rabbit's horn.¹⁰⁵ Ignorance is called a fetter . . . a bond. In the sūtras it is called the ignorance fetter . . . the ignorance bond . . .]

Well, in that case, as a bad wife is called a "non-wife" and a bad son is called a "non-son," might it not also be the same with ignorance (that bad knowledge be called "non-knowledge")?

(IF YOU SAY THAT IGNORANCE IS) BAD WISDOM, (THEN WE SAY IT IS) NOT, BECAUSE (BAD WISDOM) IS A VIEW.¹⁰⁶ (29b)

For defiled (kliṣṭa) knowledge is contemptible, and has the self-nature of a wrong view (drṣṭi), so ignorance is not suitable (as bad wisdom).

In that case, could (ignorance) be that (defiled wisdom) which is not wrong view?

No, this can't be either.

Why not?

[Yaśomitra--It has the self-nature of a wrong view, so ignorance is not suitable. Because wrong view and ignorance are listed separately as two fetters, etc. In that case, that which is not wrong

view. Defiled wisdom which is associated with attachment (rāga), etc.]

BECAUSE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF WRONG VIEW WITH IT. (29c)

If ignorance were wisdom, then wrong view would not be associated, would not be linked, with it, because two elements of wisdom (prajñādravya) cannot be associated.

[Yaśomitra--Because of the association of wrong view with it.

It means because of the association with ignorance. How is wrong view associated with ignorance? Because delusion (moha), which is characterized by ignorance, is listed among the mental concomitants which accompany all defiled thoughts¹⁰⁷ (kleśamahābhūmika), and these mental concomitants are also associated with the mental concomitants which accompany all thoughts (mahābhūmika), so it is understood that ignorance is associated with wrong views, such as the belief in a personality (satkyādr̥ṣṭi), etc., which have the self-nature of wisdom. Therefore it is not so that ignorance is wisdom, because two elements of wisdom cannot be associated.]

Also--

BECAUSE OF THE TEACHING THAT IT IS AN IMPURITY¹⁰⁸ OF WISDOM. (29d)

It is said in the sūtra, "A thought (citta) fouled (upakliṣṭa) by passion (rāga) is not free; wisdom fouled (upakliṣṭa) by ignorance is not pure." It is not acceptable that wisdom itself be an impurity (upakleśa) of that wisdom. As passion is a separate (anya) impurity of the mind, belonging to another class, thus also is ignorance of wisdom.

[Yaśomitra--Wisdom fouled by ignorance is not pure. This is an example by which knowledge is said to be inherent in the meaning of wisdom . . .]

However, it is not accepted thus. Good wisdom, being mixed with defiled wisdom, is not pure. Therefore, it (defiled wisdom) is called an impurity of it (good wisdom). Although a thought fouled by passion is not free, is it then necessarily possessed (paryavasthita) by passion? However, that (thought) which is afflicted (upahata) so by passion is not free, but (the thought) of one who has destroyed that state is free. Thus, wisdom that is fouled by ignorance is not pure, so we postulate (parikalpayati) (wisdom) that is afflicted by ignorance.

Indeed, who, postulating, is stopped? However, they describe as ignorance that which is actually of another class.

[Yaśomitra--Being mixed, is not pure. It means that good wisdom, arisen at a given time, mixed with defiled wisdom, arising from time to time, is not pure. Is it, though, necessarily possessed by passion? This means associated (samprayukta) with passion. However, that which is afflicted so by passion. It is afflicted by active passion, a receptacle of impressions.¹⁰⁹ The thought¹¹⁰ of one who has destroyed, a yogi, that state that bad state (daṣṭulya), is free. Thus, defiled¹¹¹ wisdom, afflicted by ignorance, is not pure. Therefore wisdom is not ignorance and he points out that there is no mistake. For, who, postulating, is stopped? He declares this to be merely a supposition (parikalpanā) independent of the canonical texts.]

We thereby also refute anyone who thinks, "Ignorance is all the defilements (kleśa)."¹¹¹ If ignorance had the self-nature of all the defilements, then it would not be mentioned separately among the fetters, etc., nor would it be associated with wrong view or with another defilement, because of the mutual non-association of wrong view, etc. Furthermore, (in that case), thought would have been said to be fouled by ignorance, (not by passion).

[Yaśomitra--Whoever thinks, "Ignorance is all the defilements." Bhadanta Śrīlābha thinks that "ignorance" is a general term for all of the defilements; (he thinks) that it is not so that ignorance is distinct from the defilements, passion, etc.¹¹² Why does he think this? Because of the Buddhasūtra (which says), "He does not understand, he does not understand, O honorable Mahākauṣṭhila, therefore it is called 'ignorance.'" The defilements, the false belief in a true personality, etc., have the nature (svarūpa) of non-knowing (ajñāna) because of wrong comprehension (viparītagrahaṇa). Thereby him also . . . We thereby refute Bhadanta (Śrīlābha) with (these same) words of negation. The refutation of his opinion is to be inferred. How? He says, "If ignorance were the self-nature of all the defilements, it would not be mentioned separately among the fetters, etc." The ignorance fetter would not be mentioned separately among the proclivities and fetters because it would be no different from the rest of the fetters . . . (nor would it be associated with wrong view). Why not? Because of mutual non-association. It is not the case that wrong view is associated with wrong view, nor passion with passion. Ignorance is said to be associated with wrong view, etc.,

because of the rule about the association of the mental concomitants accompanying all thoughts with the mental concomitants accompanying all defiled thoughts. Also, thought should have been said to be fouled by ignorance. "Thought, fouled by passion, is not free," should not have been said, because saying simply that (a thought) is fouled by ignorance should include its fouling by passion, etc.]

If you are of the opinion that, "It was so stated for the purpose of differentiating," (then we say that, in that case) the differentiating factor of ignorance should be specified for wisdom also.

[Yaśomitra--It might be thought, "It was so stated for the purpose of differentiating." A thought fouled by ignorance, which is itself characterized by passion, is not free. It should be specified for wisdom also. That it is fouled either by passion, or by anger, or by pride, but let's not conclude that it means all the defilements. If this is accepted? Then the differentiating should not be made about thought either. However, it is stated just this way, "A thought fouled by ignorance is not free."]

Suppose ignorance is a separate dharma, then what is its self-nature?

Lack of understanding¹¹³ about the Four Truths, act, and its result.

Exactly what lack of understanding is, though, is not known.

If it is that which is not understanding, or also if it is the non-existence of understanding, then the same problems occur as did

in the definition of ignorance. So, it is a separate dharma, the opposite of understanding.

Then exactly what that is is not known.

The definition of dharmas is of the following type: for example, "What is the eye? The subtle material¹¹⁴ which is the support of eye consciousness."

[Yaśomitra--Understanding. One meaning is wisdom (prajñā) . . . Of such a type This means (they are defined) by their action (karmaprabhāvita). So the self-nature of ignorance is ascertained through its action, its activity. There is a certain dharma which is the opposite of knowledge. The fact of opposing knowledge is its action. For example, what is the eye? The subtle material which is the support of eye consciousness. Isn't "subtle material" a definition of it by its self-nature (svabhāvaprabhāvita)? No, because of the fact that eye consciousness is always inferred; it is imperceptible.]

Bhadanta Dharmatrāta says ignorance is the mayatā of creatures which says, "I am."¹¹⁵

Is this mayatā different from egoism (asmimāna)?

It was explained in the sūtra, "I, unobstructed,¹¹⁶ knowing thus, understanding thus, was freed (nirvṛta)¹¹⁷ by full understanding (parijñāna), by the abandoning of all desires, of all wrong views, of all mayatā-s, of all ideas of "I" (aḥamkāra), possessiveness (mamakāra), egoism (asmimāna), attachments (abhiniveśa), and proclivities (anuśaya)."¹¹⁸

So there is this mayatā, but you say it is ignorance, from where do you get this?

Because it's not possible to call it any other defilement.

Couldn't it be another pride (māna)?

There is too much to be said in the discussion about this, therefore let it be.

[Yaśomitra--The ignorance of creatures which says, "I am."

This is of unknown meaning. The elder did not determine its meaning, but the Sautrāntikas consider mayatā to be either a different type of ignorance or pride. Which was stated in the sūtra. This is understood to mean it is the name of different types of ignorances, called mayatā. Bhadanta Dharmatrāta says it means this because of the separate mentioning of desire, etc. The teacher says, "There is this mayatā." It is so that mayatā is mentioned in the sūtra, (it is mentioned) in the singular because it is defined as a type. It is ignorance. Where for what reason is this decided that it is ignorance? Bhadanta Dharmatrāta explains what he means, Because it cannot be called any other defilement. Why can't it be? Because desire, wrong view, and egoism are mentioned separately. The teacher says, "Couldn't it be another pride?" Another one of the six, other than (this type of) pride.¹¹⁹ This means it (pride) is mayatā, not ignorance. Much more arises to be said in this discussion. About this, moreover, a huge book could be filled (jāyate), as said, when discussing the ignorance limb. Therefore let it be. Let's end the discussion here . . .]

Now, what does "name and form" (nāmarūpa) mean? Form has been explained at length.¹²⁰ (1.9)

NAME, THOUGH, IS THE NON-MATERIAL AGGREGATES. (30a)

Why (is it called "name")? "Name" means it bends towards (namati) the sense objects (artha), because of name, the sense organs (indriya), and the sense objects. Because of which of two names? For example, the making-known (pratyāyaka) of these various sense objects is acknowledged in the world: cow, horse, form (rūpa), flavor, etc. Why is this called "name"?¹²¹ Because of the inclination (namana) of the non-material aggregates (nāma) towards these various sense objects.

Others say the non-material aggregates are called name because of the inclination towards another birth when the body is cast off here.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Name means it bends toward the sense objects--visible objects, etc., because of name, because of the sense organs, and because of the sense objects. Because of which of two names? He asks (this) because name has a twofold nature. The teacher explains, "For example, the making known in the world . . . cow, horse making known collections, form, flavor making known one thing. So, this fourfold group of aggregates, beginning with feeling, is called by the word "name." It is because of their name, that is, because of their everyday designation (saṃjñākarāṇa) that (the non-material aggregates) bend towards, are active with respect to the sense objects, both visible and invisible--"This is the object of this name." Because of the sense organs and objects, (the non-material

aggregates) bend towards, this means arise, with respect to the visible sense objects, visible form (rūpa), etc., and because of the objects, the (non-material aggregates) bend towards name--"This is the name of that object." Why, though, is it called name? What is the reason that this naming, characterized by designation, is called name? Because of the bending of name towards these or those sense objects. Because that name (designation) makes name, the four aggregates, bend towards, makes them active with respect to the sense objects . . .]

The six sense spheres were explained.¹²² Contact will now be explained.

THERE ARE SIX CONTACTS. (30b)

Eye contact (saṃsparśa) through mind contact. Further--

THEY ARISE FROM THE COMING TOGETHER. (30b)

They arise from the coming together (sannipāta) of the three--sense organ, sense object, and consciousness.

This is acceptable in the case of the coming together of the (first) five sense organs with the sense objects and consciousness, because of the fact that they arise together (that is, simultaneously). However, how can there be the coming together of a defunct (niruddha) mental organ with a future object (dharma) and an existing mind consciousness?¹²³

Either their coming together itself has the nature of cause and effect (kāryakāraṇabhāva), or it means that their coming together has only one effect, (contact). They all three also participate in (praguna bhavati) the arising of contact.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . However, how can there be the coming together of a defunct mental organ with a future dharma with a visible object, etc. which will arise (and) with an existing mind consciousness? What is the nature of cause and effect? Mind consciousness is the effect; the mental organ and objects, visible object, etc., are the cause. Or, it means that there is one effect . . . How does it mean that there is one effect? He said, "They all three mental sense organ, etc. participate in are necessary for (anukūla) the arising of contact."]

However, the opinions of the teachers differ on this point. For some (the Sautrāntikas) explain contact as merely the simultaneous occurrence (sakṛnnipāta) itself and they point to the sūtra which teaches, "It is said that contact is the meeting (saṅgati), the coming together (sannipāta), the collision (samavāya) of these three dharmas."¹²⁴

However, those who explain contact as a separate dharma associated with thought (citta), (the Sarvāstivādins), point to the sūtra which teaches, "What is the succession (pariyāya) of the six hexades of dharmas? The six internal spheres (the sense organs), the six external spheres (the sense objects), the six groups of consciousness, the six groups of contact, the six groups of feeling, the six groups of desire."¹²⁵ For here the groups of contact are taught separately from the sense organs, sense objects, and consciousnesses.

About this, those who say that contact is the mere coming together offer this refutation: it is by no means the case that there

is separate existence because of separate definition. Feeling and desire do not exist separately from the dharma-sphere.¹²⁶ There is no mistake here, then, because of the existence of the dharma-sphere also separate from them. So it's not true that there is a triad different from the contact triad, an additional (triad) (śeṣa) which should be understood here.

[Yaśomitra--"The six groups of contact" is the correct teaching. For if they were identical, then "contact group" would be mentioned again when the sense organs, sense objects, and consciousnesses are mentioned, and then there wouldn't be six hexades. Feeling and desire do not exist separately from the dharma-sphere. If there were separate existence because of separate definition, then, since feeling and desire also are defined separately from the dharma-sphere, there would be the existence of these two, feeling and desire, also, separate from the dharma-sphere. It is not so that their separate existence is admitted, because they are contained within the dharma-sphere . . . So it is not so. Thus it is not so, according to one maintaining "Contact is the coming together of the three," that there is a triad sense organ, sense object, and consciousness, a triad which is not contact different from the triad sense organ, sense object, and consciousness which is contact, an additional triad which should be understood here in the sūtra. It says "the six groups of contact" on purpose, even though they do not exist separately from the triad which is contact. Therefore, even though they do not exist separately, the separate definition of feeling and desire is acceptable because of

the effect on those to be instructed. However, it is not so, according to those maintaining that contact is the mere coming together, that the separate definition, "the six groups of contact," is acceptable for any reason whatsoever, since by saying "the six groups of contact," the triad of sense organ, sense object, and consciousness is stated. Since it's been stated, saying "the succession of the six hexades of dharmas" would therefore not be admissible. However, it is admissible to me, despite the mentioning of the hexades of contact, feeling, and desire, because of the existence of the hexades sense object, sense organ, and consciousness in the dharma-sphere, which is separate from them. Therefore, because of the separate definition, "the six groups of contact," "There is a separate dharma called contact, associated with thought (citta)," is proved.]

For, although the sense organ and sense object can exist without consciousness,¹²⁷ there is, however, no consciousness without the sense organ and object. Therefore, understanding contact again when the three have (already) been mentioned, is pointless.¹²⁸

Indeed, it is not so that every eye and visible object is the cause of every visual consciousness, nor is every visual consciousness the result of every eye and visible object.¹²⁹ Therefore, some say that (only) those which have the nature of cause and effect are established as contact.

[Yaśomitra--About this, Bhadanta Śrīlābha says, "Indeed, it is not so . . . Eye and visible object which have arisen previously are cause, but not those which arise simultaneously with consciousness.

Nor is all visual consciousness that which arises after earlier eye and visible object, not those (eye and objects) which arise simultaneously (with it). Therefore those consciousness, sense organs, and sense objects which have the nature of cause and effect are established as contact. In this sūtra it says, "the six groups of contact," so it should not be taught differently.]

Then how do those who say that contact is something other than the coming together refute this sūtra, "It is said that contact is the meeting, the coming together, the collision of these three"?

They don't read it that way.

Then how do they read it?

They read, "From the meeting, from the coming together, from the collision," or else they say it is a figure of speech (upacāra), expressing the result as the cause.

This discussion is going too far. Enough of conjecture! The Abhidharma masters describe contact as a separate dharma.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Or it is a figure of speech for the effect as the cause. They say contact is a figure of speech expressing the result as the cause, which is the meeting, the coming together, the collision. As in, "Happiness is the arising of the Buddhas."¹³⁰]

Furthermore, of these six contacts--

FIVE ARE CONTACTS OF RESISTANCE, THE SIXTH IS CALLED DESIGNATION. (30c-d)

The eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body contacts are called the five contacts of resistance (pratigha),¹³¹ because they have sense organs of resistance as their supports (āśraya). The sixth, mind

consciousness, is called designation (adhivacana)¹³² contact. Why is name called designation? It is called designation contact because that (name) indeed is its special (adhika) object (ālambana). As was said, "Through eye consciousness he knows blue, but he does not know, 'This is blue,' through mind consciousness, he knows blue and he knows, 'This is blue.'" The (first) one (is so called) because of its support (āśrayaprabhāvita), the second because of its object (ālambanaprabhāvita).

However, others say that (only) mind consciousness, not the other five (consciousnesses), functions with respect to objects because of verbal expression (vacana). Therefore, that alone is designation. Contact associated with it is called "designation contact," the (first) one (is so called) because of its support, the second because of its association (samprayogaprabhāvita).

[Yaśomitra--Name is called designation. Designation means, "It is called by this" (adhyucyate). Name is designation, (which means) it explains the meaning of the word, it functions with respect to verbal naming . . . ¹³³ He knows blue through mind consciousness. This means that he knows the meaning (of the word "blue"). And he knows, "This is blue." He knows, "This is the name of this object." One, because of its support. The first, (called) resistance contact is contact having a resistant support, because of the power due to its support, or it means contact of that which is resistant. Because of its object. Designation contact means contact with an object because of its designation (name) or it means contact with respect to designation . . . Therefore only that is designation. (Only)

mind consciousness functions with respect to verbal expression, so it is called designation. Designation contact is associated with it, or (it is) of that contact. Therefore, this second contact is said to be (named) because of its association.]

Furthermore, these same six contacts become three--134

CONTACT WITH KNOWLEDGE, IGNORANCE OR NEITHER. (31a)

There is contact associated with knowledge, contact associated with ignorance, and another, besides these two, contact associated with neither knowledge nor ignorance.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Knowledge means pure wisdom (anāśravā prajñā). Ignorance is defiled not-knowing (kliṣṭa ajñāna). Neither knowledge nor ignorance is wisdom which is good, but has influx.¹³⁵]

Further, these are to be known in order as:

PURE, DEFILED, AND THE REMAINDER (31b)

Contact associated with knowledge is pure (anāśrava) contact, contact associated with ignorance is defiled (contact), because of their association with knowledge or ignorance, (respectively). The remainder is contact associated with neither knowledge nor ignorance because of non-association with either. What is the remainder, though? Good, but with influx and undefiled-indeterminate.¹³⁶

Furthermore, because of the understanding of that one part of contact which is associated with ignorance, and which is constantly active, there are two (types of) contact --

[Yaśomitra--Further, of that one part of contact associated with ignorance . . . of contact associated with ignorance, associated

with all the defilements, which is constantly active always active . . .]

THE TWO CONTACTS ARE: WITH MALICE AND WITH CONCILIATION. (31c)

Because of the association with malice (vyāpāda) or with conciliation (anunaya).

However, taken all together--

THERE ARE THREE: TO BE EXPERIENCED AS PLEASANT,¹³⁷ ETC. (31d)

Contact is to be experienced (vedanīya) as pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent, because of the fact of being conducive to pleasant feeling, etc. Or else, "to be experienced" means "It is felt" or "It is possible to feel it." What is "It"? Feeling (veditam). "Contact which is to be experienced as pleasant" (is contact) in which there is pleasant feeling; it means there is pleasure to be experienced in it. "To be experienced as unpleasant" and "to be experienced as indifferent" are defined analogously.¹³⁸

These are the sixteen contacts. (Thus) contact has been explained.

Feeling will now be explained.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Wasn't feeling already explained? "Feeling is experience" (1.14).¹³⁹ (Yes, but) it is said that it was explained differently (there) . . . This is no mistake, because (here) the definition is by types. Earlier (its) characteristic (lakṣaṇa) was explained, now its type(s) (will be).]

Regarding the six types of contact which were explained earlier--

THERE ARE SIX FEELINGS WHICH ARE BORN FROM THEM. (32a)

There is feeling born of eye contact (and those) feelings born of ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind contact. Further, of them--

FIVE ARE BODILY, THE OTHER IS MENTAL. (32a-b)

The five feelings which are born from eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body contact are called bodily (kāyikī) feelings, because they have as support material sense organs (rūpīndriyāśritatva). However, feeling which is born from mind contact is called mental (caitasikī), because it has only the mind as support (cittamātrāśritatva).

Now then, does feeling occur after contact or do they occur simultaneously? The Vaibhāṣikas say they occur simultaneously, because they are simultaneously-arising mutual causes.¹⁴⁰

(The Sautrāntikas, however, object, asking) how, of two dharmas which arise together, is it possible that one be the produced, the other, the producer?

Why isn't this possible?

Because of lack of efficacy (aśāmarthyā).

That a dharma has no efficacy with respect to (another) dharma which has already arisen is no different from the (original) assertion (pratijñā) (that two simultaneously-arising dharmas cannot be producer and produced).

Just that which says that two dharmas which arise together cannot have the nature of cause and effect also says that there

cannot be the relationship of cause and effect between a dharma and one which has already arisen.¹⁴¹

Then, in that case, because there is the unacceptable consequence (of two dharmas) being mutual producers.

This isn't an error, though, because we admit just that; we admit that two simultaneously-arising (dharmas) can be mutual results.

You may admit this, but it is not admitted in the sūtra, that contact and feeling can be mutual results. It says, "Dependent on eye contact arises feeling born of eye contact"; it does not say, "Dependent on feeling born of eye contact arises eye contact." (Also, your assertion) is not acceptable because it transgresses the nature (dharma) of a cause (janaka). For that dharma which is established as the producer of (another) dharma is established (as occurring) at a different time from it. For example, first there is the seed and later, the sprout, first there is milk and later yogurt, first there is the impact (abhighāta) and later the noise, first there is the mind and later, mind consciousness, and so on. Otherwise, because of the fact that cause and effect depend upon an order of succession, either all (would) arise simultaneously or nothing (would) arise because of a lack of distinction later.¹⁴²

It's not so that we deny that cause and effect precede and succeed one another, but we also affirm that they can be simultaneous, for example, eye consciousness, etc., with eye and visible objects, and the great elements with derived matter.¹⁴³

In this case also¹⁴⁴ (the cause precedes the effect). The sense organ and object arise first, and consciousness later. What's the obstacle to this being admitted--that it arises later from the previous arising of the great elements and derived matter?¹⁴⁵

The Vaibhāṣikas say, then, that contact and feeling are like the shadow and the sprout.¹⁴⁶

[Yaśomitra--In this case also, first the sense organ and sense object arise, and later consciousness. The sense organ and object arise in the first moment, consciousness in the second. Like the shadow and the sprout then. How? There is the nature of producer and produced of two things which arise together. The sprout produces the shadow as it arises. The sprout is not without a shadow in the first moment, and with one in the second. Thus also of contact and feeling. Also of these two, the shadow and the sprout, it is possible to say that the cause is the previous totality (of causes). However, it is said that this meaning was stated in the definition of simultaneously-arising causes. It is not stated again.¹⁴⁷

Others¹⁴⁸ say feeling (arises) at a later time than contact, because first there are the sense organs and objects, (then) consciousness. The coming together of the three is contact. Later, in a third moment, dependent on contact, there is feeling.

Thus, in that case, (object the Vaibhāṣikas), it follows that feeling does not (necessarily) exist whenever there is consciousness, nor is all consciousness contact.

There is no mistake. Feeling, caused by previous contact, exists at the time of later contact, and all contacts are associated with feeling, and all contact is consciousness.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Feeling (arises) in the third moment. The first moment is (the arising of) the sense organ and object, the second, the arising of consciousness, the third, the arising of feeling. It follows then that it is not so that wherever there is consciousness there is feeling. Because of the non-existence of feeling in the second moment, consciousness. Nor is all consciousness contact. Consciousness in the third moment, feeling, is not contact. Contact is limited to the first and second moments . . .]

No, this isn't correct.

Why not?

(If it were correct), a feeling (could then arise at the same time) as the later of two contacts which have different objects, but be caused by the earlier of the two. How, indeed, could feeling have an object different from the object of the contact from which it arose, or have an object different from that of the consciousness with which it is associated?¹⁴⁹

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Feeling, caused by previous contact, which has as its cause contact whose object is a visible object, arises at a later time, when there is contact whose object is sound. This is not correct . . . For when there is feeling which has arisen from contact whose object is a visible object, then there will be feeling due to this object, the visible object, only, and then it is correct to say that a feeling caused by previous contact exists at the time of later

contact. How can this be correct, though, that feeling whose object is sound, arises from contact whose object is a visible object?]

In that case, at that time, let it be that consciousness is contact but it is not connected with feeling. Therefore, the consciousness which is previous is associated with feeling, but it is not contact. This being so, as is said, "Because of the inadequacy (vaidurya) of the cause," what mistake is there?

The rule about the mental components which accompany all thought (mahābhūmika) is broken. "In every thought there are ten mental components which accompany all thought."¹⁵⁰

Where is this rule established?

In the śāstra.

We take the sūtras, not the śāstras, as our authority (pramāṇa). For the Buddha said, "Take your refuge in the sūtras."

[Yaśomitra-- . . . At that time. At what time? At the time of having sound as an object. Consciousness is contact not associated with feeling and therefore the consciousness which is previous, because of having sound as its object, and which is associated with feeling, is not contact. This way there is no error. For otherwise, if the consciousness which arose earlier and was associated with feeling were contact, then there would be an error, as stated, in saying, "Feeling is dependent on contact." Then, what is the cause? Something which is without consciousness, without feeling, and which is not contact? Because of the inadequacy of the cause. Because causes which are hindered¹⁵¹ are inadequate. It is not so that every immediately-preceding cause is capable of producing

consciousness which is contact and which is dependent on feeling. Thus consciousness that has an object different from it is not associated with feeling, because of the exclusivity (of the object), and that which is produced from it, is not contact. However, if eye consciousness, having a visible object as its object, arises immediately after eye consciousness, having that same visible object as its object, then the mind consciousness which has arisen previously, and which is associated with that feeling, is contact. If this is so, the rule about the mental components which accompany all thought is broken. Because of the rule about contact and feeling being successive.^{152]}

Or else this is not the meaning of "the mental components that accompany every thought"--that these ten mental components arise in every thought.

In that case, what is the meaning of "the mental components that accompany every thought?"

There are three stages (bhūmi): the stage with initial investigation (vitarka) and sustained reflection (vicāra), the stage without initial investigation, but with sustained reflection, and the stage without initial investigation or sustained reflection.¹⁵³ There are also these three: the good (kuśala), the bad (akuśala), and the indeterminate (avyākṛta) stages,¹⁵⁴ and these three: the stage of the student (śaikṣa), the stage of the adept (aśaikṣa), and the stage of the neither-student-nor-adept.¹⁵⁵ Those which occur in every stage are the "mental components accompanying every thought."¹⁵⁶ Those which are found only in the good (stage) are the mental

components which accompany every good thought, (and) those which are found only in the (bad) stage are the mental components which accompany every bad thought.

[Yaśomitra--There are three stages. The stage with initial investigation and sustained reflection, the realm of sensual desires and the first stage of meditation. Without initial investigation, but with sustained reflection, the intermediate stage of meditation (the dhyanāntara, between the first and second stages).¹⁵⁷ Without initial investigation or sustained reflection from the second stage of meditation to the summit of existence (bhavāgra)¹⁵⁸ ... The stage of the student the pure dharmas of a student, the adept the pure dharmas of the non-student, neither student nor adept, the stage having impure dharmas ... in every stage in the stage of initial investigation and sustained reflection through that of neither-student-nor-adept. These are the mental components that accompany every thought.]

However, others say that they (arise) successively in their appropriate stage (yathāsambhavam), that they are not all simultaneous.

[Yaśomitra--However, they (arise) in their appropriate stage. However, the mental components that accompany every thought, which arise in a particular (stage), arise in that (stage) in turn. Others say they are not all simultaneous, just as feeling, although occurring in all the stages, is not simultaneous with ideation (saṃjñā), volition, contact, and attention. so, also, contact (although occurring in all the stages, is not simultaneous) with feeling, etc.

. . . However, others explain that it should be understood as it is written in the Pañcaskandhaka . . . ¹⁵⁹ where, about this, it was said, "Five--feeling, ideation, contact, attention, and volition are universal. Five--desire (chanda), zealous application (adhimokṣa),¹⁶⁰ mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom, have particular spheres (viśaya)" and so on.]

However, the mental components which accompany every bad thought are now added because of the influence (prasaṅga) of the reading. Previously, they were not listed (pathyate).

[Yaśomitra--However, the mental components which accompany every bad thought were added because of the influence of the reading. Because of the reading in the sūtras, etc. They were included because of the influence of the reading, "good (kuśala), bad (akuśala), and indeterminate (avyākṛta)"; it means they were added later.¹⁶¹]

If, in that case, feeling occurs at a later time than contact, (say the Vaibhāṣikas), then the sūtra which reads as follows should be refuted: "Eye consciousness arises dependent on the eye and on visible objects; contact is the coming together of the three; feeling, ideation, and volition are born together (sahajāta)."

It says, "They are born together," not "They are born together with contact," so what's to be refuted here? Besides, the word "together" can also mean immediate succession, as, for example, "He cultivates the enlightenment limb, mindfulness, together with (sahagata) friendliness (maitrī)."

So (that which you maintain) is not the correct teaching.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Together with friendliness. The word "together" does not necessarily have the meaning "simultaneous," it also means "immediately after." For it is not so that there is the simultaneous occurrence (samavadhāna) of friendliness and the mindfulness enlightenment limb, because friendliness is exclusively impure and the mindfulness enlightenment limb is exclusively pure . . .]

Yet, the sūtra does say "Feeling, ideation, volition, and consciousness are connected (saṃsr̥ṣṭa);¹⁶² these dharmas are not unconnected (asaṃsr̥ṣṭa)." Therefore, it is not so that there is consciousness not connected with feelings.¹⁶³

This has to be settled, though, what is the meaning of "connected"?

[Yaśomitra--Connected means "arisen together."]

Right there also, the sūtra says, (respond the Sautrāntikas), "What he feels (vedayate), that he reflects upon (cetayate), what he reflects upon, that he discerns (samprajānīte), what he discerns, that he understands (vijānāti)." This isn't known, though, are they said to be "connected" because they have the same object or because they occur at the same time?¹⁶⁴

[Yaśomitra--Right there the sūtra just where was it said? Feeling, volition, ideation and so on, it means at that point in the sūtra . . . Is the rule, though, about their, that is, feeling, etc., object? The rule about the object--that very object which causes him to feel, he also reflects upon and so on until he understands consciously. Or is the rule about their timing--in that very moment

that he feels and so on until he understands. We say that this rule is about their object. So this means that the sūtra isn't contradicted.]

It is proved that the rule refers to their timing, because of the use of the word "connected" as in "the concomitance (sāhabhāvyā) of life and heat." Also, what is stated in the sūtra, that "Contact is the coming together of the three"--how can there be consciousness and not be the coming together of the three and not be contact? So it is admitted that there is necessarily contact wherever there is consciousness, and that feeling is born along with contact. Enough of this discussion, it is going too far. Let's pursue the original subject.

[Yaśomitra--The teacher (Vasubandhu) said that at the same place in the sūtra, it says, "The rule about time is established because the word 'connected' is used as it is in the 'concomitance of life and heat.'" Life and heat are connected; these two dharmas are not unconnected. It has been said that life and heat arise together, because of the fact that they have no object, (and hence, cannot have a common object). So thus it is proved that feeling, ideation, volition, and consciousness necessarily arise together, because of the fact that they are spoken of with the word "connected" there, in the sūtra, like life and heat . . . How can there be consciousness and not be the coming together of the three? . . . Therefore it is agreed that there is necessarily coming together when there is the existence of consciousness and that there is coming together when there is contact. Therefore, not all consciousness is contact, nor is coming together contact, are both refuted.]

Mental feeling has been briefly explained.

FURTHER, IT IS OF EIGHTEEN TYPES BECAUSE OF THE MENTAL SPHERES.¹⁶⁵ (32c-d)

This same mental feeling is further divided into eighteen because of its classification into eighteen mental spheres. However, the formation of the elision (sandhi) here should be understood.

[Yaśomitra--However, the elision here should be understood.

8.2.1. Pūrvatrāsiddham. ("Whatever will be taught hereafter, up to the end of the work, is to be considered as not taken effect, in relation to the application of a preceding rule."¹⁶⁶) There should be no strengthening of the vowel (guṇa), because of the non-effectiveness (of the rule about vowel sandhi), with the dropping of the -s-. Now, the refutation--this negation should be understood to mean "partially." Non-effectiveness means partial effectiveness, therefore, because of its effectiveness, there is the strengthening of the vowel with the dropping of -s-, as in saiṣa dāśarathī rāmaḥ.¹⁶⁷]

What are the eighteen mental spheres? Six spheres of satisfaction (saumanasya), six spheres of dissatisfaction (daurmanasya), six spheres of indifference (upekṣā). How are they classified? If (they are classified) according to their self-nature (svabhāva), there will be three: the spheres of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference. If according to their association (samprayoga), there will be one, because they are all associated with the mind. If according to their object, there will be six, because they have the six sense objects, visible forms, etc., as their objects.

There is also a division by threes.¹⁶⁸

[Yaśomitra--There are six spheres of satisfaction. Seeing visible objects with the eye, he occupies himself with (upavicarati) visible objects which are conducive to satisfaction, hearing sounds with the ear, he occupies himself with sounds which are conducive to satisfaction, and so on, until discerning ideas, etc. (dharma) with the mind, he occupies himself with ideas which are conducive to satisfaction. And so on in the same manner--seeing visible objects with the eye . . . which are conducive to dissatisfaction or indifference. There is also a division by threes. The feeling element (dravya), which is associated with mind consciousness only is one, that, in turn, is divided into three, because of the threefold division by self-nature, satisfaction, etc., then each one is further divided into six because of the sixfold division of the six sense objects. That makes eighteen . . .]

Fifteen of them, the spheres of visible object, etc., have an unmixed (asambhinna) object, because their object, visible form, etc., is fixed in each case. The three spheres of mental objects (dharmopavicāra) are both.

[Yaśomitra--An unmixed object means an uncombined (asam-miśra) object. The three spheres of mental objects are both. Those three spheres of mental objects which have as their object dharmas other than the five sense objects, visible form, etc., have an unmixed object. Those which (also)¹⁶⁹ take as their object one, two, or up to six of the six sense objects, visible form, etc., have a mixed object.]

What is the meaning of "mental sphere?" (Some, the Vaibhāṣikas) wrongly (kila) say it means that these satisfactions, etc.,

dependent on the mind, occupy themselves with the sense objects. Others say they make the mind preoccupied (upavicārayanti) with sense objects, because the repeated consideration of the sense objects by the mind is due to feeling.

[Yaśomitra--Mind (kila). The word "kila" indicates that this is someone else's opinion. It means, dependent on, that is, supported by (āśritya) the mind, so they say, they (the satisfactions, etc.) occupy themselves with take as their objects (ālambante) the sense objects. The meaning of the prefix "upa" is again and again.]

Why isn't bodily feeling a mental sphere?

Because it is not the case that it is dependent on the mind alone, nor is it connected with deliberation (upavicārikā), either, because it is without discrimination (vikalpa). So it is not possible.

[Yaśomitra--Nor is it connected with deliberation. It is not connected with judgment (asamtīrika) . . . 170]

Why isn't the pleasure (sukha) of the third stage of meditation included among the mental spheres? (The) Vaibhāṣikas say (kila) that it is because of the non-existence of the faculty of pleasure belonging to the mind (manobhūmikasukhendriya) from the beginning, that is, in the realm of sensual pleasures, and because of the non-existence of the sphere of displeasure (duḥkhopavicāra) because of being its opposite.¹⁷¹

[Yaśomitra--If a mental sphere is a feeling dependent only on the mind, (and) the pleasure which exists in the third stage of meditation is dependent only on the mind, not on the visual sense organ, etc., then why isn't it included among the mental spheres? . . . The

word "kila" shows that this is someone else's opinion. In the realm of sensual desires, there is no pleasure relating to the mental realm (manobhūmika), so there is no mental sphere (manopavicāra) of it. Therefore, later also, in the third stage of meditation, the faculty of pleasure is not included among the mental spheres despite the fact of its dependence on the mind . . .

Thus it is not so that there is a sphere of displeasure, because of being the opposite of the sphere of pleasure, because of the fact that displeasure is dependent on mind consciousness. Therefore everywhere that there is pleasure, there is no mental sphere.]

If they belong only to the mental realm, then, in that case, (how do you explain) the sūtra which says, "Having seen visible objects with the eye, they (the mental spheres) occupy themselves (upavicarati) with those objects which are conducive to satisfaction, and so on?" How (do you explain this?)

This was said referring to (their) production by the five groups of consciousnesses. "Indeed, these belong to the mental realm (manobhūmika), as, for example, the impure meditations ¹⁷² which are produced by eye consciousness and belong to the mental realm." Moreover, (your position) should not be insisted upon because it says "having seen . . . having touched." For otherwise, there could not be the spheres (upavicāra) of visible objects, etc., in the realm of sensual desire, which have the form realm as their object, nor could there be spheres of smell, taste, and touch in the form realm, which have the realm of sensual desires as their object.¹⁷³

However, it is explained as it is so as to be clearer. That, also, is a mental sphere, which, having seen visible objects, occupies itself with sounds. It is explained as it is, though, according to the division of the sense organ and its object, so as to be consistent.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . However, these belong to the mental realm, for example, the impure meditations, produced by eye consciousness because of seeing a corpse which has turned blue-black. They belong to the mental realm because of being connected with meditation. However, this should not be insisted upon because it says, "Having seen visible objects with the eye and so on until having touched tangibles with the body." if it said, "Seeing visible objects with the eye, he occupies himself with visible objects conducive to happiness . . . touching tangibles with the body . . . ," then it could be insisted upon. It doesn't say this, however, so it can't be . . .]

Is there a visible object which could be conducive only to satisfaction . . . only to indifference? It is determined by the individual personality (santāna),¹⁷⁴ not by the object.

[Yaśomitra . . . Why? . . . Because the same object which gives satisfaction to one person may not give satisfaction to another.]

Now, how many of these mental spheres are connected with each realm and how many have each realm as their object will be explained.¹⁷⁵

IN THE REALM OF SENSUAL DESIRES, THERE ARE ALL, HAVING THEIR OWN REALM AS OBJECT. (33a)

There are all eighteen in the realm of sensual desires and it (that realm) is the object of them all. Of these same (mental spheres)--

THE FORM REALM IS THE OBJECT OF TWELVE. (33b)

The form realm is the object of twelve, excepting the six spheres of smell and taste, because of the non-existence of those two in that realm.

THE HIGHER REALM OF THREE. (33c)

"Object" (gocara) is understood. The formless realm is the object of the three spheres of mental objects (dharmopavicāra), because of the non-existence of visible objects, etc., in that realm.

Those connected with the realm of sensual desires have been explained. Those connected with the form realm will now be explained. Of them--

THERE ARE TWELVE IN TWO OF THE STAGES OF MEDITATION.¹⁷⁶
(33c-d)

Excepting the spheres of dissatisfaction. These twelve--

ARE CONNECTED WITH THE REALM OF SENSUAL DESIRES. (33d)

"Connected with the realm of sensual desires" (kāmagā) means they approach sensual desires. It means they take the realm of sensual desires as their object. For here the use of "to go" should be understood to mean "seizing the sense objects." "How is this to be understood? It is to be understood thus."

THE OBJECT OF EIGHT IS THEIR OWN (REALM.) (34a)

"Their own" means the form realm itself. Eight mental spheres, excepting the four spheres of smell and taste, have their own (realm) as their object.

THE FORMLESS REALM IS THE OBJECT OF TWO. (34b)

It is the object of two spheres of mental objects (dharmopavicāra).

[Yaśomitra--Of the two spheres of mental objects of pleasure and indifference.]

HOWEVER, IN THE (OTHER) TWO STAGES OF MEDITATION, THERE ARE SIX. (34b)

In the third and fourth stages of meditation, there are only the six spheres of indifference, no others. Further, the object--

OF SIX IS THE REALM OF SENSUAL DESIRES. (34c)

The realm of sensual desires is the object of six.

[Yaśomitra--There are only the six spheres of indifference, no others. There are only the spheres of indifference having as their objects visible objects, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and mental objects (dharma), because of the non-existence in the third and fourth stages of even the pleasant spheres. However, it should be understood that in this case the two spheres having smell and taste as their objects means the two having smells and tastes of the realm of sensual desires as their objects.]

THEIR OWN (REALM IS THE OBJECT) OF FOUR. (34d)

The form realm (is the object) of four, because of the non-existence of smell and taste there.

THE HIGHEST IS THE OBJECT OF ONE. (34d)

The formless realm is the object of only one sphere of mental objects. Thus those connected with the form realm have been explained. Now those connected with the formless realm are explained.

IN THE STAGE PREFATORY TO THE FORMLESS REALM, THERE ARE FOUR. (35a)

Here "prefatory (sāmantaka) to the formless realm" means the vicinity (sāmantaka) of the sphere of the infinity of space (ākāśānantyāyatana).¹⁷⁷ The four spheres in this stage are the visible object, sound, tangible, and mental object (spheres of indifference). Further they--

HAVE THE FORM REALM AS OBJECT. (35b)

The fourth stage of meditation is their object. (So say) those who think that it has a distinct (vyavacchina) object. Others think it has a lumped (paripindita) object, and, in that case, there is only one sphere of mental objects, having a mixed (sammiśra) object.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Who think it has a distinct object. According to the opinion of these teachers, the stage prefatory to the sphere of the infinity of space has a distinct object. This means that the object is not compounded (asamasta), the objects, visible form, etc., are (perceived) separately. Some teachers think the fourth stage of meditation takes the objects as gross forms (rather than distinct forms). According to the opinion of those teachers who think that the stage prefatory to the infinity of space has only a "lumped" object, that object is the five aggregates of the fourth stage of

meditation. They say that there is only one sphere of mental objects, having a lumped object.]

ONE HAS THE HIGHER SPHERE AS OBJECT. (35b)

There is only one sphere of mental objects which has the formless realm as its object.

THERE IS ONE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL REALM. (35c)

However, in the fundamental (maula)¹⁷⁸ formless realm there is only one sphere of mental objects, no other, and further, it--

HAS ITS OWN (REALM) AS ITS OBJECT. (35c)

It has only the formless realm as its object. For it is not so that a lower realm can be the object of the fundamental formless meditations. We will teach this later.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . A lower realm cannot be the object of the fundamental formless meditations. This means that an impure thing, a lower stage, cannot be the object. I will explain this later. 8.21 "It is not so that the fundamental good formless meditations have an impure, inferior object."¹⁷⁹]

These mental spheres--

ARE ALL EIGHTEEN IMPURE. (35d)

There is not one that is pure.¹⁸⁰

Who has (samanvāgata) which ones? One who is born in the realm of sensual desires, who does not possess the good thought of the form realm, has all eighteen pertaining to the realm of sensual desires, eight associated with the first and second stages of meditation, four defiled associated with the third and fourth stages of

meditation, excluding those having smell and taste as objects, and one defiled belonging to the formless realm.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . One is endowed with eight belonging to the first and second stages of meditation and four belonging to the third and fourth stages of meditation. With which? He says, "With defiled, excluding those which have smell and taste as objects." Because of the non-existence of smell and taste there. Why? It was explained that there are twelve spheres of the first and second meditations, because the satisfaction and indifference spheres (each) have as objects the six sense fields (viṣaya). There (in the first and second stages of meditation) there are four defiled spheres of satisfaction which have visible objects, sounds, tangibles, and mental objects as their objects, and which have their own stage as object. There are four defiled spheres of indifference. One born in the realm of sensual desires, possessing the good of the form realm, is endowed with them, because one born in a lower realm possesses the defiled spheres of the higher realms. He does not, however, possess the four particular ones having smell and taste as their objects because they are not defiled and he does not possess the good of the form realm . . . Also, the six spheres of indifference belonging to the third and fourth stages of meditation have been explained. Those which have their own stage as object are defiled, so one is endowed with them, but those two which have smell and taste as objects are not defiled. Therefore, he is not endowed with these two because of the rule stated just previously . . .]

One having the good thoughts of the form realm, but still having passions, is endowed with all belonging to the realm of sensual pleasures, with ten associated with the first stage of meditation, which are the four defiled spheres of satisfaction excluding the two having smell and taste as objects, and the six spheres of indifference associated with the stage prefatory to the first meditation,¹⁸¹ with eight associated with the second stage of meditation, with those associated with the third and fourth stages of meditation, and the formless realm, as before.¹⁸² The rest is to be determined (anugantavya) by this method.¹⁸³

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Those born in the second, third, and fourth stages of meditation, and the formless realm, as before. How? One born in that realm, who possesses the good thought of the form realm, but still has passions, is endowed with those eight which are connected with the second stage of meditation, excluding those having smell and taste as objects, with four defiled belonging to the third and fourth stages of meditation, excluding the two having smell and taste as objects, and with only one defiled belonging to the formless realm.]

As for one born in a meditation realm, it should be understood that he is endowed with one sphere of mental objects of indifference belonging to the realm of sensual desires, which is associated with the thought of creation.¹⁸⁴

Others say that this is the meaning of "mental spheres" according to the Vaibhāṣikas, but that the meaning of the sūtra should be understood (drśyate) differently. It is not so because it is

not correct to say that one who is dispassionate occupies himself (upavicarati) with that object (towards which he is dispassionate). Therefore, although impure, not all satisfactions, etc. are mental spheres. Which are, in that case? Those which are defiled, those by which the mind occupies itself with the sense objects. How does it occupy itself? It is sympathetic, or antipathetic, or else, not even considering (apratisamkhāya),¹⁸⁵ it is indifferent. There are six eternal abodes¹⁸⁶ for the purpose of opposing the spheres. "Seeing visible objects with the eye . . . discerning dharmas with the mind, he is neither happy nor unhappy, he remains indifferent, mindful, fully aware." For it is not so that an arhat has no good worldly satisfaction, the object of which is dharmas. Rather, it is only that which is defiled, being a sphere of the mind, which is to be obstructed.

[Yaśomitra--Others say. This is the author of the text, (Vasubandhu) . . . It is not so that an arhat. An arhat does have worldly, good, impure satisfaction, which has as its object a dharma, either the sphere of mental objects (dharmāyatana) or the dharma of spiritual attainment (adhigamadharmā).¹⁸⁷ Good satisfaction arises when an arhat contemplates the qualities that constitute the Buddha, and that should not be restrained.]

Furthermore, these same satisfactions, etc., are the thirty-six "feet" of the Buddha (śāstrapada), because of the division into those depending upon greed and those depending upon renunciation (naiṣkramya); this division of them was explained by the Buddha.¹⁸⁸ Of them, those depending upon greed are defiled, those depending

upon renunciation are good. So this limb of existence (bhavāṅga) called feeling should be understood to have many types of divisions.

The remaining limbs, however, are not explained (here). Why not? Because--

THEY WERE EXPLAINED (EARLIER) OR WILL BE EXPLAINED LATER.
(36a)

Some limbs were explained here; some will be explained later. Of them, consciousness was explained: Consciousness is the individual discernment and the mind sphere (1.16). The six sense spheres were also explained: The material sensibility, the eye, etc., are the bases for the consciousness of them. (1.9) The karmically-caused tendencies and becoming will be explained in the chapter on karma, desire and grasping in the chapter on defilement.

Dependent origination, succinctly, is defilement, action, and base, as already taught. (3.26)

WITH REFERENCE TO THIS, DEFILEMENT IS TO BE REGARDED AS LIKE A SEED, LIKE A SNAKE, LIKE A ROOT, LIKE A TREE, OR LIKE THE CHAFF OF GRAIN. (36b-d)

What is its similarity to a seed, etc.? Just as there is the appearance of a sprout, stalk, and leaves from the seed, so there is the appearance of defilement, action, and base from defilement. As a lake inhabited by snakes does not dry up, so the lake of births, inhabited by the snakes of defilement, does not dry up. Just as great trees whose roots have not been extricated grow back, although cut and cut again, so with births (gati) whose roots of defilement have not been extricated. As trees produce flowers and then fruits in the

course of time, so also defilements are not simultaneously the cause of defilement, action, and base. As grain, covered with chaff, is capable of germinating, but not without it, so action, covered with the acquired chaff of defilement, is capable of shooting forth another birth, but not without it. So in this way defilement is to be understood to be like a seed, etc.

ACTION IS LIKE GRAIN POSSESSING CHAFF, LIKE HERBS, AND LIKE FLOWERS. (37a-b)

"Possessing chaff" means it has chaff. Defilement was explained as being represented by chaff, now action is said to be represented by grain possessing chaff. Herbs meet their end with the ripening of the fruit, thus deeds ripen, and then produce results, and meet their end. As a flower is the proximate cause in the arising of the fruit, so actions should be understood to be the proximate causes in the arising of results.

BASES ARE LIKE PREPARED FOOD AND DRINK. (37c)

As prepared food and drink are suitable only for eating, but not for regeneration (punarviroha), so this is also true of the base called result. It is not true that another result arises in other births from the result, for, if it did, release (mokṣa) would not be possible.

This series of births, being thus dependently-originated, does not extend beyond the four existences--the intermediate existence, the birth existence, the previous-time existence, and the death existence. These have been explained.¹⁸⁹

AMONG THE FOUR EXISTENCES, THE BIRTH EXISTENCE IS DEFILED. (37d-38a)

Invariably. By which defilements?

BY ALL THE DEFILEMENTS OF ITS OWN REALM. (38b)

By all the defilements of that realm in which birth existence occurs. The Ābhidhārmikas say, "There is no (single) defilement by which the connection to rebirth is effected, rather, (it is) by (all) the defilements, but not by the independent corruptions."¹⁹⁰ Although the state is feeble (mandika), nonetheless, when one who has constantly behaved in a certain manner is about to die, that very defilement is present, because of the previous throwing (of the karma). Rebirth in the intermediate existence should be understood thus also to be necessarily defiled.¹⁹¹

[Yaśomitra--Not by the independent corruptions. These are independent: envy (īrṣyā), jealousy (mātsarya), anger (krodha), and hypocrisy (mrakṣa), because they are not associated with any defilement other than ignorance. Since ignorance is said to be found everywhere, an association with it does not mean a lack of independence. A connection with rebirth is not prohibited, however, for those, shamelessness (āhrīkya), etc., which are associated with other defilements. Although that state is feeble and so on. Even though the state of death is feeble, because the activity of the mind and mental concomitants is not sharp. It is said, "Death and birth with indifference" (3.42), because of the weakness of feeling . . . ¹⁹²]

THE OTHERS ARE OF THREE TYPES. (38c)

The other three existences are of three types. The intermediate existence, etc., are good, defiled, or indeterminate.¹⁹³

Next, of these existences, which are associated with which (realms)?

THREE IN THE FORMLESS. (38c)

Except the intermediate existence. Because the formless realm is not divided into different places for the sake of the attainment of which the intermediate existence would come into being.¹⁹⁴ Because the realm of sensual desires and the form realm are not listed (here), it is agreed that there are all four existences (in them).

The dependent origination of beings has been explained at length.

APPENDIX

In 3.36a, it states that some of the twelve limbs of dependent origination are explained in other chapters of the Kośa rather than in the third. This appendix offers the definitions of those remaining limbs from the other chapters. The limbs which are omitted in the third chapter are: the karmically-caused tendencies (saṃskāra), consciousness (vijñāna), material form (rūpa), the six sense spheres (sadāyatana), desire (trṣṇā), grasping (upādāna), and becoming (bhava). Feeling (vedanā) is included in chapter three, but also defined at 1.14c. The threefold division of dependent origination into act (karma), defilement (kleśa), and base (vastu) (3.26) plays an important role in the discussions of the karmically-caused tendencies, becoming, desire, and grasping, none of which is as succinctly nor as neatly defined as one would desire. The limb of the karmically-caused tendencies is defined at 1.15, in the context of the discussion of the aggregates (skandha). However, as the karmically-caused tendencies and becoming, also, are essentially act (karma), the former specifically being mental act, their nature is actually described in chapter four. (3.36) Therefore, 4.1-4.2a, defining act and its divisions, are included. Consciousness (1.16), material form (1.9), the six sense spheres (1.9c-d), and feeling (1.14c), being concisely defined in the first chapter, present no problems. Desire and grasping, however, are by nature defilement (kleśa) (see 1.8), and so they are discussed in chapter five on the proclivities (anuśaya). (3.36) Therefore, 5.1, explaining the role of

the proclivities in rebirth, is translated, but the details of the nature of the proclivities and their relation to desire and grasping may be found in the Introduction to the Translation. Grasping is separately defined in 5.38, in a technical enumeration of the component types of defilement constituting grasping. This is included despite its technicality because it is the most important definition of grasping in the Kośa.

The twelve limbs are defined in 3.21-3.24, although some only by their temporal sequence in the chain. As the remaining limbs are presented here in the order of their occurrence in the chain, rather than the order of their consideration in the Kośa, it would be helpful to review the definitions given in 3.21-3.24. They are:

Ignorance is the state of defilement in the past. (3.21a)

The karmically-caused tendencies are actions in the past. (3.21b)

Consciousness is the aggregates at conception. (3.21c)

After this is name and form, until the arising of the six sense spheres. (3.21d-3.22a)

That is prior to the coming together of the three. (3.22b).

Contact (lasts) until (one acquires) the ability to discriminate the causes of pleasure, displeasure, etc. (3.22c-d)

There is feeling until (there is) sexual desire. (3.23a)

There is desire of one hankering after sensual delights and sexual pleasure. (3.23b)

However, there is grasping of one running around in order to obtain sensual delights. (3.23c-d)

He makes karma which has as its result future birth (bhava); this is becoming (bhava). (3.24a-b)

Rebirth is conception. (3.24c)

Old age and death, as far as feeling. (3.24d)

AS FOR THE AGGREGATE OF KARMICALLY-CAUSED TENDENCIES, IT IS (THOSE) OTHER THAN THE FOUR. (1.15a-b)

As for the aggregate of karmically-caused tendencies, it is those tendencies which are other than the four, (that is, other than) form, feeling, idea,¹⁹⁵ and consciousness. The Buddha, however, has said in a sūtra¹⁹⁶ that (the aggregate of karmically-caused tendencies) is the six groups of volition (cetanā), because (volition) is predominant. For it (volition) is predominant in karmic formation (abhisamskaraṇa) because it is the essence of action (karma-svarūpa).¹⁹⁷ For this very reason the Buddha said, "It karmically forms (abhisamskaroti) that which is conditioned (samskrīta), therefore it is called the aggregate of the appropriation of the karmically-caused tendencies (samskāra-upādānaskandha)."¹⁹⁸ For otherwise, the rest of the karmically-caused tendencies--that is, those connected with thought (caitasika) and those not connected with thought (viprayukta)¹⁹⁹--would not be (included in) the Truths of Suffering and its Arising, because they are not included in the aggregates, (and consequently), there would be neither the comprehension nor the abandonment of them. The Buddha has (also) said, "I say that there is no end to suffering if even a single dharma remains unknown, uncomprehended . . . (Or if even a single dharma remains)

unabandoned." Therefore the inclusion of these (dharmas which are thought-related and thought-unrelated) in the aggregate of karmically-caused tendencies must necessarily be understood.

Now by whom was this great diversity of the world receptacle (bhājanaloka)²⁰⁰ and of living creatures, which was described (in chapter three), made? It was not made by anyone intentionally (buddhipūrvaka). In that case, how (was it made)?

THE DIVERSITY OF THE WORLD ARISES FROM THE ACTS (4.1a)

of living creatures. If (the diversity of the world) arises from acts, then why are saffron and sandal, etc., which arise for living creatures because of acts, enjoyable, but the bodies (of living creatures, which also arise from acts), are not (enjoyable)? These very acts of this type (that is, good and bad) of living beings, who perform both good and bad actions (vyāmiśrakāriṇa), give rise to bodies (āśraya) which are like sores and also to objects of pleasure (bhoga) which are enjoyable and which counteract them. However, both (the bodies and the objects of pleasure) of the gods, who do not perform both good and bad actions,²⁰¹ are enjoyable.

Then, what is this act?

VOLITION AND THAT PRODUCED FROM IT. (4.1b)

In one sūtra, it is said, "There are two (types of) act, the act which is volition and (the act) after having willed."²⁰² That produced by volition is that which (is), after being willed. These two (types of) act become three--acts of the body, of speech, and of the mind. How are these acts classified (vyavasthāna)? Is it

according to their physical support (āśraya), or according to their self-nature, or according to their origin? If according to their physical support, one, acts of the body, results, because of the fact that they all have the body as their physical support. If according to their self-nature, one, acts of speech, results, because of the fact that the self-nature of speech is act. If according to origin, one, acts of the mind, results, because of the fact that they have all risen up from the mind.

[Yaśomitra--If according to their self-nature, then there is only one (type of) act, vocal (act). Only speech is act; the other two are not act. "Bodily act" means an act by the body or of the body, "mental act" is defined the same way. Thus, (they) are not act according to their self-nature.]

The Vaibhāṣikas say that the (classification) of the three is by (all) three causes, in order. Furthermore, of these--

VOLITION! IS MENTAL ACT. (4.1c)

It should be understood that volition is mental act.

ACTS OF SPEECH AND OF THE BODY ARISE FROM IT. (4.1d)

That which is produced by volition is called the act after having willed. These two types of act--of the body and of speech--should be understood (as the act after having willed).

AS FOR THESE TWO, THEY ARE INDICATION AND NON-INDICATION. (4.2a)

As for these two types of act--of the body and of speech--they should each be understood as having the self-nature of indication and non-indication (avijñapti).²⁰³

CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE INDIVIDUAL DISCERNMENT. (1.16a)

The awareness (upalabdhi), the discernment (vijñapti) with respect to each individual sense object (viṣaya) is called the aggregate of consciousness. There are also six groups of consciousness--eye consciousness through mind consciousness. This which is called the aggregate of consciousness, in the list (vyavasthā) of the spheres (āyatana), is

THE MIND SPHERE. (1.16b)

It also, in the list of components, is

CONSIDERED TO BE SEVEN COMPONENTS. (1.16c)

Which seven?

SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES AND THE MIND. (1.16d)

The eye consciousness component through the mind consciousness component, and the mind component (manodhātu). So, here, the five aggregates, the twelve spheres, and the eighteen components have been explained . . . 204

It has been said that there are five aggregates, material form (rūpa), etc. (1.7) Regarding them--

FORM CONSISTS OF THE FIVE SENSE ORGANS, THE FIVE SENSE OBJECTS, AND NON-INDICATION. (1.9a-b)

The five sense organs are the organs of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. The five sense objects are the five spheres (viṣaya) of these sense organs, the eye, etc., each having its own, called, respectively, visible object (rūpa), sound, smell, taste, and

the tangible. There is also non-indication (avijñapti).²⁰⁵ This is the extent of the aggregate of form (rūpaskandha).

With respect to these five sense objects, visible form, etc., which have been mentioned--

THE MATERIAL SENSIBILITIES,²⁰⁶ THE EYE, ETC., ARE THE BASES FOR THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THEM. (I.9c-d)

These five material sensibilities, which have the nature of form (rūpātmaka), being the bases for the consciousnesses of visible object (rūpa), sound, smell, taste, and touch, should be understood, in order, as the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. As the Buddha said, "The eye, O Monk, is the internal sense field (ādhyātmikamāyatana), a material sensibility which has appropriated (upādāya)²⁰⁷ the four great elements . . ."208

(Or it can be understood this way, that) these which have been mentioned, the eye, etc., are the material sensibilities, the eye, etc., which are the bases for the consciousness of these (organs). Understanding it in this way, the Prakaraṇa book, too, is then followed. "What is the eye? The material sensibility which is the basis of eye consciousness . . ."

The five sense organs have been explained, (now) the five sense objects should be explained. Of them--

VISIBLE OBJECT IS TWOFOLD. (I.10a)

Color and shape. Of them, color is fourfold: blue, etc. Other colors are types of these four. Shape is eightfold, beginning with "long" and ending with "unequal." This form sphere (rūpāyatana)²⁰⁹ is further explained as--

TWENTY-FOLD. (1.10a)

That is, blue, yellow, red (and) white; long, short, circular (vr̥tta), round (parimaṇḍala),²¹⁰ convex (unnata), concave (avanata),²¹¹ equal (and) unequal; cloud, smoke, dust, mist, shadow, glare, glow, and darkness. Some count (sampathanti) twenty-one, saying that the sky is (also) a color. Of these, equal means having the same shape; unequal means having different shapes. Mist is haze (nīhāra). Glare is the light of the sun. Glow is the brilliance of the moon, stars, fire, herbs, and jewels. There is shadow where there is the visibility of forms, in the opposite case, there is darkness. The rest are not defined individually because they are easy to understand.

There is form sphere which is known (only) through color, not through shape, (for example), blue, yellow, red, white, shadow, glare, glow, and darkness. (Or), there is (form sphere which is known only) through shape, not through color, (for example), that part of long, etc., which has the self-nature of bodily indication (kāyavi-jñapti).²¹² There is (also form sphere which is known as) both, (that is), the remaining form sphere.

Others say that only glare and glow are known (just) through color, (because) they say that the distinction long, etc., is seen of something blue, etc.

How, though, can one thing (dravya) be (vidyate) both?

It is, because both are perceived there (in it). For the root "vid" here means "know, perceive," not "be".

In that case, however, the unacceptable consequence (of being both color and shape) would also apply to bodily indication.

The form sphere has been explained.

SOUND, THOUGH, IS EIGHTFOLD. (1.10b)

(The following are) four types: that caused by the appropriated (upāṭṭa)²¹³ or unappropriated (anupāṭṭa) great elements,²¹⁴ and that indicative of living creatures or not indicative of living creatures. Further, it is eightfold because of the division of the above four into pleasing and non-pleasing sounds. Of these (sounds), that caused by the appropriated great elements is, for example, the sound caused by the hands or the voice, that caused by the unappropriated great elements is, for example, the sound made by the wind, the trees, or a river, that indicative of living creatures is verbal indication (vāgvijñapti),²¹⁵ that not indicative of living creatures is other (sound).

Others, however, say that there is also sound which is caused by both the appropriated and unappropriated great elements, for example, they say, that produced by the combination of a hand and drum. Just as it is not admitted that one atom of color can appropriate²¹⁶ two sets of four elements, so also it is not admitted that one atom of sound can appropriate two sets. Sound has been explained.

[Yaśomitra-- . . . Caused by the appropriated great elements. The appropriated elements are a presently-existing part of the sense organs, others are unappropriated . . .]

TASTE IS SIXFOLD. (1.10b-c)

(Taste is sixfold) because of the division into sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and astringent.

ODOR IS FOURFOLD. (1.10c)

(Odor is fourfold) because there are good and bad smells which can be either excessive or not. In a śāstra,²¹⁷ however, odor is threefold: good, bad, and indifferent.

THE TANGIBLE HAS THE NATURE OF ELEVEN (THINGS). (1.10d)

Eleven things (dravya) have the self-nature of the tangible: the four great elements, smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst. Of these, we will explain the elements later.²¹⁸ Smoothness is softness; roughness is hardness. Heaviness is that by which things (bhāva) are weighed; there is lightness in the opposite case. Cold is that which makes one desire warmth and hunger is that which makes one desire food.²¹⁹ The effect (cold, hunger, thirst) is actually called the cause,²²⁰ as in this verse:

The arising of the Buddhas is happiness,
The teaching of the Dharma is happiness,
The harmony of the Order is happiness,
The asceticism of those who live in harmony is happiness.

Of these, there is neither hunger nor thirst in the form realm, but the rest are (there). Although the garments of those in the form realm do not weigh anything individually, they do have weight when taken together. There is no painful cold there either, only beneficial, according to some.²²¹

Non-indication²²² will now be explained. It is said to be--

AN UNINTERRUPTED CONNECTION, PURE OR IMPURE, WHICH HAS APPROPRIATED THE GREAT ELEMENTS, EVEN OF ONE WHOSE THOUGHT IS DISTRACTED OR (OF ONE WHO IS) WITHOUT THOUGHT. THAT, INDEED, IS CALLED NON-INDICATION. (I.11)

"Even of one whose thought is distracted" means even of one whose (current) thought is different from that (which started the non-indication). "Even of one without thought" means even of one who has attained the state of the non-conscious meditation (asamīñīsamāpatti) or the state of the cessation (of feelings and ideas) (nirodhasamāpatti).²²³ By the word "even," it is understood that non-indication also applies to one who has undistracted thought or to one who has thought. "Uninterrupted connection" (anubandha) means a continuous flow. "Pure or impure" means good or bad. "Which has appropriated the great elements" is said in order to distinguish it (from the attainments, prāpti),²²⁴ as the flow of the attainments is also of the same nature in so far as it is either good or bad. The Vaibhāṣikas say that "which has appropriated the great elements" means "cause," because (the great elements) are the generative, etc. cause. (In) "This indeed is non-indication," the word "indeed" means (that there will be) an explanation of the reason for this name. Non-indication means that, although like indication, it has the nature of material form (rūpa) and act, it does not inform another (person). "Is called" shows these to be the words of a teacher.²²⁵ In summary, non-indication is material form, good or bad, arising from either indication (vijñapti) or concentration (samādhi).

FEELING IS AFFECT.²²⁶ (1.14c)

The aggregate of feeling (vedanā) is threefold affect--pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent. It is also divided into six groups of feeling--the feeling born from eye contact through the feeling born from mind contact.²²⁷

It has been stated that, "The diversity of the world arises from karma." (4.1) These acts accumulate because of the proclivities (anuśaya),²²⁸ and without the proclivities, they are not capable of producing rebirth (bhava) . . . ²²⁹ Therefore, it should be understood that--

THE PROCLIVITIES ARE THE ROOT OF REBIRTH. (5.1a)

A defilement (kleśa),²³⁰ when operating, accomplishes ten actions: it makes the root (of the possession, prāpti, of that kleśa) firm, it establishes (itself) in a series, it procures for itself a "field" (kṣetra) (in which to arise), it brings about its necessary consequence (niṣyanda),²³¹ it realizes the act (which leads to rebirth), it seizes its own prerequisite (svasambhāra) (that is, ayoniśomanaskāra), it causes confusion about the object, it directs the stream of consciousness (either to an object or to rebirth), it causes one to stray from the side of good, and it serves as a tie (bandhana)²³² because it does not transgress its own realm (dhātu).

(THESE), AS EXPLAINED, ²³³ (PLUS) IGNORANCE AND THE TWOFOLD DIVISION OF FALSE VIEW, ARE THE GRASPINGS. (5.38)

The bond to the objects of sensual pleasure (kāmayoga), along with ignorance, is the grasping after the objects of sensual pleasure (kāmapadāna), consisting of thirty-four items (dravya): five each of the attachments (rāga), the hostilities (pratigha), the prides (māna), and the ignorances (avidyā) make twenty, plus the four doubts (vicikitsā) and the ten corruptions (parvavasthāna). The bond to becoming (bhavayoga), along with ignorance, is the grasping after the false view of the self (ātmavāḍopadāna), consisting of thirty-eight items: ten each of the attachments, prides, and ignorances, plus eight doubts. The bond to false views (drṣṭiyoga), minus morality and ritual practices (śīlavrata), is the grasping after false views (drṣṭyupādāna), consisting of thirty items. The grasping after morality and ritual practices (śīlavratopādāna) is the six items which were excluded from the false view about actions, because they oppose the Path (mārga) and because they delude both sides. Because of this delusion, householders confuse the path to heaven with not eating, etc., and renouncers think they can obtain purity by giving up desired sense objects.

Why is ignorance included with the others, why isn't it stated separately as a grasping? It is the seizing (grahana) of becoming (that defines) the graspings.

HOWEVER, IGNORANCE IS NOT SEIZING, SO IT IS INCLUDED.
(5.38c-d)

Ignorance is not seizing because it is not clever (apaṭu) and because it has the character of a lack of understanding (asam-prakhyāna). Therefore, it is included, say the Vaibhāṣikas. However,

in the sūtra, the Buddha said, "What is the bond to the objects of sensual pleasure? In detail, it is the attachment to (rāga), the desire for (chanda), the affection for (sneha), the love of (prema), the wish for (icchā), the infatuation with (mūṛccha), the greed for (graddha), the covetousness for (parigarddha), the happiness in (nandī), the addiction to (niyanti), the clinging to (adhyavasāna) the objects of sensual pleasure (kāma), which continually overcomes other thoughts. This is called the bond to the objects of sensual pleasure, and so on to the bond to becoming." In other sūtras, however, grasping is said to be desire (chanda) and attachment (rāga), so it is understood that desire and attachment with respect to the objects of sensual pleasure is the grasping after the objects of sensual pleasure.

NOTES

1 On skandha, see Kośa 1.20, introduction to the Translation, pp. 106-10, and Hall's translation of the first chapter of the Kośa. On saṃtāna, see the Kośa, ch. 9, the opening paragraphs. This "series" or "stream" of physical and psychological factors accounts for both the continuity of the personality and also for its lack of any underlying immutable substance.

2 See Kośa, chapter 1.7-16.

3 I have retained this "traditional" translation of pratītyasamutpāda, as it does adequately convey the meaning of the Sanskrit. For an etymological discussion, see pp. 188-93.

4 There are several variants of dependent origination, as mentioned in the essay. The Kośa, however, discusses only twelve-limbed dependent origination.

5 On the samskāras, see 3.21b and 1.15a-b.

6 See LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 61, footnote 1, where he reviews different opinions as to why the twelve limbs do not all exist in the three realms. Also see discussion of the Vibhaṅga, pp. 305-6.

7 paripūro 'syāstīti paripūrī.

8 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 62 gives Dīgha, ii. 63 as reference.

9 Compare this with Visuddhimagga, ed. by C.A.F. Rhys Davids. 2 vols. (London: Humphrey Milford, 1920-1), pp. 579-81.

10 On the kleśas, see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 133-41.

11 Yaśomitra makes the point that only morally qualifiable acts produce karmically-caused tendencies. See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 130-3.

12 See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 106-10, on the aggregates.

13 On āyatana, see Kcśa 1.20 and Introduction to the Translation, p. 110. Each āyatana includes both the external sense object and its respective internal receptive faculty.

14 Upapattibhava is normally the "karmically passive side of existence consisting in the arising and developing of the karma-produced and therefore morally neutral mental and bodily phenomena of existence" (Āyāttiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, p. 26), as opposed to the active formation of new karma. Here, however, it is synonymous with pratisandhi.

15 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 63, explains ". . . mais c'est au moment où apparaissent les quatre organes, oeil, etc., que les deux organes préexistants se trouvent <<arrangés>> [dans un groupe de six]."

16 The words sukha (pleasure) and duhkha (displeasure) refer to both physical and mental states. Duhkha has an even broader meaning, referring to the unsatisfactoriness of all "things," as they are transitory and insubstantial.

17 See LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 64, where he translates the commentary as "Le sparśa [qui commence à la naissance]. . . " indicating that these limbs belong to the middle of the three divisions of dependent origination, the present life. There has, after all, been no mention of birth, only of conception.

18 "Feeling" here translates the Sanskrit vitti, which Yaśomitra says means vedanā, vittiḥ vedanetyarthaḥ.

19 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 64, adds Yaśomitra's definition of grasping as the four defilements in brackets and refers the reader to V. 38 (see pp. 258-60), where the sūtra definition of upādāna as kāmopādāna, ātmavādupādāna, dr̥ṣṭyupādāna and śīlavratopādāna is given.

20 LVP, ibid., translates more clearly: "L'acte fait et accumulé dans la recherche des jouissances produira la réexistence. La période où on fait l'acte, c'est le bhava."

21 LVP, ibid., adds, as above, see footnote 17, "Après la mort, les cinq skandhas au moment où a lieu la réincarnation, c'est la jāti."

22 "Feeling" here translates the Sanskrit vid.

23 Etāni dvādaśāṅgāni. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 65, translates this as ". . . douzième membre de la série duodénaire," taking it as the conclusion of the discussion of old age and death.

24 The word indriya, from the root id meaning "supreme power" (paramaiśvarya), means that which has supreme or sovereign power. It is synonymous with adhipati, sovereignty. (2.1) The Vaibhāṣikas accepted a list of twenty-two such indriyas, or faculties. It is the first six that are referred to here. They are: the sense organ of sight (cakṣurindriya), that of hearing (śrotendriya), of smell (ghrāṇendriya), of taste (jihvendriya), of touch (kāyendriya), and of consciousness (mana-indriya). The five sense consciousnesses are sovereign with respect to personal physical beauty, personal protection, the production of consciousness, and, finally, the particular consciousness which is their sphere. The mana-indriya is sovereign over rebirth, for it is the link between births. It is also sovereign over the world, for it determines one's view of it. (2.1) For the other indriyas, see, in particular, 2.1-2.21. The second chapter of the Kośa is devoted to the indriyas.

25 LVP, ibid., translates abhinipāta as "l'application."

26 On pariyavasthāna, see V. 47 and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 137-40. The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that kleśa, anuśaya, and pariyavasthāna are synonyms.

27 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 66 says arising either from vedanā or trṣṇā.

28 On the conditioned (samskr̥ta) dharmas, see pp. 101-6 of the Introduction to the Translation.

29 Kila, "so they say," indicates that this is the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas, an opinion Vasubandhu does not accept.

30 See "The Interpretation of Dependent Origination by Western Scholars," footnote 71, p. 91, about the meaning and translation of ābhiprāyika. Also see pp. 332-3.

31 sattvākhyo 'sattvākhyā. The same phrase occurs in the discussion of sound, see p. 255, where it means "indicative of living beings, not indicative of living beings."

32 tathāvasthikaḥ kṣaṇikaḥ prākaraṣikaḥ sāmbandhikaḥ sattvākhyo 'sattvākhyāśceti bhedaḥ kimarthaṃ punaḥ sūtre sattvākhyā eva. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 67, translates this logically as, "D'une part, le Pratītyasamutpāda est donné comme statique, prolongé, relatif aux êtres vivants (sattvākhyā); d'autre part, comme momentané, sérial, relatif aux êtres vivants et non vivants (sattvā-sattvākhyā)."

33 See references given by LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 67, fn. 3. The same passage occurs in the Śālistamba Sūtra also.

34 On dravya, see Introduction to the Translation, p. 106.

35 See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 133-41.

36 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 68, gives references to the Visuddhimagga 581 where these three varman or vaṭṭa are also given; see also see p. 324.

37 Yaśomitra glosses āśraya as adhiṣṭhāna, basis, seat.

38 phalaḥetvabhisamkṣepo dvayormadhyānumānataḥ.

39 See 3.24 where old age and death is defined as name and form, the six sense spheres, contact, and feeling in a future life.

40 ayoniśomanaskāra. Ayoniśo- is formed by addition of the privative particle -a- and the ablative suffix -śas to the word yoni, which means the "female organs of generation" and hence "source, origin" (MW 858). Ayoniśo thus has the meaning "not fundamental, not thoroughgoing" (BHS 64). I have chosen the translation "incorrect" rather than "incomplete," however, because the implication is that the manaskāra is, because of its incompleteness, mistaken. Also, in Yaśomitra's subcommentary, ayoniśomanaskāra is said to be "confused" (āvilo) and "born from delusion" (mohaja) and "mistaken" (viparīta). Manaskāra is one of the seven thought-related dharmas found in all types of consciousness. It is attention or advertence to the object of consciousness, and is a voluntary, conscious consideration of it. See Kashyap, The Abhidhamma Philosophy or The Psycho-Ethical Philosophy of Early Buddhism. Vol. I. (n.d. Reprint. Delhi, Varanasi: Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśhan, 1982), and E.R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception (Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1958), esp. pp. 26-7 for more detail.

41 Hetu, pratyaya, and nidāna are virtually synonymous here.

42 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 70, n. 3, identifies the first quote in this passage as from the Madhyamakavṛtti, 452, where it is a quote from the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra. He identifies the second quote, see p. 71, n. 3, at Samyukta ii. 8 and also as a paraphrase found once again at Madhyamakavṛtti 452, from the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra. Yet he translates as follows on p. 70, ". . . Il est dit, dans un autre Sūtra, que l'avidyā a pour cause le jugement incorrect, ayoniśo manasikāra, et, dans un autre Sūtra encore, que le jugement incorrect a pour cause l'avidyā." This seems to contradict Yaśomitra also, see below.

43 Sarathchandra (p. 26) says ābhoga is synonymous with āvajjanā, samannāhāra, and manasikāra, all referring to the "voluntary aspect of attention."

44 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, pp. 70-1, translates this slightly differently. The Sanskrit is yadi samprayogataḥ tṛṣṇā 'vidyayorapi tasyantarbhāvaḥ prāpnoti. LVP's translation reads, "Sans doute, il est associé (samprayukta) à l'upādāna; mais il est aussi bien associé à l'avidyā et à la tṛṣṇā." See Yaśomitra below.

45 This line is missing in LVP.

46 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 71, translates the passage as ". . . l'ayoniśo-manasikāra, cause de l'avidyā, naissant lui-même de l'avidyā désignée sous le nom de moha." The Sanskrit reads: tasyāpyayoniśomanaskārasya punarmohajavacanād āvilo manaskāro mohaja iti.

47 See p. 171.

48 Pradhan has niravadya, "blameless," Shastri niravidyā. Yaśomitra confirms the reading niravidyā, which LVP (p. 72) also has. The context, too, supports niravidyā.

49 āniñjya (also spelled āneñjya). The meritorious (punya) or karmically wholesome (kuśala) states of the formless realm (ārūpadhātu) are called āniñjya. It means immobile, immovable or imperturbable, and applies to acts (karma), karmically-caused tendencies (samskāra), and to the states (dharma)

which are its results. See BHS, p. 24 and PTS, p. 101, where possible derivations of this obscure word are also given.

50 See 3.25c-d above.

51 See 3.20.

52 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 72, translates simply ". . . d'après l'Abhidharma." See 3.24d and 25b where the quote is attributed to the Prakaraṇa. For the conditioned dharmas, see pp. 101-6 of the Introduction to the Translation.

53 ābhisamskārikayā cetanayā cetitavāt.

54 On prāpti, see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 128-9.

55 See 1.13, esp. LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 25.

56 heturatra samutpādaḥ samutpannam phalam matam.

57 na caivam satyavyavasthā bhavantyapekṣābhedaḥ. (Yaśomitra: na caivam satyavyavasthānam bhavati . . .)

58 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 74, adds in brackets ". . . [qui sont pratītyasamutpāda et pratītyasamutpanna]." This would then seem to be an instance in which the dharmas were both pratītyasamutpāda and pratītyasamutpanna, not in which they weren't.

59 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 75, identifies this quote at Samyukta, 12, 21.

60 Shastri (vol. 2, p. 450) begins the next paragraph with this last line, suggesting it is part of the Sarvāstivādin response, but this is clearly wrong. Nītārtham refers to a passage or a word whose meaning is clear (Yaśomitra glosses it as vibhaktārtham); neyam refers to a passage or word which must be explained or interpreted. See LVP, vol. 5, ch. 9, p. 247, for discussion and references on nītārtham and neyam.

61 yadvā punaranyadapyasmin kēye khakkhaṭam kharagatam iti vacanāt bhavatu vā tathaivāvidyāvaśeṣo yadi śakyate darśayitum . . . The Pali quotation is missing in LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 76.

62 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 76, adds "Donc un <<état à cinq skandhas>> n'est pas <<membre>>."

63 I follow Yaśomitra here, since Pradhan omits na bhavati.

64 vedanādisadbhāve, which LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 76, translates as "Chez l'Arhat existent les cinq skandhas (vedanā, etc.)"

65 For this entire paragraph, LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, pp. 76-7, has only: "Quant aux quatre cas de Pūrṇāśa, son premier cas--que les dharmas de l'avenir ne sont pas <<produits en dépendance>>--est contredit par le Sūtra qui donne la jāti et le jarāmaraṇa comme <<produits en dépendance>>: <<Quels sont les pratītyasamutpannas? L'avidyā . . . la jāti, le jarāmaraṇa>>. Dira-t-on que la jāti et le jarāmaraṇa ne sont pas de l'avenir? C'est renoncer à la théorie du Pratītyasamutpāda à trois parties ou tronçons."

66 On the unconditioned dharmas, see pp. 101-6 of the Introduction to the Translation.

67 Although Yaśomitra does not say so, this is the opening paragraph of the Śālistamba Sūtra.

68 Masuda discusses the views of the Mahīśāsaka school on pp. 58-63 of his translation, Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools. Also see Points of Controversy, especially p. XXIV where there is a table of contents arranged by schools.

69 The text reads anutpāda.

70 utpādasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇatvāt.

71 utpādaśca nāmotpatturbhavatīti. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 77, translates, "D'ailleurs on entend par utpāda <<existence succédant à l'inexistence>>. . . , which is Paramārtha's translation of the Sautrāntika definition, utpadaś ca nāmābhūtvābhāvalakṣaṇaḥ.

72 Pradhan reads padārthaścāsamartho, and has Shastri's version, padārthaścāsambandho, as a variant reading from Yaśomitra. LVP, vol. 2,

ch. 3, p. 78, translates, "Enfin l'expression Pratītyasamutpāda devient absurde . . . ," for which he gives the following Sanskrit: padārthaś cāsam-baddho bhavati.

73 For a full discussion of the development of the varying interpretations of these three sankhatalakkhaṇas of the Anguttaranikāya and their relation to the theory of moments, see Karunadāsa, pp. 78-91. Sthityanyathā originally referred to the moment of stasis which occurred before decay began, but came to be identified with decay itself by the later Theravādin commentators. The Vaibhāṣikas, of course, count four phases, distinguishing jarā and sthiti.

74 See footnote 63 and LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 77, fn. 3, where LVP and Yaśomitra agree on this reading.

75 This is in verse in the text. pratyeti pūrvamutpādād yadyasattvānna yuiyate saha cet ktvā na siddho 'tra pūrvakālavidhānatah.

76 Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, ed. and trans. by Śrīśa Chandra Vasu. 2 vols. 3rd ed. Reprint. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p. 564.

77 aniṣpannam cedam yaduta śābdikīyam kartṛkriyā vyavasthānam bhavatītyeṣa karttā bhūtirityeṣā kriyā. na cātra bhaviturarthāt bhūtimanyām kriyām paśyāmaḥ. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 79, fn. 3, follows Yaśomitra, see below. He translates, "Cependant la théorie du Grammairien et la manière dont il oppose l'agent et l'action, tout cela ne tient pas. Pour lui il y a un agent (kartar) qui est ici <<celui qui naît>> (bhavitar), et une action (kriyā) qui est l'action de naître (bhūti). Or on ne constate pas que la bhūti soit distincte du bhavitar."

78 tasmiṇ acchalam bhavatyutpadyate pratyetiyevevamaḍiṣu. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 79, includes this line from Yaśomitra, translating it, "Il n'y a donc aucun mal à employer, bien entendu comme expressions conventionnelles, les mots: <<il naît, il est produit après être allé aux pratyayas>>."

79 This is the so-called "general formula" of dependent origination, see p. 7.

80 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 79, adds here, "La première phrase rend compte de pratītya, la seconde de samutpāda."

81 This too, is in verse: asannutpadyate yadvat pratyetyapi tathā 'tha san. utpanna utpadyata ityāniṣṭhā 'san purā 'pi vā. sahakāle 'pi ca ktvā 'sti dīpam: prēpya tamo gatam. āsyam vyādāya śete ca paścāccet kim na samvrte.

82 The Pradhan and Shastri editions both have asan, with the a elided, as above. This line, however, can also be read as san, a reading found in LVP, who translates, vol. 2, ch. 3, pp. 79-80, "Si vous admettez qu'il naisse d'abord existant, né, il continuera de renaître; donc regressus ad infinitum; ou bien disons que, pour nous autres aussi; il est préexistant à sa naissance." He here refers in a lengthy footnote to Yaśomitra, who supports this reading. As Yaśomitra explains, it is not completely incorrect to say that the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas think that something extant arises. On the other hand, the phrase may mean "not existing," thus being simply the conclusion necessary in order to avoid an infinite regression.

83 On the existence of the future according to the Vaibhāṣikas, see pp. 17-23.

84 Here LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 80, adds, from Yaśomitra, ". . . sam signifie <<concourse>> (samavāya). . ."

85 Yaśomitra cites Pāṇini 4.4.98.

86 Yaśomitra cites the Kośa 2.22 and 2.23 where it is explained that any molecule (paramāṇu) is composed of at least eight dravyas, and that thought and the mental concomitants always arise together.

87 Nature (prakṛti) and Spirit (puruṣa) are the two fundamental, eternal, origin-less forces or causes in the universe, according to the Sāṅkhya system. Their illusory interaction creates the phenomenal world.

88 Yaśomitra does not identify them. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 81, fn. 2, merely says "explication hétérodoxe."

89 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 84, translates, ". . . il accomplit la triple action, corporelle, vocale, mentale, en vue du sukha, sensation agréable, et de l'aduḥkhāsukha, sensation d'indifférence. . .," but Pradhan and Shastri both have sukhārthamaduḥkhārtham. Yaśomitra is unhelpful here.

90 LVP, ibid., translates here, "Le sot (bāla) ou Pṛthagjana ne comprenant pas (aprajāna) que le Pratītyasamutpāda n'est que samskāras" He gives the Sanskrit, with the word pratītyasamutpāda in brackets in a footnote with no reference. Yaśomitra does not say this; in fact, he says "only" points out the absence of a soul. It seems unnecessary to add it, as "this" can reasonably be interpreted to mean the person, the individual.

91 On meritorious, etc., see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 130-3.

92 tadanyasamskārapratyayam vijñānam. Or, perhaps, "Consciousness is not dependent on tendencies other than these," although exactly what this would mean is unclear. It must be a wrong reading. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 85, translates from the Chinese, "C'est là le vijñāna qui est en raison des samskāras." This line is analogous to the statement above, that the tendencies are dependent on ignorance. It is also supported by the intent of the discussion, and by Yaśomitra's comments. He quotes samskārapratyayam vijñānam twice. He also makes the point that it is the six types of consciousness, caused by threefold action, that constitute the intermediate existence. If it meant the rebirth consciousness of a new birth existence (see p. 244), consciousness would then be defined only as mind consciousness, for the other five groups are not active at rebirth. Clearly Yaśomitra is also stumped by the definition of consciousness as the third limb of dependent origination as the six groups of consciousness, for this definition seems to require the pre-existence, as it were, of the being whose conception in this life is being described. Or, it does not refer to this life, which then contradicts the division of the twelve limbs into three lives, consciousness being the first limb of the present existence. On this problem, also see the discussion in the next chapter.

93 avidyā āveṇikī is ignorance itself, unassociated with any of the defilements. See the Kośa V. 12 and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 130-1.

94 Yaśomitra cites 3.42.

95 kṛtsnajanmānugatam. This is missing in LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 85.

95 kraimeṇa. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 85, says "en leur temps."

97 The Pradhan and Shastri editions are printed this way. Yaśomitra, however, says only, "according to the definition in the Vibhaṅga," and the

definition he then quotes is that of name and form. See the commentary below. LVP follows Yaśomitra.

98 Desire is for happiness in the first three stages of meditation, for indifference in the fourth.

99 tata iṣṭavedanātrṣṇāyāḥ kāmādīnām utpādanam. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 86, translates, "Ensuite, de la trṣṇā relative à la vedanā, le quadruple upādāna" This is supported by Yaśomitra, see below, and certainly fits the context better than utpādanam.

100 The Brahmajālasūtra is in the Dīgha Nikāya. T. W. Rhys Davids has translated it in Dialogues of the Buddha (London: Henry Frowde, 1899), pp. 1-55.

101 ātmavādaḥ punarātmabhāvaḥ. ātmeti vādo 'sminnityātmavādaḥ.

102 evam hi Bhagavatā sarvatrākyātām. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 87, has, "Comme Bhagavat l'a dit dans le Sarva," which he explains in a footnote is probably the Sarvavarga, although no such passage is found in the Pali version. He notes that the Chinese translations have "en tous lieux."

103 kāmādīnām upādānamiti. See note 99.

104 On the various classifications of anuśaya, see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 133-41.

105 The karmically-caused tendencies arise only from ignorance, which an arhat has eliminated. As for the rabbit's horn, a non-existent thing cannot be a cause.

106 kuprajñā cenna darśanāt. Darśana, false view, is equivalent to drṣṭi. See also 7.1, and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 133-5.

107 On the mahābhūmikas and the kleśamahābhūmikas, see 2.23, 24 and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 122-6.

108 upakleśa, see 5.46 and Introduction to the Translation, p. 140. They are defiled mental concomitants, found along with the kleśas, but differing from them in that they are not "roots."

109 samudācaratā rāgeṇa vāsanādhānena tadupahataṃ bhavati. LVP, vol. 2., ch. 3, p. 91, translates, ". . . mais qui est opprimée (upahata) par le désir [Le désir n'est pas en activité, samudācaran; mais ses traces demeurent et la pensée est opprimée]."

110 The word citta occurs as part of the lemma in Yaśomitra's commentary. Although it is not in the text, it is clearly implied.

111 Yaśomitra includes the word kliṣṭa, not found in the text.

112 Shastri here has na rāgādikleśavyatiriktā 'vidyā nāstīti. This clearly cannot be correct. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 91, fn. 3, quotes Yaśomitra as follows: na rāgādikleśavyatiriktāvidyā nāmāstī.

113 asamprakhyāna, a lack of "intellectual clarity" (BHS 576). Yaśomitra identifies it with prajñā.

114 See Introduction to the Translation, p. 117, p. 253, and footnote 206, p. 283.

115 asmīti sattvamayatā 'vidyeti Bhadantadharmatrātaḥ. The meaning of mayatā is uncertain. Yaśomitra comments that Vasubandhu did not determine its meaning, but that the Sautrāntikas considered it a type of ignorance or pride. To add to the confusion, LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 93, has a different reading: asmīti sattvamayanā, which he states is correct and cites Tibetan sources which seem to confirm it. The Chinese sources that he cites seem to confirm mayatā, however.

116 "Unobstructed," the Sanskrit is niśchāya, literally, shadeless (see MW 542). LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 93, fn. 4 says this reading is confirmed by the Tibetan. He also says that niśchāya corresponds to the Pali nicchāta which means "having no hunger, being without cravings" (PTS 356), and always occurs along with nibbuta or parinibbuta in the description of an arhat.

117 Nirvṛta, the past passive participle of nirvr, (iMv 556), like nirvāṇa, means extinguished, and is often used as synonymous with nirvāṇa. See BHS 304.

118 The Sanskrit is, So 'hamevaṃ jñātvā evaṃ dr̥ṣṭvā sarvāsāṃ
tr̥ṣṇāṇāṃ sarvāsāṃ dr̥ṣṭīnāṃ sarvāsāṃ mayatānāṃ sarveṣāmahamkāra-
mamakārāsmimānābhīniveśānuśayānāṃ prahāṇāt pariññānniśchāyo
nirvṛtaḥ. (Shastri, vol. 2, p. 466) LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 93, translates a somewhat
different text: "Je sais, je vois,--par l'abandon et connaissance complète
(prahāṇa, pariññāna) des soifs, des vues (dr̥ṣṭi), des mayanās, des
attachements (abhiniveśa) et adhésions (anuśaya) à l'idée de moi
(ātma-grāha), à l'idée de mien (mama-grāha), à l'asmimāna,--sans ombre, le
Parinirvāṇa."

119 There are seven types of māna, or pride. See 5.10.

120 rūpaṃ vistareṇa yathoktam. See pp. 252-7. On the non-material
aggregates (skandha) composing name, see Introduction to the Translation,
pp. 106-10.

121 etasya punaḥ kena nāmatvam.

122 Five are explained at 1.7 and 1.9, see pp. 252-3. The mind-
sphere is explained at 1.16 and 1.17. See below.

123 mana-indriyasya punarniruddhasyānāgatavarttamānābhyāṃ
dharmamaṇovijñānābhyāṃ katham sannipātaḥ. See Yaśomitra below, he
differs slightly grammatically. As for the "defunct mental organ," see 1.17.
Manas, or manodhātu, or mana-āyatana, or mana-indriya, all refer to the six
groups of consciousness which have just passed and which serve as the
support for mind consciousness, which, unlike the other five consciousnesses,
has no material support. Since in the case of mental consciousness, the "sense
organ" as it were is always past, and the sense object may be future, the three
do not come together. See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 119-22.

124 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 97, cites Samyukta 3,9 and similar passages
in Samyukta IV. 68 and Majjhima I.111.

125 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 97, fn. 3, cites this quotation at Majjhima III. 180
and Dīgha III.243.

126 The dharmāyatana (see 1.17), or dharma-sphere is the sphere of
mental objects, corresponding to the external sense object of the other five
sense organs. The dharmāyatana consists of the vedanāskandha (see 1.14),

the samjñāskandha (see 1.14), the samskāṛaskandha (see 1.15), avijñapti (see 1.11), and the three unconditioned dharmas (see 1.5), space, and the two types of cessation, that due to wisdom and that not due to wisdom. See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 104, 120-22.

127 As, for example, in the case of a blind man, where both the sense organ and the sense objects exist, but there is no visual consciousness.

128 The point of this argument is that the first two of the six hexades, the sense organs and objects, are implied in the third, the consciousnesses, just as these three are implied in the fourth, the contacts. It would therefore be pointless to mention it again unless it were referring to something different. Hence, this proves that contact is something other than the mere coming together.

129 nāpi sarvaṃ cakṣurvijñānaṃ sarvayoścakṣūrūpayoh kāryam. Shastri has pūrvayoś instead of sarvayoś, which corresponds to the explanation of Bhadanta Śrīlābha, a Sautrāntika, as given in Yaśomitra's commentary, see below. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 98, who omits the word, refers the reader to ch. 4, p. 18, where it is explained that invisible "visible objects" can be produced through meditation.

130 See 1.10d, p. 256.

131 On pratigha, see 1.29 and Introduction to the Translation, p. 114.

132 On adhivācana, see Dhammasaṅgaṇi, ed. by Edward Müller (London: Henry Frowde, 1885), 1306, and other references given by LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 99, fn. 2.

133 vāññāmi pravartate nāmārthaṃ dhyotayati ityadhivācanaṃ nāma. Here nāma can be understood in its simple meaning as "word" or "name," the equivalent of samjñākaraṇa, the common word used to designate something. See 2.47a-b on nāmakāya.

134 punasta eva ṣaṭ sparśāstrayo bhavanti. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 99, translates, "Le sixième sparśa est de trois espèces" While the context seems to suggest that only the sixth contact, mind contact, is being discussed here, the Sanskrit does not support this interpretation. Nor does the explanation which follows, see 3.31b, if, in the case of the other five contacts, not being associated with knowledge or ignorance, also means not having a karmic result.

135 Kuśalaśāśrava. There are eight classes of good, or karmically wholesome, consciousness in the realm of sensual desires. These are discussed in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi. For a clear chart listing them all, see either Āyāṇatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary or his Guide through the Abhidhammapitaka, both of which contain it. These good thoughts of the kāma-dhātu, in the case of one who is not an arhat, are still connected with the āśravas, however, for which, see the Kośa 5.38c-d-40 and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 130-3.

136 anivṛtāvvyākṛta, undefiled-indeterminate, means that it is undefiled, it is not morally unwholesome, because it is karmic result, and that it is indeterminate because it has no result. See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 130-1.

137 sukhavedyādayastrayaḥ. See 4.49 where Vasubandhu explains the five ways of being experienceable (vedanīya). Contact forms the second category, that which is to be experienced by association. Contact is experienceable because of its association with feeling.

138 Yaśomitra refers the reader to Pāṇini 5.1.1 and 3.3.169 in which the formation and meaning of gerundives is explained.

139 See p. 258.

140 Sahabhūhetu, mutually-arising simultaneous causes, are defined as those dharmas which are the effects of each other. Sahabhūrye mithaḥ-phalaḥ (2.50c-d). Examples given include the four great elements, which are sahabhūhetu with each other, thought and its accompaniments, and characteristics and that which is characterized. Bhūtavaccittacittānuvartilakṣaṇalakṣyavat (2.50c-d). It is a category of cause not accepted by the Sautrāntikas, who object that it is contradictory to the accepted definition of cause. (2.51d). A cause, they argue, must exist previous to its effect, a relationship that is impossible for two dharmas arising together. In reply, the Vaibhāṣikas give as examples of sahabhūhetu a lamp and its light, or a sprout and its shadow. The light is caused by the lamp, the shadow by the sprout, and yet, in both cases, they arise and exist simultaneously. These examples are rejected by the Sautrāntikas, who respond that both the lamp and its light, and the sprout and its shadow are the results of a complex of previous causes and conditions. The Sarvāstivādin answer is simple: there is such a causality because our definition of causality allows it. The relationship of cause and effect, they say, is determined by the existence or non-existence of the effect: "When A is or is not, B is

or is not; A is the cause, B is the effect." The Sautrāntikas do then admit that, of simultaneous dharmas, one could be the cause of another, but they could not be the cause and effect of each other.

141 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, pp. 101-2, omits this.

142 This line is missing in LVP, see vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 102.

143 On the mahābhūtas, or great elements, and the bhautikas, or upādāyarūpa, derived matter, see 1.12, 2.65, and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 115-16.

144 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 102, attributes this response to the Sautrāntikas, which must be the case, although the Pradhan and Shastri editions include it as part of the preceding sentence.

145 pūrvakācca bhūtabhautikasamudāyāduttara utpadyata itī sya-
maṇe kaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 102, translates this as ". . . les
grands éléments et la matière dérivée, qui sont simultanés, procèdent
ensemble d'un complexe de causes antérieures." See Yaśomitra below and
footnote 140.

146 See 2.50c. The shadow and the sprout exist simultaneously, but
the sprout is the cause of the shadow.

147 See footnote 140.

148 Yaśomitra identifies this as Bhadanta Śrīlābha's opinion.

149 Feeling, vedanā, is one of the caitta, see p. 123 of the Introduction
to the Translation, or mental components, which occurs in every thought. It
cannot arise separately from consciousness (2.23), and must have the same
object (3.34).

150 See 2.23c-d, and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 122-3.

151 For vipratibandha, "opposition," "hindrance," "obstacle," see BHS,
p. 494. It occurs, according to Edgerton, in the Bodhisattvabhūmi only. Monier-
Williams (p. 668) defines pratibandha as a "connection, uninterruptedness."
Vipratibandha could therefore mean a lack of connection. This is precisely the
point here--that feeling cannot have a different object than the contact from
which it arises, or that contact is not the cause of that feeling.

152 If one maintains that contact and feeling are successive, then they can't co-exist in every moment of thought, which they are supposed to, by virtue of both being among the ten mahābhūmikas.

153 Vitarka and vicāra are defined by Vasubandhu as the grossness and subtlety of thought, respectively. See 2.33 and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 126-8.

154 See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 130-3.

155 A śaikṣa is one who is pursuing the three types of śikṣā-s or training, in morality, concentration, and wisdom, with the goal of Arhatship. An aśaikṣa is one who has completed this path; he is an Arhat, and a neither-śaikṣa-nor-aśaikṣa is simply an ordinary person. For details on the various stages of this training, see the Kośa, ch. 6. For the definitions, see, in particular, 6.45b.

156 tadya etasyāṃ sarvasyāṃ bhūmau bhavanti te mahābhūmikāḥ. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 104, translates this as, "Les dharmas mentaux qui se trouvent dans toute cette bhūmi-là (etasyāṃ sarvasyāṃ bhūmau), on les nomme mahābhūmika" According to his footnote, there is confusion over the meaning of this in the Chinese translations, Paramārtha translating, "in the first three bhūmis" and Hsüan-tsang "in the first bhūmis." He says that the Vyākhyā glosses it as "bhūmi savitarkasavicāra," but see Yaśomitra below.

157 See 8.22 for dhyānāntara.

158 Bhavāgra is another name for the naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana, the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, the highest realm in the Ārūpyadhātu. See 8.4 and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 99-101.

159 Vasubandhu expounds his theory of the māhābhūmikas in another work, the Pañcaskandhaka. There is one difference in the lists of Vasubandhu and the Kośa; Vasubandhu has prajñā instead of mañi. The section of Yaśomitra's commentary omitted above contains the definitions of each of the mahābhūmikas. They can also be found in LVP's translation, vol. 1, ch. 2, pp. 153-6.

160 Adhimokṣa generally means the determined or concentrated attention of the mind on a particular object, although its exact sense is difficult to determine. LVP, vol. 1, ch. 2, pp. 154-5, gives extensive references and discussion of the various definitions of adhimokṣa. That found in the Pañcaskandhaka is "the ascertainment of a determined object" (niścite vastuny avadhāraṇam). Also see p. 350.

161 The Prakaraṇapāda classifies mahābhūmikas into four categories: the mahābhūmikas, the kuśalamahābhūmikas, the kleśamahābhūmikas and the parīttakleśabhūmikas. The akuśalamahābhūmikas were apparently added later as the opposite of the kuśalamahābhūmikas, on the model of the kuśala-akuśala opposition found in the sūtras.

162 On saṃsrṣṭa, also see the commentary to 7.11d, where a discussion of the meaning of sarāga entails a distinction between saṃsrṣṭa-sarāgāta and saṃyuktasāragāta. The first is "mixed" or "associated with" rāga, the second is "united" with rāga.

163 ... ato nāsti vedanābhirasaṃsrṣṭaṃ vijñānam. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 106, translates, "De ce Sūtra nous concluons qu'il n'est pas de vijñāna, vedanā, saṃjñā ou cetanā qui ne soient simultanés." Yaśomitra supports his translation of "simultaneous," and, although Pradhan and Shastri both read "vedanābhir," I believe it should read "vedanādibhir," a reading also supported by Yasomitra.

164 tanna vijñāyate kiṃ tāvadaṃyameṣāṃlambananiyama ukta utāho kṣaṇaniyama iti.

165 The word manopavicāra, "sphere of mental activity," according to Edgerton (p. 141), occurs only in Buddhist Sanskrit. "Upavicāra" is listed lexically in classical Sanskrit (MW p. 206) meaning "environs, neighborhood." It also occurs in Pali several times in connection with somanassa-, domanassa-, and upekkha- (see PTS, p. 147, LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 107, fn. 3 for references), but not with mano-. In Buddhist Sanskrit, both the noun, upavicāra, meaning "occupies one self with," and its causative, are found.

166 Pāṇini, 8.2.1; Śrīśa Chandra Vasu, vol. 2, p. 1532.

167 In the example, there was originally sas eṣa, the -s- in sas always being dropped, it becomes sa eṣa, and then the sandhi rules between vowels take effect, and it becomes saiṣa. As for manopavicāra, originally it was manas-upavicāra, the s being dropped gives mana-upavicāra, and the rules of vowel sandhi result in manopavicāra.

168 tribhirapi sthāpanā. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 108, makes the intent of this clear in his translation: "Répondons qu'il faut tenir compte en même temps des trois données."

169 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 108, fn. 2, refers to the Vibhāṣā, 139, 8, in order to explain this. According to it, if a dharmopavicāra has any or all of the six internal āyatanas and the external dharmāyatana as object, it has an unmixed object. If it has one of these seven and one or more of the external sense objects, as well, as its object, then it has a mixed object. On the dharmāyatana, see Introduction to the Translation, p. 122.

170 LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 109, ". . . elle n'est pas davantage upavicārikā, [c'est-à-dire susceptible de <<considération>>, saṃtīrikā]." The word saṃtīraṇa occurs in the commentary to 1.41c-d, where dr̥ṣṭi, there meaning "vision," is said to be saṃtīraṇa, or "judgment preceded by consideration of the object" (LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 81). LVP relies on Yaśomitra who says, saṃtīraṇaṃ punarviśayopanidhyānapūrvakaṃ niścayākaraṇaṃ, for this definition.

171 Pleasure and displeasure are strictly corporeal in the realm of sensual pleasures; there is no mental satisfaction.

172 The aśubha meditations are those meditations concerning the decay and impermanence of the body, done either in a cemetery or by imagining a corpse in various stages of decomposition.

173 itarathā hi kāmādhātu rūpadhātuvāmbanā rūpādyupavicārā na syuh kāmādhātuvāmbanāśca rūpadhātu gandharasaspraśāvopavicārāḥ. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 110, translates the objects of each of the realms differently. He says, ". . . un être du Kāmādhātu, ne pourrait <<considérer>> les visibles, sons et tangibles du Rūpadhātu [qu'il ne perçoit pas]; un être de Rūpadhātu ne pourrait considérer les odeurs et saveurs du Kāmādhātu . . ."

174 On santāna, see chapter 9, especially the opening paragraphs.

175 athaiṣāṃ manopavicārāṇāṃ kaṭi kāmāpratisaṃyuktās teṣāṃ ca kaṭi kimālabhāṇā evaṃ yāvadārūpyāpratisaṃyuktā vaktavyāḥ.

176 This refers to the first two stages of meditation; those referred to in 34b-d are the last two. For these various realms and stages, see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 97-101.

177 The ākāśānantyāyatana is the first of the four stages of meditation in the ārūpya realm. On it, see 8.2c and Introduction to the Translation, p. 101. The sāmantakas are the introductory meditations, the means by which the separation from an inferior stage and the entrance into the succeeding superior stage is effected. (8.22). Each of the eight fundamental meditations (maula-samāpatti) is preceded by its sāmantaka. The sāmantaka of the first meditation is distinguished from the others and given the name anāgāmya, or not to be entered, because one attains it without having attained or experienced samādhī, whereas the others are attained by the previous samādhī. (8.22)

178 eko maule, "one in the fundamental." Maula, derived from the word mūla, meaning "root," means "fundamental, essential" in Buddhist Sanskrit. (BHS 441) LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 113, translates it as "principal," or "l'Ārūpya proprement dit," the latter being the meaning of the Tibetan translation of the word.

179 See Pradhan, p. 447, na maulāḥ kuśalārūpyāḥ sāsravādhara-gocarāḥ and LVP, vol. 5, ch. 8, p. 177.

180 On pure and impure, see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 104, 130-1.

181 The sāmantaka to the first stage of meditation is known as the anāgāmya. See 8.22 and footnote 177.

182 The Pradhan edition reads: dvitīyadhyānabhūmikairāṣṭābhiḥ. tritīyacaturthadhyānārūpyabhūmikaiḥ pūrvavat. Yaśomitra reads: dvitīyatrītyacaturthadhyānārūpyajaiḥ pūrvavat. In his explanation, however, it becomes clear that this means, ". . . with eight associated with the second stage, etc.," as before. Shastri follows Yaśomitra here, as does LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 114, who translates, ". . . quant aux autres dhyānas et à l'Ārūpya, comme ci-dessus."

183 See Yaśomitra for a detailed explanation of which upavicāras are possessed by whom.

184 The nirmāṇacitta, the thought of creation, is one of the ṛddhis, or supernatural powers, that is obtained through meditation. The nirmāṇacitta associated with the realm of sensual pleasures includes the creation of external visible objects, smells, tastes, and tangibles, but not sounds. See 7.49.

185 Pratisaṃkhyā is the "careful consideration" or "thorough knowledge" of something. (BHS 371) Apratisaṃkhyā therefore means without deliberation or reflection.

186 ṣaṭ sātātā vihārā. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 114, fn. 3, gives several references, including Dīgha 3.250, 281 and Aṅguttara 2.198, 3.279. The six eternal abodes are the indifference and equanimity rather than the happiness or unhappiness that one maintains when confronted with the six objects of the senses.

187 Adhigamadharmā is defined in the bhāṣya to 8.39a-b as the thirty-seven bodhipakṣya dharmas. They are the four applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), the four right efforts (samyakprahāṇa), the four paths to supernormal power (ṛddhipāda), the five moral faculties (indriya), the five powers (bala), the seven limbs of enlightenment (bodhyaṅga) and the eightfold Path (mārga). Also see LVP, vol. 5, ch. 8, p. 219, fn. 1 and 2 on adhigama and 6.67-6.73 on the bodhipākṣikas.

188 tadbhedasya śāstrā gamitatvāt.

189 Yaśomitra refers the reader to 3.10 and 3.13, where the intermediate existence (antarābhava) is defined as the five aggregates between two lives, as they approach the next life, the birth existence (upapattibhava) as the aggregates at the moment of conception, the previous-time existence (pūrvakālabhava) as the aggregates from the moment after conception until death-existence (maranābhava), the aggregates at the moment of death.

190 na hi sa kleśo 'sti yena pratisaṃdhibandhaḥ pratividya ityābhidhārmikāḥ kleśaireva tu na paryavasthānāiḥ svatantraḥ. LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 118, translates, "Les Ābhidhārmikas disent: <<Parmi les passions (kleśa), il

n'en est pas une seule qui ne souille la pensée à la renaissance (pratisaṃdhi-bandha); mais la renaissance a lieu seulement par les passions, non pas par les pariyavasthānas dits svatantra" See Yaśomitra below for the independent corruptions, and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 133-40, for the kleśas and pariyavasthānas.

191 This line is missing in LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 118.

192 In 3.42 mind consciousness is said to be associated with indifference (upekṣā) at birth and at death. Indifference is a weak feeling, and therefore the weak mind consciousness of birth and death is associated with it, rather than with a strong feeling.

193 See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 130-3.

194 This line is missing in LVP, vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 119.

195 Idea (saṃjñā) is one of the five aggregates or skandhas. It is defined in 1.14c-d as, saṃjñā nimittudgrahaṇātmikā. "An idea has the nature of the apprehension of the characteristics."

196 See LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 28, fn. 3 for references.

197 In 3.21b the saṃskāras were defined as the state of action in a past life. In 4.1b act is clarified as cetanā, or volition, and that which is produced by volition. Of the three types of acts--mental, bodily, and vocal--volition is mental act, and it is from mental act that the other two arise (4.1c-d).

198 On the upādhānaskandha, see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 104, 107-10.

199 On caitasika and viprayukta, see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 122-30.

200 The bhājanaloka, its geography, and life cycle, are explained in detail at 3.45-3.102. Also see introduction to the Translation, pp. 97-101.

201 The gods perform only good actions.

202 According to LVP, vol. 3, ch. 4, p. 1, fn. 3, this is found at Aṅguttara Nikāya III.415.

- 203 See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 117-19.
- 204 The bhāṣya goes on here to review the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus and their interrelations. See LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 31 or Hall, pp. 85-6. On the mental sphere, see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 110-12 and 120-22.
- 205 On avijñapti, see pp. 117-19.
- 206 The sense organs are called the "material sensibilities" (rūpa-prasāda) (see ch. 4, fn. 36). Prasāda in classical Sanskrit means "clearness" or "brightness" (MW 696). In Pali, however, pasādo, meaning "sensitive surface" (PTS 446), first occurs in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka (see A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, trans. by C.A.F. Rhys Davids. 3rd ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1974), p. 159). The sense organ (indriya), then, does not here mean the visible, tangible, physical eye or ear, etc., but rather, the faculty of sight itself which is conceived of as a subtle type of matter. They are described as being supra-sensible (atīndriya) (1.9c-d) and translucent (accha), like the brilliance of a gem. (1.36). They therefore cannot be cut or burned or weighed. (1.36). Karunadāsa (pp. 44-6) gives references from other Buddhist texts, both Pali and Sanskrit, to show that this distinction between the physical sense organ, which is only the support for sense consciousness, and the sense organ per se, which is the perceiving, receptive faculty (rūpaprasāda), is generally accepted by Buddhists. See Introduction to the Translation, p. 117.
- 207 On upādāya, see footnotes 213 & 216.
- 208 See 1.35 for full quote.
- 209 Here rūpāyatana refers to the objects of the eye. See 1.24.
- 210 Most probably square and round were intended here, although see Hall, p. 64, fn. 4, where he remarks that no such list has been found.
- 211 Unnata and avanata literally mean "bent upwards" and "bend downwards," respectively. I have adopted Hall's translation here as preferable to LVP's "high" and "low."
- 212 Kāyavijñapti is, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, "figure," "configuration" (saṁsthāna) of the body (4.2b-3b). Others maintain it is movement, but

this the Vaibhāṣikas deny because of the momentary nature of all that is conditioned.

213 Upāṭṭa is the past passive participle of the root dā, with the preverbs upa and ā, meaning to receive, acquire, or appropriate to one's self (MW 213). The meaning of upāṭṭa is given in the Kośa at 1.34c-d as "that which the mind and mental components seize by way of support" (yaccittacaittair-adhiṣṭhānabhāvenopagrhītam). The five sense organs which presently exist, visible objects, odors, tastes, and tangibles are upāṭṭa.

214 The great elements or mahābhūta are earth (prthivī), water (ap), fire (tejas), and air (vāyu) (1.12). Their acts, in order, are support, cohesion, heating, and expansion; their natures are the solid, the moist, the warm, and motion. See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 115-17.

215 Vāgvijñapti is defined in 4.3d as "vocal sound," "speech." Vāgvijñaptistu vāgdhvaniḥ. Vāksvabhāvo yaḥ śabdah saiva vāgvijñaptiḥ.

216 Upādāya, here translated as "appropriate," is, of course, from the same root as upāṭṭa, see above. It is a gerund, commonly meaning "together with" (MW 213), "depending upon." LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 17, translates it as "aīt pour cause."

217 According to LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 18, this is the Prakaraṇapāda.

218 The great elements, as mentioned above, are explained at 1.12.

219 The text omits thirst here, although LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 18, and Hall, p. 69, add it from the Tibetan.

220 An upacāra is a figure of speech in which the effect is called the cause.

221 Kila, "according to some." Yaśomitra says this is the Vaibhāṣika opinion which Vasubandhu rejects.

222 See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 117-19.

223 On these two samāpattis, see 2.42, and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 129-30.

224 Prāpti is one of the cittaviprayuktadharmas belonging to the saṃskāraśkaṇḍha (2.35-6). The Vaibhāṣikas claim it is the acquisition of that which was not previously possessed or that which had been lost, and the possession of it, once obtained. The Sautrāntikas deny its existence. See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 128-9.

225 LVP, vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 21, says this is the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas, not of Vasubandhu.

226 I have chosen to translate anubhava as affect, even though anubhava is a neutral word in Sanskrit, which affect is not in English. The fact that "feeling" can be indifferent seems to necessitate a neutral term, and yet, a neutral term such as "experience" is too broad and vague. "Affect" does convey the personal and the emotional/psychological aspects of "feeling." "Reaction," which is sometimes used to translate sparśa, seems to me to not be totally inappropriate either as a translation of anubhava.

227 There is a distinction made between bodily and mental feeling. Bodily feeling is either pleasant (sukha) or unpleasant (duḥkha), but mental feeling is either satisfaction (saumanasya) or dissatisfaction (daurmanasya).

228 On anuśaya, see Introduction to the Translation, pp. 133-41.

229 Yaśomitra comments, "Punarbhavasya karmabhavasya vā mūlam anuśayā ityabhiprāyaḥ." Proclivities can be either the root of punarbhava, rebirth, or of karmabhava, action.

230 The use of the words anuśaya and kleśa interchangeably here is in accordance with the Vaibhāṣika contention that they are synonyms. See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 135-6.

231 The "necessary consequences" of the anuśayas are the upakleśas. See V.46 and Introduction to the Translation, p. 140.

232 There are three bandhanas, attachment (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), and delusion (moha). On them, see V.45d and Introduction to the Translation, pp. 140-1.

233 The ninety-eight anuśayas along with the ten pariyavasthānas are classified into four groups--the three influxes (āsrava), the four floods (ogha), the four bonds (yoga), and the four graspings (upādāna). (5.35) The graspings

are the grasping after the objects of sensual pleasure (kāmopadāna), the grasping after the false view of the self (ātmavāḍopadāna), the grasping after false views (dr̥ṣṭyupādāna), and the grasping after morality and ritual practices (śīlavratopadāna). The "these" to which the text refers are the oghas and yogas as defined in V.37c-d. There, kāma-ogha is said to be five rāgas, five pratighas, five mānas, four vicikitsās and ten paravasthānas, bhava-ogha to be ten rāgas, ten mānas and eight vicikitsās, dr̥ṣṭi-ogha to be the twelve dr̥ṣṭis and avidyā-ogha to be the five avidyās of the three realms. See Introduction to the Translation, pp. 137-40.

Dependent Origination: The Problem of Succession versus Simultaneity

Introduction: The Thesis and the Materials

The problems surrounding the interpretation of dependent origination gave rise to diverse explanations of the doctrine within the Buddhist tradition as well. This chapter will compare the interpretations of the Abhidharmakośa and the Visuddhimagga, against the background of the Pali Suttas and Abhidhamma. The central problems are time and the role of consciousness. As we saw in the third chapter, the temporal reference of the twelve links has always been a major impediment to a satisfactory explanation of its functioning. La Vallée Poussin commented on this problem in Théorie des douze causes.¹ As he explains, difficulties with the chain require the uninterrupted existence of certain links, for instance, ignorance, and therefore the simultaneous existence of some links. So, understanding dependent origination as a succession of events, one derived from the other, is inadequate. Instead, they must be simultaneous. In the simultaneous interpretation of the chain, consciousness is the crucial link. It is the "seed" and the "pith" of both physical and intellectual development from conception until death.² Dependent origination then becomes a series of states of consciousness, as in the Śālistamba Sūtra.³ La Vallée Poussin suggests that the Kośa has reconciled the successive and simultaneous views of dependent origination by combining its theories of static and serial dependent origination.⁴ I contend, however, that the Kośa has not successfully reconciled these two views, and that its failure to do so is primarily due to its neglect of the consciousness limb. Buddhaghosa, on the other hand, belonged and contributed to a tradition that emphasized the analysis of consciousness. He applied those teachings to dependent origination in chapter

seventeen of the Visuddhimagga, and has, in my opinion, given a far more satisfactory explanation of the process of dependent origination, and a better resolution of the temporal problems connected with it.

We have in the Kośa and the Visuddhimagga the unusual opportunity of comparing the interpretations of dependent origination presented by two of the greatest systematizers of Hīnayāna Buddhism, contemporaries, namely, Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa, as found in two of the greatest works of the Pali and Sanskrit traditions. Both are encyclopedias of Buddhist philosophy. According to tradition, Buddhaghosa wrote his masterpiece in order to demonstrate his competence to the monks of the Mahāvihāra in Ceylon;⁵ Vasubandhu wrote his in order to expound and criticize Sarvāstivādin doctrine. Both discuss dependent origination at some length; that they belong to different schools is clearly evident in their discussions. The Kośa reflects the Sarvāstivādins' concern with the enumeration and classification of dharmas, focusing on arguing with the Sautrāntikas about the status of many of the links as independent dharmas. The Visuddhimagga reflects the Theravādins' concern with the enumeration and classification of states of consciousness, its discussion focusing on the tendencies, the types of consciousness, and the resulting processes of rebirth. They also share many important correspondences indicating a common source of interpretation of dependent origination.

The Suttas and the Vibhaṅga of the Theravādin Abhidhamma also have much to contribute on these questions. The pivotal role of the consciousness limb is recognized even in the Suttas, and it is virtually the subject matter of the Vibhaṅga. In the Suttas we discover that the limbs do not necessarily extend over three lives, and in the Vibhaṅga we see the attempt to fit them all into a single thought-moment. The Suttas were, of course, one of the primary sources

for many of the Western interpretations we have just discussed, but the Abhidhamma works were overlooked. The most important Nikāya texts discussing dependent origination are the Mahāpadāna and the Mahānidāna Suttas of the Dīgha Nikāya, and the Nidānavagga, the second part of the Samyutta Nikāya. We will look at them in so far as they pertain to the problems mentioned above, time and consciousness.

We will also look at the Vibhaṅga, and Buddhaghosa's commentary on it, the Sammohavinodanī. Together, they contain a unique, comprehensive, and extremely important exposition of dependent origination. Although they have been translated,⁶ they have not figured in any Western attempt to understand dependent origination, nor is there any secondary literature on them.⁷ I have therefore included in this essay extensive discussion of and quotation from these works. We have in them a valuable source on dependent origination, inexplicably neglected until now. The sixth chapter of the Vibhaṅga, second book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, is called the Paccayāṅkāravibhaṅga. It discusses dependent origination at great length. Its method and intent differ sharply from those of the Nikāyas. It is divided into two sections, the analysis according to the Suttas and the analysis according to the Abhidhamma. The latter is more than ten times the length of the former and bears little resemblance to it. We find in the Abhidhamma section the application of the chain of dependent origination to each of the eighty-nine types of consciousness enumerated in the Dhammasaṅgani, the first book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Here, the chain, limited to a single thought-moment, is reduced to a microscopic examination of each and every possible state of consciousness. The first section of Buddhaghosa's commentary, the Sammohavinodanī, on the Sutta explanation, is virtually identical to chapter seventeen of the Visuddhimagga.

and will not be considered separately.⁸ The second section on the Abhidhamma explanation elucidates the Vibhaṅga, which would otherwise be incomprehensible. We can also see the influence of this Abhidhamma theory on Buddhaghosa's interpretation of dependent origination in the Visuddhimagga.

The chapter, then, will take as its theme La Vallée Poussin's suggestion, mentioned above, that the Abhidharmakośa reconciles the successive and the simultaneous views of dependent origination. As stated earlier, I contend that the Kośa has not successfully reconciled these two contradictory views, whereas the Visuddhimagga has. We will first see what the Suttas and the Vibhaṅga have to say about time and consciousness in dependent origination, and then, against that background, compare the interpretations of the Kośa and the Visuddhimagga.

Dependent Origination in the Suttas

The oldest recitation of dependent origination may be that found in the Mahāpadāna Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.⁹ Since it illustrates well the Sutta style and many points made in the preceding chapters, it will be considered at length. In this Sutta, the Buddha recounts the lives of the former Buddhas to his disciples, telling of their conception and birth, their cloistered and luxurious upbringing, their viewing of the Four Sights, and their subsequent renunciation and enlightenment. The life of the Bodhisatta Vipassī, who lived ninety-one aeons ago, is told in detail. He attained enlightenment as he sat alone meditating,

'Verily this world has fallen upon trouble; one is born, and grows old, and dies, and falls from one state, and springs up in another. And from this suffering, moreover, no one knows of any way of escape, even from decay and death. O when shall a way of escape from this suffering be made known, from decay and from death!' Then to Vipassi the Bodhisat, brethren, this thought occurred:--'What now being present, is decay and dying also present; what conditions decay and dying?' Then, brethren, from attention to the cause arose the conviction through reason:--Where birth is, there is decay and dying; birth is the condition of decay and dying.¹⁰

Then, pondering the conditions under which birth occurs, the Bodhisatta traces the links of dependent origination back through becoming, grasping, craving, feeling, contact, the six senses, and name and form to consciousness. There he stops, finding that consciousness is present when name and form are present.

He then reviews the chain in its anuloma sequence and gains insight into arising, an insight which has not been gained before. "Coming to be, coming to be!"-- at that thought, brethren, there arose to Vipassi the Bodhisat a vision into things not called before to mind, and knowledge arose, reason arose, wisdom arose, light arose."¹¹ His unprecedented insight is that arising is the cause of all suffering and that arising is conditioned. Conversely, the absence of the condition means the absence of the result. "Then to Vipassi the Bodhisat, brethren, this occurred:-- 'What now being absent; is decay and dying also absent, by the ceasing of what does decay and dying cease?'"¹² Naturally, when birth is absent, decay and dying are absent, when birth ceases, decay and dying cease, and so on.

Vipassi then proclaims his own enlightenment, as the anuloma sequence of the chain based on cessation. "Such is the ceasing of this entire body of Ill. 'Ceasing to be, ceasing to be!'-- at that thought, brethren, there arose to Vipassi

the Bodhisat a vision into things not called before to mind, and knowledge arose, reason arose, wisdom arose, light arose."¹³

Doubts and hesitation about teaching this new-found insight then fill the Buddha Vipassi's mind. However, Mahābrahmā intercedes, successfully persuading the Buddha Vipassi to teach. The Sutta concludes with his first sermons and conversions.

This presentation of dependent origination, although early and brief, contains many important features. Dependent origination is here the content of enlightenment. It is explicitly connected with the Four Noble Truths, as the insights into arising (samudaya) and ceasing (nirodha) are the second and third Truths, respectively. Furthermore, it is an enlightenment obtained by analysis, starting from the most obvious examples of suffering.¹⁴ Dependent origination is discovered in the pratiloma sequence, progressing from result to cause. The last cause is consciousness; at that point, the chain reverses direction. Consciousness and name and form are dependent upon each other for arising, whereas the remaining links are dependent upon the preceding link only for arising. Already, these two limbs, which constitute individuality, are singled out from the rest by a unique relationship. The omission of the ignorance and karmically-caused tendencies links is significant. There are, throughout the Nikāyas, a number of starting points for the chain. The two most common are ignorance, with a total of twelve members, or consciousness, with nine or ten members. The absence of the first two links limits the chain to the present life, calling into question the possibility of the three-lives explanation.¹⁵

More importantly, the general formula is applied here, even though it is not stated as such. The first half, "This being, that is; from the arising of this, that arises," is expressed as "What now being present, is decay and dying also

present; what conditions decay and dying?"¹⁶ The second half, "This not being, that is not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases," is expressed as "What now being absent, is decay and dying also absent; by the ceasing of what does decay and dying cease?"¹⁷

Furthermore, the connection between dependent origination and the anattā doctrine is explicitly drawn. After gaining insight into the arising and ceasing of the ten limbs, Vipassī ponders the arising and ceasing of the aggregates. Arising and ceasing are facts which apply to all perceptible things, including that which we call the "self" and the specific arising and ceasing of the ten or twelve limbs of dependent origination outline precisely what occurs within that so-called self.

Also notable are two points from the biography itself. The Mahāpadāna Sutta says that these exact same events have occurred seven times to seven Buddhas in different world ages. The discovery of dependent origination is made by every Buddha. It is not a unique occurrence, but a recurrent one. In this lies the idea of the eternality of dependent origination.¹⁸ Finally, we should note the Buddha's hesitation about teaching his insights. We are warned again and again that the chain is not easy to understand.

The following Sutta in the Dīgha Nikāya is the Mahānidāna Sutta, or the Great Discourse on Causation, also about dependent origination. Ānanda's assertion that dependent origination is easy to understand, which closed our introductory remarks, opens this Sutta. Ānanda approaches the Buddha, makes his assertion, accepts the Buddha's reproach and then, his instruction. He leads Ānanda through the causal chain, in pratiloma order, by instructing him, "If you, Ānanda, were asked:--'Is old age and death due to a particular cause?' You should say:--'Birth is the cause of old age and death,'" and so

on.¹⁹ As in the Mahāpadāna Sutta, the chain stops and turns back at consciousness.

Here, however, an explanation of each of the links follows the recitation of the chain. For the most part, these definitions are identical to those of the Samyutta Nikāya, quoted in the introduction. Craving, contact, name and form, and consciousness, however, receive greater elaboration. Craving is defined the same way as in the Samyutta Nikāya, but the definition is followed by a curious "digression,"²⁰ a dependent origination within dependent origination. The commentary explains that craving can be considered from two viewpoints. There is the craving which is the fundamental cause of rebirth and there is also the craving which is exhibited in everyday behavior. The Buddha pauses in his explanation of the ten links to explain this latter type of craving in detail. It is the cause of an entire secondary series of results. Craving leads to pursuit (pariyesanā), pursuit to acquisition (lābha), acquisition to decision (vinicchaya), decision to desire and passion (chandarāga), desire and passion to tenacity (ajjhosāna), tenacity to possession (pariggaha), possession to avarice (macchariya), avarice to watch and ward (ārakkha), watch and ward to many a bad and wicked state of things . . . blows and wounds, strife, contradiction and retort, quarrelling, slander, and lies (daṇḍādānasatthādānakalahaviṇṇahavi-vādatuvaṃ tuvaṃ pesuññamusāvāda aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā).²¹

The ten or twelve member standard dependent origination is thus neither an exclusive nor a comprehensive statement. Since everything has a cause, everything can be traced back through a series of causes. As we will see, the Vibhaṅga enumerates the many different chains which occur in different types of thought. The twelve links may be only the most important among many others. There are, as we see here, a number of steps possible between craving

and sensation. We shall also find in the Samyutta Nikāya another, more surprising chain.²²

Contact is in this Sutta divided into two, "verbal" (adhivacanasamphassa) and "sensory" (patighasamphassa) impression, a division also found in the Abhidharmakośa.²³ Their connection with name and form is intimate. Here, the specification of name as certain mental processes and form as the elements is missing. The emphasis instead is on the interrelation and interaction of the two.

Those modes, features, characters, exponents, by which the aggregate called 'name' manifests itself,-- if all these were absent, would there be any manifestation of a corresponding verbal impression in the aggregate called (bodily) form? . . . Those modes, features, characters, exponents, by which the aggregate called (bodily) form manifests itself--if all these were absent, would there be any manifestation of an impression of sense-reaction in the aggregate called name?²⁴

This definition does, significantly, seem to limit name and form to a "psycho-physiological"²⁵ system, which does not justify an extended meaning of the entire phenomenal world.

Finally, consciousness is explained as that which descends into the mother's womb, causing and sustaining name and form. "Were cognition not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form become constituted therein? . . . Were cognition, after having descended into the mother's womb, to become extinct, would name-and-form come to birth in this state of being?²⁶" Here the dependence of name and form on consciousness is stressed. Consciousness is the animator without which life cannot exist.

The Buddha's summation of the chain is important. He says that this is the extent of human life. "Only to this extent"²⁷ can one be born or live or die or express himself or have knowledge of anything. Only to this extent, that name and form together with consciousness are continually reborn. These two links,

name and form and consciousness, are the core and the totality of human life.²⁸

The emphasis in the Mahānidāna Sutta seems to be less on sorrow (dukkha) than on soullessness (anattā).²⁹ Of course, these doctrines are so closely linked that this is really only a difference of emphasis, not of substance. Clearly, by stressing that consciousness and name and form is all there is, the existence of a soul is strongly denied. By stressing the mutual causality of name and form, which constitute one's entire being, no room is left for an independent or eternal soul apart from them. By stressing that consciousness animates and maintains life, no role is left for a soul. Not surprising, then, is the discussion which follows this exposition of the links. It concerns the many ways the soul is described and defined, and all are rejected. The absence of views about the soul and the absence of grasping that such views engender are called nibbāna.³⁰

As for the concept of cause in these two Suttas, it is still quite undeveloped. There is no analysis of types of causes as in the Abhidhamma. A cause is a cause primarily because of precedence and influence, as in, "When A is, B is." There are hints, however, that not all of the links are related to each other in the same way. Particularly in the mutual relation and mutual arising of name and form and consciousness, the later idea of simultaneity is evident.

The Samyutta Nikāya, Part Two, is called the Nidānavagga, "The Kindred Sayings on Cause."³¹ It is a collection of discourses dealing with dependent origination. The first chapter, entitled the Buddhavagga, repeats the essentials about dependent origination which we have already also learned from the Dīgha Nikāya. It begins with the desāna, or teaching, the anuloma and pratiloma sequences of dependent origination, significantly presented in

that order and composed of twelve, not ten, members. Then there is the vibhaṅga, the analysis of the teaching. It offers the definitions of the twelve links, here, however, starting with old age and death. The first chapter concludes with the histories of the Buddhas and their discovery of dependent origination, as also found in the Mahāpadāna Sutta. This chapter sets the stage for the remaining Suttas on dependent origination, many of which are very important. The Nidānavagga contains both further elaborations and applications of the doctrine of dependent origination and hints and seeds of later interpretations.

Dependent origination as soullessness is implied in the Mahānidāna Sutta, in the Nidānavagga, it is stated outright. In the second chapter, the āhāra or sustenance sutta,³² the Buddha is teaching the four sustentances when Moliya-Phagguṇa asks him, "Who now is it, lord, who feeds on the consciousness-sustenance?"³³ The Buddha rebukes him, saying,

Not a fit question I am not saying (someone) feeds on. If I were saying so, to that the question would be a fit one. But I am not saying so. And I am not saying so, if you were to ask me 'Of what now, lord, is consciousness the sustenance?' This were a fit question. And the fit answer to it is: the consciousness-sustenance is the cause of renewed becoming, of rebirth in the future. When that is come to pass, is present, the sixfold sense-sphere becomes and conditioned by the sixfold sense-sphere contact becomes.³⁴

The same question and answer is repeated for the remaining links. Thus we have here the explicit statement of the inseparability of the dependent origination and soullessness doctrines. Dependent origination illustrates the theory of soullessness. Notable also is the fact that once again consciousness starts the chain, and that craving, not ignorance, is the cause of the sustentances.³⁵

We also have the idea that the twelve member chain of dependent origination is only one application of a general law of arising and ceasing. The general formula expresses causality as follows: "This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases."³⁶ This law is not stated in the Mahāpadāna or the Mahānidāna Suttas, but in the Samyutta Nikāya it occurs along with dependent origination. Together they explain the "uprising" and "ceasing" of this entire mass of Ill.³⁷

There are still other interpretations and applications of dependent origination competing in this text. A unique example occurs in the discourse entitled upaniṣā, or "cause".³⁸ It shows that if all things are conditioned, then the twelve-linked dependent origination is only one of many possible chains. The Buddha preaches to his followers, telling them that one who knows the five aggregates to be impermanent knows that the defilements are extinguished.³⁹ Here again the insight into dependent origination is directly connected to soullessness. This knowledge, he says, is "causally associated".⁴⁰ "And what is that which is the cause of knowledge about extinction? Liberation is the answer . . . And what is that which is the cause of liberation? Passionlessness is the answer."⁴¹ Repulsion (nibbidā) is the cause of passionlessness (virāga), knowledge and clear understanding of things as they really are (yathābhūta-ñāṇadassana) is the cause of repulsion, concentration (samādhi) is the cause of knowledge and understanding, happiness (sukha) is the cause of concentration, serenity (pīti) the cause of happiness, rapture (pāmojja) the cause of serenity, joy (passadhi) the cause of rapture, faith (saddha) the cause of joy, and suffering (dukkha) the cause of faith.⁴² The cause of suffering is well-known, it is birth, and then here follow the familiar twelve links of dependent

origination. This series is truly unusual in its optimism, from suffering can come either more suffering and endless rebirth, or faith and eventual liberation.

There are yet other places in the Nidānavagga where consciousness is the first member of the chain.⁴³ The process of the arising of consciousness and contact is described at greater length and identified as the arising of sorrow. "What, brethren, is the arising of Ill? Because of sight and visible objects visual consciousness arises, contact is the clash of the three; feeling is conditioned by the contact, craving by the feeling. This, brethren, is the arising of Ill."⁴⁴ The Sutta continues, describing the production of each type of sense consciousness, and, from each, the same chain of causation results. Sense consciousness, then, starts the process, and, in effect, creates the world of our perceptions. It also implies a restriction of the process to this life and to this perceptible, tangible world. Without ignorance in the chain, however, the implication is that consciousness is either inherently distorted or distorted by craving. Indeed, the cessation of suffering is attributed to the cessation of craving. The arising of consciousness, contact, feeling, and craving occur in just the same way, but now the rest of the chain appears. "By the utter fading away and ceasing of the craving, grasping ceases, by the ceasing of the grasping, becoming ceases. . . ."⁴⁵ Thus the links of consciousness, which arises dependent on a sense organ and sense object, through feeling, are the involuntary part of the sequence. Feeling, however, is the pivotal link, in that it does not necessarily result in craving. This is also in the Abhidhamma the point at which the chain can be diverted.

The primary role of consciousness in the process of human life is explained at length in other discourses. Consciousness requires a base, a sustenance; it needs to be fed in order to persist. It is fed by our will, by our

intentions, and by our preoccupations, which become its object.⁴⁶ It is rooted in passion and pleasure. Consciousness abides where there is desire (taṇhā), attachment (rāga), and pleasure (nandi).⁴⁷ From consciousness come name and form and activities which result in future birth.⁴⁸ So, here, craving, not ignorance, is again the essential cause in the process.

Thus, the Suttas contain the earliest presentations and explanations of a still immature doctrine. In them, dependent origination is fluid, in contrast to the fixed twelve-limbed chain discussed in the Kośa and the Visuddhimagga. Interestingly, those two works specify that it is the dependent origination applying to beings of the kāma realm that they discuss, implying that they knew of other chains with different applications. We have just seen some of these other chains in the Suttas. Any attempt, however, to trace the historical development of the doctrine in the Suttas is elusive and probably pointless. Both the nature of the texts and the nature of the doctrine itself preclude a successful historical analysis.⁴⁹ Moreover, the doctrine is at all periods capable of a variety of interpretations and manipulations.

In the Suttas, dependent origination is a general description of the process of entanglement in sorrow and samsāra and of the way out. Dependent origination has a concrete, goal-oriented sense in these texts. It is directly and uncomplicatedly connected to human life: how does this process of craving, grasping, and rebirth occur, and how does it stop? It outlines a natural sequence of steps. It has a broad temporal reference of succession, the relationship between the links being accepted as stated. Conspicuously absent from the Nikāyas are the two themes which dominate later Buddhist discussion of the chain: the analysis of the causality existing between the links and the temporal framework of the limbs as a whole. In fact, the three-lives theory may

not apply to those chains which begin with consciousness and omit ignorance and the tendencies. Only consciousness and name and form are mutually conditioning. Even in these early speculative Suttas, consciousness already has a special role. It is the base or the origin of the whole process of life, functioning when will and desire do, and producing the acquisitive interaction with the world of the senses which is sorrow. Closely linked with the teaching of soullessness, it has no substratum and no permanence.

Dependent Origination in the Vibhaṅga and the Sammohavinodanī

The Suttas apply dependent origination to existence in general, the Theravāda Abhidhamma, the Vibhaṅga in particular, applies dependent origination to states of consciousness. It shows that dependent origination has a much broader application, that it functions in all mental states and processes as well. The Vibhaṅga and the Sammohavinodanī offer an intellectual and conceptual analysis of dependent origination. The Sutta explanation that such leads to such, which was accepted as obvious, natural, and emotionally self-explanatory, is no longer adequate for the scholastics. They must determine precisely and exactly how such causes such; it must be specifically understood in each case. For, although in the Nikāyas, only consciousness and name and form are mutually conditioning, and the remaining links successive, in the Vibhaṅga, the links are in some cases both successive and simultaneous. This problem of the links' succession or simultaneity, or, in other words, their temporality or atemporality, passes without comment in the Vibhaṅga. It is as though the minute analysis of the causal relation between each pair of links has obscured a total picture of the process. This approach is taken to its extreme in

the Paṭṭhāna,⁵⁰ the final, massive book of the Theravāda Abhidhamma Piṭaka, in which the limbs of dependent origination are dismembered from the chain and considered in the twenty-four separate categories of the types of causes (paccaya).⁵¹ In the Theravāda Abhidhamma tradition, the analysis of dependent origination is inseparable from the analysis according to the twenty-four conditions. Although the Vibhaṅga does not expound this point at any length, it is nonetheless the intellectual basis for the division of dependent origination by tetrads.

The Paccayākāravibhaṅga is divided into two distinct sections, the section discussing the Sutta interpretation of dependent origination and that discussing the Abhidhamma interpretation. The Suttantabhājanīya section is brief, only four pages. With the exception of a few additional details, the definitions are the same as those in the vibhaṅga section of the Nidānavagga, on which the introductory material on the links was based.⁵² However, in the Vibhaṅga, the karmically-caused tendencies are classified in two ways, by moral character and by source. That is, the tendencies are meritorious (puñña), demeritorious (appuñña) or immovable (āneñja).⁵³ They originate from bodily, verbal or mental activity; this latter definition is the only one given in the Nidānavagga. The Vibhaṅga also defines name in the more common way as consisting of the aggregates of feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), and mental accompaniments (saṅkhāra), whereas the Nidānavagga lists feeling, perception, will, contact, and attention as its components. The last important difference is the definition of becoming. The Nidānavagga says it is threefold--becoming in one of the three realms, that of sensual pleasures, fine matter, or the non-material.⁵⁴ The Vibhaṅga makes a significant distinction between "action-becoming" (kammabhava) and "resultant-becoming" (uppattibhava).⁵⁵

The first is action itself, which produces the three moral categories of the tendencies; the second is its result, becoming in one of the three realms. The *Nidānavagga* definitions are simpler. The tendencies are merely bodily, verbal, and mental acts, becoming the appearance of a new life in one of the three realms. The *Vibhaṅga* definitions of these two limbs reflect its recognition of their similarity and its primary interest in states of consciousness. Actions in themselves are not as significant as the type of consciousness with which they are performed. Most states of consciousness of an ordinary person have a moral quality entailing a result, becoming. The *Vibhaṅga* also includes definitions of sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair.

Since the commentary on this section in Buddhaghosa's *Sammohavinodanī* is virtually identical to the *Visuddhimagga*, we will not consider it here at all, but save it for the discussion of the *Visuddhimagga*.⁵⁶ It is the *Abhidhammabhājanīya* and the *Sammohavinodanī* commentary on it that interest us here.

The *Abhidhammabhājanīya* applies dependent origination to the eighty-nine categories of consciousness as outlined in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*.⁵⁷ It presents varied applications and formulations of dependent origination, occurring in each single moment of consciousness, appropriate to the different types of consciousness, the different forms of existence, and the different relations possible between the links. The links which occur, and the definitions of them, vary according to the above factors. Buddhaghosa explains that the *Abhidhammabhājanīya* teaches causality (*paccavākāra*) occurring in a single thought-moment (*ekacittakkhanika*),⁵⁸ and that the *Suttantabhājanīya* teaches causality occurring over many thought-moments (*nānācitta*), for both are possible.⁶⁰ Dependent origination functions in each and every thought-moment, as

well as over many, successive thought-moments. The Sutta explanation applies only to dependent origination extending through time, whereas the Abhidhamma explanation is atemporal. The details of these varied chains occurring in a single thought-moment are sometimes obscure. We will follow the explanations given by Buddhaghosa, although these, too, are on some points, incomplete.⁵⁸ Our discussion will focus on the attempt to fit dependent origination into a single thought-moment, keeping in mind that the Kośa attempts the same.

A mātikā, or table of contents, precedes the application of dependent origination to each type of thought. It presents twenty-four variants of the chain. The first sixteen are the so-called four tetrads (catukka), each having four modes (vāra).⁶¹ The tetrads are: the tetrad of cause (paccaya), the tetrad of root cause (hetu), the tetrad of association (sampayutta), and the tetrad of reciprocity (aññamañña). Each tetrad has four modes, each mode presenting a different chain of dependence. The chain in the first mode is ignorance, the tendency, consciousness, name, the sixth base,⁶² contact, feeling, desire, grasping, becoming, birth, and old age and death. The second mode omits the sixth base, making contact directly dependent on name. The sixth base reappears in the third mode, here, however, dependent on name and form. In the fourth mode, there is again name and form, now the cause of the six bases. These four modes are the same in all four tetrads. Variants number seventeen through twenty-four present the chain in the same fashion as the four tetrads do, except that each variant begins with ignorance being dependent on each of the links, the tendency through grasping in turn. For example, variant seventeen begins, "Dependent on the tendency is ignorance, dependent on ignorance is the tendency . . . ," and eighteen: "Dependent on consciousness is ignorance,

dependent on ignorance is the tendency . . . ," and so on. Buddhaghosa calls these first nine links the nine basic constituents (mūlapada), and so there are nine systems (nava), one beginning with each of the basic constituents, and each system having the four tetrads and the four modes. The system discussed in detail in the Vibhaṅga and the Sammohavinodanī is the cause tetrad of the first system having ignorance as its root.⁶³

The four modes of dependent origination occur in different locations.⁶⁴ According to the Sammohavinodanī, the first, distinguished by the absence of rūpa and the occurrence of only the sixth or mind base, applies to all realms (sabbasaṅgāhika). It occurs everywhere that there is the occurrence of thought.⁶⁵ The second, which omits the bases altogether, points out a distinction to be made in the cause (paccayavisesa) of contact. The sixth base is not its only cause; the three aggregates beginning with feeling, in other words, name, can also be its cause.⁶⁶ The second mode also conforms to the Mahānidāna Sutta which omits the six sense organs from its chain. In fact, the Mahānidāna Sutta also omits ignorance and the tendencies, presenting a nine member chain. It is obviously the omission of the sense organs that is the correspondence between this sutta and the second mode, although it is interesting to note that the Mahānidāna Sutta, of course, has name and form causing contact. The third mode, wherein consciousness is the cause of name and form, and name and form the cause of the sixth base, refers to beings who enter another womb (gabbhaseyyakasatta). Specifically, it refers to the first two types of birth (yoni) in which only four, not all six, bases occur.⁶⁷ The sense organs of smell and taste do not exist in the Rūpa realm. Although the dependence of both name and form on consciousness is possible at conception in the twelve-limbed dependent origination occurring over three lives, the possibility of the same

dependence in a single moment is questioned.⁶⁸ Buddhaghosa explains that even if the rūpa arises in a different, earlier moment and lasts longer than one moment, consciousness is still its cause by way of post-nascent condition.⁶⁹ In other words, although consciousness arises anew each moment, it is still the cause for the preservation of the rūpa composing the body which exists throughout many moments.⁷⁰ The first challenge to the possibility of dependent origination occurring in a single thought-moment is answered by recourse to the mutual causality of consciousness and name and form. The fourth mode refers to beings of apparitional birth (opapātikasatta),⁷¹ or to the last two yonis, because the six bases always exist in them.⁷² Thus, the first two modes illustrate causality in the formless realm, where there is no rūpa. The third illustrates causality in the form realm, where, despite the existence of rūpa, there are only four bases. The fourth illustrates causality in the realm of sensual desires, where all six bases occur.⁷³

There are some general remarks which can be made about the links in these tetrads, based on the fact that they all teach causality as occurring in a single thought-moment. As we will see, the limbs, when defined as in the *Nidānavagga*, and the *Kośa*, cannot all occur in a single thought-moment. This temporal restriction necessitates changes in the definitions of the links. All four tetrads have sankhāra, in the singular, rather sankhārā, the plural, as in the *Suttas*. This is simply because many volitions cannot exist in a single thought-moment.⁷⁴ Name is included in all modes and all tetrads because it occurs in all locations and in a single thought-moment. Rūpa, on the other hand, occurs only in certain realms and over many moments.⁷⁵ There can also be only one contact in each thought-moment and therefore only the base or bases appropriate to it are named. A redundancy occurs in the first mode because of the

absence of rūpa and all but the sixth base. Saying "The sixth base is dependent on name" is identical to saying "Consciousness is dependent on the tendency," but they are nonetheless both stated in order to include all the limbs.⁷⁶ Sorrow (soka), etc. do not all arise in a single thought-moment, nor do they occur in every thought-moment, so they are not included.⁷⁷ Birth and old age and death are included in order to complete the limbs, although they do not consist of a thought-moment.⁷⁸

As for the four tetrads, they each teach a particular type of causality operating among the links. The first of the four tetrads presents the chain in its usual form. "Dependent on ignorance is the tendency . . ." and so on, according to the four modes. The second tetrad, the root tetrad (hetucatukka) states, "Dependent on ignorance is the tendency rooted in ignorance, dependent on the tendency is consciousness rooted in the tendency . . . dependent on desire is grasping rooted in desire."⁷⁹ The remaining links, grasping, becoming, birth, and old age and death are stated in the usual manner; the preceding is not the root of the succeeding. The association tetrad (sampayuttacatukka) similarly reads, "Dependent on ignorance is the tendency associated with ignorance . . ." Again, the relation of association stops with desire. The final tetrad, the reciprocity tetrad (aññamaññacatukka) declares, "Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, likewise dependent on the tendency is ignorance," and so on, the reciprocity stopping with desire and grasping.

Each one of these tetrads teaches a specific kind of causality existing between the links. The first nine links, the basic constituents (mūlapada), are singled out from the remaining three because only they function as the non-disappearance, association, and reciprocity conditions taught by the last three

tetrads. The root, association, and reciprocity tetrads teach dependent origination according to three of the twenty-four types of causes. The root tetrad states dependent origination by way of the non-disappearance (avigata) condition, the association and reciprocity tetrads, obviously, state dependent origination by way of the association (sampayutta) and reciprocity (aññamañña) conditions, respectively.⁸⁰ In "dependent on ignorance," only the general dependence of the tendency on ignorance by way of the six causes common to all associated dhammas is stated.⁸¹ However, "having ignorance as root" specifically teaches ignorance as the non-disappearance condition of the tendency.⁸² Analogously, the association and reciprocity tetrads specifically emphasize the association and reciprocity relations that connect the first nine links. Interestingly, the association condition refers only to mental phenomena, and the reciprocity condition links mental and physical phenomena only at conception, as does the non-disappearance condition. In addition, the last also pertains to mind-produced rūpa, as consciousness and the mental accompaniments are the non-disappearance condition to mind-produced rūpa.⁸³ They are causes operating primarily among mental phenomena. Therefore, in the third mode of the association tetrad, in which both name and form occur, only name, not form, is associated with consciousness. Likewise, in the fourth mode, although the six sense bases are dependent on name and form, it says, "name and form are dependent on the sixth base," because name and form and the six bases cannot all exist in a single thought-moment.⁸⁴ Here, again, dependent origination is restricted by time, and is also accommodated to the doctrine of the twenty-four causes. As for becoming, birth, old age and death, they are not the roots of the following link simply because the non-disappearance condition does not exist between them.⁸⁵ If becoming were "rooted" in grasping, it would continue as

long as grasping did; the next phase, birth, would never be reached. There is no becoming at the moment of birth and no birth at the moment of old age and death. The last three links cannot be associated, as has been explained, because it is a condition existing only among mental phenomena.⁸⁶ They cannot be reciprocal conditions, either, as they have no fixed place of occurrence.⁸⁷

The last three links are also excluded from variants number seventeen through twenty-four in the mātikā, in which ignorance is in turn dependent on the links of the tendency through grasping. Buddhaghosa tells us that these chains teach the "wheel of causality" as it occurs in a single thought-moment.⁸⁸ There are, however, no systems beginning with becoming, birth, or old age and death because they are not causes of ignorance. In other words, ignorance can cause, for example, desire, or desire can cause ignorance, and so on. Ignorance is thus clearly not the sole beginning of the chain and has no single cause. This is not a relationship of simultaneity, however, as of consciousness and name and form. Rather, the same link occurs both as the cause of the chain and as a result in it. The restrictions of time also play a role in precluding a chain beginning with becoming. Becoming includes ignorance, so it would be equivalent to saying ignorance is dependent on ignorance, which is not possible in a single thought-moment.⁸⁹

The application of dependent origination to each of the types of thought outlined in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi follows the mātikā. The two works have the same structure except that the Dhammasaṅgaṇi begins with the good thoughts, and the Vibhaṅga with the bad, in order to conform to the limbs of dependent origination, which, of course, begin with ignorance. The Vibhaṅga begins, "Which states are bad?"⁹⁰ and responds,

At the time when bad consciousness arises accompanied by mental pleasure, associated with wrong view, having visible object, audible object, odorous object, sapid object, tangible object, ideational object or is concerned with whatever (object); at that time because of ignorance there is activity; because of activity there is consciousness . . .

and so on.⁹¹ This is the first mode of the first tetrad of causality, occurring at the time of the first type of bad thought. Following each statement of dependent origination, there is a series of questions and answers giving the definition of each of the limbs in that particular chain. These vary according to the modes of the tetrads. The Vibhaṅga continues, giving at length the sixteen modes for this first bad thought. Although all sixteen are also possible for each of the remaining eleven bad thoughts, only the differences are taught. After the bad thoughts, the good thoughts are considered, and then the indeterminate thoughts.⁹² Again, then, it asks, "Which states are good?," this time in order to teach dependent origination by way of inducement condition.⁹³ Next the indeterminate states, which can be either the results of good or bad roots, are also considered by way of inducement condition.⁹⁴ That concludes the Paccayākāravibhaṅga.

Three factors determine the changes that occur in the chain when applied to the different types of thought. The changes in the definitions of the links are determined primarily by the mode of the tetrad, as these refer to different realms of existence, having different mental and physical components. The changes in the links themselves are determined primarily by the type of thought, for instance, functional states (kiriyaḍḍhamma)⁹⁵ never have ignorance as a root.⁹⁶ Finally, some changes are determined by the fact of this being dependent origination occurring in a single thought-moment. For example, Buddhaghosa tells us that desire and grasping after sensual pleasures cannot

exist in the same moment, so grasping here means grasping after wrong views.⁹⁷

The links whose definitions change are: name and form, contact, feeling, grasping, birth, and old age and death. The definition of name is consistent, although form, of course, occurs only in the third and fourth modes. In the third mode, first tetrad, in "dependent on consciousness are name and form," name is defined as the feeling, perception, and tendency aggregates.⁹⁸ Form is defined as the arising⁹⁹ of the bases of the five senses¹⁰⁰ and as whatever other form there is which is caused by consciousness.¹⁰¹ In "dependent on name and form is the sixth base," form is defined as "that material quality depending on which mind-consciousness element exists."¹⁰² In the fourth mode, form is, in "dependent on name and form are the six bases," the four great elements¹⁰³ and the rūpa which serves as base for mind consciousness element, the hadayarūpa. These changes are logical; only that form which is appropriate to the realm and the preceding link is included in each definition. In the second mode only, which omits the six bases, the definition of contact is modified, in "dependent on name is contact," to read, "Excepting contact, name is the feeling aggregate, the perception aggregate, the tendency aggregate and the consciousness aggregate."¹⁰⁴ This is because contact itself is included in name, in the tendency aggregate, so that saying contact is dependent on name would be equivalent to saying contact is dependent on contact.¹⁰⁵ Note, however, that Buddhaghosa makes no comment about the appearance of consciousness in the definition of name in the second mode, in "dependent on name is contact." It occurs nowhere else in the Vibhaṅga as a component of name,¹⁰⁶ but is obviously required here by the omission of the six bases, which included mind base, or consciousness, among them. Feeling, as we have seen,

is threefold: pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent. It is also either bodily or mental.¹⁰⁷ The nature of thought as pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent is determined by the feeling with which that particular thought is associated. Every thought arises connected with either happy (somanassa), unhappy (domanassa), or indifferent (upekkhā) feeling.¹⁰⁸

Grasping means the grasping associated with wrong views, but not that associated with sensual desires, because desire and grasping after sensual desires cannot both exist in the same thought-moment.¹⁰⁹ For the same reason that contact was excluded from name, grasping is also excluded from becoming; since grasping is included in the tendency aggregate, it would amount to saying that grasping is dependent on grasping.¹¹⁰ The physical aspects of birth, old age, and death are omitted when referring to the arising and ceasing of dhammas.¹¹¹

As stated, the changes in the links themselves are determined primarily by the different types of thought. There are three classes of thought or consciousness, determined by their moral quality: bad, good, and neutral or indeterminate. The indeterminate states are either the results of good or bad karma, or the thoughts of an arhat, neither of which have any karmic result. Not all bad thoughts are associated with wrong view,¹¹² in fact, only four of the eight bad thoughts rooted in greed (lobha) are, and none of those rooted in hatred (dosa) or delusion (moha). Without wrong view, desire does not lead to grasping.¹¹³ Instead, it leads to decision.¹¹⁴ Decision is likened to grasping, as both are strong movements towards an object.¹¹⁵ In those bad thoughts accompanied by sadness (domanassa), which are the two rooted in hatred, not desire, but repugnance (paṭigha) arises from feeling. Desire and repugnance are similar in that they are both strong defilements.¹¹⁶ Naturally, grasping

does not arise from repugnance, once again, decision does. However, the eleventh type of bad thought is associated with doubt (vicikicchā). Obviously, feeling would in that case lead neither to desire nor to repugnance, it merely leads to doubt, from which grasping cannot arise. The place of grasping is omitted entirely.¹¹⁷ Distraction or restlessness (uddhacca), with which the final type of bad thought is associated and which arises from feeling in this chain, does not prevent the arising of decision. So the chain in this last case reads feeling-distraction-decision-becoming.¹¹⁸

As for the good thoughts,¹¹⁹ they can have either the roots of good or ignorance as their cause. When these twenty-one types of thought have the roots of good as their condition, the chain of dependent origination begins, "Dependent on the good roots are the karmically-caused tendencies."¹²⁰ This is because it is not possible for good tendencies to exist along with ignorance in a single thought-moment, but only over the course of time.¹²¹ In fact, ignorance does not appear at all in these chains, because the nature of the chain is determined by the type of thought in which it occurs. This, in turn, necessitates other changes in the links. Obviously, desire and grasping do not exist in good states founded on the roots of good. Feeling here leads not to desire, but to faith (pasāda), and faith to decision. Note, however, that even in these "positive" chains, the outcome is always becoming, birth, old age, and death. Ignorance can be the first member of the chain in good thoughts when it is the inducement (upanissaya) condition for those good states.¹²² Buddhaghosa explains that those who have not renounced ignorance attempt to do so by striving for good and by cultivating the supramundane.¹²³ Once again, faith and decision, not desire and grasping, occur in the resulting chains. That

ignorance and the good tendencies cannot co-exist in a single moment, but that ignorance could produce faith and decision in the same moment, seems odd.

The indeterminate states, on the other hand, never have a system with ignorance as the beginning,¹²⁴ although the good and bad roots sometimes operate in them as the inducement condition for good and bad results, respectively.¹²⁵ In the first case, the chain for these states simply begins, "Dependent on the tendencies is consciousness" ¹²⁶ Nothing replaces ignorance or the roots of good here because these states occur automatically as the results of karma. In these chains, feeling leads directly to becoming. Desire, grasping, and decision do not occur in involuntary resultant sense consciousness. Furthermore, only the first two modes in any of the four tetrads are possible, because the last two include rūpa. Sense consciousness cannot give rise to rūpa.¹²⁷ Here we see the accommodation of the doctrine of dependent origination not to a temporal restriction, but to that of a competing philosophical classification. The Theravāda school lists eighty-nine classes of consciousness. Dependent origination is supposed to operate in them all, but here especially we can see the inconsistencies between the two. Dependent origination is therefore manipulated in order to fit. To conclude, in the other indeterminate states without root cause, only desire is missing; decision does occur. In the states with root causes, feeling leads to faith instead of desire. Thus, in the bad thoughts, there are five possible chains of dependent origination, in the good thoughts, there are two, and in the indeterminate thoughts, eight.¹²⁸

In the Suttas, then, the links of dependent origination are, with the exception of consciousness and name and form, successive, and they occur over a considerable period of time. They describe the predicament of human

life in a general way, and offer a solution. In the Vibhaṅga, however, the links can be prenascent, postnascent, simultaneous, or even absent, and they occur in a single thought-moment. They describe the possible "routes" of consciousness. As a result, the two present very different pictures of dependent origination. Yet, it could be said that the Vibhaṅga focusses on and enlarges on the crucial mechanism in the process, consciousness. It is consciousness that connects each moment with the next, and each life with the next. In fact, the connection of one life with the next is the same as the connection of one moment with the next;¹²⁹ the death consciousness, existing in one moment, gives rise to rebirth consciousness, existing in the next. The Vibhaṅga, then, zeroes in on a small segment of the chain, in order to examine its functioning in detail. Unexpectedly, it also shows its flexibility. The Sutta chain, by comparison, is relatively stable. The usual Sutta chain, that beginning with ignorance and consisting of twelve members, is actually, as the Vibhaṅga shows, of extremely limited application. It functions only in certain bad states in certain realms. In fact, the standard Sutta chain doesn't match any of the four tetrads.¹³⁰ The Vibhaṅga shows that there are a great many chains of dependent origination possible.¹³¹ Not all even begin with ignorance; they do, however, all end in becoming, birth, old age, and death. Even the mundane and supramundane states based on the roots of good, and the indeterminate states,¹³² based neither on ignorance nor the roots, and entailing no result of their own, lead only to becoming and decay. All consciousness is conditioned, and it is conditioned by the process outlined in dependent origination. Dependent origination thus operates in all types of consciousness, and in all types of birth. The twelve-limbed standard chain presents only one of many possibilities.

Feeling is second to consciousness in determining the direction of the chain. Feeling and consciousness are, of course, intimately related, as each type of consciousness arises associated with one of the three feelings. It is clear, however, that the experience of a pleasant or unpleasant feeling can lead to a reaction which alters the course of dependent origination. Desire, repugnance, doubt, restlessness, faith, becoming, and decision can all arise from feeling. Only when feeling is associated with ignorance does it lead to desire, and ignorance is associated only with certain types of thought. A thought dominated by a different feeling or a different attitude will produce a different chain. Although, as we have seen, there is a variety of limbs possible in the chain of dependent origination, feeling signals a primary break in that chain. In Frauwallner's thesis, it is the last link in the first of the two separate chains, one beginning with ignorance and one with desire, which have been put together to form twelve-limbed dependent origination.¹³³ Feeling is a weak point in the chain. There are many possible reactions to it other than desire. When desire follows from feeling, it seems to repeat, rather than to continue, the process described in the beginning of the chain. However, when repugnance or doubt, for example, follows from feeling, the arising of becoming dependent on it is less satisfactory. These other feelings do not always seem to be able to play the same role that craving does in leading to rebirth. In some cases, feeling itself leads directly to becoming. One might conclude that feeling, not ignorance, is the more important factor, for even when ignorance is absent, feeling leads to rebirth. In some chains, there is neither ignorance nor craving, the two "causes" of suffering and rebirth, and yet the presence of consciousness and feeling results in rebirth. When dependent origination occurs in a single thought-moment, feeling acquires a different status than it has when considered as a

collective phenomenon, the result of a lifetime. There can be only one feeling for each moment of consciousness, so the type of feeling which occurs in any thought-moment must correspond to the class of consciousness which exists. Feeling occurs as an essential component of consciousness whether or not ignorance exists.

There is not only a great variety of chains possible, but also a great variety of relations between the links. This raises the complex problem of how each link causes the next. The Vibhaṅga avoids the problem altogether, offering only presentation and definition. Unfortunately, the Sammohavinodanī has no comment on this point either. It merely tells us that each of the tetrads teaches dependent origination according to a particular type of cause, and by which causes each link is connected to the next. It does not mention the implications or the problems connected with its explanations. The Sammohavinodanī claims that the Vibhaṅga teaches dependent origination as occurring in a single thought-moment. Yet, it states that certain limbs cannot co-exist in a single moment, and that certain limbs are the pre- or post-nascent causes of other limbs, thereby seeming to contradict itself. These apparent contradictions stand without comment. The fact that some limbs are both successive and simultaneous does not seem to disturb Buddhaghosa. The only case in which this problem is hinted at is in reference to name and form. These two members of the fourth link require frequent qualification, since form does not occur in all realms, nor can it be associated either with name, or with the third link, consciousness, by the same causes that operate among the other links.¹³⁴

No matter what the alterations or omissions in the chain, the attempt to "fit" dependent origination into a single moment seems, in all cases, to fail. Twelve-limbed dependent origination, as explained in the Suttas, the Kośa,¹³⁵

and the Visuddhimagga, cannot be squeezed into one thought-moment. To attempt it, volition, contact, and feeling must all be reduced to a single occurrence, and sorrow and lamentation, and so on, must be excluded altogether. Rūpa must be excluded in some realms, as it cannot be associated with immaterial dhammas, and, in any case, it lasts longer than one moment. Name and form and the six bases cannot all exist in the same moment, nor can desire and grasping after sensual pleasures. The good tendencies cannot coexist with ignorance, nor can ignorance depend on ignorance in one thought-moment. Moreover, some of the limbs are overlapping. Name must be defined so as to exclude contact, which it otherwise includes, and becoming must likewise be defined to exclude grasping.

One must wonder, then, about the point of the Vibhaṅga. Is the determination of the various chains of dependent origination in the various types of thought merely an intellectual exercise, or does it really contribute to the understanding of dependent origination? Clearly, the methodology of the Abhidhamma requires completeness and we must sometimes wonder if its systematizing has overridden its meaning. Dependent origination, being a system of causality, is inseparably connected with the twenty-four conditions of the Theravāda Abhidhamma theory by the scholastics. Although Frauwallner was not speaking of the Abhidhamma, we are reminded of his contention that there were in Buddhism, from the earliest times, overlapping and competing doctrines whose incomplete reconciliation we can still see. In the Suttas, dependent origination competes with the Four Noble Truths. In the Abhidhamma, dependent origination competes with and is assimilated to the doctrine of the twenty-four conditions. If each link of dependent origination causes the next, it must do so by way of one or more of the twenty-four conditions, as these are all-inclusive. Thus, the

interpretation of dependent origination in the Abhidhamma texts and commentaries emphasizes the analysis of pairs of links and their interconnection. The process of dependent origination is almost obscured by this minute examination of each link as cause, and then, surprisingly, clarified by the application of dependent origination to each type of thought. For then we see more than simply a "playing" with the concept, we see an expansion of its domain and function. Dependent origination is a process automatically occurring in all states and in all realms, except nirvāṇa. Its links may change according to these factors, but its operation does not, nor does its ineluctable outcome, renewed existence.

Buddhaghosa says that the Suttas teach dependent origination occurring over many moments, and the Vibhaṅga teaches dependent origination occurring in a single thought-moment. In both cases, however, there is no entirely satisfactory explanation of the temporality of the chain. Neither is without unsolved problems and contradictions. Perhaps looking at dependent origination as states of consciousness, rather than periods of time, is more helpful. I would suggest that it is also more accurate, for, after all, time itself is defined by reference to consciousness. We are talking here of "thought-moments," the period during which a discrete state of consciousness exists. Every state of consciousness is accompanied by the mental concomitants,¹³⁶ or auxiliary factors, some of which reappear as separate links in the chain of dependent origination. These links are both simultaneous and successive; they arise along with consciousness and arise again in the next moment as the results of that consciousness. They, in turn, may affect the next state of consciousness. Dependent origination can be visualized not as linear or circular, but as both at once, as a series of overlapping circles. More than one chain of dependent origination can operate at the same time, resulting in

interwoven sets of twelve, the links of each being successive, but existing simultaneously with the different links of another set. Looking at dependent origination in terms of consciousness also eliminates the tension between dependent origination occurring in a single thought-moment and occurring over three lives, since life itself is a series of states of consciousness, uninterrupted even by death,¹³⁷ in which this process of causality, with its many variants, continually recurs.

It is thus possible to conceptually reconcile the successive and simultaneous, the temporal and the atemporal interpretations of dependent origination by assigning the pivotal role to consciousness, and viewing dependent origination as a description of recurrent and interdependent states of consciousness.¹³⁸

The Abhidharmakośa and the Visuddhimagga Compared

La Vallée Poussin suggests that the Abhidharmakośa resolves these two contradictory views of the links of dependent origination as the "simultaneous coefficients of existence" and as "twelve successive causes" with its theory of static dependent origination "contrasted and combined" with serial dependent origination.¹³⁹ He quotes the definitions given in 3.21-24, admitting that they are "sometimes forced."¹⁴⁰ To my mind, however, the Kośa fails in this task of reconciliation whereas the Visuddhimagga presents a more successful accommodation of both views.

The Kośa and the Visuddhimagga basically agree on the characteristics of each of the limbs, and on many general divisions of the twelve as a whole.¹⁴¹ They both claim to present an explanation of twelve-limbed depend-

ent origination occurring over three lives. The Kośa contains in all three sets of definitions of the limbs. These are connected with its fourfold division of dependent origination into momentary, prolonged, serial, and static. The definitions given in 3.21-3.24 are those of static dependent origination. It teaches dependent origination as a successive series of states, each comprised of all five aggregates, and each labelled according to what is predominant at a particular time, applicable only to living beings in the realm of sensual desires. The second set of definitions is those of momentary dependent origination.¹⁴² In this case, it teaches dependent origination as a simultaneously-occurring complex of twelve factors, all associated with the commission of a murder. Prolonged and serial dependent origination seem to be secondary. In fact, the Kośa connects static with prolonged dependent origination, and momentary with serial dependent origination.¹⁴³ These two types of dependent origination are analogous. Momentary and static dependent origination both divide the operation of dependent origination into discrete time periods and serial and prolonged dependent origination both provide the connecting link between these discrete periods. The third set of definitions is incomplete, at least in this chapter of the Kośa. Only ignorance, name, contact, and feeling are discussed here. These discussions are largely opportunities to argue sectarian disputes, and are minimally connected with the earlier definitions. The discussion of ignorance argues the status of ignorance as a separate dharma and the definition of form includes a category peculiar to the Sarvāstivādins, non-indication. Contact, a limb which has up until now caused few problems, elicits a long discussion, again focusing on the question of its status as a separate dharma. Finally, there is an extensive account of mental feeling, which, it must be admitted, contributes little to understanding dependent origination.

The Visuddhimagga introduces its reader to the twelve links first in a "brief exposition," in which the etymological meanings, the characteristics, and the function of each link are stated.¹⁴⁴ This is immediately followed by a "detailed exposition" in which each link is explained at length.¹⁴⁵ Then, which of the twenty-four conditions operates between each pair of links is explained. The definitions of the links in the Visuddhimagga are essentially the same as those in the Nidānavagga and the Suttabhājanīya section of the Vibhaṅga, although more information is given here. For instance, Buddhaghosa gives both the Sutta and the Abhidhamma definitions of ignorance, the latter adding ignorance about the past, the future, the past and future, and conditionality to ignorance about the Four Truths. As for the tendencies, the meritorious, demeritorious, and imperturbable are defined as the twenty-nine classes of consciousness outlined in the Dhammasaṅgani: the eight good of the sensual sphere and the five trances of the form realm, the twelve bad of the sensual sphere, and the four imperturbable, or the trances in the formless realm. The other threefold classification of the tendencies into bodily, verbal, and mental is subsumed under this classification by moral quality. We should carefully note the definition of consciousness. The usual six kinds are further subdivided. Each of the five sense consciousnesses is twofold, either good karma result or bad karma result, giving ten kinds of consciousness. Mental consciousness is twenty-twofold: the good karma and bad karma resultant mind elements, the three mind consciousness elements without roots, the eight sensual sphere resultant consciousnesses with roots, the five of the form realm, and the four of the formless sphere. So, consciousness means the thirty-two kinds of mundane resultant consciousness,¹⁴⁶ occurring both during existence and at rebirth-linking. Name is the three aggregates of feeling, perception, and the forma-

tions; form is the four great elements and their derivatives. The six bases can also be further analyzed as thirty-two, one associated with each of the thirty-two kinds of mundane resultant consciousness. The six types of feeling become eighty-nine, if considered by association with the eighty-nine kinds of consciousness. The six kinds of desire become eighteen, as each can be desire for sensual pleasures, for becoming, or non-becoming. They become thirty-six when associated with oneself and with others, and one hundred and eight when associated with the past, the present, and the future. The four kinds of clinging are familiar, as is the division of becoming into kamma-process becoming and rebirth-process becoming. Birth is the period from rebirth linking until physical birth. Old age and death are self-explanatory. Thus, the definitions of the links of dependent origination in the Visuddhimagga are clearly within the Pali Buddhist tradition, incorporating well the complexities of the Abhidhamma.

There is a striking difference between the first set of definitions offered by the Kośa, those in 3.21-24, and those of the Visuddhimagga. These differences, I believe, sum up the reasons for the Kośa's failure to reconcile the successive and the simultaneous interpretations of dependent origination. These definitions describe the links temporally. In other words, the Kośa still defines dependent origination as a series of successive states, without resolving any of the problems connected with the temporality of the limbs, and, moreover, essentially eliminating all explanation of the causality between them. The Visuddhimagga, on the other hand, defines the links causally. Its definitions are those usual in the Pali tradition, given successively, in the anuloma order.¹⁴⁷ The ways in which each limb causes the next, virtually ignored by the Kośa, receive much attention in the Visuddhimagga. The temporality of the

links is secondary to their causality. The Kośa, then, defines the limbs as periods of time, the Visuddhimagga defines them as causes. Furthermore, the Kośa gives no additional explanation and makes no connection between the definitions of static or momentary dependent origination and the discussion of the individual limbs which follows. It fails to integrate or to even follow up these definitions in its discussion. Instead, the discussion argues sectarian positions. Not only does the Kośa fail to integrate the different sets of definitions that it presents, it also fails to clarify the different uses and meanings of "consciousness." As we will see, the fundamental definition of consciousness as the awareness of objects is expanded in the Pali Abhidhamma tradition to mean the continual, underlying stream of consciousness, called bhavaṅga, which determines the moral quality of a life and provides the connection between births, thereby ensuring the functioning of karma without a soul.

Despite the differences in the definitions of the individual links in the Kośa and the Visuddhimagga, there are many correspondences in the general divisions made among the twelve links. The Visuddhimagga concludes with these. There we find the divisions into the three times,¹⁴⁸ the four sections and twenty spokes,¹⁴⁹ and the triple round.¹⁵⁰ The triple round naturally explicates the concept of dependent origination as an ever-recurrent wheel.¹⁵¹ Most significantly, we also find in the Visuddhimagga the idea that the links of dependent origination are states, that each state arises because of particular causes,¹⁵² and that these states and causes are only representative, not comprehensive.¹⁵³ This is remarkably similar to the Kośa's concept of static dependent origination, which declares each of the limbs to be a state comprised of all five aggregates, named according to what is predominant, and giving rise to the next link.

Let us continue, then, with our discussion and determine why, despite the important overall agreements between these texts and their common intent, they differ so in their treatment of the subject and in their presentation of a satisfactory accommodation of the many interpretations of dependent origination. To do so, we must return to the Vibhaṅga. There, we saw that it was possible to reconcile many of the contradictory interpretations of dependent origination by viewing it as a process occurring in all consciousness. The Kośa's neglect of consciousness as the third limb of dependent origination is startling. There is little discussion of this all-important limb to which the Visuddhimagga devotes many pages. Consciousness is defined in 3.21c as the aggregates at conception. Furthermore, birth, defined as a new incarnation, is equated with consciousness in 3.24c. As the bhāṣya explains, "The limb which is called consciousness in this life is called birth in a future life."¹⁵⁴

However, the Kośa discards this definition of consciousness in its discussion in favor of the definition found at 1.16. There, consciousness is the "individual awareness of each object."¹⁵⁵ As Vasubandhu himself, in 3.36a, refers the reader to this definition, we must assume that he considered it a satisfactory definition of consciousness as the third limb of dependent origination also. That it is not is clear. For, in static dependent origination, ignorance and the tendencies belong to a past life. For consciousness, the first member of the chain occurring in the present life, to be the awareness of objects, is strange indeed. Even stranger would be this awareness giving rise to the psycho-physical individual, called name and form.

Let's see how the Visuddhimagga explains these links. As mentioned, it stresses the moral quality, not the origin, of the karmically-cause tendencies.¹⁵⁶ In other words, the classification of the tendencies into meritorious,

demeritorious, and imperturbable is paramount to the classification by means of expression, bodily, vocal, or mental. Then these first three types of tendencies are further defined as the twenty-nine volitions: the thirteen meritorious, composed of the eight good volitions of the sense realm and the five good volitions of the form realm, the twelve demeritorious volitions of the sense realm, and the four imperturbable volitions, which are the good volitions of the immaterial realm. This does not differ that much from the definition of the tendencies given in the Kośa in 3.21b, "The tendencies are the state of action in the past life," to which the bhāṣya adds that these acts are good or bad, etc. Once again, however, the Kośa fails to expand on this definition, thereby also failing to explicate the connection between the tendencies and consciousness. The Visuddhimagga's enumeration of the twenty-nine volitions by nature and realm clearly shows their connection with the resulting states of consciousness, as we will see shortly. The Kośa's definition of the tendencies as good or bad acts in a past life does not explain the resulting emergence of consciousness, defined in 3.21c as the aggregates at conception. We cannot see how this happens; the process is ignored. Yet, we should note that Vasubandhu says the tendencies are discussed in the fourth chapter of the Kośa about karma, although, significantly, no clear distinction is made between karma and the tendencies. Karma is defined as mental intention and it is mental intention that is primary; bodily and vocal action follow from it. These, in turn, can be indication or non-indication. Perhaps the Sarvāstivādins' interest in defending their concept of non-indication accounts for the definition of karma first by source rather than by moral quality, as in the Visuddhimagga. In fact, a good portion of chapter four of the Kośa is devoted to the exposition and defense of non-indication. In 4.45 we find the explanation of karma according to moral quality. The definitions are

disappointing to one seeking to understand the mechanism by which good, bad, and indeterminate acts produce rebirth. A good act is one which is beneficial and has a desirable result, a bad act is harmful and has an undesirable result, an indeterminate act is neither and has no result. Although the Kośa goes on to classify karma according to many other categories, nowhere is there a statement that this particular type of volition causes that particular state of consciousness.

This is precisely what the Visuddhimagga explains about consciousness. The third limb of dependent origination consists of thirty-two kinds of consciousness, all of them mundane and the results of previous volition. In other words, the tendencies and consciousness, as the second and third limbs of dependent origination, are intimately connected. The former is the development of the latter; tendencies are volitions, consciousness is the states resulting from them. As Tatia nicely expresses it, "Saṅkhāras (kamma-forces), as already suggested, blossom into particular psychic conglomerates or rather moulds. These moulds are called viññāṇa (resultant consciousness)."¹⁵⁷ Each of the five sense consciousnesses is twofold, as the result of either a good volition or of a bad volition.¹⁵⁸ Mind consciousness is twenty-two-fold: the mind element as the result of either good or bad volition, the three mind consciousness elements without root causes, the eight sense sphere consciousnesses with root cause as result, and the five material realm and four immaterial realm consciousnesses as result. The good volitions of the sense sphere condition the five sense consciousnesses with desirable object, the mind element with desirable object, two mind consciousness elements with joy and equanimity and the eight sense sphere consciousnesses as result. The five good material realm volitions condition the same five as result. As for the demeritorious volitions, they condi-

tion the five sense consciousnesses with undesirable object, the mind element with undesirable object, and the mind consciousness element with undesirable object. The imperturbable volitions condition the four immaterial consciousnesses as result.

Furthermore, these thirty-two kinds of consciousness occur in two ways, either during the course of an existence, or at rebirth linking.¹⁵⁹ As such, they perform two different functions. They cognize objects in a process (viññāṇa-vīthi) normally lasting sixteen moments, the different phases of which are explained below, and they compose the bhavaṅga, "the basis of individuality."¹⁶⁰ As the sense consciousnesses of a newborn individual mature, the process of cognition begins. The sense consciousnesses perform their respective functions with the appropriate object, desirable or undesirable. Then the mind element, either good or bad depending upon the object, performs the function of receiving,¹⁶¹ and the mind consciousness element performs investigation. As for the other nineteen types of consciousness, they perform different functions during life. The mind consciousness elements without roots, as results of good and bad, perform investigation, registration, life continuum, and death. The eight sense sphere consciousnesses with root cause perform registration, life continuum, and death. The five material sphere consciousnesses and the four immaterial sphere consciousnesses perform only life continuum and death. In every case, these different functions of consciousness have the same object.

What happens at rebirth is more complicated. There are, as stated, nineteen kinds of rebirth-linking consciousness. Naturally, however, rebirth consciousness occurs appropriate to its cause and the place of its rebirth. Therefore, if rebirth is effected by the bad mind consciousness element without

root cause, it takes place in the "plane of misery"--hell, the animal kingdom, or the realms of ghosts and demons. If the good mind consciousness element without root cause is the rebirth consciousness, rebirth takes place among defective human beings. The eight sense sphere consciousnesses as result with root cause effect rebirth either among good humans or the gods of the sense sphere. The material sphere consciousnesses produce a birth in the Brahma realms, and the immaterial sphere consciousnesses in the immaterial realm.¹⁶²

Rebirth consciousness can connect four kinds of existences. It can connect a happy existence to an unhappy one, an unhappy to a happy one, a happy to a happy, or an unhappy to an unhappy. There are further subdivisions in each of these four rebirths depending on whether the object of the rebirth consciousness is past, present, or neither.¹⁶³

As one approaches death, either the moral quality of his life (kamma) or the sign of it (kammanimitta) or the sign of his future place of birth (gatinimitta), occurs as the object of his consciousness. This then starts a process of consciousness (viññāṇavīthi) having that as its object, which ends with the arising of death consciousness (cuti). When that ceases, rebirth-linking consciousness, having that same object, arises, thereby effecting the beginning of a new bhavaṅga in the sphere appropriate to its causes. Buddhaghosa stresses the lack of a transmigrator in the process.

So it is a mere material and immaterial state, arising when it has obtained its conditions, that is spoken of, saying that it comes into the next becoming; it is not a lasting being, not a soul. And it has neither transmigrated from the past becoming nor yet is it manifested here without cause from that.¹⁶⁴

What is described by the death-rebirth process is instead a "stream of continuity"¹⁶⁵ in which there is neither identity nor difference, like an echo, or a

mirror reflection. The process which occurs in every moment of consciousness during an existence is exactly the same process which effects rebirth.

Buddhaghosa has done a thorough job of explaining dependent origination, and, in particular, the pivotal role that consciousness plays in it. The types of volitions and the types of consciousness which they cause are clearly set out. The functions of consciousness throughout life, and also at its end, are comprehensively explained. The connection between consciousness in this life and rebirth in the next is no longer a mystery. Above all, he has accomplished this remaining true to the Sutta teachings on dependent origination, and yet incorporating the Abhidhamma complexities. He has integrated the twelve-linked Sutta chain with the twenty-four Abhidhamma conditions. More importantly, he has explained a process which is applicable to one thought or to three lives. By defining the links as causes, and consciousness as the central link, he has not been trapped by the problem of time. Furthermore, his explanation of consciousness and life has updated the Sutta teachings on dependent origination as anattā. Nowhere is a "soul" necessary for the process to operate.

The Kośa, on the other hand, as we have seen, defines consciousness in 3.21c, as the aggregates at conception, and at 1.16 as the awareness of each and every object. From the preceding exposition of the Visuddhimagga, we can see that these definitions are not necessarily at odds. Consciousness is, of course, always the awareness of an object; the consciousness which effects rebirth has as its object the future birth. The shortcomings in the Kośa's explanation of dependent origination are often thus attributable to a failure to integrate different aspects of a subject, or to completely explain the details of a definition or process. There may also be another reason for the Kośa's neglect of this role of the consciousness limb. The Sarvāstivādins accepted the exis-

tence of the gandharva, or intermediate being (antarābhava).¹⁶⁶ This being, they said, existed between the moment of death and the moment of rebirth. According to the Visuddhimagga, there is no such time, death consciousness leads directly to rebirth consciousness. The Sarvāstivādins deny that the gandharva is an ātman,¹⁶⁷ or that the aggregates transmigrate, but the need for the gandharva is obscure. The explanation of the process of consciousness and rebirth already exists without recourse to a concept that dangerously undermines the doctrine of anattā. That explanation is found in the theory of bhavaṅga, or life continuum, mentioned earlier as one of the fourteen functions of consciousness according to the Visuddhimagga. Bhavaṅga is the ". . . passive state of mind, when it is having its own course, undisturbed by any kind of impression, either objective or ideational."¹⁶⁸ It is the fundamental mode of occurrence of consciousness; at rebirth, it is the paṭisandhi or linking consciousness, during life, it is the underlying recurrent base, and at death, it is the cuti, or final moment of consciousness in life, giving rise to the paṭisandhi of the succeeding life. It has the same object in all these phases. It is an unbroken chain of identical states of consciousness, thus explaining the continuity between lives in the same way as the continuity between moments. The theory of bhavaṅga in the Visuddhimagga complements and expands its explanation of dependent origination. In the Kośa, however, bhavaṅga merely refers to the limbs of dependent origination. In contrast to the many occurrences of bhavaṅga in the Visuddhimagga, there are only two in the Kośa.¹⁶⁹ One, in chapter three and included in the translation on page 170, refers to the limbs of dependent origination as the "factors of existence," and the other, in the possibly spurious chapter nine, states that the aggregates, spheres, and components are among the twelve "members of existence." Although Haldar suggests that

the Kośa accepted the Theravada theory of bhavaṅga,¹⁷⁰ there is no evidence that it did so. In fact, its acceptance of the gandharva makes it unlikely. Although as La Vallée Poussin points out,¹⁷¹ there is no direct connection made in the Kośa between the gandharva and dependent origination, it is not impossible nor unjustifiable to speculate about the gandharva's effect on the chain. It does, after all, usurp the role of consciousness in the process of rebirth. At the same time, it invalidates the identity between consciousness occurring throughout life and consciousness occurring at rebirth. Bhavaṅga and the gandharva are alternate explanations of rebirth, the latter conflicting more seriously with fundamental Buddhist teachings and superfluous to the process described in dependent origination.

There is another fundamental aspect of Buddhist exegesis which has not yet been mentioned in this discussion. That is the principle referred to earlier in connection with the word "ābhiprāyika,"¹⁷² the principle that there are different levels of teaching in Buddhism. The problem is explicitly addressed in the Kośa at 3.25B¹⁷³ with the question why the Sūtras and the Abhidharma define dependent origination differently. The Sūtras say that dependent origination is the chain of twelve links, the Abhidharma that it is all conditioned dharmas. The response is that the Sūtra teaching is suggestive (ābhiprāyika). Its intent is to end misconceptions about the past, the present, and the future (3.25c-d), and about the existence of an "I" in any of these periods; therefore, it teaches only twelve-limbed dependent origination as applying to living beings. Yet the intent to illustrate that there is no permanent self does not preclude the suggestion, which will be understood by those with greater insight, that there is no permanence at all. The Vibhaṅga exemplifies this teaching by listing the chains of dependent origination that arise with every thought. Although the Theravāda

Abhidhamma tradition does not develop the idea of Emptiness (śūnyatā)¹⁷⁴ from these teachings, clearly the exposition of dependent origination as found in the Vibhaṅga, the Sammohavinodanī, and even the Visuddhimagga is more complex and more profound than Mahāyāna critics charge.

Conclusion

Our premise in this chapter has been that many of the temporal problems in the interpretation of dependent origination can be reconciled by emphasizing the role of the consciousness limb. We showed that even the Suttas recognized its paramount importance. In fact, in the Mahāpadāna and Mahānidāna Suttas, it is the last limb, or the "final" cause to which birth, suffering, and death are traced. The absence of the two limbs belonging to a previous existence limits the chain to the present life, precluding the possibility of the three-lives theory. It does not, however, eliminate the temporal problems altogether. For consciousness must exist simultaneously with the other limbs, as ignorance must in the twelve-limbed chain. The chain is, however, presented as successive links; only consciousness and name and form are mutually conditioning. These two links are significantly described in the Mahānidāna Sutta as the totality of human life. In the Suttas we have looked at, consciousness functions much as the ego does. Nourished by the self-centered interaction with the world of sense consciousness and sensual pleasure, it, in turn, creates the world of our perceptions and experiences. There is no eternal, immutable soul behind it. Consciousness and name and form, being the "extent" of human life, leave no room and no role for a soul. Consciousness, then, is the most important link, for

it is because of, or even, within consciousness, that this process of interaction with the world, which results in its own perpetuation, occurs.

The Vibhaṅga exalts consciousness to a cosmological structure. It develops one theme found in the Suttas, that there are many chains of dependent origination possible, and introduces one missing in them, that the links are joined one to the next by specific types of causes.

The type of consciousness determines the total number of links and which of the links appear in the chain. The fact that this is dependent origination occurring in states of consciousness adds a further restriction-- the chain must occur within a single thought-moment. As we saw, the manipulations performed on the chain because of these restrictions leave it bearing little resemblance to the Sutta chains. They also seem to compound the temporal problems, as many of the links cannot occur simultaneously. Thus, we learn that twelve-limbed dependent origination is only one possible chain, operating under specific conditions, and that there are numerous other chains occurring under different conditions. The type of consciousness determines the members of the chain. Some links, for instance, feeling, occur simultaneously with consciousness, as one of its inseparable mental accompaniments, and also successively, as a link in the chain of dependent origination arising within that state of consciousness. We concluded that the successive and the simultaneous interpretations of dependent origination can be reconciled by viewing it as a description of recurrent and interdependent states of consciousness, the very same process occurring in each single moment and also between lives.

In the Kośa and the Visuddhimagga we saw the attempt to integrate the standard twelve-member chain spanning three lives into two different, fully-

developed schools of philosophy, each containing other doctrines both complementing and competing with dependent origination. In the Kośa, the problem of time is explicitly addressed by the fourfold division of dependent origination into static, serial, momentary, and prolonged. In the Visuddhimagga, the problem of time is implicit, intimately connected to the enigma at the heart of dependent origination-- how do volition and consciousness cause rebirth? We concluded, however, that the Visuddhimagga presented a more internally consistent system than the Kośa and a more satisfactory resolution of the problems connected with dependent origination. This is because the Visuddhimagga concentrates on those links crucial to the rebirth process: the tendencies, consciousness, and name and form. They are defined as causes and results, not as states or periods of time, as in the Kośa. The mechanism whereby the tendencies "blossom" into consciousness and consciousness joins name and form to experience life in the appropriate realm is thoroughly explained. The Visuddhimagga, in all its detail, teaches the very same theme found in the Mahānidāna Sutta, that consciousness and name and form are the extent of human life. Furthermore, the Theravāda tradition developed consciousness into both a cosmological structure and a cognitive process. The process which occurs each and every moment as cognition is the same process which necessitates and effects rebirth at the end of life. The discrepancies between the simultaneous and the successive, the momentary and the three-lives interpretations of dependent origination are largely resolved by an expanded and comprehensive definition of consciousness as the essential constituent of life, both the cause and the result of renewed existence.

The Kośa, on the other hand, offers two distinct interpretations of dependent origination and two definitions of consciousness. Dependent

origination is either serial or simultaneous; consciousness is either the start of a new life or the awareness of individual objects. Challenging La Vallée Poussin's suggestion that the Kośa has reconciled the successive and the simultaneous interpretations of dependent origination, we have shown that the two sets of definitions stand unconnected to each other or to the discussion in the Kośa as a whole. The definition and role of consciousness, which, as we have seen, can be used to accommodate these two views, remain obscure in the Kośa. The two definitions are essentially the same two roles the Visuddhimagga assigns to consciousness: the cognitive process and rebirth-linking. In the Kośa, however, there is no explanation of the functions of consciousness which encompasses both these roles. Furthermore, theories such as that of the gandharva, compete with, rather than complement, the role of consciousness. As for the links of dependent origination, they are defined as periods of time in the static interpretation, leaving the problems of causality unsolved. In the momentary interpretation, the twelve links are individually defined and merely claimed to occur in a single moment, although no explanation is given. As we saw in the Vibhaṅga, the standard twelve links cannot occur in one moment. The Kośa, then, contains many of the same ideas that the Visuddhimagga does, but it does not present a comprehensive philosophical framework within which they can operate. It does, however, offer much information on the particulars of the Sarvāstivādin doctrines, and how they affect the interpretation of this central Buddhist teaching. It also shows that despite sectarian differences, there seems to have been a common tradition of interpretation about dependent origination. Most important, the sources we have looked at in this chapter all show that the Hīnayāna interpretation of dependent origination was by no means simplistic.

Notes

¹ La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes, pp. 40-43. Also see pp. 65-7 of chapter three.

² Ibid., p. 40.

³ The Śālistamba Sūtra, (see Théorie des douze causes, pp. 68-90 and N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Ārya Śālistamba Sūtra (pp. 1-19), which La Vallée Poussin believed was the source of the Hindu philosophers' knowledge of dependent origination (p. 69), divided dependent origination into internal (ādhyātmika) and external (bāhya) dependent origination. (p. 73) It also divides it into two again by dependence on cause (hetu) and on condition (paccaya). Thus, there results the dependence on cause of external dependent origination, defined as all the stages of the development of a seed into a fruit, and the dependence on conditions of external dependent origination, defined as the coming together of the six elements necessary for the seed's germination, earth, water, fire, wind, space, and temperature. Internal dependent origination, in turn, also occurs dependent on cause, which is defined as the twelve links of dependent origination in anuloma sequence, and dependent on conditions, defined again as the coming together of the six elements, in this instance, earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness. There is then an analogy drawn between internal and external dependent origination. The seed of consciousness, planted in the field of karma, watered by desire, and scattered by ignorance, produces the sprout of name and form. (p. 84) Dependent origination is thus a process that is applicable to the entire universe, both animate and inanimate, operating in a similar fashion in each sphere. The Kośa mentions that dependent origination can either be considered as applying to living beings (sattvākhya) or to both living beings and non-living things (asattvākhya), and restricts its teaching to living beings. (3.25b)

⁴ See the translation, pp. 164-5.

⁵ K. R. Norman, Pāli Literature: Including the Canonical Literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of all the Hīnayāna Schools of Buddhism (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983), p. 120.

⁶ A translation of the Vibhaṅga was published by the Pali Text Society in 1969 under the title The Book of Analysis (Vibhaṅga), trans. by Pathamakyaw Ashin Thittila (London: Luzac and Co., 1969). K. R. Norman, Pāli Literature, footnotes (p. 122) a translation of the Sammohavinodanī, entitled The Dispeller

of Delusion, "to appear in 1983," by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, also to be published by the Pali Text Society, but it has not yet appeared.

7 There are a few general remarks about the Abhidhamma interpretation of dependent origination made in the Introduction to The Book of Analysis, pp. xxxiv-xxxvii and in the Appendix to Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, which is an essay on dependent origination based primarily on the Visuddhimagga, pp. 139-159.

8 The most significant differences between the texts of the Suttanta-bhājanīya of the Sammohavinodanī, ed. by A.P. Buddhadatta Thero (London: Oxford University Press, 1923) and chapter seventeen of the Visuddhimagga are the following: the Sammohavinodanī lacks the introduction found in the Visuddhimagga, in which the definition of the term "paṭiccasamuppāda" is discussed and the Sammohavinodanī also lacks the presentation of the twenty-four paccayas found in the Visuddhimagga. On the other hand, the Sammohavinodanī has a longer "detailed exposition" of ignorance and the saṅkhāras. There are other, briefer differences between the two texts, usually only a matter of a few sentences or paragraphs. Nowhere, however, do the differences indicate a significant difference in the meaning of the text. This seems to be an unusual case, as K. R. Norman makes the point that generally in the Abhidhamma commentaries, Buddhaghosa avoids repetition of subjects already discussed in the Nikāya commentaries or the Visuddhimagga, referring the reader to them instead. (p. 123)

9 ERE, vol. 9-10, pp. 672-3.

10 T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha (London: Luzac and Co., 1951), pp. 23-4. For the Pali, see Bhikkhu Kashyap, the Dīghanikāya (Bihar Gov't.: Pāli Publication Board, 1958), pp. 25-6.

11 Ibid., p. 26.

12 Ibid., p. 27.

13 Ibid., p. 27-8.

14 See chapter 3, pp. 76-8, about Lamotte's conclusions regarding the doctrinal significance of the relationship between the Four Truths and dependent origination and the meaning of enlightenment.

15 See footnote 1, p. 26 of Dialogues.

- 16 Dialogues, p. 24.
- 17 Ibid., p. 27.
- 18 See Masuda, pp. 28-9, 47 and 61 for those schools which maintained the eternality of dependent origination, and the Kathāvatthu VI. 2, where the idea that each of the links is eternal is rejected.
- 19 Dialogues, p. 51.
- 20 Ibid., p. 55, footnote 1.
- 21 Dialogues, p. 55; Kashyap, p. 47. Also see the discussion of Nakamura's article on pp. 74-6 of chapter 3.
- 22 See pp. 298-9.
- 23 Dialogues, p. 59; Kashyap, p. 50; Abhidharmakośa, 3.30c-d.
- 24 Dialogues, pp. 58-9.
- 25 Ibid., p. 59.
- 26 Ibid., p. 60.
- 27 Kashyap, p. 51, "ettāvatā."
- 28 Dialogues, p. 61. "In so far only, Ānanda, can one be born, or grow old, or die, or dissolve, or reappear, in so far only is there any process of verbal expression, in so far only is there any process of explanation, in so far only is there any process of manifestation, in so far only is there any sphere of knowledge, in so far only do we go round the round of life up to our appearance amid the conditions of this world-- in so far as this is, to wit, name and form together with cognition." There is a very similar passage in the Mahāpadāna Sutta, see Dialogues, p. 26 or Kashyap, p. 27.
- 29 See Dialogues, p. 42, where Rhys Davids writes, ". . . although the formula, as expounded in this Suttanta, ends in the usual way--'Such is the uprising of this whole body of ill'-- the burden of the Dialogue is in no way directly concerned with ill, pain, or sorrow."
- 30 Kashyap, p. 54, "parinibbāyati."

31 C. A. F. Rhys Davids, trans., The Book of Kindred Sayings, Part II (London: Oxford University Press, n.d.), p. 1.

32 The four sustenances (āhāra) are: material food (kabalinkāra), contact (phassa), volition (mano-sañcetanā), and consciousness (viññāṇa). These four are the "foundations" or "conditions" (Buddhist Dictionary, p. 5) for continuing existence. Food nourishes and sustains the physical body, contact causes feeling, volition produces rebirth, and consciousness supports name and form at re-conception.

33 The Book of Kindred Sayings, Part II, p. 9.

34 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

35 Ibid., p. 8.

36 Ibid., p. 23.

37 Ibid., pp. 23, 45, 49.

38 The Book of Kindred Sayings, p. 25; M. Léon Feer, ed. Samyutta-Nikāya. Part II, p. 29.

39 Kindred Sayings, pp. 25-7; Samyutta-Nikāya, pp. 29-32.

40 Samyutta-Nikāya, p. 30, "upanisā."

41 Kindred Sayings, p. 25.

42 Kindred Sayings, pp. 25-6; Samyutta-Nikāya, pp. 30-1.

43 See Kindred Sayings, pp. 45-7.

44 Ibid., p. 50. The same response is given in the Milindapañho to the question, "Are there karmically-caused tendencies (saṅkhāra) which are produced?" (See The Questions of King Milinda, Part I, trans. by T. W. Rhys Davids (1890. Reprint. New York: Dover Publications, 1963) pp. 82-3 and The Milindapañho, edited by V. Trenckner (1880. Reprint. London: Luzac and Co., 1962), p. 52.) Nāgasena explains to King Milinda that, "Where there is an eye, and also forms, there is sight, where there is sight there is a contact through the eye, where there is contact through the eye there is a sensation, where there is

sensation there is a longing, where there is longing there is a grasping . . . Thus is the rise of the whole of this class of pain." The Milindapañho, then, lists an eight member chain, omitting ignorance, the karmically-caused tendencies, name and form, and the six bases. Rather than following the anuloma and pratiloma sequences, however, it follows the general formula of causality. That is, after the above chain modelled on "When A is, B is," the same chain is repeated, modelled on "When A is not, B is not," "Where there is neither eye nor form there is no sight . . ." and so on. In the Nidānavagga, however, we have the same eight members, but there they are divided into two groups at craving. See discussion in text. The Kośa mentions this explanation of the arising of consciousness also, see 3.28a-b. In rejecting the analysis of "pratītyasamutpāda" as meaning, "the arising together of transient things, because of this or that complex of causes," Vasubandhu points out that the same interpretation of the word pratītya is impossible in the sentence, "Dependent on the eye and on forms arises eye consciousness."

45 Kindred Sayings, p. 50.

46 Ibid., p. 45. Samyutta-Nikāya, p. 65. Yañca kho bhikkhave ceteti yañ ca pakappeti yañca anuseti, ārammaṇam etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa tthitvā.

47 Kindred Sayings, p. 71.

48 Ibid.

49 The Nikāyas are collections of materials grouped by artificial or external criteria, such as length or subject. They contain side by side earlier and later materials, which can at best be arranged in a general chronological sequence based primarily on philological analysis. This makes the determination of an historical sequence difficult and problematic. The Suttas are not internally consistent either. As K. R. Norman remarks about the Mahāpadāna Sutta, "Although the inclusion of seven Buddhas and the other features suggest a late origin for this sutta, it is noteworthy that the paṭiccasamuppāda which Vipassin realises has only ten links instead of the more usual twelve in the form in which Gotama realised, since it omits the two ultimate links avijjā and saṅkhārā." (p.36) As for the doctrine itself, it is in the Nikāyas quite fluid. Although eventually the twelve-limbed chain becomes standard, it always remains flexible, as we will see in the Vibhaṅga.

50 Ñyānatiloka, Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, p. 94, says the complete text of the Paṭṭhāna in the Siamese Tipi ṭaka consists of six volumes

and 3,120 pages. Although he declares the Paṭṭhāna to be the work which "above all" (p. 142) expounds dependent origination, I have nonetheless omitted it from all but passing reference as its technicality and complexity require a study unto themselves.

51 On the twenty-four paccaya of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, see Nyaṇatiloka's Guide, pp. 97-118, or the entries in his Buddhist Dictionary.

52 See pp. 7-9.

53 For the definitions of these terms, see pp. 130-3.

54 On the three realms, see pp. 97-101.

55 Vibhaṅga, ed. by C.A.F. Rhys Davids (London: Henry Frowde, 1904), p. 137; The Book of Analysis, p. 182.

56 See pp. 322-3.

57 The Dhammasaṅgaṇi, translated by C. A. F. Rhys Davids as A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, categorizes all mental and material phenomena according to moral quality. In fact, its entire cosmology is based on states of consciousness. In the first book, entitled the "Arising of Thought" (cittuppāda), eighty-nine classes of consciousness are listed according to the realm in which they occur and their moral quality. Buddhaghosa also explains these eighty-nine kinds of consciousness in chapter fourteen of the Visuddhimagga, pp. 506-13 in Nyaṇamoli's translation, The Path of Purification, 2nd ed. (Colombo: A. Semage, 1964). These are the classes of consciousness which the Vibhaṅga takes one by one in order to examine the chain of dependent origination which occurs in each. The Dhammasaṅgaṇi and the Vibhaṅga are stylistically similar. The Dhammasaṅgaṇi opens with the question, "Which states are good?" (katame dhammā kuṣalā) and answers by listing the possible states and how dependent origination arises in each. As for these classes of consciousness, the chart provided by Nyaṇatiloka in his Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka (facing p. 12) is indispensable. Briefly, there are eight classes of good (kuṣala) consciousness in the kāma realm, the variables being that they are associated either with joy (somanassa) or with indifference (upekkhā), either with or without knowledge (ñāṇasampayutta, ñāṇavippayutta), and either with premeditation or without premeditation (sasaṅkhāra). In the rūpa realm, the five trances are good, as are their mental

accompaniments. The four trances of the arūpa realm are also good. In the supramundane (lokuttara) realm, the stages of the path leading to Arahatsip are all good. The twelve classes of bad (akusala) thought are limited to the kāma realm; no bad states occur in the rūpa, arūpa or lokuttara spheres. Of the twelve classes, eight are rooted in greed (lobha), and they, analogous to the good classes, can either be associated with joy or indifference, with or without wrong view (ditthigatasampayutta), and with or without premeditation. Two bad states are rooted in hatred (dosa); they may be premeditated or not, but they both are always accompanied by sadness (domanassa) and anger (paṭigha). The final two bad states, which are rooted in delusion (moha), are always indifferent, but may be accompanied either by doubt (vicikicchā) or restlessness (uddhacca). The last type of thought, the karmically neutral states (avyākata) are either themselves the results of karma (vipāka), which entail no further result, or "functional" (Ñāṇatiloka, p. 12) states (kiriya), which have no relation at all with karma. The latter are the mundane conscious states of the Arhat, grounded in at least two of the roots of good. (See Ñāṇatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, pp. 77-8). The results of karma (vipāka) can, of course, be the results of either good or bad karma. The results of good karma are the five sense consciousnesses, the mind element (manodhātu), and the mind consciousness element (manoviññāṇadhātu), with desirable objects. The mind consciousness element can be accompanied either by joy or indifference. The trances of the rūpa and arūpa realms, and the stages of Arahatsip can also be karma result. There are also the five sense consciousnesses, the mind element, and the mind consciousness element with undesirable objects as the results of bad karma. The karmically neutral states are the mind element, the mind consciousness element with either joy or indifference, the eight good states of the kāma realm, which in the Arhat are kiriya states, and the trances as practiced by an Arhat. These total eighty-nine. Rūpa is always indeterminate (avyākata see pp. 130-1). See Appendix II for dependent origination as it occurs in each of these types of thought.

58 A cittakkhaṇa, a thought or consciousness moment, is actually the time over which the three stages of the arising (uppāda), the stasis (thiti) and the dissolution (bhanga) of an individual consciousness take place. (Buddhist Dictionary, p. 34). The cittakkhaṇa is therefore not a single moment, but really three moments. Jaini ("Development of the Theory of the Viprayuktasamskāras," p. 547) points out that the Vaibhāṣika kṣaṇa corresponds to the Theravādin cittakkhaṇa, although the Vaibhāṣikas divide a kṣaṇa into four, not three.

About this, see p. 38, fn. 33. Also see La Vallée Poussin, "Documents de l'Abhidharma," in Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, vol. 5: 152-5.

59 The Sammohavinodanī, pp. 199-200. The Mohavicchedanī, ed. by A. P. Buddhadatta Mahathera and A. K. Warder (London: Luzac and Co., 1961), a commentary on the mātikās of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, written by Thera Kassapa, who lived in the Coḷa country of South India between 1160 and 1230 (Norman, p. 147), makes another distinction between the references of the Sutta and the Abhidhamma explanations. The Sutta explanation refers to all worldly dhammas, the Abhidhamma also refers to the supramundane dhammas (p. 144).

60 For instance, his explanation of the appearance of adhimokkha, decision, in the chain. On page 209 of the Sammohavinodanī, he says that adhimokkha occurs instead of upādāna in bad states not associated with wrong view, but this is contradicted by the Vibhaṅga, pp. 164-5, where the second type of bad thought, associated with wrong view, contains adhimokkha in its chain.

61 Sammohavinodanī, p. 200. See Appendix I for the table of contents to the Vibhaṅga.

62 The chatthāyatana, the sixth base, is, of course, the mind base (manāyatana). Ñyāṇatiloka (Buddhist Dictionary, p. 84), says it is "a collective term for all the different states of consciousness."

63 Sammohavinodanī, p. 220.

64 Ibid., pp. 200-1.

65 Ibid., p. 204. Pathamo vā sabbatthagāmitaṇ sandhāya vutto. So hi na katthaci cittappavattidese na pavattati.

66 Ibid., p. 203. Phassassa hi na kevalañ ca chatthāyatanam eva paccayo, vedanākkhandhādayo pana tayo khandhā pi paccayā yeva.

67 Ibid., pp. 204-5. Tatiyo purimayoni-dvayaṇ sandhāya vutto; purimāsu hi dvīsu yonīsu so sambhavati, tattha sadā salāyatanassa asambhavato.

68 Sammohavinodanī, p. 203. Tatīyavāre pana viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṇ ti suttantabhājanīye āgataṃ eva catuttham angaṇ vuttaṇ, taṇ ekacittakkhanikattā paccayākārassa idha ayuttan ti ce?

69 Consciousness and mental accompaniments that arise after rūpa are a post-nascent condition to that rūpa because they help support it. See Nyānatiloka, Guide, p. 104.

70 This conditionality is reciprocal. The pre-nascent physical sense organs, including the physical mental organ, are conditions for the consciousness which arises later. See Nyānatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, p. 104.

71 There are four possible types of birth (yoni). Those who are opapātika are "spontaneously born" (Buddhist Dictionary, p. 99), that is, they do not have parents, but appear in the realm of their birth full-grown. Gods and residents of hell are born in this way. The other three kinds of birth are: from an egg, from a womb, and from moisture. See Majjhima Nikāya 12.

72 Sammohavinodanī, p. 205. Catuttho pacchimayoni-dvayaṇ saṇḍhāya vutto. Pacchimāsu hi so dvīsu yonīsu sambhavati, tattha sadā saḷāyatanassa sambhavato ti.

73 Ibid., p. 204. . . . paṭhamakā dve vārā arūpabhava paccyākāradassanattāṇ vuttā ti veditabbā. Arūpabhavasmiṇ hi rūpena asammissāni paṭiccasamuppādaṅgāni pavattanti. Tatiyo rūpabhava paccayākāradassanattāṇ vutto. Rūpabhavasmiṇ hi sati pi rūpasammissatte saḷāyatanaṇ na pavattati. Catuttho kāmabhava paccayākāradassanattāṇ vutto. Kāmabhavasmiṇ hi sakalaṇ saḷāyatanaṇ pavattati.

74 Ibid., p. 201. Ekacittakkhaṇe ca bahū cetanā ca santīti saṅkhārā ti avatvā saṅkhāro ti vuttaṇ. The second ca must obviously be a misprint for na, a reading confirmed by the Mohavicchedanī, p. 145, which explains, "Ten' eva h' ettha 'Avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā 'ti avatvā 'saṅkhāro 'ti ekavacanena vuttaṇ, ekacittakkhaṇe bahucetanābhāvā."

75 The Mohavicchedanī, p. 145, says, ". . . etaṃ paṭhamacatukkaṃ . . . rūpaṇ chaḍḍetvā vutto; rūpassa sabbabhavāsādhāraṇattā, bahucittakkhanikattā ca."

76 Sammohavinodanī, p. 201. Kāmañ c' etaṇ sankhārapaccayā viññāṇaṇ ti etthāpi vuttaṇ, hetuphalavisesadassanattthaṇ pana angapunṇatthaṇ ca puna idha gahitaṇ.

77 Ibid. Sokādayo pana yasmā sabbe ekacittakkhaṇe na sambhavanti, sabbasmiñ ca cittappavattitthāne ceva citte ca na pavattanti, tasmā na gahitā.

78 Ibid., pp. 201-202. „Iṭṭijarāmarañāni pana acittakkhaṇamattiṇi pi samānāni cittakkhaṇe antogadhattē angaparipūraṇatthaṇ gahitāni.

79 Vibhaṅga, p. 139.

80 Sammohavinodanī, p. 202. . . . hetucatukkādīni tīṇi catukkāni avigata-sampayutta-aññamañña paccayavasena vuttāni. . .

81 The first nine links of the first tetrad, first mode are "associated" because they are mental; this would not pertain to all the modes. The association condition refers only to the four mental groups which are associated because, " . . . they are aiding each other by their being associated, by having a common physical base, a common object, and by their arising and disappearing simultaneously." (Buddhist Dictionary, p. 105 quoting Paṭṭhāna commentary). These six causes which all associated dhammas have in common are: co-nascence condition (sahajāta), which is a "condition in such a way that, simultaneously with its arising, also the other thing must arise" (Buddhist Dictionary, p. 103), reciprocity condition (aññamañña) which states that, all associated and conascent mental phenomena are also conditioned by mutuality (p. 103), foundation condition (nissaya), which refers to pre- or co-nascent phenomena which aid others "in the manner of a foundation" (p. 103), association condition (sampayutta), or the fact that the co-nascent and mutually-conditioned four mental groups are also related by association, as defined above (p. 105), presence condition (atthi), that is, any phenomenon whose presence is a condition to other phenomena is a presence condition (p. 105), and non-disappearance condition (avigata), which is the same as presence condition (p. 106). See the Kośa 2.34d for Vasubandhu's definition of association (samprayukta).

82 Sammohavinodanī, p. 205. Avijjāpaccayā ti ca eittāvataṇ sahaajātādi paccayavasena sādharaṇato sankhārassa avijjāpaccayo ti dassetvā puna avijjāhetuko ti eten' eva visesato avigatapaccayatā dassitā.

83 See Œyāṇatiloka, Guide, pp. 101, 107, 108-9.

84 Sammohavinodanī, p. 207. . . . saḷāyatanapaccayā ekacittakkhaṇe nāmarūpaṇ natthi. . . See text of Vibhaṅga, p. 142. The printed edition has saḷāyatana in all cases, with a note that two other manuscripts "revert" to chaṭṭhāyatana, the correct reading according to Buddhaghosa. Also see Œyāṇatiloka, Guide, p. 150, where various dependencies are possible between the six bases and name and form, but none that includes all six bases and name and form simultaneously.

85 Ibid., p. 205. Avigatapaccayaniyamābhāvato, abhāvato ca avigatapaccayassa.

86 Ibid., p. 206. . . . arūpīnaṇ dhammānaṇ rūpadhammehi sampayogo n'atthi . . .

87 Ibid., p. 206. . . . sappadesadhammo ca nippadesadhammassa paccayo hoti, na nippadesadhammo sappadesadhammassa . . .

88 Ibid., . . . puna avijjāpaccayā sankhāro ti ādinā nayena ekacittakkhaṇe pi paccayākāracakkassa pavatti dassitā.

89 Ibid., p. 207. Sankhārapaccayā avijjā ti evam ādisu pana vuccamānesu na koci bhavapariyāpanno dhammo avijjāya paccayo na vutto, tasmā apubbassa aññassa avijjāpaccayassa vattabbassa abhāvato bhavamūlako nayo na vutto. Bhavaggahaṇena ca avijjā pi sangahan gacehati . . .

90 Vibhaṅga, p. 144. Katame dhammā akusalā?

91 The Book of Analysis, p. 189. See Appendix II for the different chains of dependent origination which occur in the eighty-nine states of consciousness.

92 On the bad, see the Vibhaṅga, pp. 144-169, on the good, pp. 169-173, and on the indeterminate, pp. 173-184.

93 See Vibhaṅga, pp. 184-187. Sammohavinodanī, p. 211. idāni aparena pariyāyena ekacittakkhaṇe paccayākāraṇ dassetuṇ puna Katame dhammā kusalā ti ādi āradhaṇ. Tattha avijjāpaccayā ti upanissayapaccayataṇ

sandhāya vuttaṇ. The inducement condition is of three types: direct inducement, as greed is an inducement to theft, inducement by way of object, as any object can be an inducement to moral activity, and inducement by way of immediacy, as any state of consciousness is a condition to the immediately following stage of consciousness. (Buddhist Dictionary, p. 10)

94 Sammohavinodanī, p. 212. Idāni avyākatesu pi aparen' eva nayena paccayākāraṇ dassetuṇ Katame dhammā avyākatā ti ādi āradghan. Tattha kusalamūlapaccayā ti idam pi upanissayapaccayataṇ sandhāya vuttaṇ. Kuslavipākassa hi kusalamūlaṇ, akusalavipākassa ca akusalamūlaṇ upanissayapaccayo hoti. See the Vibhaṅga, pp. 187-192. The roots (hetu) ". . . are those conditions which through their presence determine the actual moral quality of a volitional state (cetanā), and the therewith associated consciousness and mental factors. . . There are 6 such roots, 3 karmically wholesome and 3 unwholesome roots, viz: Greed, Hate, Delusion (lobha, dosa, moha) and Greedlessness, Hatelessness, Undeludedness (alobha, adosa, amoha)."
(Buddhist Dictionary, p. 89).

95 On kiriyaḍḍhamma, see p. 343.

96 See Vibhaṅga, pp. 173-184, 187-192, and Mohavicchedanī, p. 146.

97 Sammohavinodanī, p. 208.

98 See Vibhaṅga, p. 147.

99 "Upacayo," Vibhaṅga, p. 147. "Initial arising," Book of Analysis, p. 192.

100 That the Sammohavinodanī fails to explain the Vibhaṅga in an entirely satisfactory manner must be admitted. This is an example of one minor inconsistency, for the third mode, in which this definition of rūpa appears, is said (Sammohavinodanī, pp. 203-4, see text p. 305) to apply to the rūpa realm. The sense organs of smell and taste do not exist in the rūpa realm, however.

101 Cittasamutthāna rūpa. Rūpa can arise through four causes: karma, consciousness, temperature, and nutriment. Nyāṇatiloka (Buddhist Dictionary, p. 140) defines consciousness-produced rūpa as bodily and verbal indication (viññatti, viññapti, see p. 118), but adds that this is a simplification and refers the reader to the Visuddhimagga, ch. XX. In that chapter, Buddhaghosa

analyzes the four causes of rūpa (see pp. 715-19 of Ñyāṇamoli's translation), explaining exactly which types of consciousness "produce" rūpa and under what conditions. Karunadasa (pp. 68-75, 112-13) also discusses cittasam-utthāna rūpa, stressing that the term does not mean the creation of matter by mind, but rather that some material dharmas are "given rise to by consciousness" (p. 68) or "set up or prompted by mind" (p. 112).

102 Book of Analysis, p. 193; Vibhaṅga, p. 147. This is the hadaya-rūpa or hadayavatthu, the physical seat of consciousness, corresponding to the sense organs as the seats of visual sense, etc. Although it is generally located in the heart by the Buddhist tradition, no specific location is given for it in the Paṭṭhāna, the first canonical book to mention it. See Ñyāṇatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, p. 54, Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, p. 277ff., and Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter, p. 62-6.

103 On the great elements, see pp. 115-16.

104 Vibhaṅga, p. 146, 150, 155 and 161.

105 Sammohavinodanī, p. 208. Tattha t̥hapetvā phassan ti idaṃ yasmā phasso pi nāma-pariyāpanno, tasmā phassassa nāmato nīharaṇatthan vuttaṃ.

106 It does occur, of course, as a component of becoming, which is defined as the four immaterial aggregates, Vibhaṅga, p. 145.

107 This division of feeling into bodily and mental is also found in the Kośa. It is really the same as the sixfold division of the Suttas, the feelings arising from the five physical senses all being called bodily.

108 See the Dhammasaṅgani, Book 1.

109 Sammohavinodanī, p. 208. Yasmā pana ekacittakkhaṇe taṇhāya ca kāmupādānassa sambhavo natthi, tasmā yaṃ ettha taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ labbhati, tad eva dassetuṃ dīṭṭhi dīṭṭhigataṃ ti ādi vuttaṃ.

110 Ibid., p. 208. Bhavaniddese ca yasmā upādānaṃ sankhāra-kkhaṇḍhe saṅghaṇaṃ gacchati . . . upādānassa upādānapaccayattaṃ āpajjeyya.

111 ibid.

112 See Āyāṇatiloka's chart.

113 Sammohavinodanī, p. 209. . . . ditthivippayuttesu tanhāpaccayā upādānaṇ n' atthi . . .

114 Adhimokkha, decision, is defined by Buddhaghosa (Sammohavinodanī, p. 210) as, "The mind settles on, becomes clear about an object because of it, it reaches a definite conclusion because of surety." Adhimuccatī vā tena ārammaṇe cittaṇ, nibbīkicchatāya sannitthānaṇ gacchāī ti adhimokkho. The Pali Text Society Dictionary (p. 30) defines it as "firm resolve, determination, decision," the Dhammasaṅgaṇi (pp. 4-5) as steadfastness, the being unshaken as a pillar. The Compendium of Philosophy, ed. and trans. by Shwe Zan Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids (London: Henry Frowde, 1910), pp. 17-18, further clarifies, "Adhimokkha presupposes a certain amount of hesitancy on the part of the mind whether it shall attend, or not, to a particular object out of many presented . . . It is the property by which the mind decides, or chooses to attend to this, other than that, in the field of presentation. It has nothing to do with judgment . . ." Although the absence of wrong view results in the absence of grasping, it is not so that the presence of wrong view necessarily results in the presence of grasping. For instance, see the Vibhaṅga, pp. 164-5, where the second, third, and fourth types of bad thought are all considered together. The second type is associated with wrong view, but the third and fourth are not. Nonetheless, the chain of dependent origination occurring in all three of these thought-moments has ". . . tanhāpaccaya adhimokkho, adhimokkhapaccaya bhavo . . ." Whether there are other factors operating here, or this is a more serious flaw in the Sammohavinodanī's explanation of the Vibhaṅga, I cannot determine.

115 Sammohavinodanī, p. 209. Tasmā upādānaṭṭhāne upādānaṇ viya dalhanipātinā adhimokkhena padaṇ pūritāṇ.

116 Ibid. Domanassa-sahagatesu ca yasmā vedanāpaccayā tanhā pi n' atthi, tasmā tanhāṭṭhāne tanhā viya balavakilesena paṭighena padaṇ pūritāṇ.

117 Ibid., Vicikicchā-sampayutte pana yasmā sannitthānābhāvato adhimokkho pi natthi . . .

118 See the Vibhaṅga, pp. 164-9 for the second through twelfth types of bad thought.

119 Buddhaghosa explains that good worldly dharmas are considered separately from good supramundane dharmas because the former are included in the Truth of Suffering and the latter are not.

120 For these good states, see the Vibhaṅga, pp. 169-173.

121 Sammohavinodanī, p. 210. Tattha yasmā ekacittakkhaṇe kusala-sankhārena saddhiṃ avijjā natthi . . .

122 See footnote 93.

123 Sammohavinodanī, p. 212. Yasmā pana appahīnāvijjā avijjāya pahānatthaṃ lokuttaraṃ bhāveti . . . avijjāvato yeva hi kusalāyūhanaṃ hoti, na itarassa.

124 Ibid. Sabbavāresu ca avijjāmūlakā nayā parihīnā.

125 Ibid., p. 212. Kusalavipākassa hi kusalamūlaṃ, akusalavipākassa ca akusalamūlaṃ upanissayapaccayo hoti. Ōyāṇatiloka's Guide, pp. 11-13, distinguishes those indeterminate states which have roots from those which do not. The roots, of course, are greed, hatred, delusion, absence of greed, absence of hatred, and absence of delusion. The five classes of sense consciousness with desirable or undesirable objects, the mind element with desirable or undesirable object, and the mind consciousness element with desirable or undesirable object, do not have root causes, nor do the mind element or the mind consciousness element accompanied by joy or indifference as functional states (kiriya). The results of the eight good states of the sensual realm and the trances do have root causes. The same eight good states as functional states of the Arhat also have root causes.

126 See the Vibhaṅga, pp. 173-184 for the indeterminate states.

127 Sammohavinodanī, p. 211. Rūpamissakā hi te, na ca cakkhu-viññāṇādīni rūpaṃ samuṭṭhāpentī.

128 In the bad thoughts, the chains, in addition to the standard chain, are: vedanā-taṇhā-adhimokkha-bhava, vedanā-paṭigha-adhimokkha-bhava, vedanā-vicikicchā-bhava, and vedanā-uddhacca-adhimokkha-bhava. In the good thoughts, the two possibilities are: kusalamūla-sankhāra . . . vedanā-pasāda-adhimokkha-bhava, and avijjā-sankhāra, etc. In the indeterminate

states, these are the chains: vedanā-bhava, vedanā-adhimokkha-bhava, and vedanā-pasāda-adhimokkha-bhava, each beginning with the tendency or the good roots, and the first two also beginning with the bad roots.

129 See in chapter three, pp. 83-4, Johansson's contention that rebirth and perception are the same process.

130 The fourth mode differs only slightly, it says sankhāra, not sankhārā.

131 We have already seen that even in the Suttas, dependent origination is not a frozen formula. See the comments about Nakamura's article on pp. 74-6 of the third chapter, and pp. 294 and 298-9 of this chapter.

132 There is one exception to these statements, the functional consciousness of the Arhat.

133 See pp. 72-3, and 92 of the third chapter.

134 Although name and form exist simultaneously in the realms in which they both occur, they arise simultaneously only at conception. They are, therefore, not sahajāta causes during life.

135 The Kośa, in the introduction to 3.25 (see translation, pp. 164-5), offers an example of twelve-limbed dependent origination as occurring in one moment, but this is nothing more than another set of definitions. It does not explain how this could occur.

136 See pp. 119-27.

137 This according to the Theravādin explanation. The Sarvāstivādins did accept the existence of an intermediate existence, see pp. 330-2 and the Kośa, 3.11-18.

138 Thus, Yamada's criticism that the Abhidharmists failed to see the reciprocal and simultaneous relationship existing among the links and instead developed only a theory of rigid and successive cause and effect (see pp. 78-81 of the third chapter) is not completely accurate with respect to the Vibhaṅga. The ideas of the simultaneity and interdependence of the links are clear, although not stated as such or thoroughly reasoned out. The examination of the chain in its anuloma order has not precluded these insights, nor has it contradicted the anattā doctrine. The Theravāda Abhidhamma interpretation of dependent origination is more complex and more profound than he states.

139 La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes, pp. 40-1.

140 Ibid., p. 41. The definitions appear on pp. 42-3.

141 There is another Pali work, entitled the Vimuttimaggā or the Path of Freedom, attributed to Upatissa, trans. by N. R. M. Ehara, Soma Thera, and Kheminda Thera (Colombo: Dr. D. Roland D. Weerasuria, 1961), which bears more similarity to the Visuddhimaggā than can be explained by coincidence. A comparative study of the two works by P. V. Bapat, Vimuttimaggā and Visuddhimaggā: A Comparative Study (Poona: P. V. Bapat, 1937) concludes, "That Buddhaghosa had Upatissa's book, Vimuttimaggā, before him and that he, taking the framework of Upatissa's Vimuttimaggā, amplified it with his scholastic erudition, and composed his work, Visuddhimaggā . . . (p. Iviii). The Vimuttimaggā contains many of the same analyses and divisions of the limbs that the Visuddhimaggā does, for example, that into the kilesa, kamma, and vipaka, the three times, the three junctures, the four sections and the twenty modes. (See Visuddhimaggā, pp. 578-81, Bapat, pp. 103-107, and Path of Freedom, pp. 259-268). This is extremely interesting, as these analyses do not occur, as far as I have found, in the earlier Pali literature, except the Paṭisambhidāmagga, ed. by A. C. Taylor, vol. 1 (London: Henry Frowde, 1905), which Buddhaghosa quotes, see footnote 149 below. The two authors drew on many common sources (Bapat, pp. xxiii-xxvi) which we can only speculate may have taught these analyses of dependent origination. I suspect that they were widely known, as the Kośa also teaches them. Even more interesting is an extended simile given in the Vimuttimaggā in which the limbs, in the anuloma order, are compared to: a paddy, a seed, a sprout, a leaf, a branch, a plant or a tree, a flower, juice, a seed again, and a sprout again. No similes are given for old age and death. One immediately thinks of the Śālistamba Sūtra, of course (see p. 337, footnote 3), although agricultural similes for dependent origination are common in other texts as well. The Vimuttimaggā definitions of the limbs also deserve note. The tendencies, compared to a seed, are defined simply as bodily, vocal, and mental acts, and consciousness, compared to a sprout, is defined as thought occurring at the moment of rebirth, as in the Kośa. Further, as in the Kośa, 3.21c and 3.24c, consciousness and birth are equated. Here they are both compared to a sprout.

Also significant, although unclear, is a paragraph which Bapat doesn't mention. In The Path of Freedom, immediately after stating that all of the defilements condition ignorance, it continues, "And again, it is likened to a single thought-state (?)." (p. 262) The text then describes the occurrence of all twelve limbs in a moment of visual consciousness, as the Kośa describes their occurrence in a single moment during the commission of a murder. It concludes, "Thus in one moment the twelvefold conditioned arising is fulfilled" (p. 262), but there is no further explanation. That the twelve members of the chain could

operate in a single moment, the theme of the Vibhaṅga, is evidently a familiar, although undeveloped, idea.

142 See pp. 164-5.

143 See the introduction to 3.25, pp. 165-6 of the translation.

144 Visuddhimagga, pp. 523-9: The Path of Purification, pp. 600-608.

145 Visuddhimagga, pp. 529-78; The Path of Purification, pp. 608-66.

146 Visuddhimagga, p. 545; The Path of Purification, pp. 626-7. These thirty-two kinds of consciousness are numbers 34-65 on Ñyāṇatiloka's chart. The supramundane consciousnesses are not included in the cycle of becoming.

147 See the Visuddhimagga, pp. 524-5 or The Path of Purification, p. 602, where it explains that it is taught this way in order to show the "laws of the process (of becoming)" and the "order of arising," which is evident in the emphasis on the death-rebirth link.

148 Visuddhimagga, p. 578; The Path of Purification, p. 669; Kośa, 3.20.

149 The four sections are: links number 1 and 2, 3-7, 8-10, and 11 and 12. Buddhaghosa explains in detail that ignorance, the tendencies, desire, grasping, and becoming are all past causes of present existence, which is composed of consciousness, name and form, the bases, contact, and feeling, and that present ignorance, tendencies, desire, grasping, and becoming are the causes of future consciousness, name and form, bases, contact, and feeling, which can all be termed "birth." Thus dependent origination has four sections, each containing five links, so it has twenty spokes or qualities (The Path of Purification, pp. 669-72). The same divisions and explanation occur in the Kośa (3.26-27), although more succinctly. Buddhaghosa quotes this analysis of dependent origination into four sections and twenty modes from the text mentioned above in footnote 141, the Paṭisambhidāmagga, vol. I, p. 52, see The Path of Discrimination (Paṭisambhidāmagga), trans. by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (London: Pali Text Society, 1982), p. 52. This text belongs to the Khuddaka Nikāya, although in form it resembles the Abhidhamma works, and is probably of a late origin (Norman, p. 87). We can fairly confidently say, then, that the Paṭisambhidāmagga was Buddhaghosa's source for this important and widely-known teaching about dependent origination, but as for the Kośa and other works which also teach it, we can only speculate.

The Abhidharmasamuccaya by Asanga, trans. by Walpola Rahula as Le Compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharma-samuccaya) d'Asanga (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1971), contains an interesting variant on the four sections of dependent origination as taught in the Visuddhimagga and the Kośa. In the Visuddhimagga, the four sections are: ignorance and the tendencies, consciousness through feeling, craving, clinging, and becoming, and lastly, birth, and old age and death. The first and third sections are both kamma process (kammabhava) and the second and fourth are rebirth process (upapattibhava). The Abhidharmasamuccaya groups the links in the same way, except for one. That one is consciousness, which is grouped along with ignorance and the tendencies as a "projecting factor" (ākṣepakāṅga). Again, in the classification of the links according to their impurity, consciousness appears along with the tendencies and becoming as the group of "impurity of acts" (karmasamkleśasaṅgraha). One would expect to find it under the category "impurity of birth" (janmasamkleśasaṅgraha), which includes all the rest of the factors other than the three which are "impurity by nature" (kleśasaṅgraha), that is, ignorance, desire, and grasping. This classification would then correspond to the threefold grouping kleśa, karma, and vipāka or vastu familiar from the Visuddhimagga and the Kośa. Consciousness is, as it were, "misplaced" by the Abhidharmasamuccaya. It is active, playing a role in producing the present life by being a past projecting factor of it, and in producing the future life by being present impure "act." The Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya ed. by N. Tatia (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976), emphasizes the close link between the tendencies and consciousness; the tendencies are the causes of the trace of consciousness because they nourish the seed of a future life. Consciousness, for its part, maintains the bonds of karma, and is included in the group "impurity of act" because it is the development of those tendencies. ([saṃskāraḥ] pratyayāśca bhavanti vijñānasya vāsanāyāḥ, āyatvā nāmarūpābhiniṣṭtaye bījaṣaṅgāt. vijñānam karmabandham dhārayati . . . (p. 32). vijñānasya karma[sam]kleśasaṅgrahanam saṃskāra-vāsanāprabhāvitatvādvijñānāṅgasya (p. 33). Also see A. Wayman, "Dependent Origination--the Indo-Tibetan Tradition," in Buddhist Insight: Essays by Alex Wayman, ed. by George Elder (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 163-92, esp. 180ff.

150 The Visuddhimagga, p. 581, says kamma, kilesa and vipāka; the Kośa says karma, kleśa, and vastu (3.26-27). The categories are identical, however.

151 Kośa, 3.27; Visuddhimagga, pp. 576-8, The Path of Purification, p. 666-8.

- 152 Visuddhimagga, p. 518; The Path of Purification, p. 593.
- 153 Visuddhimagga, p. 542-3; The Path of Purification, pp. 623ff.
- 154 See translation, p. 163; Pradhan, p. 132.
- 155 See translation, p. 252; Pradhan, p. 11. This definition also occurs in the explanation of momentary dependent origination, given in the introduction to 3.25.
- 156 See p. 322.
- 157 N. Tatia, "Paṭiccasamuppāda," Navanālandā Mahāvihāra Research Publication 1 (1956): 211.
- 158 Refer to Nyāṇatiloka's chart in Guide to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, facing p. 12.
- 159 Of these thirty-two, the two fivefold sense consciousnesses, the mind elements as good and bad result and mind consciousness element with joy occur only during the course of an existence with all five aggregates. The rest occur in three kinds of becoming, either during existence or at rebirth.
- 160 Tatia, "Paṭiccasamuppāda," p. 211.
- 161 According to the Abhidhamma (see the Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Anuruddha, ed. and trans. by Narada Maha Thera. 2nd. rev. ed. Kandy, Ceylon: Buddhist Publication Society, 1968, chapters four and five) and the Visuddhimagga (pp. 457-60; The Path of Purification, pp. 513-18), the eighty-nine types of consciousness (see footnote 57) have fourteen functions: rebirth, life-continuum or subconsciousness, adverting, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, body consciousness, receiving, investigating, determining, impulsion, registering, and dying. As Buddhaghosa explains, nineteen kinds of resultant consciousness can function as rebirth consciousness (paṭisandhi), and when rebirth consciousness ceases, the same nineteen arise as the life-continuum (bhavaṅga), having the same object as the rebirth consciousness. The life continuum continues to arise (nadīsoṭam viya) as long as there is no interruption. However, as the sense organs mature and sense objects are perceived, the life-continuum ceases and the mind element and the mind consciousness element perform the function of advertence (āvajjana), taking the sense objects as their object. Then, as appropriate, the ten kinds of profitable and unprofitable resultant consciousness occur as the five sense consciousnesses. This is immediately followed by receiving (sampaticchana) consciousness, which is the mind element, either profitable or unprofitable.

Then follows investigating (santīraṇa) consciousness, either profitable and accompanied by either joy or equanimity, or unprofitable. Then mind consciousness element without root cause accompanied by equanimity performs the function of determining (voṭṭhapana) the sense object. Determining is followed by impulsion (javana) which occurs six or seven times. The eight profitable, the twelve unprofitable or the nine functional sense sphere consciousnesses function as impulsion. (In mind consciousness, however, impulsion arises after adverting.) In the case of a great object, when impulsion ceases, registering (tadārammaṇa), occurs. The eight sense sphere resultant consciousnesses with the root cause or the three mind consciousness elements without root cause function once or twice as registration; their object is the object of the life-continuum. After registering, the life-continuum resumes and this process is repeated throughout life. The very last life-continuum consciousness is death (cuti), of nineteen kinds like rebirth and life continuum. Also see the entries in Nyaṇatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary, and Shanta Ratnayaka's article, "Metapsychology of the Abhidharma" in the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 4, No. 2 (1981): 76-88.

162 Visuddhimagga, pp. 548-51; The Path of Purification, pp. 631-5.

163 Ibid.

164 The Path of Purification, p. 638.

165 Ibid., p. 639.

166 See La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes, pp. 14-16 and 38-9 for his comments about this Hindu concept's ambivalent adoption by some Buddhist schools.

167 Kośa, 1.18.

168 Kashyap, Abhidhamma Philosophy, p. 2. Also see E.R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception, pp. 75-96, and the Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 265-7.

169 Akira Hirakawa, Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Part One: Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese. (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kabushikikaisha, 1973), p. 275; Visuddhimagga, vol. 2, Index, p. 740; LVP, vol. 6, index Général, p. 70.

170 A. Haldar, Some Psychological Aspects of Early Buddhist Philosophy based on Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1981), pp. 64-5. "The terms (sic) "Bhavaṅgacitta" does not anywhere

occur in the Kośa . . . but it may be inferred that the Abhidharmakośa accepted, among certain other points, the previously continuing ideas like Bhavaṅga and Pratisandhi and so on from the earlier Theravāda texts."

171 La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes, p. 39.

172 See pp. 65-8, 91, 166.

173 See the translation, pp. 166-8.

174 See the discussion of Yamada's article on pp. 78-81. Also see the Visuddhimagga, p. 578, or the The Path of Purification, p. 668, where Buddhaghosa explains that the "wheel of becoming" has a twelvefold Emptiness. Each of the links is void of permanence or selfhood, and so is Empty.

Appendix I

Mātikā to the Paccayākāravibhaṅga

Variants 1-16

I. Cause Tetrad

a. First mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, dependent on consciousness is name, dependent on name is the sixth base, dependent on the sixth base is contact, dependent on contact is feeling, dependent on feeling is desire, dependent on desire is grasping, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

b. Second mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, dependent on consciousness is name, dependent on name is contact, dependent on contact is feeling, dependent on feeling is desire, dependent on desire is grasping, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

c. Third mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, dependent on consciousness are name and form, dependent on name and form is the sixth base, dependent on the sixth base is contact, dependent on contact is feeling, dependent on feeling is desire, dependent on desire is grasping, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

d. Fourth mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, dependent on consciousness are name and form, dependent on name and form are the six bases, dependent on the six bases is contact, dependent on contact is feeling, dependent on feeling is desire, dependent on desire is grasping, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

II. Root Cause Tetrad

a. First mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, having ignorance as root, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, having the tendency as root, dependent on consciousness is name, having consciousness as root, dependent on name is the sixth base, having name as root, dependent on the sixth base is contact, having the sixth base as root, dependent on contact is feeling, having contact as root, dependent on feeling is desire, having feeling as root, dependent on desire is grasping, having desire as root, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

b. Second mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, having ignorance as root, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, having the tendency as root, dependent on consciousness is name, having consciousness as root, dependent on name is contact, having name as root, dependent on contact is feeling, having contact as root, dependent on feeling is desire, having feeling as root, dependent on desire is grasping, having desire as root, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

c. Third mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, having ignorance as root, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, having the tendency as root, dependent on consciousness are name and form, having consciousness as root, dependent on name and form is the sixth base, having name and form as root, dependent on the sixth base is contact, having the sixth base as root, dependent on contact is feeling, having contact as root, dependent on feeling is desire, having desire as root, dependent on desire is grasping, having grasping as root, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

d. Fourth mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, having ignorance as root, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, having the tendency as root, dependent on consciousness are name and form, having consciousness as root, dependent on name and form are the six bases, having name and form as root, dependent on the six bases is contact, having the six bases as root, dependent on contact is feeling, having contact as root, dependent on feeling is desire, having feeling as root, dependent on desire is grasping, having desire as root, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

III. Association Tetrad

a. First mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency which is associated with ignorance, dependent on the tendency is consciousness which is associated with the tendency, dependent on consciousness is name which is associated with consciousness, dependent on name is the sixth base which is associated with name, dependent on the sixth base is contact which is associated with the sixth base, dependent on contact is feeling which is associated with contact, dependent on feeling is desire which is associated with feeling, dependent on desire is grasping which is associated with desire, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

b. Second mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency which is associated with ignorance, dependent on the tendency is consciousness which is associated with the tendency, dependent on consciousness is name which is associated with consciousness, dependent on name is contact, which is associated with name, dependent on contact is feeling which is associated with contact, dependent on feeling is desire which is associated with feeling, dependent on desire is grasping which is associated with desire, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

c. Third mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency which is associated with ignorance, dependent on the tendency is consciousness which is associated with the tendency, dependent on consciousness are name and form, name is associated with consciousness, dependent on name and form is the sixth base, which is associated with name, dependent on the sixth base is contact which is associated with the sixth base, dependent on contact is feeling which is associated with contact, dependent on feeling is desire which is associated with feeling, dependent on desire is grasping which is associated with desire, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

d. Fourth mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency which is associated with ignorance, dependent on the tendency is consciousness which is associated with the tendency, dependent on consciousness are name and form, name is associated with consciousness, dependent on name and form are the six bases, which are associated with name, dependent on the six bases is contact which is associated with the six bases, dependent on contact is feeling which is associated with contact, dependent on feeling is desire which is associated with feeling, dependent on desire is grasping which is associated with

desire, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

IV. Reciprocity Tetrad

a. First mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, also, dependent on the tendency is ignorance, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, also, dependent on consciousness is the tendency, dependent on consciousness is name, also, dependent on name is consciousness, dependent on name is the sixth base, also, dependent on the sixth base is name, dependent on the sixth base is contact, also, dependent on contact is the sixth base, dependent on contact is feeling, also, dependent on feeling is contact, dependent on feeling is desire, also, dependent on desire is feeling, dependent on desire is grasping, also, dependent on grasping is desire, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

b. Second mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, also, dependent on the tendency is ignorance, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, also, dependent on consciousness is the tendency, dependent on consciousness is name, also, dependent on name is consciousness, dependent on name is contact, also, dependent on contact is name, dependent on contact is feeling, also, dependent on feeling is contact, dependent on feeling is desire, also, dependent on desire is feeling, dependent on desire is grasping, also, dependent on grasping is desire, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

c. Third mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, also, dependent on the tendency is ignorance, dependent on the tendency is consciousness, also, dependent on consciousness is the tendency, dependent on consciousness are name and form, also, dependent on name and form is consciousness, dependent on name and form is the sixth base, also, dependent on the sixth base are name and form, dependent on the sixth base is contact, also, dependent on contact is the sixth base, dependent on contact is feeling, also, dependent on feeling is contact, dependent on feeling is desire, also, dependent on desire is feeling, dependent on desire is grasping, also, dependent on grasping is desire, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

d. Fourth mode

Dependent on ignorance is the tendency, also, dependent on the tendency is ignorance, dependent on the tendency is consciousness,

also, dependent on consciousness is the tendency, dependent on consciousness are name and form, also, dependent on name and form is consciousness, dependent on name and form are the six bases, also, dependent on the six bases are name and form, dependent on the six bases is contact, also, dependent on contact are the six bases, dependent on contact is feeling, also, dependent on feeling is contact, dependent on feeling is desire, also, dependent on desire is feeling, dependent on desire is grasping, also, dependent on grasping is desire, dependent on grasping is becoming, dependent on becoming is birth, dependent on birth are old age and death. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

Variants 17-24

17. Dependent on the tendency is ignorance, dependent on ignorance is the tendency, dependent on the tendency is consciousness. . .
18. Dependent on consciousness is ignorance, dependent on ignorance is the tendency. . .
19. Dependent on name is ignorance, dependent on ignorance is the tendency. . .
20. Dependent on the sixth base is ignorance, dependent on ignorance is the tendency. . .
21. Dependent on contact is ignorance, dependent on ignorance is the tendency. . .
22. Dependent on feeling is ignorance, dependent on ignorance is the tendency. . .
23. Dependent on desire is ignorance, dependent on ignorance is the tendency. . .
24. Dependent on grasping is ignorance, dependent on ignorance is the tendency. . .

Appendix II

The Chains of Dependent Origination Occurring in the Eighty-Nine Types of Thought according to the Paccayākāravibhaṅga

Chapter Six discusses the Vibhaṅga's application of dependent origination to each of the types of thought outlined in the Dhammasaṅgani, see pp. 309-14. This Appendix presents in outline form the Vibhaṅga's enumeration of those states of consciousness and the chain of dependent origination that each produces. The outline contains, first of all, the Vibhaṅga's question, "Which states are good?," or bad, or indeterminate, which determines the major sections of its discussion. Then, within each category of thought, there are further subdivisions determined by the specific characteristics of that thought, i.e., is it associated with pleasure, pain, or indifference, with knowledge or with wrong view, and so on. The Vibhaṅga gives the chain of dependent origination which occurs in each one of these subdivisions. This Appendix indicates only deviations from the standard twelve-member chain. The outline also gives the definition of feeling, where it has been indicated by the Vibhaṅga, because of its pivotal role in the chain. Buddhaghosa briefly discusses these chains on pp. 209-13 of the Sammohavinodanī, but, unfortunately, leaves many questions unanswered. The paragraph numbers in The Book of Analysis are given for easy reference.

The Twelve Bad Thoughts

The first eight bad thoughts are rooted in greed (lobha). The Vibhaṅga gives all sixteen modes for the first bad thought only. This first bad thought is accompanied by mental pleasure (somanassasahagata), associated with wrong view (ditthigatasampayutta), and has an object (ārammaṇa). See The Book of Analysis, pp. 189-215, the Vibhaṅga, pp. 144-64, the Dhammasaṅgani,

pp. 75-87, and Nyāṇatiloka's chart, facing p. 12 of Guide through the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka. Feeling (vedanā) is mental pleasure in the first bad thought.

WHICH STATES ARE BAD? (KATAME DHAMMĀ AKUṢALĀ)

- 1) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
- b. associated with wrong view
- c. has an object

The Book of Analysis para-graph no.

248-255	the four modes of the causal tetrad chain as given in Appendix I
256-263	the four modes of the root tetrad chain as given in Appendix I
264-271	the four modes of the association tetrad chain as given in Appendix I
272-279	the four modes of the reciprocity tetrad chain as given in Appendix I

For the second through twelfth types of bad thought, see the Vibhaṅga, pp. 164-9.

The second through fourth types of bad thought are also rooted in greed. Grasping (upādāna) does not occur in these chains; instead, desire leads to decision (adhimokkha). Feeling in them is mental pleasure.

280	2) a. accompanied by mental pleasure	
	b. associated with wrong view	
	c. with instigation (<u>sasankhāra</u>)	
	3) a. accompanied by mental pleasure	
	b. not associated with wrong view	
	4) a. accompanied by mental pleasure	dependent
	b. not associated with wrong view	on desire is
	c. with instigation	decision
	and, in all cases, having an object	

282 5) a. accompanied by indifference (upekkhā)
 b. associated with wrong view standard
 c. has an object chain

284

6) a. accompanied by indifference
b. associated with wrong view
c. with instigation

7) a. accompanied by indifference
b. not associated with wrong view

8) a. accompanied by indifference
b. not associated with wrong view
c. with instigation

and, in all cases, having an object

dependent on
desire is
decision

286 9) a. accompanied by mental pain (domanassa)
 b. associated with repulsion dependent on
 10) a. accompanied by mental pain feeling is
 b. associated with repulsion repulsion,
 c. with instigation dependent
 both having an object on repulsion is
 decision

288 11) a. accompanied by indifference
b. associated with doubt dependent on
c. has an object feeling is doubt

366

- | | | | |
|-----|-----|---|--|
| 290 | 12) | a. accompanied by indifference
b. associated with restlessness
c. has an object | dependent on
feeling is
restlessness,
dependent on
restlessness is
decision |
|-----|-----|---|--|

The Eight Good Thoughts of the Sensual Realm

The chains of dependent origination occurring in these thoughts begin with the good roots (kusalamūla); ignorance (avijjā) does not occur in them at all. Because of that, feeling does not lead to desire, but to faith (pasāda), and faith to decision. In the first four, feeling is mental pleasure, in the last four, it is mental indifference. For the good thoughts, see The Book of Analysis, pp. 221-8, the Vibhaṅga, pp. 169-71, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, pp. 9-30, and Ñyāṇatiloka's chart.

WHICH STATES ARE GOOD? (KATAME DHAMMĀ KUSALĀ)

- | | | | |
|-----|----|--|--|
| 292 | 1) | a. belonging to the sensual realm (<u>kāmāvacara</u>)
b. accompanied by mental pleasure
c. associated with knowledge (<u>ñāṇa</u>) | |
| 294 | 2) | a. belonging to the sensual realm
b. accompanied by mental pleasure
c. associated with knowledge
d. with instigation | |
| | 3) | a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. not associated with knowledge | dependent on
the good roots |
| | 4) | a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. not associated with knowledge
c. with instigation | is the tendency. . .
dependent on
feeling is faith,
dependent on
faith is decision |
| 296 | 5) | a. accompanied by indifference
b. associated with knowledge | |
| | 6) | a. accompanied by indifference
b. associated with knowledge
c. with instigation | |
| 298 | 7) | a. accompanied by indifference
b. not associated with knowledge | |
| | 8) | a. accompanied by indifference
b. not associated with knowledge
c. with instigation
and, in all cases, having an object | |

The Good Thoughts of the Form, Formless, and Supramundane Realms

The chains of dependent origination in these states all also begin with the roots of good, not with ignorance. In all cases, feeling leads to faith, and faith to decision. In the formless and supramundane realms, feeling is mental pleasure. (see note, paragraph 303)

300	1)	when practising the first stage of meditation in the form realm	dependent on the good roots is the tendency. . .
missing	2)	when practising the second through the fifth stages of meditation in the form realm	dependent on feeling is faith,
302	3)	when practising the stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception of the formless realm	dependent on faith is decision
304	4)	when practising the first stage of meditation in the supramundane realm	

The Indeterminate Thoughts

The indeterminate thoughts have no moral quality, no karmic result. They are either karmic results (vipāka) themselves, entailing no further result, or the thoughts of an arhat (kiriya), which are neither good nor bad, and have no result. For the indeterminate thoughts, see The Book of Analysis, pp. 228-40, the Vibhaṅga, pp. 173-84, the Dhammasaṅgāṇi, pp. 87-124, and Nyaṇatiloka's chart.

The chains of dependent origination occurring in the indeterminate thoughts all begin with the tendency or activity (sankhāra). Neither ignorance nor the roots of good appear in them.

The Results of Good Karma

The first five results of good karma in the sensual realm are the sense consciousnesses with pleasurable objects. These chains of dependent origination have only nine members, as they begin with sankhāra, and feeling leads directly to becoming. In the case of resultant eye consciousness, feeling is mental indifference, in the case of the other sense consciousnesses, it is bodily pleasure.

WHICH STATES ARE INDETERMINATE? (KATAME DHAMMĀ AVYĀKATĀ)

306-310 These paragraphs give the first mode in each of the four tetrads for the first type of indeterminate thought.

- | | | | | |
|-----|------|----|---|---|
| | 1) | a. | eye consciousness which is the result of action in the sensual realm | dependent on the tendency is consciousness. . . |
| | | b. | accompanied by indifference | dependent on feeling is becoming |
| | | c. | has an object | |
| 311 | 2-5) | a. | ear, nose, tongue or body consciousness which is the result of good action in the sensual realm | |
| | | b. | accompanied by indifference | |
| | | c. | has an object | |

The sixth type of sense consciousness, mental consciousness, also arises as the result of good karma. The mind element (manodhātu) and the mind consciousness element (manoviññāṇadhātu), accompanied either by pleasure or indifference, produce the same chain of dependent origination, in which feeling leads to decision, and decision to becoming. When the mind element is accompanied by indifference, feeling is mental indifference, when it is accompanied by pleasure, feeling is mental pleasure.

- | | | | | |
|-----|----|----|--|---|
| 313 | 6) | a. | mind element as result of good action in the sensual realm | |
| | | b. | accompanied by indifference | |
| | | c. | has an object | |
| 315 | 7) | a. | mind consciousness element as result of good action in the sensual realm | dependent on the tendency is consciousness. . . |
| | | b. | accompanied by mental pleasure | dependent on feeling is decision |
| | | c. | has an object | |
| 317 | 8) | a. | mind consciousness element as result of good action in the sensual realm | |
| | | b. | accompanied by indifference | |
| | | c. | has an object | |

The mind consciousness element, as the result of good karma, can occur in the same eight categories as the good thoughts of the sensual realm. In all eight chains, feeling leads to faith, and faith to decision.

- 319 Mind consciousness element as the result of good action in the sensual realm:
- 1) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. associated with knowledge
 - 2) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. associated with knowledge
c. with instigation
 - 3) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. not associated with knowledge
 - 4) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. not associated with knowledge
c. with instigation
 - 5) a. accompanied by indifference
b. associated with knowledge
 - 6) a. accompanied by indifference
b. associated with knowledge
c. with instigation
 - 7) a. accompanied by indifference
b. not associated with knowledge
 - 8) a. accompanied by indifference
b. not associated with knowledge
c. with instigation
- and, in all cases, having an object
- dependent on the tendency is consciousness. . . dependent on feeling is faith, dependent on faith is decision

The stages of thought in the form, the formless, and the supramundane realms can also occur as karmic result. In all of them, feeling leads to faith, and faith to decision.

- | | | |
|---------|---|--|
| 321 | 1) when abiding in the first stage of meditation of the form realm, as the result of good action in that realm | |
| missing | 2) when abiding in the second through the fifth stages of meditation of the form realm, as the result of good action in that realm | |
| 322 | 3) when abiding in the fourth stage of meditation of the formless realm, the stage of neither perception-nor-non-perception, as the result of good action in that realm | |
| 323 | 4) when abiding in the first stage of meditation in the supramundane realm, as the result of practising it | |
- dependent on the tendency is consciousness. . . dependent on feeling is faith, dependent on faith is decision

The Results of Bad Karma

The first five sense consciousnesses, with unpleasant objects, can be the results of bad karma. Like the chains occurring in the sense consciousnesses as the result of good karma, these chains have only nine members, feeling leading directly to becoming. Feeling is defined as bodily pain, in the case of the fifth sense organ.

- | | | | |
|-----|------|---|---|
| 324 | 1-4) | a. eye, ear, nose, and tongue consciousness which is the result of bad action | dependent on the tendency is consciousness. . . |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference | |
| | | c. has an object | dependent on |
| | 5) | a. body consciousness which is the result of bad action | feeling is becoming |
| | | b. accompanied by pain | |
| | | c. has an object | |

Mental consciousness, as the result of bad karma, produces the same chain as did mental consciousness as the result of good karma. In them, feeling leads to decision, and decision to becoming. Feeling is mental indifference.

- | | | | |
|-----|----|---|---------------------|
| 326 | 6) | a. mind element which is the result of bad action | |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference | dependent on the |
| | | c. has an object | tendency is |
| 328 | 7) | a. mind consciousness element which is the result of bad action | consciousness. . . |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference | dependent on |
| | | c. has an object | feeling is decision |

The second type of indeterminate thought is the functional or inoperative states of *an arhat*.

The mind element and the mind consciousness element accompanied by either mental pleasure or by indifference again produce the same chain of dependent origination, in which feeling leads to decision, and decision to becoming.

- | | | | |
|-----|----|--|---------------------|
| 330 | 1) | a. mind element, which is neither good nor bad, nor the result of action | |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference | |
| | | c. has an object | dependent on the |
| | 2) | a. mind consciousness element, which is neither good nor bad, nor the result of action | tendency is |
| | | b. accompanied by mental pleasure | consciousness. . . |
| | | c. has an object | dependent on |
| | 3) | a. mind consciousness element, | feeling is decision |

- which is neither good nor bad, nor
the result of action
- b. accompanied by indifference
- c. has an object

Once again, the eight karmically wholesome thoughts of the sensual realm also occur as the karmically neutral thoughts of an arhat. In them, feeling leads to faith, and faith to decision.

- 331 Mind consciousness element that is neither good nor bad, nor the result of action:
- 1) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. associated with knowledge
 - 2) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. associated with knowledge
c. with instigation
 - 3) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. not associated with knowledge
 - 4) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
b. not associated with knowledge
c. with instigation
 - 5) a. accompanied by indifference
b. associated with knowledge
 - 6) a. accompanied by indifference
b. associated with knowledge
c. with instigation
 - 7) a. accompanied by indifference
b. not associated with knowledge
 - 8) a. accompanied by indifference
b. not associated with knowledge
c. with instigation
- dependent on the
tendency is
consciousness. . .
dependent on
feeling is faith,
dependent on faith
is decision
- and, in all cases, having an object

The same links occur in the chains of dependent origination occurring in the indeterminate thoughts of the form and formless realms: feeling leads to faith, and faith to decision.

- | | | | |
|---------|----|---|---|
| 332 | 1) | when abiding in the first stage of meditation of the form realm, which is neither good nor bad, nor the result of action | dependent on the tendency is consciousness. . . |
| missing | 2) | when abiding in the second through fifth stages of meditation of the form realm, which are neither good nor bad, nor the result of action | dependent on feeling is faith, dependent on faith is decision |

- 333 3) when abiding in the fourth stage of meditation of the formless realm, the stage of neither perception-nor-non-perception, which is neither good nor bad, nor the result of action

The Good Thoughts Rooted in Ignorance

In the good thoughts enumerated earlier, dependent origination began with the good roots, not with ignorance. The same good thoughts can also be rooted in ignorance; therefore, in all these cases, dependent origination begins with ignorance. The good thoughts rooted in ignorance, and the resultant thoughts having either good or bad roots are now considered by way of inducement condition, according to Buddhaghosa. Ignorance can be an inducement to moral behavior, likewise, the good roots can induce good result, and the bad roots bad result. Feeling leads to faith, and faith to decision. See The Book of Analysis, pp. 240-4 and the Vibhanga, pp. 184-7.

WHICH STATES ARE GOOD? (KATAME DHAMMĀ KUSALĀ)

334-338 These paragraphs give the first mode in each of the four tetrads for the first type of good thought rooted in ignorance.

- | | | |
|----|---|--------------------|
| 1) | a. good consciousness of the sensual realm | dependent on |
| | b. accompanied by mental pleasure | feeling is faith, |
| | c. associated with knowledge | dependent on faith |
| | d. has an object | is decision |

- 339 Good consciousness of the sensual realm:
- | | | |
|----|--------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 2) | a. accompanied by mental pleasure | |
| | b. associated with knowledge | |
| | c. with instigation | |
| 3) | a. accompanied by mental pleasure | |
| | b. not associated with knowledge | |
| 4) | a. accompanied by mental pleasure | dependent on |
| | b. not associated with knowledge | feeling is faith, |
| | c. with instigation | dependent on faith |
| 5) | a. accompanied by indifference | is decision |
| | b. associated with knowledge | |
| 6) | a. accompanied by indifference | |
| | b. associated with knowledge | |
| | c. with instigation | |
| 7) | a. accompanied by indifference | |
| | b. not associated with knowledge | |
| 8) | a. accompanied by indifference | |
| | b. not associated with knowledge | |

- c. with instigation
and, in all cases, having an object

The same links occur in the chains of dependent origination occurring in the good thoughts rooted in ignorance in the form, formless, and supramundane realms: feeling leads to faith, and faith to decision.

- | | | | |
|---------|----|---|--|
| 340 | 1) | when abiding in the first stage of meditation of the form realm, which is good | |
| missing | 2) | when abiding in the second through fifth stages of meditation of the form realm, which are good | |
| 341 | 3) | when abiding in the fourth stage of meditation of the formless realm, the stage of neither perception-nor-non-perception, which is good | dependent on feeling is faith,
dependent on faith is decision |
| 342 | 4) | when abiding in the first stage of meditation of the supramundane realm, which is good | |

Resultant Thoughts Having Good Roots

Earlier, the chains of dependent origination occurring in the karma resultant thoughts were listed; they began with activity or a tendency. These same resultant thoughts can also occur having the good roots as the first link in dependent origination. See The Book of Analysis, pp. 244-7 and the Vibhaṅga, pp. 187-9.

WHICH STATES ARE INDETERMINATE? (KATAME DHAMMĀ AVYĀKATĀ)

Feeling leads directly to becoming in the first type.

- | | | | |
|-----|----|--|---|
| 343 | 1) | a. eye consciousness which is the result of good action in the sensual realm | dependent on the roots of good is the tendency. . . |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference | dependent on |
| | | c. has an object | feeling is becoming |

In the other seven thoughts, feeling leads to decision, and decision to becoming.

- | | | |
|-----|------|--|
| 345 | 2-4) | a. ear, nose, and tongue consciousness which is the result of good action in the sensual realm |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference |
| | | c. has an object |

- 5) a. body consciousness which is the result of good action in the sensual realm
- b. accompanied by pleasure
- c. has an object
- 6) a. mind element which is the result of good action in the sensual realm
- b. accompanied by indifference
- c. has an object
- 7) a. mind consciousness element which is the result of good action in the sensual realm
- b. accompanied by mental pleasure
- c. has an object
- 8) a. mind consciousness element which is the result of good action in the sensual realm
- b. accompanied by indifference
- c. has an object

dependent on the roots of good is the tendency. . .
dependent on feeling is decision

Resultant mind consciousness element can occur as the eight categories of good thought of the sensual realm. Feeling leads to faith, and faith to decision.

346 Mind consciousness element as the result of good action in the sensual realm:

- 1) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
 - b. associated with knowledge
 - 2) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
 - b. associated with knowledge
 - c. with instigation
 - 3) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
 - b. not associated with knowledge
 - 4) a. accompanied by mental pleasure
 - b. not associated with knowledge
 - c. with instigation
 - 5) a. accompanied by indifference
 - b. associated with knowledge
 - 6) a. accompanied by indifference
 - b. associated with knowledge
 - c. with instigation
 - 7) a. accompanied by indifference
 - b. not associated with knowledge
 - 8) a. accompanied by indifference
 - b. not associated with knowledge
 - c. with instigation
- and, in all cases, having an object

dependent on the roots of good is the tendency. . .
dependent on feeling is faith,
dependent on faith is decision

The same chain occurs in the form, formless, and supramundane meditations.

- | | | | |
|-----|----|--|---|
| 347 | 1) | when abiding in the first through fifth stages of meditation of the form realm, which are the result of good action in that realm | dependent on the roots of good is the tendency. . . |
| 348 | 2) | when abiding in the fourth stage of meditation of the formless realm, the stage of neither perception-nor-non-perception, which is the result of good action in that realm | dependent on feeling is faith, dependent on faith is decision |
| 349 | 3) | when abiding in the first stage of meditation of the supramundane realm, which is the result of having practised it | |

Resultant Thoughts Having Bad Roots

The chain of dependent origination in the first type of thought having bad roots is the same as that in the first type having good roots. See The Book of Analysis, pp. 247-50 and the Vibhaṅga, pp. 190-2.

Feeling leads directly to becoming in the first type.

- | | | | |
|-----|----|--|--|
| 350 | 1) | a. eye consciousness which is the result of bad action | dependent on the roots of bad is the tendency. . . |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference | dependent on |
| | | c. has an object | feeling is becoming |

In the other six thoughts, as in those having good roots, feeling leads to decision, and decision to becoming.

- | | | | |
|-----|------|--|--|
| 352 | 2-4) | a. ear, nose, and tongue consciousness which is the result of bad action | |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference | |
| | | c. has an object | |
| | 5) | a. body consciousness which is the result of bad action | |
| | | b. accompanied by pain | dependent on the roots of bad is the tendency. . . |
| | | c. has an object | dependent on feeling is decision |
| | 6) | a. mind element which is the result of bad action | |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference | |
| | | c. has an object | |
| | 7) | a. mind consciousness element which is the result of bad action | |
| | | b. accompanied by indifference | |
| | | c. has an object | |

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